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INTRODUCTION  
 
a. Subject  
The so-called mass cases (disputes) and the procedural mechanisms for their resolution are 
the subject of this thesis. The analysis includes both the traditional (individual) civil procedure as 
a possible method of resolution of mass cases and the procedural mechanisms which were 
particularly created for mass cases resolution in certain countries.  
The analysis serves to present whether the traditional civil procedure is an (in) adequate 
method for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified as individual, while the 
comparative analysis of legal systems which have already established collective redress systems 
serves to present which model provides satisfactory results. The comparative analysis includes 
legal systems with a long tradition (the United States of America; England and Wales; and Sweden 
- Level 3), legal systems with developing collective redress systems (EU - Level 2) and legal 
systems with no collective redress systems (Macedonia – Level 1).      
The reason why this subject has been selected for research is the fact that lately the 
Macedonian civil justice system has faced new types of disputes. These cases affect a large portion 
of the country’s population and have challenged the country’s civil justice system too. The victims 
in these cases are always left uncompensated. These cases differ significantly from the regular 
court cases due to their collective nature. “Regular court cases” involve so-called individual rights 
(“droit subjectif”), while mass cases involve rights or interests that cannot be classified as 
individual. In some of the national jurisdictions these rights (interests) are designated as diffuse 
(collective) rights. A basic feature of these diffuse (collective) rights is their massiveness, which 
challenges the traditional (individual) civil procedure as a possible method for their adjudication 
because it treats each case individually. These mass cases cannot be adjudicated individually 
because the courts would work on these cases for years. Some of the countries have found a 
solution by treating the mass cases on a representative basis i.e. allowing only few of the claimants 
to represent all claims before the court. In that way, those few claimants act as representatives of 
all claimants and in the end the judgment equally binds all claimants (even though some of them 
were not made parties to the suit). In this way, instead of dealing with hundreds of claimants, the 
court deals only with a few of them, and solves the whole legal controversy at once.  
 
b. Aims 
The aim of the thesis is to present the fact that the Macedonian citizens have no effective 
right of access to court in mass cases because the traditional (individual) civil procedure is an 
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inadequate mechanism for resolution of such cases. The Republic of Macedonia is taken as an 
example of legal system which still does not have established collective redress systems (Level 1). 
R. Macedonia may serve as a model for former Yugoslav republics because they all share the same 
civil procedure law tradition, and at this moment it may be said that they have similar socio-
economic conditions. Hence, the aim of the thesis is to show the need for reform of the Macedonian 
civil justice system (as well as of the civil justice systems of the former Yugoslav republics) 
regarding the resolution of these mass cases, particularly the need for reform of the civil procedure. 
Based on the experiences from other countries, suggestions are to be given about how the 
Macedonian representative litigation model should be tailored.   
The general hypothesis of this research is that the traditional (individual) civil procedure 
is not an adequate method for solving mass disputes.1 The presence of rights or interests in the 
mass cases that cannot be classified as individual rights, challenges the traditional civil procedure 
as a procedural method for their adjudication. These rights or interests are called diffuse, collective 
and homogeneous rights or interests.2 Bearing in mind the subject of the research, these rights or 
interests are to be considered from a procedural and legal aspect. To ensure greater systematisation 
of this research, the procedural and legal aspects of the protection of these rights or interests will 
be analyzed depending on the stages of the civil procedure. These stages include: (a) commencing 
the procedure; (b) course of the procedure and (c) judgement, distribution and the res judicata 
principle. 
The first working sub-hypothesis is that there are specificities regarding the 
commencement of a civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified 
as individual. The second working sub-hypothesis is that there are specificities regarding the 
course of the civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified as 
individual. The third working sub-hypothesis is that there are specificities regarding the effect of 
the judgment in a civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified 
as individual.   
 
 
                                                          
1 Јаневски, А и Зоровска-Камиловска, Т., 2009. Граѓанско процесно право: Парнично право, книга прва. Скопје: 
Правен Факултет “Јустинијан Први“, стр.15. From Macedonian into English: “In civil proceedings, protection of civil 
(individual) rights (“droit subjectif”) is granted in case they are violated, disputed or endangered.  
2 See more in Grinover, P.A., 2007. New Trends in Standing and Res Judicata in Collective Suits. Available through 
the Global Class Actions Exchange website <http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/new-trends-standing-
and-res-iudicata-collective-suits-brazil-legislation> [Accessed 13 January 2013], pp.5-8. 
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c. Methodology  
The basic method that is used for the preparation of this thesis is the inductive method 
(research before theory). Induction is the inference of a generalised conclusion for particular 
instances. First, we collected relevant data about mass cases from several jurisdictions and later 
we have produced concrete suggestions about the possible Macedonian model of representative 
litigation.  
problem/aim        method  data collection  theory analyses  conclusion 
 
The teleological method is used to determine whether the implementation of representative 
litigation mechanisms in the legislation of the United States of America, England and Wales and 
Sweden has achieved their goals.  
The normative and dogmatic method is used to determine the function and the relevance 
of the legal norms that regulate the civil procedure, mainly in the Republic of Macedonia, as well 
as the function and the relevance of the legal norms that regulate the representative litigation 
mechanisms in the United States of America, England and Wales and Sweden. 
Content analysis is used to study the positive legal sources on this matter, such as: the 
Macedonian Civil Procedure Act, the Slovenian Civil Procedure Act, the US Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the English Civil Procedure Rules, the CAT rules, the Swedish Group Proceedings Act, 
Recommendation on collective redress the Recommendation on collective redress 2013, Directive 
98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, the Green 
Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2005) 672, the White Paper 
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165, the Green Paper on 
Consumer Collective Redress COM(2008) 794, Directive 2009/22/EC of 23 April 2009 on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent 
European Approach to Collective Redress, Report on Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress, etc. 
The synthetic method is used to draw concrete conclusions from the analyses of the 
comparative legislations;  
The historical method is used to determine the historical context which has led to the 
creation of the representative litigation models.  
The comparative law method is used to make comparisons among the legislations of the 
United States of America, England and Wales and Sweden and the EU regarding the representative 
litigation mechanisms.  
11 
 
Deduction is used to draw a new approach and conclusions from the existing general 
standpoints and cognizance. Induction is used to determine the general conclusions from the 
existing observations and analyses. 
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CHAPTER ONE – MASS CASES, THE TRADITIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE  
AND DIFFUSE (COLLECTIVE) INTERESTS  
 
1. Recent cases that challenge the right of access to justice  
Some recent cases in my country3 triggered my interest to research how they are treated 
from civil procedural aspect because in these cases a large part of the country’s population was 
harmed and left uncompensated. These cases have appeared in the context of competition law 
infringements, abuse of a dominant position, consumers’ rights, air pollution (environmental law), 
etc. The most significant feature is their massiveness - the fact that the behaviour of a single entity 
(as a centre of power) affects thousands, sometimes even millions of other persons who are related 
in a certain way. Namely, in the first case almost 70% of all landline telephone users were affected, 
while in the second case all households in the country. In the third case, all residents who live in 
the town of Veles and its region were affected (and they still are).  
Many legitimate questions arise at this point, such as: can the traditional (individual) civil 
procedure handle these types of “massive” cases; does the traditional (individual) civil procedure 
work efficiently in these cases; can the traditional (individual) civil procedure provide socially just 
results, etc. In order to find the answers to the questions above, in the following text we present 
the details of the three cases from the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
a. Commission for Protection of Competition vs. Makedonski Telekom (Case no. 1 – 
“the Telecom case”) 
The Commission for Protection of Competition of the Republic of Macedonia4 adopted a 
Decision No.07-296/35  as of 21 April 2011 on imposing a fine on Makedonski Telekom AD 
Skopje6 in the amount of 61,377,000.00 MKD7 for an offence committed pursuant to Article 47/1-
2 of the Competition Act. The misdemeanour sanction was imposed because Makedonski Telekom 
AD Skopje abused its dominant position on the Macedonian market in the period from 1 July 2006 
to 28 February 2007 by directly imposing unfair trading conditions on the market. The abuse 
consisted of charging its customers a monthly handling fee for bills’ preparation in the fixed 
amount of 6 MKD (around €0,10) for minimal service users, 25 MKD (around €0.50) for 
residential service users and 50 MKD (around €1) for business service users. According to the 
                                                          
3 The Republic of Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).  
4 Official website of the Commission for Protection of Competition: http://www.kzk.gov.mk/eng/index.asp 
5 The Decision is available on: http://www.kzk.gov.mk/images/Vestiimages/946/ПРЕЗЕМИ.pdf . 
6 Official website of Makedonski Telekom AD Skopje is: http://www.telekom.mk/mk/ 
7MKD 61,377,000.00 is approximately equal to EUR 1.000.000, [author’s note]. 
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Annual Report on the Development of the Electronic Communications Market for 20118 published 
by the Agency for Electronic Communications9, there were 422,053 landlines in the Republic of 
Macedonia in 2011. The diagram below indicates the participation of the landline operators on the 
Macedonian market (status: 31 December 2011).  
 
 
 
It is evident that Makedonski Telekom AD Skopje as a landline operator had a share of 
69.05% in the Macedonian market in 2011, which made it the dominant landline provider. 
According to the Competition Act,10 the dominant position of a company on the Macedonian 
market is not subject to sanctions per se, but rather the abuse of the dominant position. Article 14 
of the Competition Act expressly prohibits the abuse of the dominant position by any company 
whatsoever on the relevant market of the Republic of Macedonia. Article 47/1 (2) qualifies the 
abuse of the dominant position as an infringement of the provisions of the Competition Act and 
the legal person that abuses its dominant position shall be punished by imposing a fine in the 
amount of 10% of the total annual income earned in the year preceding the year in which the 
misdemeanour was committed. In this case, Makedonski Telekom abused its dominant position on 
the market because, by charging the customers a handling fee for the preparation of the telephone 
bills, it directly imposed unfair trading conditions on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia 
(Article 14/2 of the Competition Act).  
 The economic effects caused by the abuse of the dominant position by Makedonski 
Telekom can be generally considered at a macro and micro level. At a macro level, by abusing its 
                                                          
8 The report is available at the following website:  
http://www.aek.mk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=628&Itemid=&lang=mk 
9 Official website of the Agency for electronic communication of R. Macedonia: http://www.aec.mk/  
10Official Gazette of RM, No. 4/05 and 70/06.  The English translation of the Law can be found on the following link: 
http://www.kzk.gov.mk/images/LawOnProtectionOfCompetition.pdf 
1 Mak. Telekom
2 One
3 Neotel
4 Aikol
5 Blizoo
6 Infel Net Plus
7 T-mobile
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dominant position, Makedonski Telekom caused distortion (disorder) of the relevant market of 
public landline telephone networks and services in the Republic of Macedonia by imposing unfair 
trading conditions; it disrupted healthy market competition and illegally acquired approximately 
EUR 1,200,000.0011. At a micro level, 291,427.00 customers in total were illegally charged a 
handling fee in the average monthly amount of EUR 0.5 or EUR 4.00 in total for the period from 
1 July 2006 to 28 February 2007.   
 The legal effects of the decision reached by the Commission for Protection of Competition 
as of 21 April 2011, based on which the abuse of Makedonski Telekom was sanctioned, can also 
be analysed at a macro and micro level. At a macro level, by imposing the sanction, the State (R. 
Macedonia) collected MKD 61,377,00.00 or around EUR 1,000,000.00 in its budget, while at a 
micro level 291,427.00 customers in total remained uncompensated.      
 Given the legal effects that the Commission for Protection of Competition of the Republic  
of Macedonia achieved with its Decision No. 07-296/3, the legitimate question is whether that is 
enough for the harmed customers.  Namely, the results of a sanction imposed on any company that 
has abused its dominant position should be repression, prevention and restitution, that is, the 
company should be punished for the committed abuse of the dominant position (repression), a 
future abuse should be prevented (prevention) and the company should return the illegally acquired 
assets (restitution). The Decision No. 07-296/3 of the Commission for Protection of Competition 
has achieved only the effect of repression, as Makedonski Telekom was obliged to pay only a fee 
in the amount of approximately EUR 1,000,000.00, without being obliged to refrain itself from 
such further actions and to return the illegally acquired assets in the amount of approximately EUR 
1,200,000.00 to the customers. So, did Makedonski Telekom make a profit in this case? The 
answer is positive because the difference between the illegally gained amount of approximately 
EUR 1,200,000.00 and the sum paid as а fine in the amount of approximately EUR 1,000,000.00 
is approximately EUR 200,000.00. At this point one fact should be stressed in relation to the 
Decision No. 07-296/3. Namely, the period controlled by the Commission was from 1 July 2006 
to 28 February 2007, while the Decision No. 07-296/3 was delivered on 21 April 2011, after the 
expiry period of three years of the last controlled day (28 February 2007). This belated ruling by 
the Commission, in fact prevented the subscribers of filling claims for compensation against 
Telekom within the limitation period of 3 years, according to Article 58 of the Competition Act.  
                                                          
11 422,053 (total number of landline connections) x  69.05 (market share of Makedonski Telekom) = 291,427 
consumers. The average value of the handling fee for all types of landline packages is MKD 30 (EUR 0.5). 291,427 x 
0.5 = 145,713 x 8 (months) = EUR 1,165,704.00   
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From a restitution perspective, I have no data showing that anyone has initiated a court 
procedure against Makedonski Telecom for reimbursement of the illegally collected handling fees.  
 
b. Commission for Protection of Competition vs. EVN Macedonia (Case no. 2 – “the  
EVN case”) 
On 16 March 2011, the Commission for Protection of Competition reached a Decision PP 
No. 09-15/812 based on which a fine was imposed on EVN Macedonia AD Skopje13 in the amount 
of MKD 30,627,000.0014 for a misdemeanour pursuant to Article 47/1 (2) of the Law on Protection 
of Competition. A misdemeanour sanction was imposed because EVN Macedonia AD Skopje 
abused its dominant position on the market in the period from 27 May 2006 to 28 March 2008 and 
directly imposed unfair trading conditions on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia by 
calculating and charging the retail tariff customers a handling fee in a fixed amount of MKD 6.00 
(around €0.10).    
EVN Macedonia AD Skopje has a market share of 100% on the Macedonian electricity 
distribution market since it is the sole distributor of electricity in the Republic of Macedonia.15 
Retail tariff customers are actually households which are electricity consumers in the Republic of 
Macedonia. In the absence of official data from EVN about the number of retail tariff customers, 
the number of households in the Republic of Macedonia can be considered to be relevant data. 
According to the last census conducted in 200216, there is a total of 564,296.00 households in the 
Republic of Macedonia. Even though the number of households has increased since 2002, for the 
purposes of this thesis I consider that there is a total of 560,000.00 households in the Republic of 
Macedonia.17 EVN charged these 560,000.00 retail tariff customers a handling fee in a fixed 
                                                          
12 The Decision can be found on the following link: 
http://www.kzk.gov.mk/images/Vestiimages/940/ПРЕЗЕМИ.pdf 
13 The official website of EVN Macedonia AD Skopje is: http://www.evn.com.mk/ 
14 MKD 30,627,000.00 is approximately equal to EUR 500,000.00 [author’s note]. 
15  See more on the website of the Regulatory Commission of the Republic of Macedonia at: 
http://www.erc.org.mk/Uploads/2006.09.14%20Odluka%20za%20odobruvanje%20tarifen%20stav%20-
%20AD%20ESM%20so%20obrazlozenie.pdf 
16  The number of households can be found on the official website of the State Statistical Office: 
http://www.stat.gov.mk/OblastOpsto.aspx?id=31, [Accessed on 12.08.2016]. 
17A household is considered to be every family or another community of people who declare that they live together 
and jointly spend their income to settle their basic needs (housing, food, etc.), regardless of whether all members 
are constantly in the place where the household is settled or some of them reside in another place or a foreign 
country for a certain period of time because of work, education or for any other reasons. The previous definition is 
given by the State Statistical Office of RM and can be found at the following link:  
http://www.stat.gov.mk/OblastOpsto.aspx?id=31, [Accessed on 12.08.2016]. 
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monthly amount of MKD 6.00 for a period of 19 months, as a result of which it acquired assets in 
the amount of EUR 1,046,557.18  
The economic effects caused by EVN’s abuse of its dominant position can be also 
considered at a macro and micro level. At a macro level, by abusing its dominant position, EVN 
caused distortion (disorder) of the relevant market for electricity distribution; it disrupted healthy 
market competition and illegally acquired approximately EUR 1,046,557.00. At a micro level, 
around 560,000 households (customers) were illegally charged a handling fee in a fixed amount 
of EUR 0.10 on a monthly basis or EUR 2.00 in total for the period from 27 May 2006 to 28 
February 2008.    
At a macro level, the legal effects achieved by the Commission for Protection of 
Competition with its Decision PP No. 09-15/8 against EVN resulted in the collection of EUR 
500,000.00, while at a micro level about half a million of households received no compensation.  
Unlike the Telecom case, this case gained great popularity among attorneys in the country. 
Namely, some attorneys were looking for subscribers19 in order to persuade them to initiate a 
procedure for reimbursement of the handling fees unlawfully collected. The average attorney’s 
fees20 in a case with a value of €0.10 are around €60 (with one hearing), around €88 (with two 
hearings), but if the case ends before the Appellate Court, the costs would be doubled. At the 
beginning, the subscribers were not interested in initiating procedures for recovery of only €0.1,21 
but the attorneys offered them half of the attorneys’ fees in case of winning the lawsuit. 
Furthermore, the attorneys took the obligation to pay all necessary costs for initiating and running 
the procedure, and to cover all expenses in case of losing the lawsuit. Under such circumstances, 
a large number of subscribers tried their cases before the courts. There were a large number of 
claims, particularly before the courts in the city of Ohrid, the city of Bitola and the city of Shtip. 
The courts in these cities were inundated with such claims against EVN because the attorneys in 
these cities were more active, compared to the attorneys in the other cities. All submitted claims 
(in Ohrid, Bitola and Shtip) had the same legal ground – EVN’s unjust enrichment in the amount 
of the collected handling fees, plus interest and costs. Actually, the attorneys did not have any 
other options but to use the institute - unjust enrichment because the damage claims at that time 
were already time-barred. Namely, according to the Macedonian limitation rules, unjust 
                                                          
18MKD 6 x 19 months x 560,000 consumers = MKD 63,840,000.00  
19 The term “subscriber” in this context refers to those individuals who were formally registered as users (consumers) 
of electricity. Mostly one member of the family.   
20 The attorney’s tariff is announced in the Official Gazette of R. Macedonia No. 164/10.  
21 In the R. Macedonia 0.1 euros is a trivial harm. 
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enrichment claims have a five years’ limitation period, while the damage claims only three years. 
28 February 2008 was the last day controlled by the Commission, hence any potential damage 
claim should have been submitted no later than 28 February 2011, whereas the Commission 
delivered its Decision PP No. 09-15/8 on 16 March 2011. In fact, by its belated ruling, the 
Commission prevented the subscribers from claiming damages against EVN. For the reason stated 
above, the attorneys had no other options but to try the category of unjust enrichment.  
In our opinion, in the above case, there is no factual background for raising a claim 
grounded on unjust enrichment because an abuse of one’s dominant position is a delict in its 
essence, which automatically generates a right to compensation (a damage claim). Actually, 
Article 58 of the Competition Act regulates that all victims of a competition infringement may 
claim damages against the infringer. However, the courts in Ohrid, Bitola and Shtip confirmed all 
claims, requiring only one condition i.e. that the claim be submitted within a period of five years. 
For example, in the case P4-725/2013 the claim was submitted in 2013, which is within the 
limitation period of five years, and consequently the court confirmed it.  
One group of attorneys from the city of Veles tried to follow the steps of their colleagues 
from Ohrid, Bitola and Shtip, but their attempt was unsuccessful. Surprisingly, the court in the city 
of Veles denied the claims finding that they are time-barred. For this court any claim arising out 
of the Commission’s decision should have been submitted in a period of three years. For example, 
in the case Malv.P. no. 487/201222 the court denied the claim because it was submitted on 30 
November 2012, which was beyond the three years’ limitation period. This court was not flooded 
with the so-called “EVN claims”.   
The facts of this case are as follows: EVN unlawfully gained around EUR 1,000,000.00; it 
paid a fine in the amount of EUR 500,000.00 and probably used the other half a million euros to 
cover all expenses of the court cases. Unlike Telecom, EVN perhaps did not make any profit, but 
it did not pay anything from “its own pocket” either.   
 
c. Green Coalition vs. Republic of Macedonia (Case no. 3 – “the Green Coalition 
case”) 
On 30 May 2008, a claim was submitted against the state of the Republic of Macedonia for 
the state-owned Metallurgy and Chemical Combine “Zletovo” – Veles’s (hereinafter referred to 
                                                          
22  The decision in Macedonia may be found on the official webpage of the Basic Court Veles at the following link: 
http://www.osveles.mk/Odluki.aspx?odluka=6406, [Accessed on 14.08.2016]. 
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as: Smeltery) long lasting pollution of the environment on the territory of the city of Veles and its 
region. The court case was registered under reference number TS-479/08 at the Court of First 
Instance in the City of Veles and was considered to be the first “big environmental dispute” brought 
before a court in the Republic of Macedonia. During the technological process of lead and zinc 
production, 23 the Smeltery permanently emitted harmful gases quantities higher than the legally 
permitted ones, which led to soil, water and air pollution (environment pollution) on the territory 
of the City of Veles and its region. All studies (some of them supported even by the EU), with no 
exception, showed enormous concentration of heavy metals in the soil, the water and the air as a 
result of the Smeltery’s production activities. According to the plaintiffs, the abovementioned 
environmental pollution has allegedly caused impairment of peoples’ health and it still presents a 
serious risk to people’s health (residents of the City of Veles and its region).  
The Municipality of Veles and seven NGOs from Veles (known as “the Green 
Coalition”24) acted as plaintiffs in the dispute, while the state was the defendant. The claim has 
been raised on the crucial fact that the state was negligent in the way it supervised the compliance 
with environmental standards of the processing activities of the Smeltery. The legal ground of the 
claim was Art. 8 and Art. 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia25, which guarantee 
the right to a healthy environment; Art.143 of the Law on Obligations26, which regulates that 
everyone may request the other to relinquish the source of harm which threatens to cause a 
significant damage to him or to indefinite number of individuals; and Art.159 of the Environmental 
Act 27 , which poses an obligation to the polluter to perform “natural restitution” in case of 
environmental damage. 
                                                          
23 The Smeltery was constantly working in the period from October 1973 to June 2003 as a lead and zinc production plant. The 
Smeltery was in state ownership until 2003, and in 2006 an insolvency proceeding was initiated, which is still pending before the 
Court of First Instance in Veles. The Smeltery has always been a significant economic entity in Macedonia, since in certain periods 
it had a share of 30% in the total GNP on national level, and a share of 70% at the level of the city of Veles.   
24 The so-called, “Green Coalition“ consisted of: 1. The Municipality of Veles represented by the Mayor of the city, 2. The 
Foundation for Local Development and Democracy FOKUS Veles, 3. Scout Association D. Vlahov Veles, 4. Environmental group 
“Green Power” Veles, 5. Association of Parents for Healthy Generations Veles - Veles, 6. Association of Parents of Children with 
Cerebral Palsy Veles – Veles, 7. Women’s Organisation Veles and 8. Ecological Society Vila Zora – Veles 
25Article 8 of the Constitution of RM: the fundamental values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia are: […] 
(10) proper urban and rural planning to promote a congenial human environment, as well as ecological protection and 
development. Article 43 of the Constitution of RM: (1) Everyone has the right to a healthy environment to live in. (2) Everyone is 
obliged to promote and protect the environment. (3) The Republic provides conditions for the exercise of the right of citizens to 
a healthy environment. 
26Article 143 of the Law on Obligations of RM: A request to remove the risk of harm (1) Everyone may request the other to 
relinquish the source of harm which threatens to cause a significant damage to him or to indefinite number of individuals, as well 
as to refrain from exercising activities which may lead to disturbance or risk of damage if the occurrence of the disturbance of 
damage cannot be prevented by undertaking suitable measures. 
27 Restitution of environmental damage: A legal or natural person, a non-profit organisation established for environmental 
protection, who/that is directly affected by environmental damage, is entitled before a court to require from the operator: (1) a 
restitution; (2) a compensation under the general principles of law, if the restitution in the concrete case is not possible.  
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The last version of the relief sought consisted of the following requests: (1) the state shall 
be obliged to relocate the slag disposal site of lead and zinc wastes; and (2) the state shall be 
obliged to undertake decontamination of the public green areas in Veles.  
After three years, the Court of First Instance denied the claim on 6 December 2011.28 In its 
judgement the court explained that the pollution in the city of Veles and its region is an 
undisputable fact, but the state was obliged to supervise the implementation of environmental 
protection measures by industrial facilities with the Environmental Act of 2005 for the first time. 
The state did not have such an obligation before 2005. Another fact determined by the court was 
that the Smeltery ended its production in 2004, one year before the new Environmental Act came 
into force. The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of first instance, explaining that the Court 
of First Instance had determined the facts of the case properly and it had applied the substantive 
law properly. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia also upheld both decisions. 
 The above court ruling is controversial. Namely, at the time the procedure was initiated, 
the risk to people’s health did not come from the Smeltery’s production, but it came (and it still 
comes) from contaminated land and from the slag disposal site of lead and zinc waste (located 
1km from the town). The contaminated land should not be used for agriculture purposes until it is 
remediated. On the other hand, the small lead and zinc particles from the slag disposal have been 
continuously dispersed by the winds in the region of Veles and when inhaled, they present a serious 
risk to local residents. Briefly, the claim was denied because the claimants were not able to prove 
the defendant’s liability. The claimants didn’t have sufficient financial resources to pay for 
relevant ecological studies, which would have been submitted before the court in the form of an 
expert report. Instead of such an expert report, the claimants submitted reports which analyse the 
pollution problem in the Veles region, but from a different perspective. These reports were not 
focused on the liability issue (causality). Besides this fact, many times during the process the 
question was raised as to whether such remedies are allowed under the civil procedure rules, 
bearing in mind that such remedies naturally belong to public law.  
However, the court in this case aroused curiosity. Namely, during the process the defendant 
objected on the ground that the Municipality and the so-called “Green Coalition” had no standing 
to sue in this case. The court denied this objection explaining that according to the Municipality 
Act, each municipality in the country is obliged to take care of the environment, and, therefore, 
                                                          
28 The judgement may be found at the link below only in Macedonian language:  
http://www.osveles.mk/Odluki.aspx?odluka=2023, [Accessed on 14.08.2016]. 
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each municipality in the Republic of Macedonia has standing to sue and to bring actions for 
environmental protection. Regarding the seven NGOs, jointly called the “Green Coalition”, the 
court explained that each of those seven NGOs has environmental protection as its main activity, 
which makes them legitimate plaintiffs in cases of environmental protection.  
 
d. Summary 
From the Telecom case, it can be concluded that the Decision No.07-296/3 brought by the 
Commission had no real effect in terms of prevention and restitution. In the end Telecom kept the 
difference between the income illegally acquired and the amount of fine paid.  
 Another important fact which can be derived from the Telecom case is the need for the 
consumers to have the right to initiate so-called stand-alone actions. A stand-alone action is a claim 
brought where the alleged breach of competition law is not already the subject of an infringement 
decision by a relevant competition authority. In this way, consumers do not have to wait for the 
Commission to determine that there is breach of the Competition Law, but rather they can do that 
by themselves in separate proceedings before the courts. In this case, it can be concluded that the 
decision brought by the Commission was delivered after the expiry of the limitation period for 
submitting damage claims. Hence the consumers’ right to compensation became time-barred due 
to the Commission’s delayed ruling. The consumers did not benefit from the Commission’s work, 
and therefore they should not depend on the Commission, but they need to be entitled to bring 
stand-alone actions at their own initiative.   
Regarding the EVN case, the same conclusion can be made. 
Namely, the Decision No. 07-296/3 brought by the Commission had no real effect in terms of 
prevention and restitution as well. In the end EVN probably managed to “get out” of the situation 
without paying more than what it gained illegally.  
In this case the Commission also brought its decision after the expiry of the limitation 
period for submitting damage claims. It is controversial that the Commission delivered their 
decisions with significant delays in both cases and prevented the consumers from submitting 
damage claims due to lack of time. The claims were already time-barred at the time when the 
Commission delivered both its decisions.   
From the EVN case it can be concluded that there was a lack of an efficient procedure for 
restitution of the income illegally acquired. In this case the civil procedure was used for restitution 
purposes, which in its essence is an individual court procedure. This means that each of the 
subscribers (consumers) who tried their cases before the court initiated their own civil procedure 
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against EVN for the recovery of €0.10 on an individual basis. The value of the total litigation costs 
(court’s taxes plus attorney’s fees) spent for running a single court procedure was approximately 
€76.00 (if the case ended in first instance), or €147 (if the case ended in second instance). The 
conclusion that can be made is that in order to recover €0.10, the plaintiff had to pay at least €76.00 
for litigation costs. The proportion recovery vs. litigation cost is 1:760. Even though the loser-pays 
principle is relevant here, the plaintiff still has the obligation to pay all necessary costs in advance. 
With this 1:760 ratio, the Macedonian civil procedure is an inefficient restitution mechanism from 
a cost litigation perspective.  
 
Claim with a value of €0.10 (MKD 6.00) 
 
First instance Second instance 
Court taxes €8.00 - claim fee €16.00 - appeal fee 
 €8.00 – judgement fee / 
  
Attorney’s fees €20 - drafting power of attorney / 
 €15 - drafting claim €30 - drafting appeal or answer 
€25 – hearing  €25 – hearing after the appeal 
  
Total  €76.00 €71.00 
Total  
(first and second instance) 
€147.00 
 
If the Commission had delivered its decision on EVN on time, there would have been 
around 100,000 individual claims throughout the entire country. Assuming there are around half a 
million households in the country, at least one quarter of them would have probably initiated a 
procedure through the entrepreneurial attorneys. One third of the Macedonian population lives in 
Skopje, the capital of the Republic of Macedonia, where the largest district court with civil 
competence is located – Basic (District) Court Skopje 2.29 Under the assumption that 100,000 
claims would have been tried around the country, one third of them (over 30,000 claims) would 
have ended before the Basic (District) Court Skopje 2. If this had happened, the Basic (District) 
Court Skopje 2 would have been entirely inundated with claims and it would not have been capable 
of further operations.  Imagining the Commission delivered the decisions on both cases (EVN and 
                                                          
29 The official webpage of the court is: http://www.osskopje2.mk/ 
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Telecom) on time paints the more terrifying scenario. In that case the Basic (District) Court Skopje 
2 would have had to deal with more than 50,000 claims at once!  
Besides the fact that the individual civil procedure proved to be inefficiency in this case, it 
also proved to be an unsuitable mechanism for redistribution. As it was said above, the “intensity” 
of filling “EVN claims” was not equal on the entire territory of the country. Instead, there were 
several cities where there was great intensity due to the fact that the attorneys were more active 
than their colleagues from the other cities in the country. The epilogue is that the restitution rate 
in the cities of Ohrid, Bitola and Shtip was high, while in the other cities it was low. Apparently, 
the rate of redistribution entirely depended on the attorneys’ activity. It seems that the traditional 
civil justice system, which is principally based on the civil procedure as a cornerstone mechanism, 
proved to be a “bad” re-distributor of the illegally acquired gain in the EVN case.  
The role of the attorneys in this case was crucial. Namely, without them none of the 
subscribers would have been willing to initiate a court procedure for the recovery of 10 euro-cents. 
The attorneys themselves took the initiative. They did not take this initiative because of ethical 
reasons, but rather because of pure economic reasons. At the beginning, the subscribers (the 
consumers) were not interested in initiating a court procedure for the recovery of only 10 cents. In 
order to persuade (attract) them, the attorneys offered them half of their attorney’s fees, plus full 
coverage of the court’s taxes and undertook to pay the costs in case of losing the lawsuit. Under 
such circumstances subscribers had nothing to lose and some of them tried their cases before the 
courts. Such agreements where the attorney covers all the costs and, in case of winning the lawsuit, 
shares half of his fees with his client are called negative contingency fee agreements. Contingency 
fee agreements are familiar in the US class litigation, but the attorney there takes a portion of the 
client’s net recovery (compensation) if he wins the case. Here, the attorney gives a portion of his 
net fee to the client. In fact, in this case the attorneys were “forced” to share their fees with their 
clients (the subscribers) because only in that way was it worth going to court. Based on the above, 
it can be concluded that the attorneys were acting as entrepreneurial lawyers in this case because 
they founded the whole process of restitution by paying the litigation costs of each individual 
lawsuit.  
The final outcome of the Green Coalition case is controversial. However, despite the final 
judgment, procedural perspective the court has managed the procedure progressively from a 
procedural perspective. This is the first court case for protection of the so-called “third generation 
rights.” The court admitted that the Municipality and the seven NGOs had standing to sue and to 
file an action for environmental protection on behalf of all residents in the City of Veles and its 
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region. Another positive experience from that case was the involvement of many private 
organisations which supported the process. Perhaps the role of private organisations of that type, 
which have a focused interest in some specific sphere of society, is an inevitable element of every 
effective civil justice system. The following can be mentioned as negative aspects of this case: 
insufficient resources for the preparation of relevant ecological studies in the form of an expert 
report and unpreparedness on the part of the court to grant such reliefs, which allegedly belong to 
public law.  
 
2. The traditional civil procedure as an (in) adequate mechanism for solving mass 
cases 
 
Each of the institutes of the traditional civil procedure which deals with situations where 
there is a plurality of parties will be analysed below.  
 
a. Plurality of claims (lat. cumulatio actionum) 
In simple terms, the plurality of claims refers to the situation where the same plaintiff may 
join claims against the same defendant in one single lawsuit.30 This procedural technique is not 
applicable to mass cases because “plurality” here refers only to the “claims” raised between the 
same plaintiff and the same defendant. In mass cases, there is numerosity of parties with similar 
claims, which makes the category of ‘plurality of claims’ inapplicable to mass disputes.  
 
b. Plurality of parties (lat. litisconsortium) 
In broader sense, the term “plurality of parties” refers to the situation where several parties 
join as plaintiffs or defendants31 in the same proceedings in order to avoid conflicting decisions 
and multiplication of lawsuits. In the former SFR Yugoslavia, the civil procedure law was 
influenced by the German legal doctrine. The essence of this doctrine is that the court has no power 
to force or otherwise induce a party to join or to be joined in the proceedings.32 This doctrine 
                                                          
30 30 Јаневски, А и Зоровска-Камиловска, Т., 2009. Граѓанско процесно право: Парнично право, книга прва. 
Скопје: Правен Факултет “Јустинијан Први“, стр.371. 
31 Civil process laws in the former Yugoslav republics recognize a so-called necessary plurality of parties only on the 
defendant’s side because the right in question can be asserted only by or against several persons. 
32 Cohn, J. E., 1987. Parties. In: M. Cappelletti, ed. 1987. Civil Procedure, p.172.  
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recognises several types of plurality of parties depending on the various elements such as the origin 
of the connection, the effect of the final judgement, the time of establishing plurality, etc.33  
Depending on the origin of the connection between the parties in terms of whether they 
have already been connected in a legal or casual relationship before the procedure even started, 
plurality may be “material” or “formal”.  
Both the Slovenian34 and the Macedonian Civil Procedure Act35 define material plurality 
as a situation “where several people may sue or may be sued through one claim, if in regard to the 
subject of the dispute they are in a legal community or if their rights and obligations arise from the 
same facts and legal ground.” They are also-called “material co-litigants” because the substantial 
law bounds them. The court may not deliver different decisions in case of material co-litigants. 
The court decision must be the same for all material co-litigants. The term ‘same facts’ (idem 
factum) is usually related to rights and obligations that stem from the same life event.36  The term 
‘same legal ground’ (idem jus) is usually related to rights and obligations whose origin (genesis) 
can be explained by legal reasons that are alike.  
Both the Slovenian37 and the Macedonian Civil Procedure Act38 define formal plurality as 
a situation “where several people may sue or may be sued through one claim, if subject of the 
dispute are claims i.e. obligations of the same type, which arise from similar facts and legal 
grounds, plus for each of the claims and over each of the defendants the same court has subject 
matter jurisdiction.” They are called “formal co-litigants” because they are joined from procedural 
reasons such as procedural economy. The term ‘similar facts and legal grounds’ (lat. simile factum, 
simile jus) refers to different life events, but the rights and obligations that arise from them are that 
much similar to each other that enables all claims to be solved in one single suit. For example, 
several employees who work for the same employer and who were injured at their places of work 
in different moments. Each of the employees is entitled to commence a court proceeding for 
compensation against their mutual employer. Under such circumstances, the employees are 
allowed to submit a single action against the employer all together.  
                                                          
33 There are also other divisions of the plurality of parties as a procedural institute, but they are not relevant to the 
topic of this thesis.  
34 Civil Procedure Act 2004. (c.14). Ljubljana: Official Gazette of the R. Slovenia. Art.191/1-1 
35 Civil Procedure Act 2005. (c.14). Skopje: Official Gazette of R. Macedonia. Art.186/1-1 
36 Ivosevič. Z., 1979. Suparnicarstvo. Beograd: Pravno Ekonomski Centar.pp.44-54.  
37 Ibid., Art.191/1-2 
38 Ibid., Art.186/1-2  
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Depending on the effect of the judgement, i.e. on whether it will affect all parties equally 
(with a single relief) because the dispute may be solved in an equal manner against all of them, or 
whether it will affect all parties with different reliefs, the plurality may be in the form of “single 
co-litigants” or in the form of “simple co-litigants”.  
Depending on the time when the party entered the proceeding i.e. at the time of issuing the 
claim, or afterwards, plurality may be in the form of “initial” or “subsequent.”  
Of all the distinctions of the institute - plurality of parties, only the distinction between 
material and formal plurality is relevant for this thesis because it deals with the question of whether 
it is possible to apply the plurality rule over collective disputes. 
Having in mind that the plurality of parties as a procedural institute deals with situations 
where there is more than one party, the principal question is whether collective disputes such as 
the Telecom case or the EVN case might be solved through the plurality rule. The table below 
contains explanations as an argument for the answer to the question. The EVN case is used as an 
example in the table. 
 
PLURALITY OF PARTIES 
 Prerequisites Explanation based on the facts of the EVN case 
Material   
Macedonian  
Civil Procedure 
Act art.186/1-1 
Slovenian  
Civil Procedure 
Act art.191/1-1 
 
 
The parties are in a legal 
community before the 
procedure started 
None of the subscribers for electricity was in a prior 
legal community with another subscriber regarding 
this issue.  
 
Their rights and obligations 
arise from the same facts 
and legal ground (lat. idem 
factum + idem jus) 
All subscribers shared the same fact (same life 
event), they were harmed by the same company 
under the same circumstances (abuse of one’s 
dominant position), but they did not share the same 
legal ground (different legal genesis) because each of 
them had a separate contract with the company for 
distribution of electricity. In other words, one delict, 
but around 500,000 separate contracts for electricity 
distribution.  
The principles of material plurality of parties cannot 
be applied in this case.  
Formal    
Macedonian  
Civil Procedure 
Act art.186/1-2 
Slovenian  
Civil Procedure 
Act art.191/1-2 
Claims i.e. obligations of 
the same type which arise 
from similar facts and legal 
grounds (lat. simile factum 
+ simile jus). 
The right to compensation for all subscribers arose 
from the same delict (idem factum), but separate 
contracts. Even though these contracts are separate, 
each of them still has typical content and the rights 
and obligations that arise from them are similar 
(simile jus).  
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Additionally, for each of 
the claims and over each of 
the defendants the same 
court has subject matter and 
local jurisdiction   
The EVN cases were dispersed around the country. 
Macedonian civil procedure allows for all claims 
(referring to the whole country’s territory) against 
the same defendant to be allocated (attracted) before 
a single forum only in case of material plurality, but 
not in case of formal plurality.39  
 
However, in this case the principle of forum deliciti 
can be used, and all claims might be submitted before 
the forum where the harmful activity has been 
performed. That is the place where the company 
headquarters are located.      
 
This implies a possibility for all claims ab initio to 
be submitted before the forum deliciti rather than 
being reallocated before the forum deliciti. 
 
 
The table above shows that material plurality is not possible in the EVN case due to 
substantive reasons. In terms of formal plurality, the first required element – “simile facts, simile 
jus” was present, but the second required element same subject matter and territory jurisdiction 
of a same forum was missing. Hence, neither the formal plurality rule may be applied in the EVN 
case.  
In any case, what would have been the benefits, if the formal plurality rule had been used 
in the EVN case? There wouldn’t have been any important benefits because the formal co-litigants 
are autonomous parties and their behaviour is neither beneficial, nor harmful to the other co-
litigants. There is a possibility for some of the facts to be commonly determined, but that is not 
enough for a collective dispute to be efficiently resolved. One of the crucial disadvantages of the 
formal plurality rule is the inability to “bring” all claims from the entire country before one single 
forum. It is only the material plurality rule which has the power to attract all claims from the entire 
country, while the formal plurality rule can attract claims only within one particular court.  
 
c. Joinder of proceedings (cases, lawsuits) 
A joinder of proceedings is a case management order which enables two or more ongoing 
proceedings to be run jointly. This order may be granted at the party’s request or at the judge’s 
own initiative (ex lege). In fact, here is the crucial difference between the formal plurality rule and 
                                                          
39 Civil Procedure Act 2005. Skopje: Official Gazette of R. Macedonia. Art.42. 
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the joinder of proceedings rule. Namely, formal plurality may arise only by an action because the 
category of litisconsortium in German influenced legislations is at the disposal of the parties only. 
The court has no power to compel or otherwise induce a party to join or be joined in the 
proceedings, while joinder of proceedings may be done by a court decision.  
The preconditions for joinder of proceedings are met if several procedures between the 
same parties are ongoing before the same court, or if the same person is the opposing party to 
different plaintiffs and defendants. Regarding the cases joined, the judge may pass a joint verdict 
or a separate verdict. This is entirely at his discretion. The aim of such a joinder is to accelerate 
the adjudication of the cases and to decrease the costs.  
The joinder of proceedings has limited “territorial” scope because it can be applied only 
within one particular court. Theoretically, there is the possibility of reallocating a case from one 
competent court to another under Art. 61 of the Macedonian Civil Procedure Act 2005. Namely, 
upon a proposal of a party or of a competent court, the Supreme Court may reallocate a case from 
one competent court to another for a practical reason or for any other important reason. Art. 61 of 
the Macedonian Civil Procedure Act 2005 was used in practice on an individual basis, which 
means that usually one case only was subject to reallocation. Under the assumption that the 
Supreme Court could issue an order for all EVN claims to be reallocated before one single court, 
all claims would be reallocated to one single court (a management court). In this way the first big 
issue of how to secure one single court for all claims is solved. But the problems do not end here: 
the next issue is how the management court can deal with approximately 100,000 claims at once.  
Before joining all proceedings, each consumer (subscriber) has to initiate his own 
(separate) procedure and comply with the formalities required by the Civil Procedure Act, such as 
drafting a claim, submitting a claim, paying court taxes, hiring an attorney, submitting evidence, 
etc. Each of those 100,000 claims must be delivered to the defendant (a service). If the defendant 
submits a response, that response must be delivered to all plaintiffs as well. This adds up to around 
200,000 summons. One of the advantages here would be the possibility of determining some of 
the facts commonly. But the court would still have the obligation to receive all documentary 
evidence accompanied with the claim forms and exchange them between the parties. Regarding 
witnesses, experts and evidence, it would probably be possible for these to be commonly 
determined in order to avoid unnecessary multiplication of the same evidence. One of the biggest 
disadvantages here would be the fact that the court would have to run 100,000 proceedings at once 
(jointly), and to prepare a verdict with 100,000 plaintiffs, since the claims would remain separate 
and distinct from one another. 
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It seems that the model described above is not feasible in reality, and it can be seen only as 
a theoretical model. The present bi-polar civil procedure would lead to a real “flood” and the entire 
court system would collapse. A good example of a court being inundated with thousands of claims 
is the case in Germany, where the Regional Court of Frankfurt/Main faced less than 14,000 
security fraud cases at once.40 In that case the court was obviously not able to use any of the 
traditional procedural institutes such as “plurality/joinder of claims” and it simply waited for the 
legislator to enact a suitable mechanism for handling all those 14,000 claims. The German 
Reichstag enacted a brand new act, the so-called Capital Markets Investors’ Test Case Act, as a 
test case collective mechanism.  
 
d. The traditional civil procedure is not an adequate mechanism for solving mass 
cases  
The traditional (individual) civil procedure is defined as a means (method) for providing 
protection of individual rights by general courts. The aim of the traditional civil procedure is to 
safeguard individual rights (droit subjective) through private lawsuits and in that way regulate the 
private relationships between the parties. 41 
These individual rights might have different nature, but in any case, they must be of civil 
nature taken in a broader sense. For example, the scope of the English civil procedure embraces 
all that is not criminal.42 The scope of the Macedonian civil procedure may be defined in а similar 
fashion, saying that it embraces all that is not criminal or administrative. Precisely, the scope of 
the Macedonian civil procedure encompasses the disputes within the field of personal and family 
relations, labour relations, as well as property and other civil relations of natural persons and legal 
entities43 Nevertheless, only individual rights (droit subjective) are principally involved in the 
disputes above.44  
Besides individual rights, the question is whether collective rights might be subject to 
adjudicating through the traditional (individual) civil procedure. There are no explicit restrictions 
                                                          
40 Wagner, G., 2011. Collective redress - categories of loss and legislative options. Law Quarterly Review 2011 (127) 
p. 62. 
41 See more in Triva, S. and Dika, M., 2004. Građansko parnično procesno pravo. Zagreb: Narodne novine, p.3-4. 
42 Andrews, N. 2003. English civil procedure, Oxford University Press, New York, p.21.  
43 The scope of the Macedonian civil procedure is defined in Art.1 of the Civil Procedure Act, Official Gazette of RM 
No.79/05.  
44  Јаневски, А и Зоровска-Камиловска, Т., 2009. Граѓанско процесно право: Парнично право, книга прва. 
Скопје: Правен Факултет „Јустинијан Први“, стр.15. 
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in that context, but from the above we saw that by using traditional civil procedure techniques, the 
courts are not able to deal with cases which involve a vast number of claims.  
 Therefore, the question arises as to why the traditional civil procedure is suitable to protect 
individual rights only. The answer lies in the fact that the so-called traditional legal doctrine was 
the dominant legal doctrine in the last two to three centuries. 45  This doctrine has sharply 
distinguished substantive law and rights into “private” and “public”, especially in the civil law 
world. Private rights are those which “belong” to private individuals, whereas “public” rights are 
those which “belong” to the general public – the people (lat. populis) – represented by the state.46 
Consequently, the traditional doctrine of standing (lat. legitimation ad causam) assigns the right 
to sue either to private individuals who “hold” the right or, in case of public rights, to the state 
itself. The basic rule in civil litigation is that standing to sue belongs exclusively to the holder 
(owner) of the right at issue. This rule has resulted from the strict division on public and private 
law since the Roman law. Nowadays, besides individuals and the state, there are also collectives 
which require legal protection of rights which cannot be classified as “public” or “private” in the 
traditional sense.  Having in this in mind, the traditional civil procedure is not an adequate 
mechanism for solving mass cases due to its individual nature. It was basically tailored for 
adjudication of individual rights. In that context Lindblom concluded the following:  
“In modern society, which is directed towards mass production, mass distribution, mass information, and 
mass consumption of goods and services, it is much more common than before for large numbers of people 
to be negatively affected by products, incidents or measures taken. In such situations, claims or disputes arise 
that are similar for large numbers of people. The existing European litigation procedures, the principles of 
which were laid down more than half a century ago in most countries, are not structured to accommodate 
these kinds of disputes.” 47 
 
e. Consumers do not have effective access to courts in mass cases  
The right of access to justice means that each citizen must have effective access to court. 
Courts have a legitimate monopoly over giving justice, thus not having access to court means being 
unable to reach justice at all. Therefore, the right of access to justice is a fundamental principle of 
any society and is raised to the highest level. In that sense, contemporary Europe enacted this 
principle into the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR)48. ECHR does not have 
a formal definition for the right of access to justice, but from the ECHR’s practice three main 
                                                          
45 Gidi, A., 2003. Class Action in Brazil – A model for civil law countries. American Journal of comparative law.p.345. 
46 Cappelletti, M., 1989, Vindicating the Public interest through the Courts, Clarendon Press – Oxford, p.272. 
47 Lindblom, P. H., 1997. Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and Proposal on Group Actions 
in Civil Procedure, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 805, 817. 
48 “ECHR” will be used to refer to “European Convention on Human Rights 1950” in the rest of the text.  
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principles may be derived which the right of access to justice is based on and these include the 
following: (a) everyone must be entitled to bring a claim before a court; (b) everyone must have 
an opportunity to bring that claim before a court and (c) everyone must have an opportunity to 
protect his rights effectively before the court.49  Regarding the nature of the right of access to 
justice, it can be said that it has pure procedural nature due to the fact that it refers to means, which 
shall enable efficient protection of civil rights. Friedman stated that access, in brief, refers 
primarily to procedures (“means”), but its goal is substantive (“justice”). Therefore, the above 
three principles are “the means by which the rights are made effective” 50. 
Having this in mind, the Telecom case showed that the consumers had no practical and 
effective access to justice. Evidence thereof is that none of the consumers filed a damage claim 
against Telecom. The main reason was that the potential damage claims were already time-barred 
at the moment when the Commission delivered its decision. In both cases the Commission 
produced a delayed reaction. The Commission knew the fact that the consumers have only a three 
years’ limitation period for indemnification because Art. 58 of the Competition Act explicitly lays 
down that all harmed consumers who want to be compensated may initiate a damage claim. A 
damage claim can be submitted within a period of three years counting from the day when the 
harmful event occurred (a limitation period for damage claims). The table below presents the dates 
for both cases.  
 
 Period of abuse  Date of starting a 
misdemeanour 
procedure 
Last day for filing a 
damage claim  
(a three years’ term) 
Date of delivering 
the judgement 
Telecom 
case 
01.07.2006 - 
28.02.2007 
10.11.2010 28.02.2010 16.03.2011 
EVN case 27.05.2006 - 
28.03.2008 
10.11.2010 28.03.2011 16.03.2011 
 
Both misdemeanour procedures (against Telecom and EVN) ended in а period of five 
mounts, which is acceptable. But, the Commission failed to consider the fact that both 
misdemeanour procedures started too late (4 years after the abuse). The delayed reaction of the 
Commission, in fact, prevented the consumers from filing damage claims against the Telecom.   
The consumers are entitled to initiate a misdemeanour procedure according to the 
Consumer Protection Act, but the Commission itself will still be “the arbiter”, and the consumers 
                                                          
49 Golder v. U. Kingdom (1975) A 18 EHRR; Airey v. Ireland (1979) A 32 EHRR No.6289/73.  
50 Friedman, M. L., 1981. Claims, disputes, conflicts and the modern welfare state. European University institute, 
p.252.  
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will once again be in a position to wait until the Commission takes its decision. Therefore, the 
opportunity of the consumers to initiate a misdemeanour procedure before the Commission cannot 
be treated as an effective remedy. An alternative for this type of cases can be the promulgation of 
a separate type of court actions, so-called stand-alone actions on a representative basis. In this 
way, the consumers would not have to wait for the Commission to determine if there is a breach 
of the Competition Law, but they would do that by themselves in separate proceedings before the 
courts.   
Like the previous case, the EVN case showed that the consumers had no practical and 
effective access to justice. Two critical points may be derived from this case regarding the current 
Macedonian civil justice system, which is primarily based on the traditional (individual) civil 
procedure.  
 Firstly, the absence of suitable mechanism for dealing with cases on a large scale will 
certainly be fatal for the entire civil justice system. The current civil justice system cannot absorb 
cases such as the EVN case because the current civil procedure may not proceed these cases on a 
representative basis.  
Secondly, the current traditional civil procedure may be applied to collective disputes only 
in theory. This individual model of civil procedure without disposable managerial tools, such as 
management court, group register, cut-off dates, allocation and reallocation of cases, test claims, 
master statement of claims, etc., will still be entirely inadequate for solving collective disputes. 
Evidence thereof is the recovery ratio of 1:760, i.e. in order to recover only €0.10, the plaintiffs 
had to pay €76.00. In addition to that is the fact that without the attorneys’ financial engagement 
in the case, hardly any of the consumers would have come before the court. So, in this case the 
consumers were not prevented from coming before the court, but the inadequate recovery system 
offered through the traditional civil procedure cannot be considered an effective remedy.   
Where the competition authority has already found an infringement and the restitution 
element cannot be resolved, the promulgation of a separate type of court actions, called follow-on 
actions on a representative basis, can be an alternative for this type of cases.  
However, formally and legally, the civil court procedure does not deny the right of access 
to court when it comes to such cases, but its bipolar nature represents a hindrance to the proper 
treatment of collective disputes.   
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3. Diffuse (collective) interests 
 
The traditional civil litigation has been built as a mechanism for the protection of individual 
rights (“droit subjectif”). Consequently, the principle of standing to sue has individual nature and 
only holders of individual rights may appear before the courts in the capacity of parties. But in our 
modern society, besides individuals, corporations and the state, there are classes, groups and 
collectives which appear as holders of “new” rights (interests), which cannot be classified as public 
or private because they are different i.e. they are diffuse.51   
 
a. Academic confusion  
In jurisprudence, there is still no unity as to the definition of the term “diffuse (collective) 
interests”. We believe that there are two reasons. The first reason is that there are different national 
concepts for the definition of diffuse (collective) interests, while the second reason is that currently 
defining the term diffuse (collective) interests is considered to be a task of procedural law.   
Worldwide, diffuse (collective) interests are perceived differently in conceptual terms. The 
North American continent (the USA and Canada) uses the term “class action”, which puts the 
emphasis on the procedural device (remedy) that protects diffuse (collective) interests. The 
Scandinavian countries use the term “group proceedings” because the emphasis is put on the 
proceedings through which the diffuse (collective) interests are protected. Within the EU there is 
a tendency for a unified use of the term “collective redress“ because the emphasis is put on the 
restitution of the proceeds illegally acquired. The countries of Latin America have adopted the 
term “diffuse (collective) interests”, stressing the diffuse (collective) interests as a special kind of 
rights (interests), etc.   
Currently, the receptive definition of diffuse (collective) interests is mainly treated as an 
issue of procedural law (method) and not as an issue of substantive law. According to Jolowicz 
defining the term of diffuse (collective) interests should not be a matter of concern of the 
proceduralists because “they should not attempt to specify the content of those rights: that is for 
the legislatures and other law–making authorities of the jurisdiction in question.” 52  The 
proceduralists should focus on “remedies”, not on “rights”. Therefore, diffuse (collective) interests 
                                                          
51 For more information see Cappelletti, M. ed., 1978. Access to justice. Florence: European University Institute, p.11. 
52 Jolowicz, J.A., 2000, On Civil Procedure. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.102. 
33 
 
from the point of view of their protection should be an obligation of procedural law, while defining 
the meaning should be an obligation of substantive law.   
 
b. Rights or interests  
The absence of a definition raises the question of whether we are talking about diffuse 
(collective) rights or diffuse (collective) interests? Jolowicz recognises them at the level of rights 
(intermediate rights)53, while Cappelletti recognises them both at the level of rights (rights without 
holder) and at the level of interests (diffuse interests; meta-individual interests).54 The legislations 
of Brazil, Portugal, Spain recognise them at the level of rights.55 Given the fact that each right 
incorporates in itself some interest, while each interest is not automatically recognised as a right, 
it seems that the category diffuse (collective) interests is broader than the category diffuse 
(collective) rights. Since both categories may be subject to civil court protection, we cannot see 
any reasons why both terms cannot be used interchangeably.  
 
c. Absence of court protection  
From a political point of view, the confusion over diffuse (collective) interests is due to the 
lack of a suitable mechanism for the protection of the interests of collective nature. An example 
thereof is the second and third generation of human rights, which have a collective nature, but 
parallel to their proclamation as rights no suitable method for their court protection has been 
developed. The analyses indicate that Western countries have implemented economic and social 
rights only through legislative and executive branches. It has led to uncontrolled proliferation of 
legal regulations which have later proved to be counterproductive because the proliferation of legal 
regulations has directly caused the proliferation of administrative bodies for the implementation 
of these regulations. These administrative bodies have usually been in the form of specialised 
agencies, committees, etc., which later have not only had the mandate to adopt bylaws, but also to 
decide on individual cases where specific individuals have been affected.56 Due to the failure to 
create an effective mechanism for the protection of rights of collective nature, now there is a 
                                                          
53 Idem.  
54 Cappelletti, M. ed., 1978. Access to justice. Florence: European University Institute, p.11. 
55 Brazilian Consumer Defence Act (Law no.8078/1990); Popular Action Law of 31 August 1995 (Law no.83/95); 
Civil Procedure Act (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil: LEC), Law no.1/2000, cited in Pablo Gutiérrez de Cabiedes 
Hidalgo., 2007. available at:  
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/spain_national_report.pdf 
56See more in Tunc, A., 1981, ”The quest for justice”. Access to justice and the Welfare state. Firenze: European 
University Institute, p.336.  
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“pressure” on the existing civil court procedure, which is basically an individual (bipolar) 
procedure. The civil court procedure has been modelled as an individual mechanism much earlier 
before the appearance of diffuse (collective) interests. 
 
d. Basic features of diffuse (collective) interests 
Despite the fact that there is no universally accepted definition regarding the term of diffuse 
(collective) interests, Grinover 57  concludes that there is at least a consent regarding their 
distinguishing features, which include (a) their massiveness (origin); (b) their different nature 
compared to public and private interests; (c) their heterogeneous object; (d) their indivisible object 
and (e) their indefinite entitlement. 
 
- Mass society and consequences of mass conflicts 
The basic and common characteristic of all disputes referred to in the previous chapter is 
their massiveness, that is, the fact that the behaviour of a single entity (as a centre of power) affects 
thousands, sometimes even millions, of other persons who are related in a certain way. Even 
though it is large, the behaviour of that person does not cause problems until it violates the interests 
(rights) of the other persons in the society. Once the interests have been violated, the problem 
becomes very serious due to the fact that thousands of people become victims of large 
environmental catastrophes, market consumers are abused, citizens discriminated on different 
grounds, etc.  
The disputes referred to in the previous chapter are a consequence of the basic feature of 
our contemporary society, namely the phenomenon of massification. We are living in a world 
which consists of massive organisations, multinational companies, mass-production, mass-
consumption, of labour, mass media, the Internet, Facebook, mass-oriented welfare state 
governments, globalisation processes, plans for ecumenopolises, etc. What has caused this 
massification? The basic reason for massification is the economic concentration of the supply of 
goods and services on the market compared to the massive number of consumers.58 Namely, there 
                                                          
57 Grinover, P. A., 2007. New Trends in Standing and Res Judicata in Collective Suits. Available through. The Global 
Class Actions Exchange [online] available: <http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/new-trends-standing-and-
res-iudicata-collective-suits-brazil-legislation> [accessed 13 January 2013], p.5.  
58 In the credit cards industry/sector VISA Inc. is an example of concentration, which in the USA only has 302 million 
customers and a market share of 49.6%. The company MasterCard has a market share of 33.4% and together with 
VISA they have a market share of 83% in the USA. Wall Street Journal 24/7, 2012. American Companies with the 
Most Customers. [online] Available at: http://247wallst.com/special-report/2012/04/30/american-companies-with-
the-most-customers/3/, [Accessed on 31.08.2016].   
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is a small number of suppliers against a vast number of consumers on the market. In that context 
Kotz also states that:  
“In the densely populated countries of the Northern Hemisphere individuals depend on a growing extent on 
numerous public and private providers of goods and services. The process of economic concentration has led 
to the emergence of large productive units each of which employs thousands of people and provides goods 
and services to a vast number of individuals. Accordingly, decisions made by these units tend to affect large 
groups of people simultaneously.” 59  
 
The economic concentration is a result of the so-called industrial society. Namely, under 
the impact of the rushing capitalism in the 17th and 18th century begins the process of disintegration 
of the medieval groups60, and by that also of the feudal social order as a whole. Unlike feudalism, 
capitalism denies the group and affirms the individual61 and the capital as the primary carriers of 
social life. In that regard, the Great Bills for the protection of human rights in the 17th and 18th 
centuries guarantee the absolute freedom of the individual, while the discovery of the corporations 
gives the possibility for, until then, unimaginable capital accumulation. The free individual, the 
accumulated capital and the benefits of the Industrial Revolution transform the traditional society 
into industrial society. The industrial society is a society driven by the use of technology in order 
to enable mass production for mass consumption. Therefore, the industrial society is also referred 
to as mass society.  
Mass society produces mass conflicts due to the fact that a single human action can be 
prejudicial to a large number of people. For example, false information released to the public in 
relation to the shares of a certain company will damage all those who purchased shares from that 
company; an possible misuse of funds of a pension fund will damage all beneficiaries of that fund; 
an possible defective packaging of a certain product will damage the individuals who have bought 
the product, etc. The basic consequence of mass conflicts is the involvement of a large number of 
individuals, who can hardly use the bipolar civil procedure as a method for protection of their 
rights.   
This leads to the conclusion that diffuse (collective) interests appear as a result of an 
unlawful behaviour of a certain entity that represents a centre of power and its behaviour can affect 
a large number of people. As long as this entity acts according to the law, diffuse (collective) 
                                                          
59Kotz, H.,1981, Public interest litigation: A comparative survey, European University Institute – Firenze, p.87-88.   
60The process of disintegration of the groups went into two directions: the first one was the disappearance of the 
groups (for example, religious guilds) and the second one was the transformation of the groups into another form 
(for example, some of the merchant and craft guilds transformed into livery companies).  
61The exaltation of the individual was one of the cardinal principles of the French Revolution. See more in Gomez, 
M., 2007.  
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interests do not exist, that is, at that time they represent only a potential category. As the entity 
begins to act unlawfully, the diffuse (collective) interests will transform from potential to real 
category. For example, as long as a certain company that has a dominant position on the market 
acts according to the law, the consumers are treated as holders of the right to fair competition. But, 
when the same company abuses its dominant position on the market, the consumers will become 
holders of diffuse (collective) interests. 
 
- Diffuse (collective) interests are placed halfway between public and private interests  
According to Friedman there are three different types of interests held by the individuals 
in a modern society. 62 Namely, one individual can act as a member of a group (group interest), as 
an individual living in a community (individual interest) and as a citizen in a state (public interest).  
Public interests originate from the relationship between the individual (mostly as citizen) 
and the state; therefore, they are related to public order, the fiscal system, etc. This relationship 
may cause a conflict between the individual and the state, as for example, in any state, without 
exceptions, tax evasion is subject to sanctions.    
 
               
 
Private interests are related to the interests that originate from a specific legal relationship 
where persons act as private parties. Therefore, conflicts would appear between two or more 
individuals as private parties and for example, if a buyer does not pay for the goods he purchased, 
the seller has the right to claim the selling price before court.   
 
           
 
In disputes, regardless of whether public or private interests are affected, the conflict is 
always between two specific entities, for example, the state (when it acts as imperium) vs. citizen 
A, or party A vs. party B.  Public and private interests can be projected as parallel lines between 
                                                          
62 Friedman M. L., 1981,” Claims, disputes, conflicts and the modern welfare state” Access to justice and the Welfare 
state, European University Institute, pp.251 
offender 
sanction 
creditor 
 
debtor 
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the individuals, while diffuse (collective) interests as a collection of lines that concentrate to a 
common and indivisible object63. That common and indivisible object makes these conflicts to 
appear between the groups of individuals vs. offenders. These kinds of groups can be recognised 
in the field of consumer protection, environmental protection, protection of market competition, 
etc. In the example below, healthy environment is common and indivisible object whose pollution 
by an industrial facility emits diffuse (collective) interests to every resident who lives in the 
affected area. Therefore, all residents share a common interest (healthy environment) which makes 
them a group and also an opposite party to the polluter.  But, some of those residents, whose health 
is impaired due to such pollution, would be “double” holders of rights. First, as holders of the 
indivisible right to a healthy environment (injunction relief) and, second, as holders of the 
individual right to compensation (damage relief). 
 
  
           
 
  
(polluter)    (healthy environment)                 (the group of residents)   
 
 
Traditional (individual) rights create “parallel lines” between their holders. These parallel 
lines symbolise the rights and obligations they established between two specifically designated 
parties. On the other hand, diffuse (collective) interests create diffusely spread lines in space. They 
meet in a certain common point and then spread dispersed in space. This means that diffuse 
(collective) interests do not create lines between designated entities, but they spread out in space 
towards anyone (erga omnes). The disputes where thousands, sometimes even millions, of 
scattered individuals’ interests converge into a single point create massivity, which is one of the 
basic features of diffuse (collective) interests. 
 
 
 
                                                          
63Idem, p.5-6.  
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- Heterogeneous object 
Another feature that characterises diffuse (collective) interests is their heterogeneous 
object. The object of diffuse (collective) interests has not been defined yet in legal science and a 
serious obstacle for that are the different types of categories that appear as objects of diffuse 
(collective) interests. For example, the categories that appear as objects of diffuse (collective) 
interests may be in the sphere of economy (protection from unfair competition, consumer 
protection, etc.), in the sphere of ecology (environmental protection), in the sphere of anti-
discrimination (protection from discrimination on various grounds), sustainable development 
(economic and social development), etc. In view of the above, people may share a common interest 
of various spheres of their life, making it difficult to find one common denominator for all 
categories that appear as objects of diffuse (collective) interests. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the objects of diffuse (collective) interests have an expressly heterogeneous nature.  
 
- Indivisible object 
The next feature of the objects of diffuse (collective) interests is their indivisibility. This is 
due to the indivisible nature of the categories themselves that appear as objects of diffuse 
(collective) interests. These categories such as fair competition, consumer protection, healthy 
environment, discrimination on various grounds, economic and social development, etc. were 
mentioned above. These categories are indivisible because they cannot be divided between the 
persons who pretend to be the beneficiaries thereof, whereby each of them wants to exercise that 
right individually. For example, the right to carry out a business activity in a certain country under 
fair competition cannot be divided into as many business entities as are operating in the country. 
The reason is that the right to fair competition in one country is either exercised by everyone or by 
no one. It is impossible for one entity to exercise the right to fair competition and for another entity 
not to do so in the same country. This is due to the fact that fair competition is a state of the market 
which “affects” equally to each entity that carries out a business activity in the country without 
exception (erga omnes). Another classical example of an indivisible category is healthy 
environment64.. It is impossible that one of two residents in a populated region exercises the right 
to a healthy environment, and the other one doesn’t. As mentioned above, either both of them live 
in a healthy environment, or neither does. This is due to the fact that polluted environment in a 
                                                          
64 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992. (art.25), Rio de Janeiro: UNEP, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 
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given region is a state that equally affects all residents of that region without exception (erga 
omnes). 
On the other hand, the objects of traditional rights have an individual character and they are 
always exercised individually. Such objects are, freedom of movement, inviolability of the home, 
ownership, inheritance, etc. These categories are exercised individually and any interference of a 
third party is considered a violation of the right.  
 
- The relation between diffuse (collective) interests and human rights  
Diffuse (collective) interests are associated with the so-called second and third generation 
of human rights65. The reason is that the categories which are protected by the second and third 
generation human rights overlap to a large extent with the categories that are object of diffuse 
(collective) interests. Namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) stipulates, 
among others, the right to social security (Art. 22), the right to work (Art. 23), the right to rest and 
leisure (Art. 24), the right to adequate standard of living (Art. 25), the right to social services (Art. 
25), as economic-social rights, while the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(1992) stipulates the right to peace, development and environmental protection (Art.25) as 
solidarity rights. Due to the convergence of diffuse (collective) interests with the second and third 
generation human rights, various authors define diffuse (collective) interests as collective rights, 
social rights, duties of communities and classes, etc.66 
In fact, the state addresses the individual through the first generation of human rights, while 
the second and third generations of human rights address the community (society). Based on the 
above, the second and third generation of human rights differ substantially from the first one. But, 
                                                          
65Karel Vasak was the first to propose a division of human rights into three generations, following the three principles 
of the French Revolution: Liberté, Égalité and Fraternité. First generation rights are related to liberty (liberté) and 
refer fundamentally to civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property and many others. Second-
generation human rights are related to equality (egalité) and they are basically economic, social and cultural in 
nature. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) is the crucial legal instrument for 
their promotion. Economic rights refer, for example, to the right to property, the right to work, trade union rights. 
Social rights refer, for example, to the right to health, the right to social care, the right to education, etc. Third-
generation human rights are related to solidarity (fraternité) and they are collective in nature in view of the fact that 
they go beyond the individual. The Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment or Stockholm 
Declaration (1972), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development or Rio Declaration (1992), The Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), etc. are rucial legal instruments for their promotion.. The above 
instruments cover group or collective rights, which include, inter alia, the right to development, the right to peace 
and the right to a clean environment. 
66 Cappelletti, M., 1989, Vindicating the Public interest through the Courts. Oxford: Clarendon Press. P.270.  
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as previously mentioned, it is the collective nature that makes these rights non-justiciable for the 
system of bipolar civil court procedure. In this regard, we present the table below:   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Indefinite entitlement  
Each right or interest has its own holder. Diffuse interests as well have their own holders 
and those are the affected individuals in mass cases. For example, if one company abuses its 
dominant position on the market, all consumers on that market will be impaired parties because 
everyone, without exception, will feel the negative consequences. The distortions caused by the 
monopolistic behaviour of the company have a “macro” effect on the market and, therefore, they 
are hardly measurable at the “micro” level or at the level of an individual. Namely, it is impossible 
to calculate “in numbers” the damage suffered by a particular consumer due to the monopolistic 
behaviour of the company on that market. This is a serious problem because only a claim which is 
precisely determined may be subject to court protection. In this case, none of the consumers can 
“tear off” part of the total damage incurred and sue the company for damage compensation on his 
own behalf and for his own account. In these cases, it is impossible to divide the rights into quotas 
attributable to each one of the group’s members. The interests of the members are so closely 
connected that when relief is granted to one member, each group member’s claim is satisfied and, 
when the rights of one of the members are violated, the rights of the whole group are violated too.67 
The holders of diffuse (collective) interests are informal groups of individuals, who gravitate 
towards one common interest that “attracts” them, such as an ecological disaster, financial market 
abuse, abuse of consumer rights, etc. But, if in one particular ecological disaster a victim suffered 
                                                          
67 Gidi, A. 2003. Class Action in Brazil – A model for civil law countries. American Journal of comparative law. p.352. 
I. Civil and Political Rights II. Economic and Social Rights and 
Solidarity Rights 
individual nature  collective nature   
expressed in precise terms  expressed in vague terms 
negative obligation for the state positive obligation for the state 
resources for their implementation are 
not necessary  
resources for their implementation are 
necessary 
their application can be immediate   their application requests progressive 
realisation 
Key consequences of the above differences:    
justiciable (enforceable) non-justiciable (non-enforceable) 
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personal injury, he would be a “double” holder of rights; first, as a holder of the indivisible right 
to a healthy environment (injunction relief) and, second, as a holder of the individual right to 
compensation (damage relief). 
 
4. Definition of the term “diffuse (rights) interests” 
 
As it was mentioned before, most of the legal systems consider diffuse (collective) interests 
from a procedural perspective, and only the Latino American countries recognise diffuse 
(collective) interests as a separate and different type of rights. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
thesis, diffuse (collective) interests shall be defined under the influence of the Latino American 
legal systems, the Brazilian legal system in particular.68 According to Pellegrini, a prominent 
Brazilian scholar, today it is quite common to acknowledge two kinds of collective rights (in a 
broad sense)69, such as: (a) diffuse rights, which are indivisible and to which indefinite classes of 
people are entitled and (b) homogeneous individual rights (in the Iberian-American jargon), which 
are divisible and to which the members of specific classes are entitled. They may be taken to court 
in the form of individual suits, but may also be dealt with in a collective way.  
Depending on the level of determination of the group of affected people, diffuse rights may 
be further divided into: (a.1) diffuse rights strictu sensu and (a.2) collective rights strictu sensu. 70  
 
a. Diffuse rights strictu sensu  
Brazilian Consumer Defence Act defines the diffuse rights strictu sensu as “trans-
individual interests and rights of an indivisible nature where the parties involved are undetermined 
persons connected by circumstances of facts”. 71 A typical example of a case which involves 
diffuse interests - strictu sensu was the Green Coalition case. In this case the right to healthy 
environment, which is a truly indivisible right, was subject of adjudication. In these types of cases 
the people affected are indeterminable because the rights that are subject to adjudication belong 
to the community as a whole. This kind of rights may belong neither to particular individuals, nor 
                                                          
68 The above classification of rights may be found in the Brazilian Consumer Act 1990, which recognizes four types 
of rights: individual rights, homogeneous individual rights, diffuse rights and collective rights. Court protection of the 
above rights could be managed individually or collectively. Individual rights are subject to personal court protection, 
while diffuse, collective and homogeneous rights are subject to collective court protection. The Brazilian legislation 
is a specific example where aggregated individual rights are sorted out as a separate kind of rights.  
69 See more in Grinover, P.A., 2007, p.8.  
70 Idem.  
71Art.81/1-1 form the Brazilian Consumer Defense Act (Law no.8078/1990), hereinafter “CDA”. 
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to a group. These rights belong to everyone. Therefore, in these types of cases the court may grant 
indivisible relief only, which will equally affect the undetermined number of people. It is 
impossible for a diffuse right strictu sensu to be divided into quotas attributable to each group 
member. In such cases the court may issue either injunction in order to avoid future harm or an 
order to reinstate the status quo ante.72  
 
b. Collective rights strictu sensu 
Brazilian Consumer Defence Act defines the collective rights strictu sensu as “trans-
individual interests and rights of an indivisible nature, where the involved party is a group, 
category or class of people connected to each other or to the defending party through a judicial 
relationship.” 73 Unlike the diffuse interests strictu sensu, where the persons are “indeterminable”, 
in the collective interests strictu sensu the persons can be determined as a result of the legal 
relationship which connects them from the very beginning (ab initio) and makes them a group. 
The most common example of this kind of rights is the example of beneficiaries of services 
provided by public utility companies. It must be pointed out that both the diffuse rights strictu 
sensu and the collective rights strictu sensu share the same basic characteristics. In that regard, 
both are ontologically collective rights due to the indivisibility of their object, and they differ from 
one another only in one element, that is, the existence of a prior legal link among the members, 
which makes the collective rights strictu sensu more identifiable compared to the diffuse rights 
strictu sensu.  
 
c. Homogeneous individual rights 
Homogeneous individual rights are individual rights which are aggregated together due to 
their homogeneity or common origin, and as a consequence they may be taken to court in the form 
of individual suits, but may also be dealt with in a collective way.74 Actually, homogeneous 
individual rights are simply aggregated individual rights. The difference between the 
homogeneous individual rights and the single individual right is quantitative, not qualitative. Every 
holder has his own right and he may protect it solely through a traditional civil procedure. For 
example, in the EVN case all claims had a common origin (abuse of one’s dominant position by 
                                                          
72 Gidi, A., 2003. Class Action in Brazil – A model for civil law countries. American Journal of comparative law, p.355.  
73Art.81/1-2 form the Brazilian Consumer Defense Act.  
74Grinover, P. A., 2007, p.8. 
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EVN) and the same debtor, which makes them homogenous.75 The reason why more individual 
rights are aggregated in a “package” is economic: if they are treated individually before the court, 
it would not be economically viable. In fact, these rights have a very low or almost insignificant 
value compared to the amount of the court fees that need to be paid for their protection and, 
therefore, their collective treatment before the court has been imposed as a rational solution (lat. 
de minimus non curat praetor).76 For example, in the EVN case for a compensation of €0.10 €76 
had to be spend. But when these low value claims are aggregated, they become public concern. In 
the same case, each of the claims (separately) was in the amount of €0.10, but all of them were in 
the amount of approximately €1,050,000.00.77  In such circumstances, the principles of legal 
certainty and procedural effectiveness require that these small claims be aggregated for collective 
treatment. 
 
d. Type of right vs. type of remedy  
In certain situations, there is only a small difference between the diffuse rights strictu sensu 
and the collective rights strictu sensu.78 Those situations are when the object of adjudication is still 
a collective right, but some of the members may succeed in an individual action, while the others 
may not. For example, currently in the Republic of Macedonia there is a problem with the type of 
therapy provided by the State Health Insurance Fund for patients suffering from chronic 
myelogenous leukaemia. Until recently, the Fund was providing the drug “Gleevec” for patients 
with chronic myelogenous leukaemia, but it replaced the drug with “Imakrebin” as a cheaper 
variant. The patients with chronic myelogenous leukaemia reacted sharply, since for the time being 
the drug “Gleevec” gives much better results, while the drug “Imakrebin” is being withdrawn from 
the market in some countries. Therefore, the patients suffering from chronic myelogenous 
leukaemia require the Fund to start providing the drug “Gleevec”, namely to include it in the 
positive drug list covered by the Fund. All patients have a prior legal link through their status as 
insured persons in the Fund via the compulsory health insurance scheme. Under such 
circumstances, if the patients did not succeed in their demand as group, maybe some of the patient 
                                                          
75 The term common origin does not refer to the same law, the same facts, but rather to simile law, simile facts.  
76 Wagner, G., 2011. Collective redress - categories of loss and legislative options. Law Quarterly Review 2011 
(127), p. 61, p.72. 
77 422,053 (the total number of landline connections) x  69.05 (Makedonski Telekom’s market share) = 291,427 
consumers. The average value of the handling fee for all types of landline packages is MKD 30 (EUR 0.5). 291,427 x 
0.5 = 145,713 x 8 (months) = EUR 1,.165,704.00   
78 A. Gidi, 2003. Class Action in Brazil – A model for civil law countries. American Journal of comparative law, p.356. 
44 
 
would try to exercise their right individually. In case of positive relief, the right to health protection 
(as an indivisible right) shall become individual right from a civil procedure perspective.  
Due to these intermediate situations, the differentiation between the diffuse rights strictu 
sensu and the collective rights strictu sensu is of little practical use from a civil procedure 
perspective,79 because the court does not take care about the type of right, instead it only takes care 
about the type of remedy sought. For example, in the US when an injunction remedy is sought, 
class members are not entitled to opt out of the class, but in case of a monetary remedy sought, 
class members are entitled to opt out of the class.80 From a civil procedure point of view, there is 
only one and always relevant distinction of diffuse, collective, and homogeneous interests (rights), 
which recognises only: essentially collective rights and accidentally collective rights.81 Essentially 
collective rights are indivisible from both substantial and procedural perspective because they 
always belong to the community and they are impossible to divide into quotas attributable to each 
group member. In such cases the court may issue injunctions only. Accidentally collective rights 
are divisible because they belong to individuals and they may be taken to court in the form of 
individual suits. But as there are common question of law and fact, collective relief might be 
granted in such cases through a representative litigation. Therefore, these rights are accidentally 
collective. In such cases the court issues monetary reliefs.  
In the text below the term “diffuse (collective) rights or interests” is used to encompass all 
three types of rights: diffuse rights strictu sensu, collective rights strictu sensu and homogeneous 
individual rights.  
 
5. Representation of diffuse (collective) rights on a class-wide basis  
 
a. The origins of the concept of representation  
As we saw from above, under the traditional civil procedure the courts cannot deal with 
mass cases because a single-plaintiff lawsuit is an inferior method of solving cases which involve 
a vast number of claims. Namely, the traditional civil procedure requires that each of the claims 
be in compliance with the formalities required by the civil procedure, such as submitting a claim, 
                                                          
79 Marinoni, L, and Arenhart, C., 2014. Collective Tort Litigation and Due Process of Law: The Barsilian Expirience. 
International Journal of Procedural Law vol.4/01 pp.47.   
80 FRCP Rule 23 (b) (2) & (3). 
81 Moreira, B. cited by Grinover, P. A., 2007. New Trends In Standing And Res Judicata In Collective Suits. Available 
through. The Global Class Actions Exchange [online] available: <http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/new-
trends-standing-and-res-iudicata-collective-suits-brazil-legislation> [accessed 13 January 2013], pp.8. 
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paying court taxes, hiring an attorney, personal services, submitting evidence, testimonials, etc. 
The problem with this kind of “giant proceedings” was noticed by the English courts in the 18th 
century. Facing numerous claimants in the case of Brown v. Howard (1701)82 , the court allowed 
only few of them to represent the entire manor before the court. 83  In this case, only the 
representatives were formal parties in the proceeding, but the judgment equally bound all claimants 
(even though some of them were not made parties to the suit). In this way, instead of dealing with 
hundreds of claimants, the court dealt only with few of them, and solved the whole legal 
controversy at once.  
What was the legal ground which authorised some of the claimants to act on behalf of all 
other claimants? According to the court, the fact that the right in question was common to all 
tenants (claimants) created no obligation that all tenants must be parties to the suit. Namely, all 
claimants were fighting with the lord because he denied their right of tenancy’s succession. 84 In 
the above case, the court used the interest as a suitable concept of representation of the group of 
defrauded tenants before the court. The interest as a concept of representation presupposes the 
existence of a common interest that many people share. The common interest is the connecting 
(attracting) factor that defines the group because a member of the group would be anyone whose 
personal interest coincides with the common one. As long as his personal interest coincides with 
the common interest (the interests of the entire group), he would be considered member of the 
group. If we take into consideration the fact that one person becomes a member of the group 
because his personal interest coincides with the common one, the same person derives his 
legitimacy to act on behalf of the group from his personal interest (self-interest representation). 
Since the realisation of his personal interest depends directly on the realisation of the common 
interest, as the representative of the group that person would seek the best way to realise the 
common interest.  So, in terms of the case of Brown v. Howard (1701), if those few claimants 
succeeded in the case, it would automatically mean that all claimants would be entitled to tenancy’s 
succession.85 
Having in mind that the legitimacy of interest-based representation is built on the premise 
that the common interest is adequately protected since it coincides with the personal interest of the 
                                                          
82Brown v. Howard, 21 Eng. Rep. 960, 960 (Ch.1701), cited in Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the 
Modern class action. Yale University Press., pp.162-163. 
83 A type of administrative unit in medieval England.  
84 Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., p.162-163. 
85 See more in Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., 
p.280-291. 
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representative and everyone protects their own interest in the best way possible, then each member 
of the group has the right to represent the entire group (class). Given that this concept of 
representation is based on the belief that everyone protects their interests in the best possible way, 
the representative is expected to be "free" to choose the means (ways) for protection of his own 
interest as well as the common one. 
 
b. The concept of common interest today  
The concept of common interests has not been changed since the 18th century. Namely, all 
groups (classes) worldwide in collective redress actions are still defined under the same principle 
that members must share common interests if they want to be recognised as a group (class), 
otherwise they would not be able to reach class certification.  
 
Country  US class action  
FRCP 23  
English rep. 
proceedings  
CPR 19.6  
Swedish group proceeding 
Section 8  
 there are questions of 
law or fact common to 
the class 
where more than one 
person has the same 
interest in a claim 
the action is founded on 
circumstances that are common or 
of a similar nature for the claims 
of the members of the group 
 
The table above shows that in the US, England and Wales and Sweden, the existence of 
common fact or law is the first and crucial element for engaging a representative litigation. The 
existence of common fact or law means the existence of common interest. Therefore, common 
interest is the first and essential element of each representative litigation.  
 
c. Class (group) representatives   
The traditional doctrine of standing (lat. legitimation ad causam) assigns the right to sue 
either to private individuals who “hold” the right or, in case of public rights, to the state itself. The 
basic rule in civil litigation is that standing to sue belongs exclusively to the holder (owner) of the 
right at issue. This rule resulted from the strict division between public and private law since the 
Roman law.  
The “doctrine of standing” at the representative litigation also assigns the right to sue to 
private individuals who “hold” the right, but it empowers them to act as class representatives on 
behalf of all similarly situated persons because their personal interest coincides with the interests 
of the entire class (victims in the same mass case). In this case, the class (group) representative is 
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a member of the class (group) and he derives the legitimacy to act on behalf of the class (group) 
from his personal interest (self-interest representation). This form of representation rests on the 
assumption that everyone knows what is best for himself. 86 
Besides the victims, some of the national jurisdictions recognise that organisations 
(associations) or the state (public authorities) have also standing to initiate collective redress 
procedures as class representatives. In both situations where either an organisation or a public 
authority is a class (group) representative, they are not class (group) members because their 
“personal” right is not subject of adjudication.87 Their legal mandate to initiate collective redress 
mechanisms directly stems out of the law. Even though they are not victims, they have the right to 
initiate a private litigation for the protection of rights which belong to private individuals (victims). 
This form of representation is designated as representation by attribution and it rests on the belief 
that the representative knows what is good for the represented party. 88  Under this form of 
representation, the representative acts as a trustee, not as a victim. This means that both when 
representing groups in collective redress mechanisms, both the organisations and the state (public 
authorities) actually act as trustees of those groups.    
It is different when one person represents someone else’s interest compared with the 
situation when the same person represents one’s own interest. In the first situation (by attribution) 
the representative acts as a trustee, while in the second situation (by self-interest) as an agent of 
one’s own interests.  
All types of class (group) representatives found in each of the focused jurisdictions will be 
analysed in the thesis below.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The three cases presented above i.e. the Telecom case, the EVN case and the Green 
Coalition Case are new types of disputes in the Macedonian civil justice system. All three cases 
are characterised by influence on a large number of the country’s population and have challenged 
the country’s civil justice system.    
                                                          
86 See more in Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., 
p.280-291. 
87 Please see the controversy with the case of Grupptalan mot Skandia v Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia (2003) 
described in the section devoted to the principle of standing to sue in Sweden.   
88 Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., p.280-291. 
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 The Telecom case presented an unacceptable belated ruling by the State Commission for 
the Protection of Competition, which was the direct reason why none of the consumers affected 
was compensated. Namely, all potential damage claims were time-barred at the time when the 
Commission delivered its decision for imposing a fine due to Telecom’s abuse of its dominant 
position. This case included only the punishment effect, while the deterrence and the restitution 
effect were absent.  
 The EVN case also presented an unacceptable belated ruling by the State Commission for 
the Protection of Competition, but regarding the fact that some of the courts confirmed actions in 
the form of unjust enrichment claims, we would say that there was a ruling delivered by the 
Commission on time. Even though we assumed that the Commission had delivered a ruling on 
time, other problems appeared.  Namely, the consumers affected (harmed) were not willing to 
initiate court procedures for compensation because their claims had trivial values and the litigation 
costs were many times higher than the expected compensation. The consumers’ indifference was 
used by the lawyers who took the initiative and filed hundreds of claims for compensation of €0.10. 
The aim of the attorneys was not to ensure compensation for the consumers, but to charge litigation 
costs to the opposing (losing) party. On average, for compensation of €0.10, the attorney’s fee was 
up to €150. The outcome of these cases was predictable - the consumers would succeed in their 
claims, which would automatically give them the right to have their litigation costs reimbursed by 
the opposing party. Hence, the reimbursement of the litigation cost by the opposing party was the 
only reason why the attorneys agreed to pay the court’s taxes from their own “pockets”. The deal 
between them and the consumers was that if the attorney won the case, the litigation costs 
(attorney’s fee) would be split in half. In this way, each claim brought a net profit of €70 in average.  
 The EVN case presented another serious problem for the consumers – a lack of an effective 
mechanism for collective redress (compensation). Instead of such a mechanism, the rules of the 
traditional civil procedure were implemented. The final outcome was that the traditional civil 
procedure in the EVN case delivered unjust results, such as entrepreneurial lawyering, many 
consumers were left uncompensated, high litigation cost, great danger of inundating the courts by 
filing thousands of cases with trivial values, etc. The EVN case involved thousands of consumers, 
and therefore we tried to handle the big number of consumers at once by using some of the 
institutes of the traditional civil procedure which deals with situations where there is a plurality of 
parties. The analysis showed that the procedural institutes, such as the material plurality of parties, 
formal plurality of parties or joinder of proceedings, are either theoretically or practically 
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inapplicable to mass cases. The principal reason lies in the fact that the traditional civil procedure 
was designed for adjudication of individual rights rather than for adjudication of collective rights. 
The results of the analysis have showed the fact that the consumers in Macedonia had no 
effective right of access to court in both the Telecom and the EVN cases. Principally, there were 
two factors leading to such a conclusion. First, the traditional civil procedure showed that it is an 
inadequate mechanism for solving mass cases, and, second, the entire civil justice system does not 
provide enough (other) remedies for solving mass cases.  
In order for the consumers to have an effective right of access to court in the future, a 
comprehensive reform of the current civil justice system has to be made. First, the traditional civil 
procedure has to be adapted for solving mass cases, as it was explained above. Second, the current 
civil justice system has to implement new types of remedies (actions) for solving mass cases. For 
example, the Telecom case pointed out the need for the consumers to be entitled to initiate their 
“own” action (the so-called stand-alone action), while the EVN case pointed out the need for the 
consumers to have at their disposal a remedy for collecting damages on a collective basis (the so-
called follow-on action). The reform list does not end here.  
 … 
   We have seen that the Telecom case, the EVN case and the Green Coalition case differ 
significantly from the regular court cases due to their collective nature. These cases involve the 
so-called collective rights, while the “regular court cases” involve the so-called individual rights 
(“droit subjectif”). Unlike individual rights, for which there is an internationally adopted 
definition, for collective rights there is no uniform definition and there is also an academic 
confusion on the subject. Most of the countries define the collective rights in procedural terms 
(class action, group action, collective redress action, etc.), which is an unsuitable approach. 
Defining the term of collective rights should not be a matter of concern of the procedural law, but 
of the substantive law because the proceduralists should focus on “remedies”, not on “rights”.  
 Under the influence of the academic work of Professor Mauro Cappelletti, the Latino-
American countries have developed a distinctive theory of collective rights. According to the 
Latino-American theory, collective rights are a separate type of rights, substantively distinct from 
individual rights. This Latino-American theory defines collective rights as trans-individual rights 
of an indivisible nature. This theory goes further by making division into diffuse rights strictu 
sensu and collective rights strictu sensu, depending on whether the parties involved are connected 
by circumstances of facts or by prior legal link. Besides ontological collective rights, the Latino-
American theory recognises the so-called homogeneous individual rights. The homogeneous 
50 
 
individual rights are simply aggregated individual rights. Their common origin enables their 
aggregation. The main reason for aggregating individual rights is the procedural economy.  
From a civil procedure point of view, there is only one relevant distinction between diffuse, 
collective and homogeneous interests (rights) which recognises only: essentially collective rights 
and accidentally collective rights. Essentially collective rights are indivisible from both substantial 
and procedural perspective because they always belong to the community and they are impossible 
to divide into quotas attributable to each group member. In such cases the court may issue 
injunctions only (with certain exceptions). Accidentally collective rights are divisible because they 
belong to individuals and they may be taken to court in the form of individual suits. But as there 
is the common question of law and fact, collective relief might be granted in such cases through a 
representative litigation. Therefore, these rights are accidentally collective. In such cases the court 
issues monetary reliefs.  
… 
 In essence, the representative litigation means a possibility for one or several members of 
one group (a representative) to act on behalf of the entire group (standing to sue) drawing their 
legitimacy for doing so from a common interest. Today the common interest is considered a 
connecting (attracting) factor that defines the modern groups. As long as someone else’s personal 
interest coincides with the common interest (the interests of the entire group), he will be considered 
member of the group. Hence, the same person draws his legitimacy to act on behalf of the group 
from his personal interest (a self-interest representation) because his personal interest coincides 
with the common interest. The self-interest representation rests on the belief that everyone knows 
what is best for him or her. The concept of common interests has not been changed since the 18th 
century. Namely, in all national legislations the existence of a common fact or law is a prerequisite 
the employment of their representative devices.  
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CHAPTER TWO – THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
1. The social context which triggered the appearance of representative litigation  
 
a. Representative litigation due to procedural necessity (19th century)   
The appearance of the representative litigation in the USA in the 19th century according to 
Yeazell was not a result of a previously prepared academic and political strategy for the 
implementation of such litigation, but, on the contrary, it was “an ad-hoc response to the problems 
of particular groups.” 89 A good example of those “problematic” groups can be found in the case 
of Smith v. Swormstedt (1853).90 In this case six plaintiffs and five defendants appeared as parties 
before the court, but, in fact, the Southern Methodist Church was the plaintiff and the Northern 
Methodist Church was the defendant. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants actually acted as 
representatives of the Churches where they belonged to at that moment. From a traditional 
procedural law perspective, the claim should have been dismissed because all members of both 
Churches had to be made parties before the court. But the court held that the representatives were 
eligible parties because they were representatives of the people they sought to represent. In that 
context, the US Supreme Court confirmed the decision explaining that:   
“The rule is well established, that where the parties interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object 
common to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others; and a 
bill may also be maintained against a portion of a numerous body of defendants, representing a common 
interest.” 91 
 
The above case shows that the representative litigation in the US in the XIX century is a 
result of the need to “escape” from the rigid rule for compulsory joinder (under which each person 
who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the proceeding) and to have a 
procedure by which a multiplicity of actions where numerous individuals sued a common 
                                                          
89Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press, p.220-221.  
90Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1854), Supreme Court of the USA, 2014. JUSTIA US Supreme Court Center. 
[online] Available at:< https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/57/288/case.html> [Accessed 06 July 2015].  
91 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1854) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=9604dc0f6a6d046d8cdc72a1098404ac&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&
_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzB-zSkAz&_md5=86029b8903c8c2e5c8a8b7ab8cb63bf3&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all 
[accessed 01 July 2015]. 
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defendant on the same legal ground will be avoided.92 Faced with this type of cases, the US 
Supreme Court promulgated its own rule devoted to the representative litigation.93  
 
b. Representative litigation due to society’s needs (20th century) 
There is a difference between the conditions that triggered the usage of the representative 
litigation in the 19th century and the one at the beginning of the 20th century. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, under the influence of different social conditions, the representative litigation was 
in the process of serious reaffirmation. Namely, that period is characterised by lots of market 
failures such as: securities frauds, unlawful practices undertaken by the companies which created 
big ill-gotten gains for themselves, etc. Those failures had tremendous economic, social and even 
political impacts on the US society. In that period, capitalism showed that some of the companies 
on the market gained lots of money by taking fraudulent manoeuvres without being sanctioned. 
The US society faced a new phenomenon, i.e.  “massive” infringements of human rights that had 
the potential to destroy the proper functioning of the economic system as a whole. In that context, 
Kalven and Rosenfield stated that “modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such 
group injuries for which individually they are in poor position to seek legal redress, either because 
they do not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. 94 
Individual litigation was not an option for those group injuries. The US society responded 
to these “massive infringements” by adopting the “class suit” as a technique suitable for solving 
collective disputes. In 1938 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were promulgated, where 
the class suit technique was introduced in Rule 23.95 Rule 23 (1938) regulated three kinds of class 
                                                          
92 Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press, p.221.  
93 That rule was designated as Equity Rule 48 and it was promulgated in 1842, as the first formal source of law that 
projected a representative litigation in the US. The wording of this rule was: “Where the parties on either side are 
very numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before 
it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having 
sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit 
properly before it.”  
94 Kalven, H. and Rosenfield, M., 1941. The Contemporary function of the class suit. Chi. L. Rev. 688, p.3. 
95 FRCP 1938 rule 23: “If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf 
of all, sue or be sued when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is (1) Joint, or 
common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of 
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; (2) Several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims 
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or (3) Several, and there is a common question of 
law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought, (a) Secondary action by shareholders […]. (b) 
Dismissal or Compromise: a class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court. If 
the right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed 
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suits: “the true”, “the hybrid” and “the spurious class suit”. The true class suit [Rule 23 (a) (1)] 
was created as a procedural necessity like the Equity Rules, i.e. it was an escaping rule from the 
rigors of Rule 19 (mandatory joinder).96 The hybrid class suit [Rule 23 (a) (2)] refers to the 
situations in which the court takes guardianship of the property for the purpose of group 
distribution, hence this rule is focused on common distribution rather than on common litigation.  
The spurious class suit was actually seen as the solution for “massive infringements”. The 
spurious class suit [Rule 23 (a) (3)] refers to situations where there is a common question of law 
or fact affecting several rights and common relief is sought, but there has been a prior link between 
the members that connected them. Based on the wording of Rule 23 (a) (3), the spurious class suit 
offered broad possibilities in reality. Namely, the connection point among the “spurious” class 
members is only coincidence, not a jural relationship as it was the case with the first two kinds of 
class suits. In the first two kinds of class suits, there is a prior jural relationship (joint right, distinct 
property) that determines the class, while in the case of spurious class suits the class members 
simply found themselves affected by the same or similar factual event with   thousands of 
individuals because, according to Rule 23 (a) (3), the classes are determined only by a common 
question of law or facts and a request for common relief. This brought the representative litigation 
into the field of delicts (lat. delictus). These conditions can be easily fulfilled in cases like 
bondholders’ suits on guaranties by third persons, damages suits under anti-trust law, shareholders’ 
suits etc.  
Besides all criticism, the “spurious class suit” took all credits regarding the high usage of 
the class suit (representative litigation) in the field of anti-trust cases, financial frauds cases, etc. It 
became a “regular” legal remedy for law enforcement and recouping group losses. The “spurious 
class suit” and all modern multi-party regimes probably lie on the same two elements: (a) private 
law enforcement, when public (state) enforcement “is late” and (b) collecting of the losses in group 
injuries. Consequently, we can conclude that the market failures that produced socially unjust 
results on a large-scale basis were the social conditions that triggered the reaffirmation of the 
representative litigation in the USA at the beginning of the twentieth century. The main function 
of the representative litigation changed from being an “escaping tool” of the mandatory joinder 
principles to being a crucial supplement for governmental regulation of the diffuse markets. 
                                                          
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court orders. If the right is 
one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court requires it.  
96 According to the rule of mandatory joinder, a person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a 
party in the proceeding (FRCP 19). 
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c. The social context in the second half of the 20th century 
In the second half of the XX century the social context in the USA did not change 
significantly. The economy still produced mass delicts situations that were the reason for the 
appearance of consumerism and environmentalism as social movements in the USA. Another 
serious problem that the USA had in that period was racial segregation. In general, these three 
social movements (consumerism, environmentalism and racial segregation) characterised the US 
social context in the late XX century and triggered the process of remodelling the class suit from 
1938. The drafters of the class suit of 1938 tried to respond to these social challenges by tailoring 
a new class suit device. The new class suit device (the class action of 1966) is a more advanced 
version of the representative litigation than the class suit of 1938, but it has more or less the same 
function as the class suit of 1938. The drafters saw the new class suit device as a (private) market-
driven supplement to the governmental regulation of the market, now amended with an additional 
function to eliminate racial segregation.97 The 1966 amendments simply extended the use of the 
class action in the public law field (civil rights cases, voter registration cases, etc.).  
In 1966, the new class suit device was born in the form of “class action”. The Supreme 
Court of the USA promulgated an entirely new Rule 23, which is still in use today. The drafters 
divided the rule into three parts: Rule 23 (proper class action), Rule 23.1 (derivative action by 
shareholders)98  and Rule 23.2 (actions relating to unincorporated associations). 99  The factual 
events (situations) covered by Rule 23.1 and Rule 23.2 back in history were solved through the 
group litigation procedure, so in order to isolate the modern class action from the “old cases” the 
“proper” class action was put apart as a separate Rule 23. 
 
 
 
                                                          
97 Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press, p.243. 
98 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23.1 (a): This rule applies when one or more shareholders or members of a corporation or an 
unincorporated association bring a derivative action to enforce a right that the corporation or association may 
properly assert but has failed to enforce. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff 
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in 
enforcing the right of the corporation or association. 
99Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23.2: This rule applies to an action brought by or against the members of an unincorporated 
association as a class by naming certain members as representative parties. The action may be maintained only if it 
appears that those parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the association and its members. In 
conducting the action, the court may issue any appropriate orders corresponding to those in Rule 23(d), and the 
procedure for settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must correspond to the procedure in Rule 23(e). 
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2. Class action under FRCP Rule 23 (1966) 
 
a. Defining the term of class action and its basic features   
The class action does not represent a joinder device, but, as its predecessors, it is a 
representative litigation in its essence. It continues the American legal tradition of Rule 23 (1938), 
the Equity Rule 38 and the Equity Rule 48. An argument which demonstrates the representative 
nature of the class action is the title of any class action judgment. For example, in the case of Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart Stores (2004), the judgment starts as follows:  
“Betty Dukes, Patricia Surgeson, Cleo Page, Deborah Gunter, Karen Williamson, Christine Kwapnoski, and  
Edith Arana on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WAL-MART STORES,  
INC., Defendant.” 100 
 
The title of the judgment indicates that B. Dukes, P. Surgeson, C. Page, D. Gunter, K. 
Williamson, C. Kwapnoski and E. Arana were formal parties (plaintiffs) in the court proceeding, 
but besides themselves, they also represented all others similarly situated female employees in 
Wal-Mart Stores, who were approximately 1.5 million. The class action is a procedural mechanism 
(a method), not a type of right. This dilemma has been solved by the US Supreme Court in the 
above case holding that the “rule 23 cannot be interpreted to abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.” 101  
The class action can be defined only in procedural terms. That is due to the fact that the 
drafters of Rule 23 were not focused on the type of rights that were going to be adjudicated, but 
on the procedure as a method for solving collective disputes. Rule 23 does not define the term of 
class action, but it simply provides the prerequisites needed for establishing a representative 
litigation i.e. class certification. Indirectly, through the prerequisites set out in Rule 23 it seems 
that the class action may be defined as a civil procedure in which one or more members of a class 
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if the class is so 
                                                          
100 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=e56b040db98b60eaf4bbaa804884435d&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL
&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVztzSkAb&_md5=5597008f2cd1bae18452464b2345f651&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all
> [accessed 05 August 2015]. 
101 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 340 (U.S. June 20, 2011) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=c04e7e503e3dd9b12e8770d0f0ace564&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&
_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzB-zSkAA&_md5=40d49837e1fc49b16920fee32527afd3&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all> 
[accessed 08 July 2015]. 
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numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class, the claims or defences of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defences of the class and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
In general, the class action remained an “interest-based litigation”, which means that the 
connecting factor that keeps the class members together is their common interest. However, not all 
types of class actions are based on the interest as an index of representation. For example, class 
actions under Rule 23 (b) (1) & (2) are based on interests as an index of representation, while class 
actions under Rule 23 (b) (3) on consent. Namely, under Rule 23 (b) (3) each class member is 
entitled to opt out of the class, but is chooses to stay that is interpreted as if he has implicitly given 
consent to stay in the class.  
 
b. Standing to sue 
In the class action procedure, the class is not a formal party, but instead it is represented 
by one or more members of the class called а representative party. Rule 23 (a) starts with the 
sentence: “one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf 
of all members […]” 102 This means that those one or more members are the formal parties in а 
class action procedure.  
The representative parties as formal parties must meet the preconditions set in Rule 17, 
which regulates the standing requirement (lat. locus standi) for individual proceedings. 103 The 
representative parties fulfil the preconditions specified in Rule 17 merely for themselves as parties, 
and not for the group. The representative parties as representatives of the class must meet the 
preconditions of Rule 23 (a), which verify their adequacy to represent the class as a whole. In order 
to be a class representative, besides meeting the preconditions set in Rule 17, the concrete person: 
(a) must be a member of the class; (b) his claims or defences must be typical of the claims or 
defences of the class (typicality requirement); (c) he must fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class (adequacy requirement) and he must be approved by the court.104 
                                                          
102Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a). 
103 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 17.  
104 Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer. P.686-
687; Also please see in Northern District of California, 2004. Manual for complex litigation. [pdf] San Francisco: 
Northern District of California, p. 276. 
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The US class action under FRCP Rule 23 may be initiated by both persons whose rights 
have been allegedly subject of an infringement (victims)105 and organisations.106 Organisations are 
not allowed to ask monetary reliefs on behalf of the class members107, instead they may ask 
injunctive reliefs only.108 Public authorities (the state) are not allowed to initiate class action 
procedures.109 
 
c. Class counsel  
According to Rule 23 (g) (1), the court that has certified a class must appoint a class counsel 
too. The duty of the class counsel is to represent the interests of the class fairly and adequately. 
The class counsel consists of lawyers (litigators) who run the class action.110   
There is no traditional relationship between an attorney and a client in the class action. The 
traditional relationship is based on the client’s consent to be represented by particular lawyers. In 
this case, the client sets the goals and the means through which those goals should be achieved in 
the suit by the lawyer. In the class action, the relationship between the attorney and the client is 
different. Firstly, there is no particular “client”, but lots of unnamed class members. Secondly, one 
cannot ask them about the goals that should be achieved by the lawyer in the suit due to the fact 
that the class action is a mechanism based on interest as an index of representation rather than on 
the consent, as is the traditional representation of individuals. The link that connects the class and 
the lawyer is the lawyer’s capacity to represent the class’s interests fairly and adequately. The class 
members do not inspect the lawyer’s capacity to represent the class, it is the court who does this. 
The court appoints the class counsel, and not the class members. By appointing the class counsel, 
the court provides for the class’s interests to be represented fairly and adequately. Therefore, in 
appointing the class counsel, the court must consider the factors laid down in Rule 23 (g) (1) and 
(4), which generally refer to the counsel’s experience in handling class actions, the counsel’s 
                                                          
105 FRCP Rule 23 (a)  
106 Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. Cal. 1984), cited in Wright, 
A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, K. M., 2010. Fed. Practice and Proced. vol. 18A. St. Paul: Thomson West. §4455, n. 26. 
107 Stuyck, L., Terryn, E., Colaert, V., Van Dyck, T., Peretz, N., Hoekx, N. and Tereszkiewicz, P., assisted by Gielen, B., 
2007. An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through ordinary 
judicial proceedings (final report), Leuven: The Study Centre for Consumer Law – Centre for European Economic Law, 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, p.284. 
108 More about the role of the organisations in the sphere of civil rights protection in Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From 
Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., p.241.  
109 Leuven Report, p.284. 
110 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters. p. 771-772. 
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knowledge of the applicable law and, perhaps one of the most important elements, “the resources 
that counsel will commit to representing the class.”111  
In the case of Krey v. Castle Motor Sales, Inc.(2007)112, the fact that “the plaintiff's counsel 
has appeared before multiple courts in this Circuit and has an extensive practice focused on 
consumer protection issues”, was sufficient for the court to appoint him as the class counsel.  
In class action suits, party autonomy, as a core principle in the traditional civil procedure, 
is seriously limited. Namely, the class action regime does not involve a client who appoint an 
attorney and supervises the attorney’s work. Instead, as it is written in the Manual for complex 
litigation113 “those tasks, by default, fall to the judge, who creates the class by certifying it and it 
must supervise those who conduct the litigation on behalf of the class. Therefore, the judge must 
ensure that the lawyer seeking appointment as class counsel will fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class.” It may be said that “remnants” of the principle of party autonomy can 
still be found in the class action in the form of monitoring the work of the class counsel (and the 
representatives),114 and in certain occasions in the form of communication with the court.115      
 
3. Class certification (admissibility)  
 
There are two implicit and four explicit prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23. 
The existences of a class and of a representative party are the two implicit requirements, while 
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy are the four explicit requirements. The 
certification stage is entirely controlled by the court.116 
                                                          
111 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (g) (1) (a) (4).  
112 Krey v. Castle Motor Sales, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 608, 616 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2007) [online] available 
at:<http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValu
e=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%2
2expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=52d16be0707b39412c54b937109ae0d5&docnum=1&_fmtstr=F
ULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzBzSkAA&_md5=a4896186c80161cb7849129e361fec6e&focBudTerms=&focBudSe
l=all> [accessed 20 July 2015]. 
113 Northern District of California, 2004. Manual for complex litigation. [pdf] San Francisco: Northern District of 
California. Available at: 
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_085307> 
[Accessed 20 July 2015], p.287. 
114 Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica, p.448. 
115 Northern District of California, 2004. Manual for complex litigation. [pdf] San Francisco: Northern District of 
California. Available at: 
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_085307> 
[Accessed 20 July 2015], p.298. 
116 FRCP 23 (a)  
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a. There must be a class 
The existence of a class is the first implicit requirement of Rule 23. There must be a class 
of people before any class action proceeding begins. In the USA, there are thousands of classes of 
people that share some mutual interest, but not all those classes are suitable for a court proceeding. 
Classes where it is almost impossible to identify the members are not relevant for the court system 
at all because in those cases the court actually does not have a party. Only those classes that are 
ascertainable and properly defined have chances of certification. Therefore, the pure existence of 
a class is not enough for the court, but what is required is a properly defined class.    
There is a properly defined (identifiable) class when its members can be ascertained by 
reference to objective criteria. The objective criteria shall enable the court to determine whether a 
particular individual is a member of the class. Individual class members do not need to be identified 
prior to certification, but class membership must be ascertainable prior to the end of the action. 
Defining the class is of crucial importance because it identifies the persons who shall be entitled 
to relief, bound by a final judgment and entitled under Rule 23 (c) (2) to the “best notice 
practicable” in a Rule 23 (b) (3) action. In general, the courts require the proposed class definition 
to be precise, objective and presently ascertainable. 
A good example of a properly defined class is the case of Cates v. Cooper Tire & Rubber 
Co (2008)117. In this case the plaintiffs Earl Cates, Bobbie Grammar and Rita Kervin alleged 
that Cooper Tire & Rubber Company breached its pension and insurance agreement. Therefore, 
they filed a motion on behalf of themselves and on behalf of persons similarly situated for class 
certification against the defendant, and sought to recover the post-retirement health benefits. The 
proposed class was defined as follows:  
“All former hourly employees of Cooper’s […] who retired between November 24, 1991 and February 15, 
2004 with eligibility for retiree health care benefits for themselves, their spouses, and eligible dependents.”118 
 
The proposed class definition is precise, objective and ascertainable because it is very 
simple for the court to determine whether a particular employee is a member of the proposed class. 
Namely, all the court had to do was to determine whether the particular employee was “a former 
                                                          
117Cates v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 253 F.R.D. 422, 424 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2008) [online] available 
at:<http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValu
e=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%2
2expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=2a51d0fd77ac59d621ea9b9f7822fc6a&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FU
LL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzBzSkAA&_md5=5f066a8b6c54d2663c225a4994450353&focBudTerms=&focBudSel
=all> [accessed 12 July 2015]. 
118 Idem.  
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hourly employee” in one of the Cooper’s manufacturing plants and also a member of one of the 
local labour unions that had signed the pension and insurance agreements. In doing so, the court 
asked Cooper to deliver a list of all former hourly employees in that period. In this way, the 
membership of each person in the class could be checked easily and objectively.  
The certification stage in the US is entirely controlled by the court.119 In order to determine 
if the prerequisites for class certification have been met, the judge schedules a formal class 
certification hearing. Unlike some countries, for example England or Sweden, the United States’ 
class action regime has a formal certification phase, which includes a class certification hearing 
and a class certification order.120  
  
b. Numerosity requirement  
 The numerosity requirement simply refers to the number of class members. This 
requirement is met when the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.121 
But, the court first needs to test the applicability of Rule 18 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 
which refers to the procedural category of “joinder of claims”.122 If the court finds that Rule 18 is 
not applicable, it may continue to examine the preconditions for the application of the numerosity 
requirement. Rule 23 (a) (1) does not set any limit regarding the number of members, which 
practically means that one member is enough for class certification. This conclusion was 
confirmed by the court in the case of Dupler v. Costco (2010)123, where Mrs. Dupler was a plaintiff 
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against Costco Wholesale Corporation.  
Even though Rule 23 (a) (1) does not require a minimum number of members, in practice, 
if the class is larger than 50 members, the numerosity requirement is usually considered to be met. 
                                                          
119 Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer. P.698-
683. 
120 Anderson, B. and Trask, A., 2012. The Class Action Playbook. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 21-55. 
121 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) (1). 
122 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters. p. 652-657. 
123  Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 705 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=88510dea4b0ed9cd3abe396f78f08e9a&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&
_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzBzSkAA&_md5=0d67bc7a8e319651a0b4e94c20fc4444&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all> 
[accessed 20 July 2015]. 
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124 The plaintiff has no obligation to identify the exact number of class members, but he must 
provide objective criteria for reasonable estimation of the class members.125  
 
c. Commonality requirement  
The commonality requirement is met when there are questions of law or fact that are 
common to the class.126 This requirement is of qualitative nature rather than of quantitative one. 
This requirement creates the class, or at least it tests the cohesiveness of the class.127  If the 
questions of fact or law differ substantially from one person to another, those people cannot 
represent each other on a representative basis due to the lack of common index of representation 
that might join them. The essence of the representative litigation is the existence of a common 
interest which creates the class. Each class member shares that common interest with the rest of 
the group. Or, as long as someone else’s personal interest coincides with the common interest (the 
interest of the entire group), he will be considered a member of the group.  
In the class action procedure, the commonality requirement applies in a broader sense. That 
means total commonality is not required. Namely, the court in the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc 
(2007)128 ruled that:  
“Rule 23 (a) (2) has been construed permissively and all questions of fact and law need not be common to 
satisfy the rule. Commonality requirement is satisfied by showing that class members have shared legal issues 
by divergent facts or that they share a common core of facts, but base their claims for relief on different legal 
theories.” 
 
This broader application of the commonality requirement is justified because the class 
action is a representative device, while the traditional civil procedure and its category of “co-
litigants” (lat. litisconsortium) is an individual device. In the class action regime, sometimes even 
one significant common question suffices for the commonality requirement to be met. In the case 
of Hernandez v. Chase Bank 2006129 the court ruled that: “a common nucleus of operative fact is 
                                                          
124 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters. p. 750 
125Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), cited in Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, 
K. M., 2010. Federal Practice and Procedure. vol. 7A. St. Paul: Thomsom West. §1762, n.7. 
126 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) (2). 
127 Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer. P.698-
699. 
128 Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9thCir. 2007), cited in Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, K. M., 2010. 
Federal Practice and Procedure. vol. 7A. St. Paul: Thomson West. §1763, n.1. 
129  Hernandez v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 243 F.R.D. 285 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 2006) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=75a82847013b2d11bf83291f79a9da4d&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&
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usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)”. In this case the plaintiffs 
filed an action alleging that the defendants' debt collection practices were against the law. Namely, 
the defendant sent mails to the plaintiffs with allegedly illegal form of letters and documents. The 
single fact who sent those mails was sufficient for the court to satisfy the commonality requirement. 
Also in one product liability class action case, if the claims stemming out of “the same defect or 
defects in one or more specimens of the same product”, the commonality requirement would be 
satisfied.130  
 
d. Typicality requirement   
The typicality requirement is met when the claims or defences of the representative parties 
are typical to the claims and defences of the class members.131 The representative party must be in 
the same “shoes” as the rest of the class. This requirement deserves some criticism. Rule 23 (a) 
requires the representative to be a member of the class. Under such circumstances is it possible for 
one class member to be atypical of another? They should all be typical of each other. If they are 
not typical of each other, then the problem is not in typicality, but in the appropriateness of the 
class definition.  
However, a typical plaintiff is the one who, by proving his claim, automatically proves the 
claims of the other members of the class. The plaintiff’s claim is typical, “if it arises from the same 
event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, or if his 
or her claims are based on the same legal theory.”132  
Due to the “similar” nature of typicality and commonality, many scholars and courts 
promote in their rulings the idea of merging commonality and typicality into one single 
requirement. On this point, the court in the case of Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon (1982) 
133 delivered the following opinion:  
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130 See more in Madden, M. S., 1988. Products Liability (Multiple litigation – The Class Action and Alternatives to It). 
St. Paul: West Publishing Co. p.291.   
131 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) (3). 
132 Mulheron, R. 2004 The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Prospective. Hart Publishing. 
Oxford. Portland Oregon.p.310,  
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“The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for 
determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and 
whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class 
members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” 
 
e. Adequacy of representation  
The requirement of adequacy of representation is met when the representative party fairly 
and adequately protects the interests of the class.134 Anderson and Trask distinguish between 
typicality and adequacy saying that “the typicality requirement asks whether the named plaintiff 
could represent the class, while the adequacy requirement asks whether the named plaintiff should 
do so.” 135  In other words, the adequacy requirement is focused on the capability of the 
representative party. 
An adequate representation of class members’ interests in a class suit is of crucial 
importance to them because the court shall deliver a judgment which shall bind them in their 
absence as formal parties. Therefore, the representative party has a serious obligation to represent 
the absentees’ interests fairly and adequately. Instead of having their day at court, the class 
members would be compensated with a fair and adequate representation of their interests. This 
means that the absent class members had their day in court figuratively. On this point, in the case 
of Cooper v. Pac. Life Ins. Co.136 the court ruled as follows: 
“if absent class members are to be bound by an adjudication of their rights and interests, fundamental notions 
of fair play and justice require that they be represented adequately.” 
 
When the courts examine if the adequacy requirement is met, they focus on two elements: 
the capability of the representative party and the compatibility of the representative party’s 
interests with the ones of the class members. 
In the case of In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig (2006) 137  the capability of the 
representative party was verified. The plaintiffs (investors in the stock market) sued the defendants 
(a company and its key managers) alleging violations of federal securities laws through false and 
misleading statements, which inflated the value of the company's stock. One of the appointed class 
                                                          
134 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) (4). 
135 Anderson, B. and Trask, A. 2012. The Class Action Playbook. Oxford: University Press, p.33. 
136Cooper v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 229 F.R.D. 245, cited in Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, K. M., 2010. Federal 
Practice and Procedure. vol. 7AA. St. Paul: Thomson West. §1765, n.8. 
137  In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89, 96 (D. Conn. Apr. 4, 2006) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=84a9f875efa3ccfa875ebe941d693159&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_
startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzB-zSkAA&_md5=424753f2467a465cf23498def5456b2e&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all> 
[accessed 25 July 2015]. 
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representatives was Mr. R. Warren Ross. The defendants objected that Ross's decision to purchase 
Priceline stock was solely premised upon the advice of his friend, and therefore his claims were 
atypical. The court rejected the defendants’ objection, saying that Mr. Ross was indeed an adequate 
class representative because he knew what the factual basis for the claims was and he had discussed 
the case with the class counsel. He was involved in the prosecution of the case, and he was 
responsive to the defendants' requests. Most significantly due to his background as a bank 
compliance officer, he understood both that he was a fiduciary for the absent members and what 
it meant to be a fiduciary.  
In Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd.138 there were two different 
groups of plaintiffs but their interests were in line. The plaintiffs, a hospital (the end-user) and a 
distributor, alleged that the defendant, i.e. the manufacturer, manifested anticompetitive behaviour 
through an unlawful selling scheme in order to foreclose the competition in the US market for 
"sharps containers". The manufacturer contended that the court should not certify the class because 
there was a fundamental conflict between the distributors and the harmed (end users) by the 
scheme. The defendant argued that the proposed class representatives could not represent the class 
adequately because the class contained a fundamental conflict between (1) distributors who 
received a net economic benefit from the manufacturer's allegedly anticompetitive scheme and (2) 
others, such as end user hospitals, which were harmed by the scheme. The court did not find 
conclusive evidence of a fundamental conflict between the distributors and the hospitals, at least 
with respect to liability issues. Nevertheless, should any fundamental conflict arise, there is a 
mechanism to protect it - the opt-out provision. Accordingly, the court found that the class 
representatives could adequately represent the proposed class as required under Rule 23(a)(4). 
 
4. Types of classes and remedies  
 
When the court has determined that the suit satisfies the two implicit and the four explicit 
prerequisites, it must decide whether the proposed class fits into one of the three types of class 
actions. If the proposed class does not fit into any of the three types of class actions enumerated in 
                                                          
138Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 247 F.R.D. 253 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2008) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=70cd7a753c3c40191edb736afa7bdac1&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&
_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzBzSkAA&_md5=d861dc270607767eda7640e1a4926fea&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all> 
[accessed 30 July 2015]. 
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Rule 23 (b), the court will not certify the class.139. This emanates directly from the text of the Rule 
23 (b) (2): “A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:” […] it continues 
with the types of class actions. The court requires the plaintiff to meet both preconditions set in 
Rule 23 (a) and Rule 23 (b). Rule 23 (b) enumerates three types of class actions:  
- Rule 23 (b) (1) - “mass production version of Rule 19”, 
- Rule 23 (b) (2) - “injunctive (declaratory) class action”, 
- Rule 23 (b) (3) - “damage class action”. 
 
Rule 23 (c) (5) allows, when appropriate, for the class to be divided into subclasses. But, 
in some cases the subclasses are mandatory. For example, a subclass must be created when the 
differences in the position of the class members require a separate representative and a separate 
counsel. These differences may arise from divergences in substantive law, different injuries, etc. 
Each subclass must independently satisfy all the prerequisites of Rule 23 (a) and (b).   
 
a. Rule 23 (b) (1) classes  
 Rule 23 (b) (1) is seen as a mass production version of the Rule 19 because historically the 
inability of the courts to solve group disputes by using the compulsory joinder rule has created the 
representative litigation. Rule 23 (b) (1) is divided into two subtypes of class actions: (a) Rule 23 
(b) (1) (A) “incompatible standards class action” and (b) Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) “limited fund class 
action”. 
 
- Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) – incompatible standards class action 
The text of the Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) reads as follows:  
“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting separate actions by or 
against individual class members would create a risk of:  
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”140 or  
(B) […]. 
 
The class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) is a mandatory type of class action, consequently  
                                                          
139 In this case the prerequisites of Rule 23 (a) were satisfied, but the proposed class did not fit into the proposed type of class 
action. Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 254 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2008) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=b1848c1975b32ee980039a300a8d63e6&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL
&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVztzSkAb&_md5=ccac846cd98231e4f95b514dd46e89e5&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all
> [accessed 01 August 2015]. 
140Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b)(1)(A).  
66 
 
opting out is not allowed for the class members. This means that a judgment rendered under Rule 
23 (b) (1) (A) has indivisible nature and it affects all the members in the same way, without any 
exception. In fact, its existence is due to the need to eliminate the risk of varying adjudications on 
the same legal matter, which must be solved equally for all affected parties. This rule helps avoid 
inconsistency in the legal system.   
 It is hard to find a practical example of this type of class actions, so the theoretical example 
provided by Anderson and Trask is very useful.141 Namely, a holder of water rights is being sued 
by several downriver owners to establish the nature of their respective rights. They sue the upriver 
owner separately. Under such circumstances, it is possible that different courts might render 
incompatible judgments against the defendant providing the downriver owners with different 
rights, in which case, the defendant cannot comply with all courts’ orders because they are 
incompatible, and even antagonistic to each other. In such situations, the court might certify a class 
action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) and all cases would be solved in one suit, equally for all plaintiffs, 
and the defendant would be able to comply with the judgment.   
 With regard to the example above, it can be concluded that the party opposing the class 
must meet its obligation uniformly towards all affected parties (class members), as a prerequisite 
for effectuation of their rights in question. All affected parties must effectuate their rights 
uniformly due to their indivisible nature. Consequently, the court relief issued under Rule 23 (b) 
(1) (A) is indivisible and binds all class members without exceptions. This means that the class 
action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) is an indivisible legal remedy. Due to the above stated 
characteristics, the class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) is the “purest” type of representative 
litigation in the USA.  
 This class action is the successor of the “true class suit” of 1938, which also referred to 
rights that are joint (indivisible) to a particular group of people. The true class suit of 1938 was 
developed as an “escaping rule” from mandatory joinder situations. The concept on which Rule 
23 (b) (1) (A) relies is suitable for cases that seek injunctive relief, and not monetary reliefs because 
when the court grants monetary relief, the class members must be previously provided with the 
right to opt out of the class, which is contrary to the “mandatory” character of the class action 
under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). 
 
 
                                                          
141Anderson, B. and Trask, A., 2012. The Class Action Playbook. New York: Oxford University Press, p.38. 
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- Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) - limited fund classes  
The text of the Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) reads as follows:  
“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting separate actions by or 
against individual class members would create a risk of:  
(A) […] or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that as a practical matter, would be dispositive of 
the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially 
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.142” 
 
The class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) is a mandatory type of class action, consequently  
opting out is not allowed for the class members.  
This class action refers to situations where individual actions “would be dispositive of the 
interests” or “substantially impair or impede” the ability of non-parties to protect their interests. 
This class action considers the situations where the defendant lacks enough funds to satisfy all the 
claims of the potential class members. The aim of Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) is to gather all potential 
creditors into one class and to distribute the fund to all of them equally. In that way, each creditor 
will collect “something”, which is better than “nothing”. In absence of Rule 23 (b) (1) (B), the first 
plaintiffs will be in a more favourable position than the latecomers. The application of Rule 23 (b) 
(1) (B) does not depend on the presence of common right or common facts and law, but it depends 
on the need for proportional (rateable) distribution among the creditors. Based on the 
characteristics specified above, the class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) is called – “limited fund 
class action.” 
The class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) is the successor of the “hybrid” class suit of 
1938. The hybrid class suit had the exact function as the class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (B). 
Namely, the hybrid class action also referred to situations in which the court took custody of 
property for the purpose of group distribution. Based on that rule, the court created a “fund” for 
distribution for all the class members. 143  
 
b. Rule 23 (b) (2) - injunction (declaratory) classes 
The text of the Rule 23 (b) reads as follows:  
“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting separate actions by or 
against individual class members would create a risk of:  
                                                          
142Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b)(1)(B).  
143 In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. "ERISA" Litig., 224 F.R.D. 613, 619 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2004) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&
numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22exp
andedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=10a76efa10a91ac74247a2a919f887f5&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_
startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzt-zSkAb&_md5=776a6b908ca35047994a640e9a4ab4c1&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all> 
[accessed 03 August 2015]. 
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(1) […] ; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.144 
 
The class action under Rule 23 (b) (2) is a mandatory type of class action, consequently  
opting out is not allowed for the class members. The relief issued under this rule binds all class 
members equally without exceptions. The class action under Rule 23 (b) (2) is an indivisible legal 
remedy and it can be issued in the form of injunctive or declaratory relief. This rule enables all 
similarly situated persons to be treated alike.   
  It was mentioned before that three social movements (consumerism, environmentalism 
and racial segregation) triggered the reform of the class action in 1966. This rule was designed to 
protect the rights proclaimed by those three social movements. Therefore, Rule 23 (b) (2) is mostly 
used in civil rights cases, employment discrimination cases, consumer cases, environmental cases, 
etc. The aim of this class action is to change someone else’s behaviour which is not in compliance 
with the law.    
 The only prerequisite for issuing injunctive or declaratory relief is for the party opposing 
the class to have acted or have refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class. The 
defendant’s conduct would not be tested on an individual basis because it only needs to be 
generally applicable to the class. Rule 23 (b) (2) is satisfied and the class can be certified, even if 
some class members have not been injured by the practice challenged. It is sufficient that someone 
else’s behaviour is unlawful and that that behaviour affects a large number of people. On the other 
hand, the class must be cohesive because the second part of Rule 23 (b) (2) requests that the relief 
sought applies to the class as a whole. All potential class members must be affected similarly. The 
cohesiveness of the class is crucial due to the fact that the relief issued under Rule 23 (b) (2) is not 
divisible.  
 The reliefs granted under Rule 23 (b) (2) are non-monetary decrees. These decrees usually 
require the defendant to cease his unlawful behaviour (a negative action), but they may also require 
the defendant to change his labour policy in a certain way (a positive action).145  
 
c. Hybrid class action (combination of remedies) 
 One of the most frequently discussed theme about the class action is the situation when the 
court is faced with requests to certify a class that seeks two remedies under the same class action. 
                                                          
144Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b) (1) (B).  
145 Anderson, B. and Trask, A., 2012. The Class Action Playbook. New York: Oxford University Press. p.243-244.  
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In that case the court has two options, either to certify a divided class or to certify a hybrid class.146 
A recent case that is commonly cited as an example of a hybrid class action is the case of Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart (2004).147 In this case three Wal-Mart employees sued Wal-Mart Stores for alleged 
discrimination based on their sex. The plaintiffs represented a group consisting of 1.5 million 
female employees. It was a nationwide class action and one of the most widespread class action 
ever. According to the plaintiffs, Wal-Mart used and still uses policies and practices that are 
discriminatory for the women who work or have worked in Wal-Mart stores in such a way that 
they were denied equal pay or promotions compared to men. In their action the plaintiffs sought148: 
injunctive and declaratory relief, monetary relief149 and punitive damages (four remedies).  
 The court granted certification in this case for the purposes of liability, injunctive and 
declaratory relief, punitive damages and lost pay. The court divided the action into a liability (stage 
1) and a remedy (stage 2) phase. The liability stage focused on the liability of Wal-Mart regarding 
the allegations that Wal-Mart had a corporate culture which involved gender discrimination. The 
remedy stage focused on the possibility for monetary and damage reliefs to be included in the same 
decree (“hybrid class”). The monetary relief consisted of promotions claims and equal pay claims, 
while the damage relief of punitive damages claims. The court considered that both types of claims 
were manageable under the “roof” of Rule 23 (b) (2) and both types of claims were confirmed by 
the court. in its ruling the court relied on the principle that “monetary relief may be obtained in a 
(b)(2) class action so long as the predominant relief sought is injunctive or declaratory.”150 Because 
the court allowed monetary and damage reliefs to be included under Rule 23 (b) (2), it afforded 
the class with notice and an opportunity to opt out in order to satisfy due process considerations. 
The appellate court confirmed the class certification, 151 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari.152 
According to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs’ monetary and damage claims were improperly 
                                                          
146 See more in Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: 
Thomson Reuters. p. 766-767.   
147Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), cited in Yeazell, C. S., 2012. Civil Procedure. 8th 
ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer. P.882-892.  
148 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
149 Based on the text of Rule 23 (b) (2), the relief issued under this rule could be in a form of injunctive or declaratory 
relief. Monetary reliefs are reserved for Rule 23 (b) (3). But, in their practice, the US courts have allowed the inclusion 
of monetary relief under the “roof” of Rule 23 (b) (2). Namely, a monetary relief is allowed, if it is incidental to the 
injunctive relief sought.  
150  Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. La. Aug. 18, 1998) [online] available at:< 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7c81e195b24c87e778768a3495302c8&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=F
ULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzt-zSkAb&_md5=294a31f160bcf0d2d8364cbe4bbfd5ea> [accessed 07 
August 2015]. 
151Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 659 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2011) 
152Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) 
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certified under Rule 23 (b) (2) because individualised monetary claims belong under Rule 23 (b) 
(3). The essence of Rule 23 (b) (2) is its indivisibility i.e. the relief issued under this rule binds all 
class members equally without exceptions. On the other hand, in this case the lower courts allowed 
a situation where each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or 
declaratory judgment against the defendant. Similarly, Rule 23 (b) (2) does not authorise class 
certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualised award of monetary 
damages.153 In that context, the Supreme Court strongly defended the due process guaranties 
incorporated into Rule 23 (b) (3) holding that:  
“The mere “predominance” of a proper (b)(2) injunctive claim does nothing to justify eliminating Rule 23 
(b) (3)'s procedural protections, and creates incentives for class representatives to place at risk potentially 
valid monetary relief claims. Moreover, a district court would have to re-evaluate the roster of class members 
continuously to excise those who leave their employment and become ineligible for class-wide injunctive or 
declaratory relief. […] It is unnecessary to decide whether there are any forms of “incidental” monetary relief 
that are consistent with the above interpretation of Rule 23 (b) (2) and the Due Process Clause because 
respondents' back pay claims are not incidental to their requested injunction. […] Once a plaintiff establishes 
a pattern or practice of discrimination, a district court must usually conduct “additional proceedings […] to 
determine the scope of individual relief.”154 
 
d. Rule 23 (b) (3) - damage class 
The text of the Rule 23 (b) (3) reads as follows:  
“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting separate actions by or 
against individual class members would create a risk of:  
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy […]. The matters pertinent to these findings include: 
 
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defence of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class  
       members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.155 
 
The class action under Rule 23 (b) (3) is not a mandatory type of class action, so 
consequently opting out is allowed for the class members. The notice for any class certified under 
Rule 23(b) (3) is mandatory.156 The relief issued under this rule binds those class members who 
did not opt out from the class. Rule 23 (b) (3) applies when the plaintiff is primarily seeking 
monetary relief. This class action is used in a wide range of damage actions, such as product 
liability cases, price-fixing cases, antitrust actions, securities-fraud actions, and even personal 
                                                          
153Yeazell, S.C., 2012. Civil procedure. Aspen Casebook Series, pp.889 
154 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 340 (U.S. June 20, 2011) 
155Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b) (3).  
156 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (c) (2) (B). 
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injury cases.157 All these types of mass-tort actions involve many individual questions that are not 
suitable for class-wide treatment. For example, how to prove a personal injury without involving 
individual questions, such as previous medical condition, medical history, diet, sex, age, and a 
myriad of other factors. It seems the broad application of Rule 23 (b) (3) has become its biggest 
problem. The judge must be able to make a distinction between the mass tort cases that involve 
common issues and those ones which do not. Namely, wrong class certification in a mass tort case 
would deprive lots of people from their rights because those rights would become res judicata 
without being adequately represented.  Therefore, besides the prerequisites set in Rule 23 (a), a 
class action under Rule 23 (b) (3) must meet additional two preconditions, that is, the 
predominance of common questions over any questions affecting only individual members and the 
superiority of class action over any available method for adjudicating the controversy.158  
 
- Predominance of common issues 
The predominance prerequisite ensures that common issues prevail over any question that 
affects only individual class members. It is normal to expect that some of the issues will be 
individual, but at least one issue must be common to all class members. Courts have the serious 
task of establishing the common issues which affect all members and if those issues have a 
relatively greater weight compared to the individual issues which appear in the case. The court 
must consider the size and the cohesiveness of the class, as well because a conflict of interests may 
easily arise among the members in these cases, which would lead to difficulties in the management 
of the class. For example, in the case of Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc159 the court found that liability 
predominates over any other individual issue and granted a certification, but the recovery was left 
to be solved afterwards by another method.  
However, the dilemma posted by Friedenthal, et al., (2010, p. 759)160 is still relevant, 
namely “whether the judge is to count the issue and see whether a majority are common, or to 
evaluate the issues and see if the most important are common.”  
                                                          
157 Grabill, J., 2012. Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlement. Seton Hall Law Review vol.42, [online] 
Available at:< http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1418&context=shlrquote the exact URL for 
the article> [09 July 2017].p.139.  
158 See more in Mulheron, R. 2004 The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Prospective. 
Hart Publishing. Oxford. Portland Oregon. p. 220-223. 
159Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 160 (E.D. Mich. 2006), cited in Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, K. M., 
2010. Federal Practice and Procedure. vol. 7AA. St. Paul: Thomson West. §1777, n.13. 
160 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters. 
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- Superiority  
The superiority prerequisite requires the court to determine “whether the class action is 
superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”161 In 
other words the court must compare the proposed class action in respect of the other possible civil 
procedure techniques. Those alternative (available) methods are: joinder, intervention, 
consolidation, a test claim, or an administrative proceeding. 162  
It is good that Rule 23 (b) (3) sets four guidelines for the courts that must be examined 
before they decide on superiority. The first element is the “class members’ interest in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defence of separate actions.”163 This element is closely connected 
with the “value” of the claims. If the proposed class consists of small value claims, the class action 
is superior because the “common issue will be resolved vis-a-vis all class members at once.”164 
Also, instead of dealing with hundreds of attorneys, in the class action procedure the court will 
deal only with one plaintiffs' counsel. But, if the proposed class consists of claims with 
considerable value, the class action might not be superior, since it is more beneficial to the party 
to initiate an individual court proceeding. For example, in the case of Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor 
Co (2008) 165  the court estimated that the class members would not have an interest to run 
individual proceedings because the potential compensation was around $4,000. The second 
element is “the extent and the nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun 
by or against class members.”166 This element is met when there are not many pending court 
procedures for the same matter. If there are, the principle of economic viability would not be 
satisfied with “belated” class certification. The third and the fourth elements raise the question of 
                                                          
161 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b) (3). 
162 Newberg cited in Mulheron, R. 2004 The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Prospective. 
Hart Publishing. Oxford. Portland Oregon. p. 224.  
163 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b) (3) (A). 
164  Hubler Chevrolet, Inc. v. GMC Corp., 193 F.R.D. 574, 582 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2000) [online] available at:< 
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&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVztzSkAb&_md5=350893e43c3abf8f3296b7d84cd28975&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all
> [accessed 12 August 2015]. 
165  Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 628 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2008) [online] available at:< 
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_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzt-zSkAb&_md5=95b215e495a4dd9ce8e691899fc5a3fa&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all> 
[accessed 12 August 2015]. 
166 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (b) (3) (B). 
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the manageability of the class action procedure, such as: appointing counsel, consolidation, jury, 
etc. The final conclusion regarding the predominance and superiority requirements is that it is up 
to the court to estimate in each concrete case whether both requirements are met.  
 
5. Notice  
 
The notice to absent class members is of significant importance for the concept of damage 
class action because it protects the absent members from inadequate representation. The 
requirement of notice protects the due process rights. Namely, each class member must be 
informed about the ongoing court proceeding in which his or her right is subject to adjudication. 
If the party prefers to adjudicate his or her right before the court on an individual basis (this refers 
only to a damages class action), he or she is entitled to opt out of the class.167  
The court must notify the class members in three cases: when the class under Rule 23 (b) 
(3) has been certified,168 in case of a settlement or voluntary dismissal169 and in case some of the 
orders held by the court are combined or altered furthermore in the process.170 We discuss the first 
two types of notices only.  
The question of certification notice is stipulated in Rule 23 (c) (2). The rule makes a clear 
distinction between “prejudice and injunctive classes”, on the one hand, and “damage classes”, on 
the other hand. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) the court may direct 
appropriate notice to the class, while for any class certified under Rule23(b)(3) the court must 
direct notice to class members. Depending on whether the class members can be personally 
identified or not, Rule 23 (c)(2)(b) sets different types of notifications. If the class members “can 
be personally identified through reasonable effort”171, they have a right to be informed through an 
individual notice, usually in the form of a personal mail.172 In case the class members cannot be 
identified through reasonable effort, the court “must direct to class members the best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances,” 173  which usually takes the form of an internet 
                                                          
167 See more in Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica, p.448.  
168 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (c)(2)(B) 
169 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (e)(1) 
170 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (d)(2) 
171 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (c)(2)(B) 
172 Northern District of California, 2004. Manual for complex litigation. [pdf] San Francisco: Northern District of 
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communication, a newspaper advertisement, etc.174  In the case of Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum 
(1984)175, the court found that the notice was directed in the best practicable manner because it 
gave a notice to 33,000 potential class members by first-class mail. 3,400 class members used their 
right to opt out of the class, while the delivery was unsuccessful for 1,500 class members.176  The 
court considered that the minimum due process protection required by the Fourteenth amendment 
of the US Constitution was satisfied in this case because the notice described the claim; and absent 
members were provided with an opportunity to leave the class by returning an opt-out notice to 
the trial court.  
The settlement notice is also obligatory for the court because those members who would 
not opt out of the class would be consequently bound by the settlement. Therefore, Rule 23 (e) (1) 
requires the court to send a “direct notice in a reasonable manner” to the class members. In case 
of a settlement, the courts usually set in the notice two cut-off dates for opting out of the class, and 
call the class members who will stay further in the class to apply for a refund. 177  
 
6. Case management  
 
Damage class actions have a more complex case management structure than the other types 
of class actions, and for that reason they will be subject of analysis. To better explain the case 
management techniques in a damage class action, the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart (2004)178 will be 
used as an example.    
In a damage class action the court has three main tasks: first, to determine the liability of 
the defendant; second, to calculate the damage on a class-wide basis; and, third, to create a plan 
about how the awarded damage will be distributed among members.  One of the greatest concerns 
                                                          
174 See more in Anderson, B. and Trask, A., 2012. The Class Action Playbook. New York: Oxford University Press. 
p.211. 
175Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195 (Kan. 1984) [online] available at:< 
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176 The class in this case consisted of around 33,000 small property owners and over 97% of them were not living in 
Kansas, where the trial took place. 
177Roberts v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21930 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 1994), cited in Hensler., D., Pace 
.M N., Moore, D. B., Giddens, B., Gross, J. and Moller, K. E., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas Pursuing Public Goals for 
Private Gain. Santa Monica: Rand Institute for civil justice. p.145-169. 
178Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), cited in Yeazell, C. S., 2012. Civil Procedure. 8th 
ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer. P.882-892.  
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for the court in a damage class action is to handle “individual questions”, and to determine if the 
proposed class shares common issues (at least one) which will justify the class-wide treatment of 
the case. In doing so, the court may conduct the proceeding as a single trial or as a bifurcated 
trial.179 In the single trial technique, the court determines the liability of the defendant and the 
volume of the damage at once,180 while in the bifurcated trial technique the court divides the trial 
into two stages, where the first stage is focused on the liability issues, while the second stage is 
focused on the calculation of the damage award. For example, in the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
(2004) the court divided the action into a liability phase (stage 1) and a remedy phase (stage 2).  
 
a. Liability stage  
In the above case, the liability stage focused on the liability of Wal-Mart regarding the 
allegations that it had a strong corporate culture which included gender discrimination. The 
defendant objected that determining the liability for the alleged pattern and practice of 
discrimination against the class would be unmanageable because "due process" would necessarily 
require 3,244 individual mini-trials, including a testimony of 3,244 store managers in order to 
determine whether each individual Wal-Mart store discriminated class members employed at that 
store. Wal-Mart also objected that each store had its own store manager and that the manager had 
full discretion over the policy of promotions and payments in that store. Therefore, Wal-Mart 
insisted that each manager’s behaviour from all stores be assessed individually through mini-trials. 
The court rejected the defendant’s objections saying that the focus of the trial would not be on 
individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decision-making. The court would 
also focus on evidence that affected the class in general and not on individuals or other minor 
segments of the class. The court solved the liability issue on a general level, as a pattern or practice 
typical of the company as a whole rather than of a particular store (at individual level).  
The Manual for Complex Litigation enumerates several procedural techniques which are 
used by the US court in dealing with class action cases, such as: “a series of individual trials against 
one or more defendants on all issues”; “a series of consolidated trials on all issues, if they are 
sufficiently common”; “a consolidated common issues trial with some plaintiffs presenting their 
claims against defendants on all issues, yielding findings on common issues”, etc.181  
                                                          
179 Anderson, B. and Trask, A., 2012. The Class Action Playbook. New York: Oxford University Press. p.197. 
180 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters. p.774-775.  
181 Northern District of California, 2004. Manual for complex litigation. [pdf] San Francisco: Northern District of 
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b. Remedy stage   
In the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart (2004)182 the remedy stage focused on the calculation of 
the monetary and damage reliefs sought.  For the monetary relief the court calculated a lump sum 
by using a general formula, where instead of calculating precise and individualised amounts of 
back-pay to each employee, the court determined a lump sum for all claimants which would be 
distributed based on the number of seasons they worked or should have worked.183 
 However, the “lump sum approach” cannot be used in cases which involve highly 
individualised questions, as are the personal injury cases. In these cases, the class may be divided 
into subclasses or the second stage of the proceeding might take the form of mini-trials on 
individual damage claims, where the focus is put on the individual issues only.184   
Another possible method which may help avoid mini-trials in mass tort cases is the so-
called “sampling” technique. 185 This sampling techniques “applies to mass tort cases in which 
individual plaintiffs have a great deal at stake and compensation entitlements are strong.”186 This 
technique works in such a way that several cases are chosen by the court on a random basis and 
each case represents different factual issues. Each of the cases will be adjudicated individually and 
the results of all sample cases will be combined together (a sample average) and multiplied by the 
total number of plaintiffs.187 In this way the sample cases will be awarded actual damages, while 
all other cases will get statistically calculated damage.  
 Another procedural technique which is used to determine both the liability and the volume 
of the damages (single trial) is the fluid class recovery procedural technique. In the well-known 
                                                          
182 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), cited in Yeazell, C. S., 2012. Civil Procedure. 8th 
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183Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1444-1445 (9th Cir. Wash. Mar. 13, 1984)  [online] available 
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case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 188 the court avoided to prove individual damage because 
it could not identify the victim, in addition individual losses were so small that made any separate 
action unfeasible for adjudication. Instead of leaving the overcharges to the defendant, the court 
ruled that Yellow Cab Company should decrease its prices to all customers for a fixed period of 
time.189   
 All the above procedural techniques are based on the same idea: how to generate results 
for a large group of people by using few parties or cases as a platform for generating class-wide 
results. 190 
  
7. Distribution of monetary (damage) awards  
 
In cases where the court may identify the class members, compensation is direct, and each 
of the class members is paid directly. But for those class members who cannot be identified, the 
court is forced to use indirect distribution or the illegal gain would be kept by the defendant. The 
Federal Rules on Civil Procedure are silent on the question, but in their practice the US courts have 
developed several models of distribution of damage awards.  
The most recognised model for the above purpose is the cy-prés distribution model, as an 
indirect model for distribution of monetary (damage) awards.191  This model is applied when it is 
factually unfeasible for the court to identify the class membership (or the membership varies) or 
the distribution is economically unfeasible because distribution costs outweigh the damage award 
itself.192 The above problems occur in the opt-out based models because they always capture a vast 
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number of members, whose membership is hard to identify accurately. 193  Under such 
circumstances instead of leaving the unlawful gain in the defendant’s hands, the US courts use the 
cy-prés model. This model may appear in two forms: as price reduction or as an allocation of the 
damage fund to a third party entity for the indirect benefit of the injured class as a whole (next 
best use).194 In the case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967), rather than leaving the overcharges to 
the defendant, the court ruled that the defendant should decrease its prices (price reduction) to all 
customers for a fixed period of time.195 In this way, even non-class members would benefit, if they 
used the taxi services in the designated period of time. In the case of Six (6) Mexican Workers v. 
Ariz. Citrus Growers (1990)196 the court identified some of the class members and verified their 
claim forms, but for those class member who could not be identified, the court ruled that the 
remaining fund asset (unclaimed damages) should be distributed on behalf of “Inter-American 
Fund for indirect distribution in Mexico” because this Fund provided human assistance projects in 
areas where many of the plaintiffs were believed to reside.  
 Another type of compensation in consumer cases is the use of coupons on the part of class 
members so that they can buy defendant’s products or services with discounts. This type of 
compensation is subject to serious criticism because it forces the consumers to “deal business” 
with the company (the defendant) which has already breached their consumer rights. 197  For 
example, in the case of Roberts v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. (1994)198, regardless of the fact that the 
class members were subject of overcharging, it was agreed that they would be provided with 
coupons to buy soft contact lenses produced by the defendant with a discount.  
 In their practice the US courts also use the model called “reverter fund”, under which the 
remaining amount (unclaimed damages) is returned to the defendant.199 
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8. Funding and costs 
 
In appointing the class counsel, the court has a duty, among other things, to consider  
whether the proposed class counsel (class litigators) has enough resources to represent the class.200 
The class action is a highly cost-consuming procedure. For example, in ten studied cases the 
transaction costs (which include plaintiffs’ costs, attorneys’ cost, costs for notices and the cost for 
managing the settlement fund) ranged from about $1 million to over $1 billion. 201  Such high costs 
are a problem for almost anyone. At this point the US lawyers play a significant role because they 
agree to finance the entire class action and to bear all the risks of the procedure.202 The relations 
between the plaintiffs and the attorneys in such cases are regulated by contingency fee agreements. 
These agreements are concluded under the condition that the lawyer is paid if he wins the case. 
The attorney’s (contingency) fee may be calculated differently, but two most recognised forms are 
the lodestar formula and the percentage formula.203   If a fund is not available (for example, 
injunctive relief was sought), the lodestar formula is usually applied, which calculates the time and 
the efforts which were reasonably put by the attorney on the concrete action.204 If a fund is 
available, the percentage formula is usually applied and the attorneys take a fixed percentage of 
the client’s net recovery.205  
Contingency fee agreements are subject to serious criticism due to the fact that the lawyers 
earn more than the class members. Namely, in the case where the defendant expects to lose 
$1,000,000, the lawyers can expect 20%-30% of the recovery.206 According to other authors the 
lawyer’s fees may range up to 50% of the total settlement value.207  
 Another important aspect which deserves attention is the relation between the “American 
rule” and contingency fee agreements. Under the “American rule” the client pays his attorney (win 
                                                          
200 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (g) (1) (a) (4). 
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or lose) and the attorney’s fee cannot be switched on the opposite (losing) party.208 This means 
that the party does not bear the risk of paying the opposing party’s attorney’s fee, if it loses the 
action (no costs shifting rule).209 On the other hand, the absent class members are not bound by 
the contingency fee agreement because that agreement is concluded between the plaintiffs and the 
lawyers as formal parties.210 In other words, why should the absent class members pay for an 
attorney who was not even hired by them? In the class action regime there is one exception: if the 
attorney (class counsel) wins the case, then all absent class members benefit from his work and he 
will be compensated.211 In damage class actions, compensation comes from the distribution fund 
and it is calculated on a lodestar or percentage basis. This is how the contingency fee system works 
in the US.  
 In the end, according to Rule 23 (h) the attorney’s fees must be agreed by the parties. The 
court has active role in the process of calculating the attorney’s fee because it has a duty to notify 
the class members in a reasonable manner about the time and place when the court hearing would 
take place. At the hearing, the court and the class members are authorised to raise objections about 
the calculation of the attorney’s fees.  
 
9. Res judicata  
 
A court procedure which has ended may not be re-litigated again. The principle of res 
judicata does not allow for the same cause of action to be adjudicated twice. In the absence of the 
res judicata principle, the class action could not achieve its primary goals of legal certainty and 
judicial economy. For the class action regime it is of crucial importance that each class member is 
precluded from the possibility of initiating a subsequent class or individual proceeding on the 
merits already solved on a class-wide basis.  
For example, in the case of Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School 
Dist.212 the plaintiffs were African-American students who alleged that there was segregation in 
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the public schools in Los Angeles. The district court certified the class, but the Appellate Court 
reversed the decision because it had found that a claim filed in another (previous) case, that of 
Crawford v. Board of Education213, was identical with the claim filed in the present case. Namely, 
in the case of Crawford v. Board of Education the class consisted of all African-American and 
Hispanic-American students who attended public schools in Los Angeles. According to the 
Appellate Court the claims were the same in both cases because they focused on the same right 
(the right to an equal opportunity for education) and the parties (the class) were the same as well. 
Thus, the future African-American students who attend (or were going to attend) Los Angeles’s 
schools could use on their behalf the same relief from the Crawford’s case.  
A class member may reserve the right for a subsequent class or individual proceeding, if 
he had used the right to opt out of the class, or if he was not adequately represented by the 
representative party.  
 
10. The need for reform  
 
Mass tort cases are the most critical element of the current US class action regime. The 
“spurious class suit” enacted with the Rule 23 of 1938 is a predecessor of the current damage class 
actions. The intention for the spurious class suit was to regulate the market as a supplement to the 
Government, or in other words the damage class action should be a corrective tool for the consumer 
to use when there is no reaction on market by the state.214 That is the field of anti-trust cases, 
financial frauds cases, where the current damage class action provides good results. 215  The 
problem arose when the damage class action became a mechanism for solving property damages 
cases and personal injuries cases. These cases involve highly individual questions which usually 
predominate over the common questions, which makes these types of cases unsuitable for class-
wide treatment. The traditional paradigm for the damage class action was for it to be a mechanism 
for enforcing regulation and compensating small losses, as a supplement to respective 
governmental agencies. 216  But today, the traditional paradigm for the class action has been 
changed. Namely, the damage class action is increasingly used in mass tort cases which involve 
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personal injury matters and property damage matters. Rule 23 (b) (3) was not originally tailored 
for these types of cases, but somehow they have come to be treated under Rule 23 (b) (3). 217 
Considering both the positive and the negative aspects of the class action regime, Nagareda 
suggested that the position of the class action must be reconsidered again. 218   
 
11. Due process guarantees (party autonomy vs. adequacy of representation) 
 
The USA has an individualistic and a superior society. In line with that, the US litigation 
is based on the theory of individual autonomy, i.e. that no one shall be bound by a judgment in a 
litigation in which one has not been made a party by service of process. The procedural guaranties 
that everyone must have had his day at court derive from the Fifth and the Fourteenth amendment 
of the US Constitution which proclaimed that “[…] nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law […].” The principle of due process of law is the 
benefit of the long-standing battle over the centuries between the citizens and the arbitral 
Government. That principle now safeguards against arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property by 
the Government.  
The traditional civil procedure lies on two corresponding principles: party autonomy and 
party disposition. 219  One of the consequences of these two principles is the optional 
commencement of a civil procedure. Another consequence of these two principles is that the 
claimant has complete control over the claim submitted. This means that he decides which facts 
will be presented before the court in order to prove his allegations.  The claimant is also free to 
withdraw the claim or to settle the claim with the defendant. And the most important consequence 
of these two principles is that no one shall be bound by a judgment in a litigation in which he/she 
was not personally served.220 It seems that the most problematic element of the representative 
litigation seen from a traditional civil procedure aspect is the binding effect of the court judgement. 
A cornerstone principle in the traditional civil procedure is that every party must have had her day 
at court before the binding judgment enters into force. Unlike this, in a representative litigation 
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the judgment binds people who were not even formal parties before the court. This is the breaking 
point where the concept of representative litigation and the concept of traditional civil procedure 
are in collision.  
How should due process guaranties be adjusted to the class action system? The solution 
has been found in the concept of adequate representation of the class members’ interests and the 
best practicable notice for the damage classes. The absentees (unnamed class members) will be 
bound by a judgment, only if their interests have been represented fairly and adequately. On this 
point, in the case of Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig.,221 the court held that: 
“To satisfy constitutional due process concerns, unnamed class members must be afforded adequate 
representation before entry of a judgment which binds them.”  
  
Adequate representation is sufficient for the classes under Rule 23 (b) (1) and Rule 23 (b) 
(2). But for the classes under Rule 23 (b) (3), where monetary reliefs are usually sought, the notice 
is also a mandatory element to satisfy the due process principle. An appropriate notice is a 
guarantee that most of the class members will be informed of the ongoing damage class action and 
they may, if they decide so, stay in the class or to opt out of the class. Opting out is a safe solution 
for the party as he or she would not be bound by the class action judgment. Instead of staying in 
the class, the party may commence an individual civil procedure for the same legal matter. 
Besides the principle of adequate representation, the interests of the absent class members 
in the class action regime are protected by the court as well. Namely, in class action procedures 
the court has a very active role during the trial and also it has great discretionary powers.222 For 
example, the court is authorised to deliver all orders by which it conducts the course of the class 
action procedure, such as certification of the class, appointing class counsel and lead 
representative, directing notices to the class members, making approvals for proposed settlements 
or dismissal of claims, making timetables for undertaking certain procedural activities, etc. 223  
Considering the list of orders that the court may grant, it can be concluded that it has full control 
and full discretion over the two essential elements on which the class action regime is based. These 
two elements are adequacy of representation and the notice for the damage class actions. This 
means that the court examines if the element of adequacy of representation is met, and, if it is met, 
                                                          
221In Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77525 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2007), cited in 
Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, K. M., 2010. Federal Practice and Procedure. vol. 7A. St. Paul: Thomson West. 
§1764, n.16.  
222 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (d). 
223 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (U.S. 1878) cited in Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. 
Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer. p. 712. 
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only the court may grant certification of the proposed class. In addition, the entire process of 
notifying the class members is under the court’s control. It may be concluded that all crucial 
procedural points in a class action procedure are controlled by the court.    
Hence, the final conclusion is that the principle of party autonomy, which is a basic pillar 
of the traditional civil procedure, is switched (traded-off) with the principle of adequacy of 
representation, which is a basic pillar of the representative litigation. This means that the 
representative of the class has an obligation to represent the interests of the entire class fairly and 
adequately. The representative is not the only one to protect the class members’ interests, but the 
court has great discretionary powers over the conduct of the procedure in the entire representative 
procedure. Contemporary procedural systems accept that the principle of adequate representation 
accompanied with the court’s active role over the procedure are sufficient guaranties for the 
protection of the absent class members’ interests. 
 
12. CONCLUSION  
 
In the 19th century the representative litigation was introduced on the American soil due to 
procedural necessity. In that time, the representative litigation was seen as an escaping tool from 
the strict rule of mandatory joinder. The mandatory joinder rule was simply too narrow to 
encompass all interested parties in one single suit. At the beginning of the 20th century the entire 
United States’ society changed. Namely, the United States of America became a well-developed 
industrial society. Common for those types of societies are market failures which always affect the 
economies dramatically. In that time, the United States did not have strong administrative control 
over the market, which triggered the need of a privately driven instrument for market regulation. 
The instrument required was invented in the form of a class suit, particularly the subtype of a 
spurious class suit. The spurious class suit was specially designed to solve anti-trust cases and 
financial frauds cases and soon after it became a supplement in the government’s hands for the 
regulation of the diffuse markets. In the middle of the 20th century the social context in the United 
States of America did not changed a lot. That period is characterised by three major movements, 
which provoked the reform of the class suit rule. Those movements were: the consumerism, the 
environmentalism and the racial segregation. The present model of class action in the United 
States was enacted in 1966 as an answer to the above-mentioned movements.   
The basic characteristics of the class action model are the following. It is a representative 
litigation mechanism, not a joinder device, which means that one or several members of one class 
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(group) may act on behalf of the entire class and the final court judgement binds the entire class. 
It is also an interest-based litigation because the representative party derives its legitimacy to 
represent the class from his/her self-interest, which has to coincide with the common interest. The 
United States class action regime stipulates a mandatory certification stage. The prerequisites 
required for granting a certification are examined in a certification hearing. If the prerequisites are 
met, the court grants a certification in the form of a separate written court order. The required four 
prerequisites are: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.  
The current class action may be found in three forms: a “mass version of Rule 19 class 
action”; an “injunctive (declaratory) class action” and a “damage class action”. The first two types 
are “true” class actions because the members have no right to opt out of the class, while in the case 
of a damage class action the members may abandon the class by opting out. Only the members of 
the damage class actions are entitled to opt out of the class because the courts principally grant 
monetary reliefs only in class action cases certified under the Rule 23 (b) (3).   
The injunction class action and the damage class action are mostly used in the United 
States. The injunctions class action is mostly used in civil rights cases, employment discrimination 
cases, consumer cases, environmental cases etc., and the aim of this type of class action is to 
change someone else’s behaviour, i.e. to force the “big wrongdoers” to comply with the law. The 
damage class action is mostly used in security cases, consumer cases, personal injury cases etc., 
and the aim of this type of class action is to ensure compensation.  
The most complex element of the US class action regime is the so-called “damage class 
action” because under this type of class action the courts grant monetary reliefs. The complexity 
of this type of class action is due to the presence of individual questions inside the certified class, 
which makes the calculation of monetary reliefs on a class-wide basis difficult. In order to handle 
such serious procedural situations, the courts have a wide range of procedural options. For 
example, the court may bifurcate the trial in two stages, where the first stage will focus on liability 
issues, while the second stage will focus on the calculation of the damage award. Furthermore, if 
there is a possibility for the amount of the damage to be calculated “at once” for the entire class, 
the court shall use a method (technique) by which the amount of the damage will be calculated on 
an aggregate basis i.e. a fixed amount which will be distributed among the class members later on. 
If the case involves highly individual questions which hinder the possibility for the amount of the 
damage to be calculated “at once”, the courts may order mini trials on individual damage claims. 
 When the damage award is calculated on an aggregate basis, the court must determine 
which model for distribution shall be used in the cases in question. The most recognised model for 
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the above purpose is the cy-prés distribution model, which is used where it is not feasible for the 
court to use direct compensation for factual or economic reasons. Under this distribution model 
the remaining fund asset (unclaimed damages) is always distributed on behalf of some charity 
organisations. Besides this model, other models for distribution have evolved in the practice of the 
US courts, such as the reverter fund, coupons fund, etc.  
Evidence shows that the damage class action provides good results in cases which include 
overcharging, deceptive sales practices, price-fixing, toxic waste products, etc. The damage class 
action also provides good results in cases where small amounts of consumer losses are 
compensated on a collective basis (scattered loss cases). But the usage of the damage class action 
in personal injury cases and in damaged property cases is under serious question.  
The class action is a highly expensive procedure, which prevents almost everyone from 
initiating a class action. Therefore, the incentives for raising class actions in the USA do not come 
from the parties, but from the lawyers who agree to finance the entire class action and, if the case 
ends successfully, get paid usually on a percentage basis (contingency fee agreement). The 
foundation of the class actions in the USA based on the contingency fee agreements is a question 
of “culture” i.e. that is how the US society works on that particular question.  
Regarding the res judicata principle, for the class action regime it is of crucial importance 
that each class member is precluded from the possibility of initiating a subsequent class or 
individual proceeding on the merits already solved on a class-wide basis. If someone does not want 
to be precluded from the possibility of initiating a subsequent individual proceeding, he may 
reserve that right opting out from the class.  
Regarding the due process guarantees inside the class action regime, it may be said that the 
principle of party autonomy, which is a basic pillar of the traditional civil procedure, is switched 
(traded-off) with the principle of adequacy of representation, which is a basic pillar of the 
representative litigation. This means that the representative of the class has an obligation to 
represent the interests of the entire class fairly and adequately. The representative is not the only 
one who protects the class members’ interests. The court also has great discretionary powers over 
the conduct of the procedure in the entire representative procedure. The contemporary procedural 
systems accept that the principle of adequate representation accompanied with the active role of 
the court in the procedure are sufficient guarantees for the protection of the absent class members’ 
interests. 
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CHAPTER THREE - ENGLAND AND WALES 
  
1. Introduction  
  
 England was the birthplace of group litigation because the English medieval law 
considered the claims and defences of groups routinely.224 Back at that time groups were an 
inevitable part of the English medieval society. But, in the next centuries, the social context 
changed and the groups were replaced by corporations. Unlike the old groups, the corporations 
had an “individual nature” and the need of group litigation spontaneously vanished. Despite all 
social changes in the last two centuries, England225 kept its representative rule. Namely, since 1873 
the representative rule has virtually existed with the same wording.226 In the 19th century the 
English Civil Rules allowed representative actions.227   
 Today England has four generic collective group regimes, as follows: a representative rule 
(representative action), a group litigation order, a follow-on representative action for damages and 
a class action under CAT Rules from 2015. 
 
2. Representative action   
 
a. Admissibility   
 The representative action is regulated in CPR 19.6. Using the wording of CPR 19.6, the 
representative action may be defined as a procedure where a representative claimant (or defendant) 
runs the procedure on behalf of himself and others with whom he shares the same interest (the 
represented class) so the outcome of the procedure shall bind the parties and the represented 
persons as well.   
CPR 19.6 does not include any “class certification stage”; therefore, anyone might appoint 
himself as a representative and the procedure may continue as a representative one. Self-
                                                          
224 See more in Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press, 
pp. 27.  
225 In this thesis England is used to refer to both England and Wales. The United Kingdom is made up of England, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. England and Wales share the same public law and the same civil and criminal 
procedures. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate jurisdictions.  
226 Mulheron, R., 2012. Reports on aspects of collective (class) actions in England and WalesTaruffo, M., 2012. Notes 
on the collective protection of rights. In: I International Conference & XXIII Iberoamerican Procedural Law 
Convention, Bueno Aires, Argentina, ed.2012. Procesos Colectivos: Class Actions.p.116. 
227 Harbour, L and Evans, J., 2012. World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe. edited by P. G. Karlsgodt. Oxford University Press. Canada.p.169. 
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appointment is not in full disposition of the parties, instead it must be approved by the court.228 
CPR 19.6 does not set any limit either on the number of claimants or defendants (the 
representatives) or on the numbers of the represented parties (the represented). The court in the 
case of Emerald Supplies Ltd and another v British Airways plc (2010) also found that there is no 
impediment to a large number either of claimants or defendant to be sued together.229 
A crucial requirement for class certification under the English representative rule is that 
the same interest is shared among the class members. Actually, the entire concept of the English 
representative rule lays on one single element i.e. the identity of interest because CPR 19.6 does 
not require any other prerequisites for employing the representative action. Having this in mind, it 
may be assumed that the English representative rule has a broad usage in England and Wales. 
History, however, shows the opposite. In her analysis of the English representative rules, Mulheron 
talks about two different periods of their interpretation and application. The first period is 
characterised by narrow interpretation of the English representative rules, while the second period 
with more relaxed interpretation. 230  
In the well-known case of Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd (1910) 231 the term 
the “same interest” has been interpreted by the court very restrictively. Briefly, in this case the 
defendant was a company who operated as a see carrier, but its vessel was sunk by a Russian 
cruiser under the suspicion that the vessel was carrying prohibited goods. The claimant party 
consisted of 45 consignors who had cargo loaded on the defendant’s vessel. The proceeding was 
run as a representative proceeding demanding damage for breach of contract and duty in and about 
the carriage of goods by sea. The representative action was not successful because the court held 
that the consignors did not have the “same interest” as the rule required. According to the court, 
the action would have been successful, if there had been: (a) the same contract between all class 
                                                          
228 CPR 19.6(2) 
229 Emerald Supplies Ltd and another v British Airways plc [2010] All ER (D) 200 (Nov) [online] available 
at:<http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValu
e=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%2
2expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=f884800d8cef359a979c785ce4549a06&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FU
LL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVztzSkAb&_md5=95b215e495a4dd9ce8e691899fc5a3fa&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=
all> [accessed 13 July 2017]. 
230 Mulheron, R., 2002. Class actions, The CPR and commencement criteria. Ph.D. Oriel College, Oxford University, 
p.24-48. The analysis encompasses the last three English representative rules from 1883, 1965 and 1999. An identical 
prerequisite must be met in order for each of these three rules to be activated – the same interest. I say three last 
English representative rules because before these rules England had medieval group (representative) proceedings, 
which were used in a completely different social context. 
231 (Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd, 1910 cited in Mulheron, 2002, p.27) 
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members and the defendant; (b) the same defences pleaded by the defendant against the claimants; and (c) 
the same measure of damages claimed by all class members.  
In this case the court concluded that there were separate contracts between the class 
members and the defendant because each consignor singed a separate shipping contract with the 
defendant (separate contracts are not permissible). Regarding the second sub-criterion, the court 
also held that it was not met because there might be factual variations under which the consignors 
had shipped their goods, which would make the defendant raise different defences against each of 
the consignors. Lastly, the court considered that each of the consignors had lost different cargos in 
values, which meant that each of them required a different amount of compensation. Undoubtedly, 
in the Markt case the court interpreted the representative rule remarkably narrow.  
 The next period is more relaxed in the application of the term the “same interest”. Namely 
instead of insisting on having the same contracts or the same defences, in the case of Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (1981)232 the court was searching for “a common 
ingredient in the cause of action of each member of the class.” The defendants contended that the 
cause of action of each member of the class was a separate cause founded in tort. The court denied 
this objection, explaining that all members of the class shared identical interest because they had 
been damaged “in the same way” and the relief sought would be beneficial to all whom the plaintiff 
proposed to represent.  
 In 2011 the High Court took a brave judgement which actually rests on the idea that the 
representative action might be used for awarding damages. That is the case of Millharbour 
Management Ltd and others v Weston Homes Ltd and another company (2011), where the judge 
Akenhead J held that:  
“[…] as the law and practice has developed, it has been held that a claimant is entitled to sue in a 
representative capacity for others and seek damages; the representative claim is not limited to declaratory 
relief […]”233 
 
                                                          
232 Prudential Assurance Co LTD v. Newman Industries LTD, [1979] 3 All ER 838, [1981] Ch 29. [online] Available at: 
http://swarb.co.uk/prudential-assurance-co-ltd-v-newman-industries-ltd-chd-1979 [11.07.2017]. Also cited in 
Mulheron, 2002, p.33. 
233 Millharbour Management Ltd and others v Weston Homes Ltd and another [2011] EWHC 661 (TCC), HT-10-372, 
(Transcript) [online] available 
at:<http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValu
e=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%2
2expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&dedupeOption=0&_m=9ebe46097ed25d5a30ee9f6a0698f541&doc
num=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVztzSkAz&_md5=757a409f396bed8e8f258ee3515d5fcb&focBudT
erms=&focBudSel=all> [accessed 02 July 2016].   
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The approach presented above is far more flexible than before, but in reality, the 
representative rule has not been used in many cases. According to Andrews the reason for the 
extremely limited employment of the English representative rule is that “the Government had no 
stomach for collective big money litigation.” 234  
 
b. Opt-out nature and binding effect  
The English representative rule has an opt-out nature. This conclusion is based on the fact 
that only the representative has the status of a formal party to the procedure, while the members 
of the class do not. 235  Another argument which proves the opt-out nature of the English 
representative rule is the binding effect of the judgment over all persons represented in the claim.236 
The case of Howells v Dominion Insurance Company Ltd (2005)237, where the Chairman and the 
Secretary of a football club filed a claim under insurance policy, was concluded in favour of the 
club house. Formally, there were two claimants (two parties) in the proceeding. On the other hand, 
the defendant (the insurance company) responded with a counterclaim for the return of money paid 
under the policy. The company succeeded in its counterclaim and applied before the court for an 
order granting them permission under CPR 19.6(4) to enforce the judgment against 32 named 
individual members of the club who were not parties to the proceeding. The court granted the 
permission adopting the position that “the judgment […] is binding on the club and all its members 
[…], the payment of the sums can necessarily be enforced against each member". 
The case presented above shows that a judgment delivered under CPR 19.6(4) has a real 
binding potential. However, in the last instance the binding effect of the judgement under CPR 
19.6(4) depends on the court. Namely, CPR 19.6(4) says the judgment binds all persons unless the 
court decides otherwise. This means that the court decides about the “extensiveness” of the 
judgement’s binding effect. Without court permission, a judgment may not be enforced against a 
                                                          
234 See more in Andrews, N., 2013. ANDREWS ON CIVIL PROCESSES - VOLUME 1. Intersentia, p.656.  
235 Idem, p.625-626. 
236 CPR 19.6(4) 
237 Howells and another v Dominion Insurance Company Ltd [2005] EWHC 552 (QB), QB/2004/PTA/0757, 
Q99X02699, (Transcript) [online] available 
at:<http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValu
e=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%2
2expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&dedupeOption=0&_m=76dc60fa3d7b33058f47c1402d713fcb&docn
um=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVztzSkAz&_md5=842faf92177f0f39e5338339ca48d5c4&focBudTer
ms=&focBudSel=all> [accessed 02 July 2016].  Cited by Zuckerman, A., 2006. Zuckerman on civil procedure, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London.pp.510-511. 
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person who was not a formal party to the procedure. By this rule the legislator wanted to prevent 
possible abuses of CPR 19.6.    
 
3. Group litigation order   
 
a. Social context before the GLO’s promulgation 
 The Group Litigation Order (GLO) is a type of court order which was introduced to enable 
efficient case management in multi-party cases.  
The introduction of the GLO was not a brand-new legal institute for the legal system of 
England and Wales because the legal techniques which the GLO uses were already known to the 
English courts to a large extent.238 The experience accumulated by the English courts in the period 
before 1998 has played a significant role in the process of “tailoring” the CPR 19.III because the 
institutes such as appointing a lead solicitor, setting cut-off dates, selecting test (lead) claims, cost-
sharing orders, etc., evolved though practice. 239 
The Opren Litigation Case (1985) is one of the landmark multi-party cases where various 
managerial techniques were used by the court, which later became part of the GLO mechanism.240 
Briefly, over 1.000 plaintiffs brought individual actions claiming personal injuries arising out of 
the use of the drug “Opren” manufactured and marketed by the defendants for the treatment of 
arthritis. So that the “entire case” is solved efficiently, a judge was appointed to assist the parties 
and to help manage the case in a financially viable manner (a managing judge). The judge prepared 
a detailed scheme for conducting the entire litigation. His plan was for some of the claims to be 
selected as test claims because some issues were common to all actions involved. Meanwhile all 
the other claims would be hold and wait for the conclusion of the main trial on liability. More than 
1.000 plaintiffs were involved in the case, who were represented by more than 200 law firms. It is 
almost impossible to run a court procedure in which more than 200 law firms participate. 
Therefore, only six lead solicitors undertook the obligation to represent the whole group of claims 
                                                          
238 Hodges, C., 2001. Multi-party actions. New York, US – Oxford University Press, p. 5.   
239 Zuckerman, A., 2006. Zuckerman on civil procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p.516. 
240 Davies and another v Eli Lilly & Co and others [1985] 1 All ER 801, [1985] 1 WLR 428, [online] available 
at:<http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValu
e=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%2
2expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&dedupeOption=0&_m=18a370f92e572a8c93bffcd8276aba14&docn
um=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzBzSkAz&_md5=5042f6c1e68d2782b48253e7319ee4f4&focBudT
erms=&focBudSel=all> [accessed 02 July 2016].  Also cited in: Hodges, C., 2001. Multi-party actions. New York, US 
– Oxford University Press, p. 327.  
92 
 
(lead solicitors). In order to avoid repetition of the individual pleadings in the case, individual 
statements of claims were not served; instead a Master Statement of Claim was served and the 
defendant responded with a Master Defence. The plaintiffs were required to serve only a writ and 
a short statement of claim in a specific period of time (cut-off date). Another notable order taken 
by this judge is the one on costs. Namely, the judge held that all plaintiffs should pay the costs in 
equal proportions (a cost-sharing order). The case ended with a settlement, where all plaintiffs 
were awarded with a global sum. The global sum was to be distributed among the plaintiffs in 
accordance with a scheme, while the unsatisfied plaintiffs had the right to initiate an arbitration.  
 Besides the experience of the courts in pre-CPR multi-party cases, another factor which 
created the need of establishing the GLO as a new multi-party procedural mechanism was the 
“diagnosis” given by Lord Woolf that England and Wales missed an effective multi-party 
procedural mechanism. In his Final Report on Access to Justice241 he stressed that “the existing 
rules which provide means of dealing with multi-party actions were not drafted with group actions 
in mind and therefore none has provided a sufficient answer to the problems they create.”242 For 
that reason, the civil justice system of England and Wales should be adapted to mass legal actions 
by creating new procedures.243  
Lord Woolf’s first objective focused on access to justice, particularly the cases where none 
of the claims were individually viable from an economic perspective in the sense that no one would 
initiate a court procedure where the costs are higher than the compensation. Lord Woolf suggested 
“facilitated” entrance for these types of cases. But, on the other hand, such increased access to 
court may cause several negative consequences. For example, in the Myodil litigation, 93% of the 
claims were legally aided, which in fact “facilitated” the entrance of cases because claimants were 
released from any obligation to pay the court‘s fee. 244 The results were unexpected because out of 
                                                          
241 See more in Lord Woolf, 1996. Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec4c.htm#c17 [Accessed 17 July 
2016].  
242 Woolf Report, chapter 17 point 7.  
243 According to Lord Woolf, those new procedures should achieve the following objectives: (1) “provide access to 
justice where large numbers of people have been affected by another's conduct, but individual loss is so small that 
it makes an individual action economically unviable”; (2) “provide expeditious, effective and proportionate methods 
of resolving cases, where individual damages are large enough to justify individual action but where the number of 
claimants and the nature of the issues involved mean that the cases cannot be managed satisfactorily in accordance 
with normal procedure”; and (3) “achieve a balance between the normal rights of claimants and defendants, to 
pursue and defend cases individually, and the interests of a group of parties to litigate the action as a whole in an 
effective manner (Woolf Report, chapter 17 point 7)”.   
244 Zuckerman, A., 2006. Zuckerman on civil procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p. 521. 
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approximately 4,000 claims, only 426 were found to be meritorious. This situation is known as a 
“bandwagon effect”, where weak cases (even groundless) alongside with strong cases would try 
to get compensation. 245 In the above case, more than 3,500 unmeritorious claims were filed 
alongside with only 426 meritorious claims. Such a vast number of claims might frighten the 
defendant, who may believe he would lose the case and pay greater fees in the end, which forces 
him to settle the case regardless of its merits. This situation is known as “blackmailing 
settlements”, where under the pressure of a vast number of claims, the defendant settles the case 
regardless of its merits. 246 The results of the case above show that “facilitated” entrance for cases 
before courts should be accompanied by certain safeguards which would prevent possible abuses 
of the court procedure.   
Lord Woolf’s second objective focused on conserving judicial resources. Each multi-party 
action mechanism makes sense if it provides an acceptable model of judicial economy, otherwise 
there is no reason to make exceptions from the principle of individual autonomy. 247  
And the third and last objective оf Lord Woolf focused on the balance between the 
individual and group interests.248 This objective raises the question of whether in a particular mass 
case the employment of a collective redress mechanism would provide socially just results 
compared to adjudicating each claim on a separate (individual) court basis.  
Based on the pre-CPR experience and having in mind the objectives set by Lord Woolf, in 
1998 the Group Litigation Order (GLO) was enacted with effect from April 1, 2000.249   
 
b. Basic features 
CPR 19.10 defines the GLO as:  
“an order […] to provide for the case management of claims which give rise to common or related  
issues of fact or law (the ‘GLO issues’).”250 
 
Based on the above definition, a Group Litigation Order is an order which enables the 
courts to manage a defined group of claims which have common or related issues of fact or law, 
                                                          
245 Gibbons, Susan MC., 2010. Group Litigation, Class Actions, and Collective Redress: An anniversary Reappraisal of 
Lord Woolf’s Three Objectives. Published in The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On edited by Deirdre Dwyer. Oxford 
University Press, p. 115. 
246 Idem, p. 114, 
247 Woolf Report, chapter 17 point 2. 
248 Idem.  
249 Civil Procedure Rules 1998. (19.III). London: HMSO; the GLO was introduced by the Civil Procedure 
(Amendment) Rules 2000 (SI 2000/221). 
250 CPR 19.10 
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instead of investigating every individual claim in detail. The actions brought together under the 
group litigation order remain separate proceedings and each of them must be resolved on an 
individual basis. 251  A GLO is not an order by which the court solves the case finally and 
substantively. Instead, it is an order with a procedural character which enables the court to solve 
one or more issues common to all claims. These issues are, for example, the element of liability of 
a company in a product-liability case, or the element of breach of duty of a company that caused 
injuries to other persons. To solve such issues, the court uses a test claim, while the rest of the 
claims are put on hold. The final outcome (result) of the test claim binds the claims that have been 
put on hold. In case the test claim finishes successfully (it is determined that the company 
defendant is liable for a defect product), the claims which have been put on hold proceed further 
as individual proceedings demanding compensation.  
For the reasons above, the GLO is defined as a case management order rather than a 
representative action. 252 The GLO rule is brief for two reasons.253 Firstly, it is about general 
principles that govern the civil procedure and, secondly, that “brief” approach empowers the 
managing judge to exercise his or her power with considerable flexibility depending on the needs 
of the specific case. The CPR has only six rules devoted to the GLO accompanied with Practice 
Direction 19B.254  
 
c. Standing to sue 
Under CPR 19.10, the Group Litigation Order may be initiated by persons whose rights 
have been allegedly subject of an infringement (victim) and at the court’s own initiative.255 
Organisations are not allowed to apply for a GLO256, expect when their own rights are subject of 
controversy. Organisations may become part of a concrete GLO mechanism as a party representing 
its own right (as a victim), but not as an authorised applicant on somebody else’s behalf. This is 
fully in line with the principle that anyone who may appear before a court as a party may also 
apply for a GLO.257 It is different to representative litigation models (such as the US class action) 
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where the formal parties in the procedure act in the capacity of representatives of unnamed class 
members. In the US class action regime, the representatives have standing to sue, while in the GLO 
there is no representation as there is in the US. In the GLO each claim stays as a separate 
proceeding and each party represents itself only.  
 
d. Application and subject-matter jurisdiction 
An application for a GLO may be filed by the claimant, the defendant and even the court 
at its own initiative.258 The GLO system has no limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction. The 
GLO has been used in cases which involve financial abuses, negligence cases, product liability 
cases, damages which come from plane crashes, etc. 259  
 
e. Certification for a GLO 
A characteristic of the GLO system is the absence of a formal certification stage.260  It 
should be noted that Practice Direction paragraph 3.4 mentions the phrase “before or after a hearing 
of the application”. This implies that “the hearing of the application” is actually the certification 
hearing within which the application for a GLO is examined by the court.  
The text of the CPR and the Practice Direction points to four requirements for group 
certification. The first requirement is the “superiority” of the GLO over any other available 
methods for adjudicating the controversy.261  The employment of a representative action or a 
consolidation procedure are possible methods which the court has to take into consideration.262  
The second requirement is to appoint a “group representative”. In the GLO, the “lead 
solicitor” who is one of the members of the appointed solicitors’ group plays the role of a group 
representative.263 The establishment of a solicitors’ group (a lead solicitor) is of crucial importance 
especially for the court because it makes communication easier. In this way, the court 
communicates with the lead solicitor only rather than with each claimant separately.  
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The third requirement is “commonality”, which requires that there are common or related 
issues of fact or law.”264 With its current formulation, the commonality requirement is flexible and 
wider than the commonality requirement under the US class action regime. In that context Hodges 
concludes that:  
“The English Rule is, therefore, primarily about achieving efficient administrative management of similar 
cases.  It does not, unlike U.S. Federal Rule 23, require that all of the cases are substantively the same and 
raise the same issues of substantive law.  The U.S. requirement for substantive congruence requires a decision 
at the start that the facts of all cases are predominantly identical and that common issues predominate.  In 
contrast, the English approach is more flexible and only requires that some common or related issues arise.”265 
 
The fourth requirement is “numerosity” because the Rule 19.11 demands a “number of 
claims giving rise to the GLO issues,” 266 which can be interpreted as a requirement that there are 
more than one claim.  
If the court identifies all requirements (“GLO issues”), it may grant a GLO.267 The court 
has full discretion over the fact whether to grant a GLO or not. There is a particularity immanent 
for the GLO mechanism only: that the judge is obliged to inform his superiors before he decides 
on whether to grant a GLO or not.268 
If the court decides to grant a GLO, the order must include these three (mandatory) 
elements: “(a) contain directions about the establishment of a register (the ‘group register’) on 
which the claims managed under the GLO will be entered; (b) specify the GLO issues which will 
identify the claims to be managed as a group under the GLO; and (c) specify the court (the 
‘management court’) which will manage the claims on the group register.” 269 
 
f. Group register and notice   
If the court grants a GLO, a group register has to be established.270 The group register is 
usually maintained by the management court, but the court may order that the register be kept by 
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one of the solicitors involved in the case, whereas all group registers in the form of a list are kept 
by Her Majesty’s Court Service. 271 
A claim’s entry into the register has a decisive effect over its legal destiny. Namely, each 
group member enjoys both membership of the group and a general status of a formal party to civil 
proceedings”.272 An order given under the GLO umbrella, irrespective of its effect (a positive or a 
negative one) is binding on the claim that has entered into the register. Therefore, the entry into 
the register is one of the most critical points in group actions processes.  
Any potential claimant who intends to add his claim on the register must meet two 
requirements: (1) the claim must be submitted before it enters the group register273 and (2) the 
claim must meet the entry criteria.274 When submitting his claim, in order to enter into the group 
register, each claimant is required to pay a regular initial court fee. 275 This requirement is under 
serious criticism because the requirement of paying a court fee upfront can easily make the 
potential claimant passive. The second requirement are the so-called entry criteria, which are set 
by the judge who has granted the GLO. Meeting the entry criteria means that the concrete claim 
shares the GLO issues. The managing judge may ask the potential claimant to provide the court 
with the evidence on which he supports his application for entry into the register.276 The managing 
judge examines the evidence and decides whether the respective claim shares the GLO issues or 
not. The entry criteria must be properly defined because they work as a filter for elimination of 
weak and unmeritorious claims. The Myodil litigation277 is a good example of a case where plenty 
of weak and unmeritorious cases came before the court because the entry criteria were not properly 
set. There were two cut-off dates: the first one for notification of potential claims and the second 
one for serving individual statements of case with medical evidence. A flood of 4,000 claims met 
the first cut-off date, but only 426 were found to meet the criteria.278 
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 Another way to enter into the group register is by court order when all pending cases are 
transferred to the management court.279    
There is a time limit on when one can join the register. According to CPR 19.13 (e), the 
managing judge will specify a date after which no claim may be added to the group register (cut-
off dates). The English group litigation is an opt-in system, which means that only those claimants 
who enter the register no later than the deadline set by the court are bound by the final (positive or 
negative) outcome of the particular trial. In any case, if a potential party fails to meet this deadline, 
he can bring a separate proceeding, so long as the claim is not barred under the limitation 
legislation.280 The question of cut-off dates is unavoidably connected with the question of giving 
notice about the issued GLO.  But neither CPR nor Practice Direction contains rules on what kind 
of notice would be considered appropriate. The management court and the solicitors are to solve 
the issue with the notice on a case-by-case basis. Evidence shows that the notice in the UK and 
Wales takes the form of an advertisement.281 
Even though the group register is a mandatory category, the GLO system allows for a 
party’s removal from the register upon an application made by the party.282  
 
g. Case management  
The appointment of a management court is another mandatory element of the GLO 
system.283 This court is the central figure in the GLO system. Having in mind the fact that the GLO 
system is a case management order, the management court plays a crucial role in the proceedings 
as the manager of all cases which share common issues of fact or law. Because the GLO cases are 
complex, besides a managing judge as a principal judge, a Master of District Judge may also be 
appointed who will deal with procedural matters and a judge who will deal with the costs issues 
during the trial.284  
The managing judge must exert full control over the case and to do that the “GLO rules 
create a flexible, highly discretionary framework for managing collective claims.” 285  The 
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managing judge orders that all cases be allocated or reallocated to the multi-track.286 He may order 
for all claims to be initiated before the management court by a specified date287 or specify a date 
after which the group register will no longer accept claims (cut-off date).288  In addition, the 
managing judge selects the lead solicitor 289 and it may publicise the GLO order.290 
The managing judge has full control in the process of adjudication as well. It depends on 
the judge to decide which issues are to be qualified as common and suitable for GLO treatment 
and which issues are to be qualified as individual. For example, the court may order that the trial 
should take the form of a single trial or may bifurcate the trial (split the trial)291 into a trial of 
common issues and a trial on individual issues.292 The judge may also divide the group into 
subgroups as necessary.293  
 
h. Test claims 
A very important case management decision which may be taken by the management court 
is to order for one or more of the claims to proceed as test claims.294 The essence of the test case 
approach is to avoid trials of each individual claim on the common issues. The test case should 
decide a single issue which is common to the claims of all group members (a “GLO issue”), while 
the rest of the claims will be put on hold.295  In that context Hodges notices that:  
“the objective of this approach would be either that one of the issues determined would itself be dispositive 
of the litigation as a whole (for example claims fail on liability) or would be dispositive of issue which arise 
in many claims (for example, the defendants were in breach of duty) […].”296 
 
The court must be very cautious in the process of selecting the test claims because these 
claims shall have a decisive effect on the rest of the claims. Neither the CPR rules, nor the Practice 
Direction stipulate how the test claims should be selected by the judge. The absence of guidance 
in that context gives wide discretion to the judge in the selection process. For example, in the case 
of MMR Vaccine case 297 the judge selected eight lead cases where half of them were selected by 
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the judge, half of them by the defendants. All eight cases were supposed to address the question 
of whether the vaccine was defective or not.  
 
i. Remedies and distribution under the GLO system 
Under the GLO mechanism, it is probably allowed to issue an injunction, but we have no 
data to analyse this question more deeply. 298  The GLO mechanism allows issuing monetary 
(damage) reliefs.299  
Under the GLO mechanism, the judge is obliged to determine the real (actual) damage 
suffered by the claimant, consequently the judge is authorised to award individual 
compensation.300 Both the CPR and the Practice Direction are silent on whether the judge may 
calculate damages on an aggregated basis under the GLO system.301 Bearing in mind that all claims 
remain separate actions and they may be filed before different courts, it is logical for the courts 
not to be allowed to calculate damages on an aggregate basis.  
 Hodge still considers that CPR 19.15 has opened the door for settlements under the GLO 
system because this rule allows for a test claim to be settled.302 This would be a situation where 
the defendant offers a settlement to the claimants. If the claimants accept this offer, both parties 
may calculate an aggregate damage but would also be obliged to set rules on distribution under the 
supervision of the court.   
 
j. Funding and costs 
 The English group litigation has the same problem as the US class action regime. Both 
systems involve high costs which are enormous from an individual perspective. Unlike in the US, 
the state is the dominant funder of the English group litigation through its legal aid schemes. For 
example, in the Opren Litigation case, 2/3 of the claims were aided by the Legal Aid Fund303, 
while in the Pertussis Vaccine Litigation case, the Legal Aid Fund covered expenses in the amount 
of £2 million304. This type of financing is mostly used in England and Wales, where the legal aid 
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rate per capita is the highest in Europe (€53.80 for England and Wales, €13.96 for Ireland, €5.59 
for Germany, €4.64 France and €0.78 Italy).305 For example, the Legal Services Commission spent 
a gross amount of £110,900,000 for ten cases.306  
 Since 1998, conditional fee agreements have been allowed in England and Wales, under 
which if the case ends successfully, the regular fee scale may be doubled.307 On the other hand, in 
the US the attorney undertakes to finance the class suit entirely, but if he wins the case, he will 
take a fixed percentage of the client’s net recovery. In England and Wales, the conditional fee 
agreements are not accepted well, and one of the reasons are the different concepts of how legal 
professionals work. Namely, English barristers work mostly as sole practitioners, which is 
different from the US attorneys who work in the form of big partnerships. The US big partnerships 
have greater financial capacity in comparison with English sole practitioners.308 
As Practise Direction point 16 provides, under the GLO system the costs are divided into 
common and individual costs.309 Common costs are those which are incurred with regard to the 
establishment and maintenance of the GLO scheme as a whole, while individual costs are those 
which are incurred in relation to the individual claims.310 CPR 46 contains further guidance on 
GLO costs.311 This rule makes additional division of common costs into: “(a) costs provoked 
regarding the determination of the GLO issues, (b) costs provoked regarding the determination of 
the test claims and (c) cost provoked for maintenance of the group register.”312 The cost order 
which determines the common costs against group litigants “imposes on each group litigant several 
liability for an equal proportion of those common costs.”313 It should be noted that the liability of 
the group litigants regarding the common costs is several, not joint,314 which means that each 
litigation is liable itself only for paying its portion. Hence, a general principle about the common 
costs under the GLO system is that each group litigant pays an equal share of the common costs.  
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k. GLO effects 
The English group litigation is an opt-in procedure. Unlike in the US, where the class 
members are bound unless they have opted-out, under the GLO system the group members are to 
be bound by a judgment, if they expressly opted-in i.e. have registered in the group register. CPR 
19.12 regulates the res judicata effect of the GLO, saying that:  
“where a judgment or order is given or made in a claim on the group register in relation to one or more GLO 
issues, that judgment or order is binding on the parties to all other claims that are on the group register at 
the time the judgment is given.” 
 
This rule is fully in line with the opt-in nature of the English group litigation. Namely, only 
those claimants who have entered the register can benefit from a judgement given under the GLO 
schema. CPR 19.12 (1) (b) gives power to the management court to decide about the extent to 
which a specific judgment or order is binding on the parties to any claim which is subsequently 
entered on the group register (so-called latecomers).315  The CPR allows exceptions from the 
binding nature of a judgement given under the GLO. Namely, CPR 19.12 (2) allows for a 
judgement given in the group litigation to be appealed by any party who is adversely affected or 
bound by that judgment, but the potential appellant first needs to obtain a permission from the 
management court to do so.  
 
4. Representative action in competition law 
 
a. Basic features  
The English representative action in competition law by its nature is a follow-on 
representative action316 and it came into force on June 20, 2003.317 As the text above indicates 
(sec. 47B, para.2), this representative action is a sector-specific device, which is only allowed in 
the field of competition law (a limited subject-matter). This action has a follow-on nature because 
it can be initiated only after it has been proved that a competition law infringement had been 
committed. According to Sec. 47B, para.3, “such a claim may only be made or continued in the 
proceedings with the consent of the individual concerned”, which makes this action an opt-in 
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based representative mechanism. A formal certification stage is not foreseen for this device, but 
regarding its limited subject matter and its opt-in nature, the two preconditions mentioned below 
must be met in all cases: (a) an anti-competitive infringement has to be previously established, and 
(b) the claims must relate to goods and services received by consumers. Another specific feature 
regarding this action is its limited standing to sue. Namely, only a specified body may initiate this 
action in the capacity of a representative rather than a directly affected consumer. 
 
b. Practice  
So far, the follow-on representative competition action in England and Wales has fallen 
short of the expectations because only one claim has been initiated. That is the case of Consumer 
Association v. JJB Sports (2007)318 initiated by the Consumer Association for price-fixing of the 
England and Manchester United replica football shirts. The affected group of people was estimated 
to hundreds of thousands of shirts’ buyers, but only 130 buyers (consumers) have opted-in, which 
was less than 0.1% of those estimated to be affected.319  
Triggered by the unacceptable results, a reform of the follow-on representative competition 
action has been initiated in England, which is still ongoing. According to the proposal, Sec. 47A 
of the Competition Act shall be reformed on an opt-out basis. Collective action can be brought on 
behalf of business, as well as consumers, in both follow-on and stand-alone cases. Law firms and 
third-party funders are excluded.320 
 
5. Class Action under CAT Rules 2015  
 
a. Basic features  
Since October 1, 2015 the Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter “Tribunal”) has been 
empowered to conduct collective proceedings either as opt-out proceedings or as opt-in 
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proceedings321, in accordance with the Consumer Rights Act 2015322 and Competition Appeal 
Tribunal Rules323 (hereinafter “CAT Rules”). In its nature, these proceedings are class action 
mechanisms because they are “brought on behalf of a defined class of persons by a representative.” 
324 The persons (class members) represented are not formal parties to the proceedings. To better 
distinguish between this and the US class action, the collective proceedings under the CAT Rule 
will be designated as a class action under CAT Rules.  
 According to our sources, only two cases have been recorded so far. The first case D. 
Gibson vs. Pride Mobility Products Limited (2017)325 is still pending, while the second W. H. 
Merricks CBE vs. Mastercard (2017)326  is dismissed. Both cases were initiated as follow-on 
actions on an opt-out basis. The first case is about overcharges in selling mobility scooters, while 
the second case is about the overcharges in using MasterCard cards.     
 
b. Subject matter jurisdiction 
The class action under CAT Rules is a sector-specific instrument which covers competition 
cases only. No other types of cases are allowed under this regime. 327   
 
c. Standing to sue  
Based on the rule from CRA 47B (2), each class action under this regime must be initiated  
by a person who proposes to be a class representative (the applicant). The applicant may, or may 
not belong to the group, but who shall be a class representative depends completely on the 
Tribunal.328 In the appointment phase (whether or not the applicant is a class member), before it 
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authorises the applicant to act on behalf of the class, the Tribunal shall examine the following 
elements: whether that person 
- “would fairly and adequately act in the interests of the class members;  
-  does not have, in relation to the common issues for the class members, a material interest that is in conflict  
   with the interests of class members;  
-  if there is more than one applicant seeking approval to act as the class representative in respect of the same  
   claims, would be the most suitable;  
-  will be able to pay the defendant’s recoverable costs if ordered to do so; and  
-  where an interim injunction is sought, will be able to satisfy any undertaking as to damages required by the  
   Tribunal.”329 
 
 If the applicant is a class member, the Tribunal shall additionally examine “its suitability 
to manage the proceeding”, requiring from the applicant to have knowledge of this type of 
proceeding, ability to manage and control the work of the attorneys, etc.330 For example, in the 
case of W. H. Merricks CBE vs. Mastercard (2017)331 the Tribunal accepted Mr. Merricks as a 
class representative because he had distinguished experience in consumer protection, as a former 
chief of the Financial Ombudsman Services. Under CAT Rules a wide range of “players”, such as: 
non-governmental organisations, consumer organisations, trade assosiations, ad-hoc designated 
bodies, etc. may act as an applicant (who is not a class member). Before authorising any of these 
bodies to act on behalf of the class, the Tribunal will particularly examine the nature, functions 
and motivations of the concrete body for asking to be appointed as a class representative.332  
 
d. Application 
The proposed class representative submits an application for initiating a class action under 
CAT Rules. The applicant is required to submit an application in which he has to present the course 
of the concrete proceeding with all phases in detail.333  
 
e. Certification  
The class action regime under CAT Rules foresees a mandatory case management 
conference, a certification hearing and a written court order for granting or denying certification 
to the collective proceeding. At the case management conference, the Tribunal and the parties 
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determine which preparatory steps would be taken in relation to the certification hearing.334 At the 
certification hearing the class representative applies for a collective proceeding order (“CPO”). 
Upon previous permission given by the court, the putative class members are allowed to express 
their views regarding the concrete proceeding at the certification hearing. At the hearing, the 
Tribunal must resolve two main questions: (a) whether the proposed class representative should 
be certified and (b) whether the proposed class should be certified.  
The CAT Rules set three mandatory requirements which must be met as preconditions for 
class certification:   
 - “the claims must be brought on behalf of an identifiable class of persons,   
 - the claims must raise “common issues”, 
 - the claims must be suitable to be brought in collective proceedings.”335  
 
There is an identifiable class of persons when the members can be ascertained by reference 
to objective criteria.336 As it was already mentioned in this thesis, in the chapter devoted to the US 
class action regime, it must be administratively feasible for the court (here, the Tribunal) to detect 
whether a particular person is a member of the class. Defining the class is of crucial importance 
because it identifies the persons who would be entitled to relief, bound by a final judgment and 
entitled to a notice. For example, in the case of D. Gibson vs. Pride Mobility Products Limited 
(2017)337, the Tribunal accepted the following class definition:  
“any person who purchased a Pride mobility scooter other than in the course of a business in the UK between 
1 February 2010 and 29 February 2012.” 
  
According to CRA Rule 47B (6) the claims may be treated on a collective basis, “if they 
raise the same, similar or related issues of fact or law.” Like in the other collective redress 
mechanisms, total commonality is not required. Instead, there should be at least one common 
element (shared by all members) which will move the entire proceeding forward.338 For example, 
the defendant’s liability is sufficient for the proceeding to move forward as a class action because 
the variations in the causation or in the amount of damage can be solved through establishing 
subclasses, assessment of aggregate damages, etc. In the case of W. H. Merricks CBE vs. 
Mastercard (2017), the Tribunal dismissed the application for a CPO due to lack of 
                                                          
334 CAT Rules no.76 (9).  
335 CAT Rules no.79. 
336 CAT Guide p.74. 
337 Case No: 1257/7/7/16, p.51.  
338 Heaton, N., 2016, p.5.  
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commonality.339 Namely, the Tribunal required the applicant to prove six issues as a precondition 
for verifying the commonality requirement. The first issue was the obligation for the applicant to 
prove that interchange fees from the European Economic Area had an effect on the level of 
interchange fees in the UK. The second issue referred to the obligation for the applicant to prove 
in which amount the interchange fees were higher than the counterfactual interchange fees that 
would have applied in the absence of an infringement. The third issue referred to the level of pass-
through of these interchange fees between the acquiring banks340 and the merchants where the 
claimant bought goods and services. The forth issue referred to the degree to which that merchant 
passed through those overcharges and the percentage impact on its prices. The fifth issue referred 
to the amount that the claimant spent at each of those merchants and the sixth issue referred to the 
possible benefits which were received under that particular card. From all six issues, the Tribunal 
found that only the first issue is truly common, while the rest vary among the class members.341  
The third and last precondition for class certification is the suitability (superiority) of the 
claims to be subject of collective treatment. When evaluating suitability, the Tribunal should 
consider whether the resolution of the common issues would be fair and efficient under the class 
action regime, whether the class action approach would rise or decrease the costs of the proceeding, 
if there are any pending cases and how many they are, what is the size and the nature of the class; 
whether the claims are suitable for the assessment of damage on an aggregate basis, etc.342   
 
f. Case management  
The Tribunal under CAT Rules is empowered with wide and strong discretions.343 The 
Tribunal evaluates both the application for certification and the response submitted by the 
defendant upon which it decides whether to grant a collective proceeding order or not, and whether 
to grant authorisation of a class representative to the proposed class or not.   
Based on the current circumstances in а case, the Tribunal, decides what course the 
proceeding will take. For example, if the concrete case involves individual issues, the Tribunal 
may order bifurcation of the proceeding into a trial for solving common issues and a trial for 
solving any individual issues.344 Considering the strength of the proposed class, the Tribunal 
                                                          
339 Case No: 1266/7/7/16, p.26-35. 
340 Merchant's bank, also known as Acquiring bank.  
341 Case No: 1266/7/7/16, p.26-27 
342 CAT Rules no.79 (2).  
343 CAT Guide p.80. 
344 CAT Guide p.67; CAT Rules no.88. 
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decides whether the collective proceeding should be an opt-in proceeding or an opt-out proceeding, 
and when the cut-off dates should be set.345   
At any time during the proceeding, the Tribunal may at its own initiative order a halt of the 
proceedings or even revoke the collective proceeding order previously granted if the certification 
preconditions are no longer met.346 Under CAT Rules the class representative may not withdraw 
from that position without the Tribunal’s permission.347  Before the class representative starts the 
process of serving notices to the class members, the Tribunal must approve the manner of delivery 
and the contents of the notice.348  
 At the remedy stage, the Tribunal also has great discretional powers. For example, it 
decides on the manner of damage calculations. If the Tribunal has made an aggregate award of 
damages, it provides further instructions on how the distribution process should be managed. In 
the opt-out proceedings the Tribunal orders that the damage award be paid either to the class 
representative or another suitable person.349 In case of а settlement proposed either by the plaintiff 
or by the defendant, the Tribunal’s approval is mandatory. 350    
  
g. Opt-in vs. opt-out approach  
The class action under CAT Rules may appear in two forms, as follows: as an opt-in based 
model and as an opt-out based model. The applicant proposes and the Tribunal decides what model 
should be implemented in each particular case. When the Tribunal evaluates which model to apply 
in the concrete case, the CAT Rules provide the following guidelines. The Tribunal shall consider:  
(a) the strength of the claims; and  
(b) whether it is practicable for the proceedings to be brought as opt-in collective proceedings, having regard 
to all the circumstances, including the estimated amount of damages that individual class members may 
recover.351 
 
The Tribunal evaluates the strength of the claims based on the information provided by  
both parties. If it finds that the claims are strong enough, the Tribunal may decide to apply opt-out 
proceedings because if there are strong claims, it is assumed that class would be cohesive. In the 
case of an opt-in proceeding the Tribunal “compensates” for the strength of the claims with a 
                                                          
345 CAT Rules no.79 (3). 
346 CAT Rules no. 85  
347 CAT Rules no. 87 
348 CAT Rules no. 88 (1) (d) 
349 CAT Rules no. 93  
350 CAT Rules no. 94 (13) 
351 CAT Rules no. 79 (3) 
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consent given by the class members when they have opted-in the proceeding. Moreover, the class 
members have the right to monitor the cases, and in certain circumstances make submissions in 
the proceedings.352 
 The opt-in models are more suitable for the types of cases where the group is small, but the 
claims are with considerable amounts.353 Therefore, if the class members may obtain considerable 
amounts of damage, the opt-in model is the preferred option.  
Under the opt-in based model, the potential class members are required to opt in the 
proceedings no later than the set cut-off day, if they want to be represented on a collective 
basis. Under the opt-out based model, the putative class members are required to opt out 
no later than the set cut-off day if they want to exclude themselves from the proceeding.354 
There is one particularity in the opt-out based model. Namely, if the persons who are not 
domiciled in the UK want to be considered class members, they have to opt in the 
proceeding. “Late coming” into the register is possible, upon a previous Tribunal 
permission.355 
 The register is kept and maintained by the class representative under the monitoring of the 
Tribunal.356 The entry criteria for the register are set by the Tribunal into the collective proceeding 
order.357  
 
h. Notice  
As it was mentioned above, the class representative has the obligation to keep the class 
members informed about each important decision taken in the proceeding. Under the CAT Rules 
the class representative makes the delivery, while the manner in which the class members shall be 
informed is decided by the Tribunal.358 The class representative has to notify the class members 
about: (a) the certification hearing; (b) the cut-off dates; (c) in case of settlement; (d) if the class 
representative intends to withdraw; (e) when the Tribunal delivers the decision; and (f) if the 
Tribunal assesses the damage on an aggregate basis.359   
                                                          
352 CAT Guide p. 76. 
353 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p. 32-34. 
354 CAT Rules no. 82 (1) 
355 CAT Rules no. 82 (2) 
356 CAT Guide p. 80 
357 CAT Rules no. 82 (1) 
358 CAT Rules no. 88 (1) (d) 
359 CAT Guide p.78-79.  
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 For issues relevant only to particular represented persons (a subclass), the notice is 
delivered only to the members who belong to that particular subclass.360  
 
i. Remedies and distribution  
Under CAT Rules, the Tribunal may grant both injunctions and compensatory (damage) 
reliefs.361  
Under CAT Rules, the Tribunal is explicitly authorised to assess damages on an aggregate  
basis. CRA 47 (C) Rule no. 2 states that: 
“The Tribunal may make an award of damages in collective proceedings without undertaking an assessment 
of the amount of damages recoverable in respect of the claim of each represented person.”362 
 
In the case of W. H. Merricks CBE vs. Mastercard (2017) one of the reasons why the 
Tribunal dismissed the application for a CPO was the omission of the applicant to present an 
appropriate methodology for damage’s calculation on an aggregate basis.363 Namely, both expert 
witnesses in the case provided the same opinion that the method proposed (per capita distribution 
on an annualised basis) could not be applied in that particular case.364 
In cases where the Tribunal makes an aggregate award of damages, it must provide in its 
judgment further instructions (a method) on how the aggregate damage is to be quantified for each 
class member who claims compensation. In its judgment the Tribunal must also appoint a 
“liquidator” who will distribute the damage award among the class members. The class 
representative himself or an independent third party may take the role of a liquidator.365 The 
liquidator collects the claim forms from all beneficiaries (class members) and is obliged to apply 
the method for quantification given by the Tribunal. 366 The beneficiaries are required to submit 
their applications before the liquidator to a certain date (cut-off dates).  
When the Tribunal is notified that the full amount of damage is not distributed (unclaimed 
damages), it may order for the unclaimed damages to be used to cover any costs made by the class 
                                                          
360 CAT Rules no.88 (2) & (3) 
361 Heaton, N., 2016, p.3. 
362 CRA 47 (C) Rule no.2 
363 Case No: 1266/7/7/16, p.28. 
364 Idem, p.35.  
365 CAT Rules no. 93 (1) 
366 CAT Rules no. 92 (1) (c) 
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representative or to pay for charity purposes.367 The above approach may be used in both opt-in 
and opt-out proceedings.368  
Under the CAT Rules, the parties may settle the case upon Tribunal’s approval. CAT Rules 
make a difference between whether the collective proceeding order has been granted in the case 
or not. If a collective proceeding order has not been granted in the case, all procedural guaranties 
which apply in ordinary collective proceedings are secured during the settlement process by the 
Tribunal.369  
Punitive damages are not allowed under the CAT Rules class action system.370 
 
j. Preclusive effect of a judgment rendered under CAT Rules 2015 
CRA 47 (B) Rule no. 12 provides a confirmation for the representative character of the 
class action under CAT Rule. It states that: 
“Where the Tribunal gives a judgment, or makes an order in collective proceedings, the judgment or order is 
binding on all represented persons, except as otherwise specified.”371 
 
Based on the above rule, all class members who have opted in (in an opt-in model) or who 
have not opted out (in an opt-out model) shall be bound by the final decision delivered by the 
Tribunal. In the opt-out proceedings, persons who have no domicile in the UK shall be bound by 
the final decision delivered by the Tribunal, if they have opted-in the proceeding.372 Each class 
member shall be precluded from the possibility of initiating a subsequent class or individual 
proceeding on the merits already solved on a class-wide basis.  
The same principle applies in case of a collective settlement approval order.373 
 In case of subclasses, or persons represented individually, the Tribunal shall specify (enlist) 
to whom the judgment shall not have a preclusive effect.374  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
367 CRA 47(C) Rule no. 5 
368 CRA 47(C) Rule no. 4 
369 CAT Guide p.85-90. 
370 CRA 47(C) (1).  
371 CRA 47 (B) Rule no. 12 
372 CAT Guide p. 81 
373 CAT Guide p. 95 
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k. Funding and costs  
 The class action under CAT Rules applies the same principles regarding the litigation costs 
as the GLO.375 The so-called “damage based agreements” are particularity of the class action under 
CAT Rules. These agreements work on the same principle as the contingency fee agreements 
because the fee is calculated on a percentage basis from the damage awarded to the client.376 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
  
England is the birthplace of the group litigation. Throughout the time various multi-party 
mechanisms were in place in England. At the moment, England has a representative action (opt-
out regime), a group litigation order procedure (opt-in regime), follow-on representative actions 
(opt-in regime) and class action which may be used either as opt-in or as opt-out model.  
 The English representative action has an opt-out nature and it is a pure kind of 
representative litigation because the absent members are represented by a representative and later 
on all of them shall be bound by the judgement without any exception. Despite the fact that this 
action is a classical model of representative litigation, it was and it still is barely used in practice. 
The reason lies in the strict requirement for all group members to share, not a common, but the 
same interest (identical interests). There is the same interest if it derives from the same contract, 
if all opposite parties have the same defences and all claimants require the same measure of 
damages.377 Such a strict requirement is not suitable for a representative litigation; instead it 
resembles the traditional civil procedure category of “co-litigants”. Hence, this type of action is 
expected to have limited usage in the future. However, the answer to the question why the legislator 
has imposed such a strict requirement should be sought in the reasons which led to the 
promulgation of the representative action. Back in the 19th century, these representative actions 
were not designed for collective treatment of rights with a common origin, but they were designed 
as a procedural necessity.  
 … 
 In the 1970s and 1980s the English society faced mass tort cases. These mass tort cases 
had different ontology compared to the cases which were solved under the representative action 
(CPR 19.6). These cases involved a greater number of persons, for example, thousands of persons 
                                                          
375 CAT Rules no.98.  
376 CAT Guide p.95. 
377 Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd, 1910 cited in Mulheron, 2002, p.27 
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injured in a similar way by the same company, but in separate life events. Indeed, these victims 
shared a common, but not the same interest, which prevented the employment of the representative 
action. In that context Lord Woolf concluded that the legal system of England and Wales should 
be adapted to mass legal actions and the existing techniques of a collection of individual cases 
should be replaced by new procedures. 
 Before the implementation of the GLO rule, the English courts already had significant 
experience in handling mass legal actions. In the absence of a suitable representative device, the 
English courts were “forced” to create techniques for handling mass legal actions. The techniques 
invented by the English courts later became a law.  
The Group Litigation Order is not a final judgement but an order which enables the courts 
to manage a defined group of claims which have common or related issues of fact or law, instead 
of investigating every individual claim in detail. The GLO works as a platform for handling a large 
number of related claims. Under the GLO platform, the management court defines the entry criteria 
and sets a time limit for bringing claims. There is no formal certification stage. All claims from 
England and Wales are allocated and transferred before the management court. Subsequently, this 
court selects several claims to be processed as test claims. The issues common to all claims, such 
as the liability of one manufacturer who allegedly released defective products, are resolved through 
such test claims. After that all claims may proceed further for the determination of the individual 
harm. It happens rarely, but in certain cases a lump sum may also be agreed. In the period 2001-
2015, around 94 GLOs were issued in all kinds of claims. 
… 
 The present follow-on representative action in England was enacted in 2003 and at the 
moment it is under an ongoing reform. It is a sectoral representative action with an opt-in nature. 
So far only one case has been resolved using this action, but with unsatisfactory results. Namely, 
the affected group of people was estimated to hundreds of thousands of shirts’ buyers, but only 
130 buyers (consumers) have opted-in, which was less than 0.1% of those estimated to be affected. 
The present ongoing reform should transform the action from an opt-in into an opt-out model. The 
action can be brought on behalf of businesses and of consumers as well in both follow-on and 
stand-alone forms.  
… 
 The GLO is not used as it was expected, while the representative follow-on action has been 
applied only in one case. Both mechanisms are opt-in based models. Apparently, the criticism that 
opt-in systems easily sweep in far fewer claimants proved to be true in England. The opt-in systems 
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are more accurate, but they are also more expensive for the consumers. Namely, each consumer 
who wants to enter into the group register must file a claim. The average costs for issuing a claim 
form may be up to £1,700. These costs hinder those who cannot afford to pay the amount and they 
also discourage the claimants with small claims. It seems that the opt-in systems may easily work 
as barriers to access to justice. 
 … 
 It seems that all criticism addressed to the GLO has been taken into serious consideration 
by the drafters of the class action model under the CAT Rules from 2015. Namely, under this 
regime, the Tribunal may “set” the proceeding according to the type of case which is subject of 
adjudication. If the class is strong enough, the Tribunal shall use an opt-out proceeding model, on 
the contrary, if the class is not cohesive enough, the Tribunal may use an opt-in proceeding model. 
Furthermore, if the case involves individual questions, the Tribunal may use a subclass approach 
in order to establish at least one common question which will move the entire procedure forward. 
In case the losses are too low to be determined on an individual basis, the Tribunal may calculate 
the damage on an aggregate basis. The greatest omission of the GLO is the lack of rules for damage 
distribution. The class action model under the CAT Rules has foreseen a detailed scheme for 
damages distribution, transfer of the damage award to the class representative and a cy-près 
distribution model for unclaimed damages.  
 Under this regime, the Tribunal has wide and powerful discretions, but the whole procedure 
is borne by the plaintiff. In our opinion, this regime requires highly motivated plaintiffs with 
serious financial resources who will run such proceedings for great fees. The other option is serious 
financial support by the government given to various public bodies.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – SWEDEN  
 
1. The multi-party litigation context in Sweden before 2002  
 
Sweden has a respectable history in the sphere of consumer protection. Bodies for 
consumer protection have been established in Sweden since the 1970s. The National Board for 
Consumer Disputes (in Swedish: Allmänna reklamationsnämnden)378 was established in 1968 
based on an idea dating back to the 1950s.379 Its main task is to settle business-to-consumer 
disputes. A proceeding before the ARN can be initiated by a consumer, by the Consumer 
Ombudsman, by an association of consumers or wage-earners. The latter three entities can initiate 
a proceeding before the ARN on a collective basis (on behalf of a group of consumers).380 Group 
proceedings before the ARN are based on an opt-out principle. ARN’s decisions are simply 
recommendations and cannot be subject of enforcement. If the opposite party refuses to comply 
with the ARN’s decision, the Consumer Ombudsman may initiate a group action before the 
ordinary (general) courts.  
Besides the ARN, there is also another body whose primary task is to safeguard consumer 
interests. That body is the Swedish Consumer Agency (in Swedish: Konsumentverket).381 The 
Swedish Consumer Agency is a government agency and it is headed by the Director General who 
is also the Consumer Ombudsman (in Swedish: Konsumentombudsman). Among the others 
discretions, the Consumer Ombudsman has the capacity to initiate a legal action on behalf of 
consumers. The Consumer Ombudsman may take a case to the ARN, the civil courts, or the Market 
court.382 Since 2002 the Consumer Ombudsman has had the right to bring a public group action 
before the ordinary (general) courts.383  
Before 2002 consumer protection in Sweden operated outside the ordinary (general) 
courts 384 . Serious debates about possible implementation of a court-based collective redress 
                                                          
378 The English version of their webpage is: http://www.arn.se/other-languages/english-what-is-arn/ 
379 See more in Hodges, C., Benohor, I and Banda, N.C., 2012. Consumer ADR in Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon. 
pp. 239.  
380  See more in Persson, A. H., Collective enforcement: European prospects in light of Swedish experience, In 
Collective Actions. Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interest (Red: Wrbka, S & Van Uytsel, S. & 
Siems, M,) Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 350-355. 
381 The English version of their webpage is: http://www.konsumentverket.se/Other-languages/English-Engelska/ 
382 Hodges, C., Benohor, I and Banda, N.C., 2012. Consumer ADR in Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon. pp. 248-
249. 
383 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35. pp. 14.  
384 Idem, p.10.  
116 
 
mechanism started in the 1990s, when a working group (Commission) was established by the 
Swedish Parliament (Sveriges Riksdag). The Commission focused its work on three areas, such as 
consumer law, environmental law and gender-based discrimination. In its Report (1995) the 
Commission concluded that Sweden lacked an efficient procedural system for the adjudication of 
certain types of smaller claims and it significantly needed to improve the protection for group 
claims. Because the opt-out regimes provide better protection for small claims cases, the Report 
proposed the enactment of a law that would provide for an opt-out group action mechanism.385 But 
under hard lobbying, organised mainly by the business sector, the enactment of the Group 
Proceedings Act was postponed for several years and the previous opt-out concept was 
transformed into an opt-in concept. 386 The Swedish Group Proceedings Act (hereinafter “GPA”) 
was promulgated on 30 May 2002 and it came into force on 1 January 2003.387  
 
2. Swedish group action (2002) 
 
a. Definition and subject matter jurisdiction 
The Swedish group action is a representative action because, being representatives of 
several persons (group members), the plaintiffs may bring an action with legal effects for them.388  
Under this model the group members are not formal parties to the group procedure and the final 
court judgement has preclusive effect over all of them.389 
The Swedish group action is applicable to all civil cases that can be brought before the 
general (district) courts390 according to the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure391 (except Chapter 
1, Sec. 3d),392 unless otherwise stated in this act. The Swedish group action is also applicable to 
all environmental cases that can be brought before the environmental courts.393 Competent courts 
                                                          
385 Sparrman, G. and Goransson., L. 2012. World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around 
the Globe. edited by P. G. Karlsgodt. Oxford University Press. Canada. pp.198. 
386 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35, p.12.  
387 Lag (2002:599) om grupprättegång. The text of the Group Proceedings Act may be found at  
http://www.government.se/contentassets/ee615abb083742e88b9fd4fac8f82183/group-proceedings-act-
2002_599.pdf 
388 GPA art.1.  
389 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35, p.15.  
390 GPA Sec.2 (3). For more about the Swedish Court System, please see Ortwein, B.M., 2003. Swedish Legal 
System: An Introduction. IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.pp.422-424. 
391 GPA Sec.2 (1) and (2). The Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure was promulgated in 1942 (SFS 1942:740) and 
came into force on 1 January 1948. Amendments of the Code in force as of 1 January 1999 (SFS 1998:605). 
392 This section of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure refers to small claims cases.  
393 GPA Sec.2 (3) 
117 
 
which may deal with group actions are only those general (district) and environmental courts 
which are designated by the Government as capable of handling these cases.394 The group action 
procedure is concentrated in a few specialised courts because many district courts have no capacity 
to deal with these cases because they are small. 395  
 
b. Standing to sue and types of group actions  
In Sweden, the right to bring a group action (standing to sue) depends on the type of group 
action. According to the GPA396, a group action may be instituted as a private group action, an 
organisation action or a public group action.  
 A private group action may be initiated “by a natural person who, or legal entity that 
himself, herself or itself has a claim that is subject to the action.”397 Anyone who is affected by the 
“subject of the action” has the right to bring a private group action has, and they can be either a 
natural or a legal person. Having in mind that their personal interest is adversely affected by the 
subject of the action, they belong to the group of people whose interests are similarly affected by 
the subject of the concrete action (a group representative as a member of the group).398  
 An organisation action may be initiated “by a not-for-profit association […] that protects 
consumers or wage-earners.”399 Every not-for-profit association (a qualified body) whose primary 
objective is consumer protection (consumer cases) or environmental protection (environmental 
cases) has the right to bring an organisation action.400 Therefore, this action has limited subject-
matter jurisdiction because it may be instituted only in consumer or environmental cases. 
The GPA does not require an organisation which intends to initiate an organisation group action 
to be formally recognised or approved by the State or any other public authority.401 Namely, any 
                                                          
Official webpage of the Swedish land and environmental courts. http://www.domstol.se/Funktioner/English/The-
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394 GPA Sec.3.  
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398 Civic Consulting (Lead) and Oxford Economics, 2008. Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
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organisation which is a not-for-profit association and in accordance with its rules protects the 
consumer or environmental rights has the right to bring an organisation group action. There are no 
additional conditions. For example, in the case below, the not-for-profit organisation “Grupptalan 
mot Skandia” was registered in October 2003, a couple of months before the proceeding was 
initiated.  
A public group action may be initiated “by a nominated and suitable public authority”402 
GPA Sec. 6 requires the public authority to be suitable regarding the subject of the claim and to be 
nominated by the government.403 For example, the Consumer Ombudsman is a nominated suitable 
public authority which has the right to bring public group actions.404   
In organisation and public group actions, the plaintiffs are not considered group members 
because they are not holders of the rights which are subject of court protection (a group 
representative who is not a member of the group). This is inconsistent with the traditional concept 
of standing to sue, 405 which requires the party who asks for court protection of a specific right to 
be a holder of that right or the court would reject the claim due to the lack of “procedural 
legitimacy” (standing to sue). Hence, in case an organisation or a public authority initiates a group 
action on its own, the group action would be considered a private one, and they would be deemed 
group members.406 For example, the case of Grupptalan mot Skandia v Försäkringsaktiebolaget 
Skandia (2003)407 was first initiated as an organisation group action by the non-profit organisation, 
but in the course of the process it has transformed into a private group action due to the transfer of 
the rights which were subject of adjudication in that proceeding on behalf of the organisation which 
had started the concrete action as an organisation group action. In other words, the organisation 
continued to run the procedure as a holder of its own right, which was the reason why the previous 
organisation group action was transformed into a private group action.   
 
                                                          
402 GPA Sec.6. 
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University Press. Canada.  
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c. Application  
From a formal aspect, the application for a group proceeding is treated as an ordinary claim 
according to the rules of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure. There are two ways of initiating 
a group action in Sweden408: first, by submitting an action to the competent district court409 and, 
second, by submitting a request for an ongoing proceeding to be converted into a group 
proceeding.410 Besides the written application, the transformation from an “ordinary” claim into a 
group action is conditioned by a consent of the defendant because the procedure was issued ab 
initio under the rules of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure rather than under the rules of the 
Group Proceeding Act 2002.411 In case the defendant denies the proposed transformation, the court 
still has a discretion to transform the individual procedure into а group proceeding. If the 
application is evidently unfounded, the court may dismiss it immediately.412  
 
d. Certification criteria  
А  feature of the Swedish group action mechanism is that the Group Proceeding Act 2002 
does not formally recognise a certification stage. In Sweden, the judges are not required to make 
a formal certification order, but they certainly have to evaluate whether the claim meets the formal 
requirements set by GPA Sec. 8. 413  
GPA Sec. 8 regulates the certification criteria (prerequisites) which must be met before the 
group action is employed as a representative device. From the text of GPA Sec. 8 it may be seen 
that the Swedish legislator had a simple and flexible approach in the process of defining the 
certification criteria. Namely, these criteria are less formal than the US class action certification 
criteria, but they are stricter than the GLO certification criteria. In the GPA, some of the criteria 
are set explicitly, while some are set implicitly.     
The first prerequisite is the commonality requirement. GPA Sec. 8 (1) requires:  
“the action is to be founded on circumstances that are common or of a similar nature for the claims of the 
members of the group”. 
 
The GPA does not provide further instructions on how the term “common or similar 
circumstances” should be interpreted, but in the next sub-paragraph stipulates that the claims may 
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not differ substantially among members.414 Based on the wording of GPA Sec. 8 (1) in our opinion 
the Swedish group action regime, like the US class action regime, does not require total 
commonality. However, the Swedish group action regime is more flexible than the US class action 
regime because in Sweden the judge is not required to ensure that the common issues predominate 
over the individual issues, which is a mandatory element for the damage class action in the USA. 
415
 
The second requirement is the superiority requirement. GPA Sec. 8 (3) requires:  
“the larger part of the claims to which the action relates cannot equally well be pursued by personal actions 
by the members of the group”. 416 
 
The Swedish group action requires the group action to be the best available procedural 
alternative in comparison with the other procedural techniques, such as joinder, consolidation, 
etc.417 When the courts test superiority, they can separate the claims of different kind in order to 
see which claims are recoverable on an individual basis and which are not. If the claims are 
individually recoverable and running individual proceedings is justified from a costs perspective, 
the group action is not a superior mechanism and personal (individual) actions should be initiated. 
418  
The third prerequisite is the appropriate definition of the group. GPA Sec. 8 (4) requires:  
“[…] the group, taking into consideration its size, ambit and otherwise is appropriately defined,” 
 
Every group’s definition depends on the specific circumstances of the case, for example, 
on the nature of the claims, the demand for relief and the cause of action. A properly defined group 
in a broader sense means that all members inside that group are “in the same shoes” and are typical 
of each other. Perhaps in GPA Sec. (4) some elements of the U.S. typicality requirement might be 
recognised. For example, the case of Devitor v Telia Sonera AB (2006)419 was dismissed due to 
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the fact that the group was not defined appropriately (GPA Sec. 8 (4)). In this case Telia Sonera 
(the largest telecom operator in Sweden) was sued on grounds that it billed more than it should 
have according to the previously defined rate for mobile phone minutes. The court called the 
plaintiff to define the group according to the GPA Sec. 8 (4), but the plaintiff did not respond and 
due to this the case was dismissed.  
The fourth prerequisite is adequacy of representation. GPA Sec. 8 (5) requires:  
“[…] the plaintiff, taking into consideration the plaintiff’s interest in the substantive matter, the plaintiff’s 
financial capacity to bring a group action and the circumstances generally, is appropriate to represent the 
members of the group in the case.” 
 
GPA Sec. 8 (5) demands two elements i.e. the plaintiff must be able to stand the financial 
burden of the case and the plaintiff must be suitable to represent the group (a group representative). 
In Sweden, there is a general rule that the plaintiff cannot be asked to guarantee for the defendant’s 
cost in case he loses the case. The court asks the plaintiff to demonstrate their financial capacity 
to cover the ongoing cost of the group action procedure only.420  For example, the court in the case 
of Grupptalan mot Skandia v Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia (2003) 421  considered that an 
amount of 200,000 euros was enough to cover the ongoing cost of the procedure. Regarding the 
suitability of the plaintiff as a representative of a group action, the GPA enhances this requirement 
with the obligation for each private or organisation group action to be represented by an attorney, 
unless the court decides otherwise. 422  
 
e. Establishment of the group and notice 
 The Swedish group action is an opt-in based representative action. Upon the judge’s 
approval that the claimant’s application for a group proceeding meets the certification criteria, the 
group is to be formed. The GPA does not contain provisions for establishing a group register, 
which gives discretion to the judges regarding the manner of forming (establishing) the group.   
The first task of the judge in Sweden regarding the formation of the group is to supervise 
whether the claimant has defined the group properly because he is required to do so in the 
application.423 A properly defined group is of crucial importance in the process of establishing the 
group. Therefore, the definition of the group should be based on facts which indicate that there are 
common or similar circumstances which are allegedly shared among the potential members. This 
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task is usually accomplished by providing the court with names and addresses of all potential 
members.424 As it was already mentioned above, the court in the case of Devitor v Telia Sonera 
AB (2006)425 dismissed the application for a group proceeding because the group was not defined 
appropriately.  
One of the pillars on which every opt-in system is based is the notice.426 If the application 
for a group proceeding is not dismissed, then the court must notify all group members in an 
appropriate way.427 Having in mind that the GPA does not formally recognise a certification stage, 
the fact that the application is not dismissed, actually means that the application has fulfilled all 
“certification criteria” which enable the procedure to be “certified” as a group proceeding.    
 The potential members whose names and addresses are known to the court are served with 
a personal notice (according to the Code for Judicial Procedure).428 The potential members whose 
names and addresses are not known to the court are informed in another suitable way (radio, 
advertisement in a newspaper, etc.) about the ongoing group proceeding (according to the Group 
Proceeding Act).429 The notice consists of a short description of the subject of the claim, a short 
description of the procedure, personal data of the plaintiff and the attorney (if any), a notification 
of the opportunity to enter the procedure, the legal effect of the judgement, etc.430 Besides this first 
notice addressed to the group members, the GPA regulates an obligation for the court to notify the 
group’s members for other important procedural orders and in case of a proposed settlement.431  
A mandatory element of each notice is the cut-off date set by the court.432 Namely, each 
potential member who wants to participate in the group proceeding must officially opt in by 
submitting an application to the court. Unlike the GLO system, where the group members are 
required to submit formal claims as a precondition to being registered into the group register, under 
the Swedish group action regime the potential members are required to registered themselves only. 
                                                          
424 Sparrman, G. and Goransson., L. 2012. World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around 
the Globe. edited by P. G. Karlsgodt. Oxford University Press. Canada. pp.203. 
425 Case no. T-5254/2006. The details about the cases from Sweden are taken from the National report: Group 
Litigation in Sweden prepared by Lindblom, P. H cited in the text; from the webpage of the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law [https://www.biicl.org/]; and from the article written by Sparrman, G. and 
Goransson., L. 2012. World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe. edited by 
P. G. Karlsgodt. Oxford University Press. Canada.  
426 GPA Sec. 13. 
427 GPA Sec. 13.  
428 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35. pp. 15. 
429 Idem.  
430 GPA Sec. 13 (2).  
431 GPA Sec. 49 
432 GPA Sec. 13 (4). 
123 
 
By registering, the potential members become group members, but not parties to the 
proceedings.433 The potential members who fail to notify the court in writing within the period 
determined by the court (the cut-off date), “shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the group.”434 
In the practice, the size of the groups ranges from 500 members in the case Åberg v 
Elefterios Kefalas (2003) 435 , 2.000 members in the case The Consumer Ombudsman v 
Kraftkommission i Sverige AB (2004)436 and 6.300 members in the case Carl de Geer et al v The 
Swedish Airports and Air Navigation Service (2007)437 etc. The largest ever tried group action in 
Sweden was the Scandia case438 which should have covered 1.2 million members, but the action 
was withdrawn before the notification process was carried out.  
 
f. Case management  
The GPA does not contain a precise procedural framework within which the court shall 
manage the group action procedure, instead it contains several rules devoted to the case 
management powers of the court.  
For example, the court has the obligation to monitor the work of the plaintiff during the 
entire trial, in that way ensuring that the group members’ interests are adequately protected. If the 
court considers that the plaintiff does no longer represent the group members’ interests appropriate, 
the court may suspend the plaintiff.439 In such case the court shall appoint someone else who is 
entitled to bring action in accordance with GPA Sec. 4-6.  
Under the GPA Sec. 49, the court has the obligation to keep the group members informed 
about every important procedural decision, such as if the plaintiff has been recalled, if the plaintiff 
has changed the attorney, if some issue has arisen regarding the approval of the risk agreement, 
etc. 440  The plaintiff also has the obligation to allow group members to express their views 
                                                          
433 Persson, A. H., Collective enforcement: European prospects in light of Swedish experience, In Collective Actions. 
Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interest (Red: Wrbka, S & Van Uytsel, S. & Siems, M,) 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 348. 
434 GPA Sec. 14. 
435 Stockholm District Court, case number T 3515, 2003; The details about the cases from Sweden are taken from 
the National report: Group Litigation in Sweden prepared by Lindblom, P. H cited in the text; from the webpage of 
the British Institute of International and Comparative Law [https://www.biicl.org/]; and from the article written by 
Sparrman, G. and Goransson., L. 2012. World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe. edited by P. G. Karlsgodt. Oxford University Press. Canada.  
436 Idem, Umeå District Court, case number T 5416, 2004.  
437 Idem, Nacka District Court, Environmental Court, case number M 1931, 2007.  
438 Idem, Stockholm District Court, Case No. T 97/04. 
439 GPA Sec. 21.  
440 GPA Sec. 49.  
124 
 
regarding the procedure and even to participate in it, but these procedural possibilities are approved 
by the court.441 
GPA Sec. 18 authorises the judge, if he finds appropriate, to allow the plaintiff to expand 
the group action to include other claims of the members of the group or new members of the group, 
if that operation would not cause serious delay to the entire procedure.442  
The GPA does not explicitly contain a rule as to whether the court in Sweden may select 
test claims,443 but it contains rules which allow the court to divide the group into subgroups.444  In 
complex cases where more than one issue is to be solved and where an issue affects only some of 
the group members, the court may create a subgroup. For example, the court has created three 
subgroups in the case of Pär Wihlborg v The Swedish State through the Chancellor of Justice 
(2007).445 In short, in this case the plaintiff and the members were private importers of alcoholic 
beverages from other EU Member States via the Internet. On the other hand, the beverages were 
confiscated by the Swedish Customs due to smuggling. The plaintiff and the members did not 
agree with the Swedish Customs’ ruling and initiated this group action claiming damages from the 
State. The court decided to divide the members of the group into the following three subgroups:  
- Subgroup 1: members who recovered alcoholic beverages that they claimed had deteriorated, 
- Subgroup 2: members who refused to recover the alcoholic beverages, referring to the fact that the 
optimal deadline for the consumption of the beverages had expired, and  
- Subgroup 3: members who did not have the opportunity to recover their alcoholic beverages as these had 
been destroyed by customs. 
 
The plaintiff may withdraw the group action. Depending on the phase in which the concrete 
procedure is, there are different consequences of such a decision. For example, if the group action 
is withdrawn within the time period for giving notice, the case will be dismissed without consulting 
the group members.446 But, if the group action is withdrawn after the expiry of the cut-off date, 
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any group member may inform the court that he intends to enter as a party in the case and bring 
action concerning his right.447 
 
g. Remedies and distribution  
Under the Group Proceeding Act the plaintiff may seek injunction reliefs, declaratory 
reliefs and monetary (damage) reliefs.448 The compensation of damages may be on the basis of 
contractual or non-contractual liability.449  
The courts in Sweden may grant interim judgements. GPA Sec. 27 regulates that “if 
appropriate […] the court may issue a judgment that for [...] other members of the group involve 
the postponement of the consideration of a particular issue.” 450 By these interim judgements the 
courts first solve the liability of the defendant as a common issue to all group members and the 
interim judgement subsequently becomes a basis for determining the damage in the next phase.  
In Sweden, the courts in the group action proceedings may award damages only, which are 
calculated on an individual basis.451 For example, in the case of Olivia Ozum v Sweden (2008)452  
the court awarded individual damage of around €3,700 for each of the forty-six claims. 
Furthermore, in the case of The Consumer Ombudsman v Kraftkommission i Sverige AB (2004)453 
the district court found that the defendant is liable for damages because they failed to supply 
electrify as it was agreed with the consumers (group members). In this case, too, the court 
calculated the damages per subscriber i.e. on an individual basis. In our opinion, this is a logical 
consequence for two reasons: (a) Sweden has an individually based enforcement procedure and 
(b) the GPA does not contain any rule by which it authorises the judges to calculate the damages 
on an aggregate basis. Having in mind the court’s obligation to specify each group member in its 
judgement,454 it actually means that each of them is individually entitled to initiate enforcement of 
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the judgment before a bailiff. 455  Regarding the possibility of the court to make post-trial 
distribution in any form (including cy-près), the CPA does not contain any rules, which means that 
the courts are not allowed to do so.456 Swedish courts are not allowed to award punitive damages 
too.457  
The absence of rules for post-trial distribution is a logical consequence of the concept on 
which the Swedish group action proceeding is founded. Swedish courts may award only damages 
which are calculated on an individual basis. If the court judgement must be delivered on behalf of 
an individually specified persons, then the Swedish group action regime has no need of a model 
for distribution of damages calculated on an aggregate basis because the beneficiaries of the 
judgment may demand enforcement before a bailiff on an individual basis.  
 Like in the US class action regime, any proposed settlement, either by the plaintiffs or by 
the defendant, must be previously approved by the court. 458 This requirement is fully in line with 
the court’s role of protecting the interests of the group members, and for that reason each settlement 
must be fair as CPA Sec. 26 particularly requires. Another element which protects the interests of 
the group members is the obligatory notice the court has to make before it approves the 
settlement.459 
 
h. Funding and costs   
The basic principle of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure regarding the litigation cost  
is the so-called “loser pay principle” or “the English rule”. Under this rule “the losing party 
reimburses the opposing party’s litigation costs”.460 This principle is also applied in the group 
action procedures and the judges may not amend or suspend it. 461 Regarding the fact that only the 
plaintiff and the defendant are formal parties in the group action, the loser pay principle applies 
only to them. If the group action ends unsuccessfully, the plaintiff is obliged to reimburse the 
litigation costs to the defendant and, the other way round, if the group action ends successfully, 
the plaintiff is entitled to collect the litigation costs from the defendant.  
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 Since the group members are not parties in the group actions, they shouldn’t be liable for 
the litigation costs either. If any group member has intervened in the group proceeding as a party, 
in that case the loser pay principle shall be applied on that particular group member.462 On this 
issue GPA Sec. 33 provides:   
“A member of the group who is not a party to the proceedings is only liable for the litigation costs regarding  
such cases as referred to in Sections 34 and 35.” 
 
The above rule confirms that under the Swedish group action regime, only the formal 
parties are liable for the litigation costs. However, the above rule has several exceptions regulated 
in GPA Sec. 34 and Sec. 35. Namely, if the plaintiff is supported by public funds in the concrete 
proceeding and he cannot reimburse the cost from the losing defendant (defendant cannot pay the 
costs), the members of the group shall bear those costs.463 This provision is appropriate because 
the group action has been financed by public funds and it ended successfully. The defendant’s 
financial incapability preventing him from reimbursing the cost may be temporary, which means 
that both the plaintiff and the group members still have a chance to be reimbursed. If both the 
plaintiff and the group members are left uncompensated, in our opinion they are still ethical 
winners in the case and at least the case has had a deterrence effect. The next exception refers to 
the situation where the plaintiff has reached a risk agreement, but he cannot assert it against the 
losing defendant, in which case he is entitled to demand the members of the group to bear his 
fee.464 And the last exception refers to a situation when a member who is not a formal party has 
made some costs due to his carelessness, in which case he shall indemnify those costs.465 In any 
case each member is not liable to bear litigation costs in an amount higher than what he has 
benefited from the case.466 
 Under the GPA it is allowed for a group representative and an attorney to reach a so-called 
“risk agreement”.467 It may be said that the risk agreements under the GPA resemble the US 
contingency fee agreements because both agreements lie on the principle that the attorney shall be 
paid if he wins the case, or get nothing if he loses the case. Nevertheless, they also differ from each 
other. Namely, contingency fees are usually calculated as a percentage of the client’s net recovery, 
while the risk agreement is calculated on an hourly rate. If the fees are based solely on the value 
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of the subject of the dispute, such risk agreements shall not be approved by the court.468 The fees 
calculated on an hourly rate might be doubled, or tripled, but never estimated in the form of a 
percentage of the client’s net recovery. For example, in the case of Åberg v Elefterios Kefalas 
(“Air Olympic”)469 a risk agreement was concluded and approved by the court. The hourly rate 
was agreed in such a way that the attorney is paid twice of his hourly rate, if he wins the case, or 
only half of his hourly rate if he loses the case.  
The risk agreement does not imply any obligations for the defendant.470 This means that in 
case of losing the proceeding, the defendant is obliged to pay the litigation costs to the plaintiff on 
a regular basis. According to GPA Sec. 38 “[…] the agreement may only be asserted against the 
members of the group […]. if it has been approved by a court.”471  
In Sweden the plaintiff is not required to guarantee for possible defendant’s costs. But the 
court demand the plaintiff to present their financial capacity to cover the ongoing cost of the group 
action procedure.472 The plaintiff’s financial capacity to bear the expected ongoing costs for the 
proposed group action is a precondition for certification.473 On the other hand, considering that the 
group action is time and money-consuming, barely anyone (as an individual) can afford it on their 
own. Similar to the other countries, in Sweden the group action may be supported by public 
authorities, private organisation, NGOs, etc. For example, the case of Pär Wihlborg v The Swedish 
State through the Chancellor of Justice (2007) 474  was supported by a private organisation 
established particularly for this case under the name “Association for Private Imports in the EU”.475 
Another example is the case of Carl de Geer et al v The Swedish Airports and Air Navigation 
Service (2007)476 where the locals from the community near Arlanda Airport brought a private 
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group action against the Swedish Airports claiming damages for aviation noise. In this case the 
plaintiffs were financially supported by the local municipality. 
In certain situations, the GPA allows for a group action to be supported by the State’s funds. 
For example, if the group representative has been found no longer appropriate to represent the 
group and the court has appointed someone else to conduct the group's action as a plaintiff, that 
person is entitled to compensation for litigation costs for their own work and time from public 
funds.477  
There are different instruments for funding multi-party proceedings and legal expenses 
insurance agreements (LEI) are one of these. Sweden has an unpleasant experience in that field. 
Namely, Lindbolm disclosed that the Swedish insurance companies were against the introduction 
of a group action in Sweden. Even the largest insurance company in Sweden (Trygg-Hansa) 
excluded coverage for plaintiffs (but not defendants) in the group actions after the GPA entered 
into force. 478  
 
i. Res judicata  
Sweden have accepted a very simple, but “powerful” res judicata rule. Namely, a 
judgement delivered under the Group Proceedings Act shall have effect on the plaintiff, the 
defendant and the group members. No exceptions are allowed under this rule. The binding effect 
of a group action judgement comes into legal force regardless of the outcome of the group 
proceeding (positive or negative) for the group members. The res judicata principle is stipulated 
in GPA Sec. 29 and it stipulates that:  
“the determination of the court in group proceedings has legal force in relation to all members of the group  
who are subject to the determination.” 
  
This simple approach towards the res judicata principle is allowed because Sweden has an 
opt-in group action regime. Under this regime the identification of the group’s members is not 
questionable. Namely, every member has already identified her/himself before the court by 
submitting an application for registration in the group register (cut-off date). In addition, each of 
the group’s members is very well informed about the procedural particularities of the concrete case 
which gives full right to the Swedish group action regime to bind all group members with a 
judgement rendered in such a proceeding. The group members enjoy further protection under the 
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Swedish group action regime because their losses will be adjudicated on an individual basis, which 
is in line with the power of the Swedish courts to award only individual damages. In our opinion, 
the identity of the group’s members is well known in Sweden. In that sense, the Swedish res 
judicata rule is fully in line with the nature of an opt-in based group action model.  
 
j. The need for reform  
 In 2007 the Ministry of Justice appointed a special investigator to evaluate the Group 
Proceeding Act. The principal focus of the investigator was to determine whether the GPA had 
achieved the aims for which had been introduction. In general, there were two aims that should 
have been achieved by the GPA, such as improved behaviour modification (prevention) and access 
to justice. Based on the cases decided upon until then, the investigator found out that the GPA 
instrument had not been subject of abuse in the cases analysed. In general, the Group Proceeding 
Act had improved the Swedish procedural law, but the efficiency of the Act was not satisfactory. 
Namely, the investigator pointed out that the examination of the preconditions for certifying a 
group action (GPA Sec. 8) lasted too long. Therefore, the GPA should have a certification 
procedure (a mandatory certification stage) in which a formal certification decision would be 
delivered.479  
The investigator did not propose any changes to the opt-in system, but stated that an opt-
out system for the public group actions should be considered in the future. In fact, the most serious 
criticisms addressed to the Group Proceeding Act in the past have to do with the suggestions that 
Sweden should switch from an opt-in to an opt-out system for the following reasons.480 The aim 
of the collective redress system is to improve access to justice in cases where the traditional civil 
procedure produces unjust results. For example, in collective cases a large number of affected 
people would not opt in due to their passivity (a passivity problem). Some empirical data show 
that only 8 per cent of group members opt out, while 60 per cent stay passive and do not opt in.481 
In small claims situations, litigation costs are higher than the compensation sought. Therefore, the 
                                                          
479  See more in Persson, A. H., Collective enforcement: European prospects in light of Swedish experience, In 
Collective Actions. Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interest (Red: Wrbka, S & Van Uytsel, S. & 
Siems, M,) Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 356.  
480 EU Civil Justice, Current Issues and Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in Eurpoean Law vol.7, 'Opt-In is Out and Opt-
Out is in’: Dimensions Based on Nordic Options and the Commission's Recommendation. Laura Ervo.2016 (Red: Hess, 
B; Bergstrom, M and Storskrubb, E) Hart Publishing: Oregon, p.191. 
481 PH Lindblom, Grupptalan I Sverige (Stockholm, Norsteds Juridik, 2008) 225. Cited by the EU Civil Justice, Current 
Issues and Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in Eurpoean Law vol.7, 'Opt-In is Out and Opt-Out is in’: Dimensions 
Based on Nordic Options and the Commission's Recommendation. Laura Ervo.2016 (Red: Hess, B; Bergstrom, M and 
Storskrubb, E) Hart Publishing: Oregon.p.192.  
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plaintiff is not motivated to go to court for a small claim, while the defendant is aware thereof and 
takes advantage of it (a rational use of resources). The opt-out systems encompass all small claims, 
plus those which would never be brought before a court. The opt-out system provides better results 
for the defendant as well. Namely, the res judicata principle favours the position of the defendant 
because the entire case is solved at once and definitely. From a procedural perspective, in the opt-
out systems it is not as necessary to use the category of joinder of claims which always complicates 
the cases.482 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
Sweden has a respectable history in the sphere of consumer protection. Sweden is probably 
one of the first European civil law tradition countries which introduced a group action in its legal 
system.  
The Swedish group action is a representative litigation based as an opt-in model. The 
Swedish group action may be instituted as a private group action, an organisation action or a public 
group action. It has no sectoral approach and it is applicable to all civil cases that can be brought 
before the general (district) courts. The Swedish group action is not enacted as part of the Swedish 
Code of Judicial Procedure (as it was the case with the United States and England), but it is enacted 
in a separate act – the Group Proceedings Act (GPA).  
The GPA does not set a formal certification stage, but explicitly enlists the prerequisites 
that must be met in order for the particular claims to proceed as a group action. As an opt-in based 
model, the Swedish group action regime is founded on two pillars, a group register and a notice 
for the group’s members. Similar to the other countries, the verification of the entry criteria for the 
group register is under court supervision. Each of the group members is required to meet the 
verification criteria and to register him/herself in the group register by submitting an application. 
Regarding the notice for the group’s member, the GPA provides three situations where the notice 
is a mandatory category (a notice which sets a cut-off date for entry into the group register, a notice 
which informs the group’s members about delivered court orders which affect their interest and a 
notice in case of a proposed settlement).  
                                                          
482 EU Civil Justice, Current Issues and Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in Eurpoean Law vol.7, 'Opt-In is Out and Opt-
Out is in’: Dimensions Based on Nordic Options and the Commission's Recommendation. Laura Ervo.2016 (Red: Hess, 
B; Bergstrom, M and Storskrubb, E) Hart Publishing: Oregon.p.197.  
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The GPA does not contain a precise procedural framework by which the court shall manage 
the group action procedure, instead the GPA contains several rules devoted to the case 
management powers of the court. The absence of a precise procedural framework does not put the 
court in an inferior position regarding the plaintiff or the defendant. On the contrary, under the 
group action regime, the court is authorised with great discretional powers. For example, the court 
may suspend the plaintiff if it considers that he is no longer an adequate representative of the 
group’s members.    
Under the GPA, the plaintiff may require injunctions reliefs, declaratory reliefs and 
monetary (damage) reliefs. The compensation of damages may be on the basis of a contractual or 
non-contractual liability. In Sweden in group action proceedings, the courts may award only 
damages which are calculated on an individual basis. As long as Swedish courts award only 
damages which are calculated on an individual basis, the Swedish group action regime has no need 
of a model for distribution of damages calculated on an aggregate basis because the beneficiaries 
of the judgments may ask enforcement on an individual basis before a bailiff.  
 Regarding the litigation costs, in group action proceedings Sweden applies the same rule 
(loser pay principle) which it applies in traditional civil proceedings under the Swedish Code of 
Judicial Procedure. Since the group members are not parties in the group actions, they are not 
liable for the litigation costs, except in certain situations stated in the GPA.  
 One of the particularities of the Swedish group action regime are the so-called “risk 
agreements.” These agreements are concluded between the plaintiff and the attorney, where the 
attorney’s fees are calculated on an hourly rate, which might be doubled, or tripled, but never 
calculated in the form of a percentage of the client’s net recovery. These risk agreements do not 
imply any obligations to the defendant because they are not parties in the proceeding, and 
therefore, in the risk agreements. 
 Similar to the other countries, the plaintiff’s financial capacity to bear the costs of the 
proposed group action is a precondition for certification. In Sweden, the plaintiff is not required to 
guarantee for the opponent’s costs, but it is required to have a financial capacity to bear the ongoing 
cost for the group action.  Evidence shows that each of the group actions initiated in Sweden was 
supported by public authorities, private organisations, NGOs, and even by the group members.   
 Sweden has accepted a very simple, but “powerful” res judicata rule. Namely, a judgement  
delivered under the Group Proceedings Act has an effect on the plaintiff, the defendant and the 
group members. No exceptions are allowed under this rule. Each of the group’s members has 
entered into the group register voluntarily and each of them was notified about every important 
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procedural order delivered in the group proceeding. The group members enjoy further protection 
under the Swedish group action regime because their losses are adjudicated on an individual basis, 
which is in line with the power of the Swedish courts to award individual damages only. The above 
said, it gives full right to the Swedish group action regime to bind all group members with a 
judgement rendered in such a proceeding. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – EUROPEAN UNION 
  
1. EU collective redress policy in consumer law   
 
a. Introduction 
Redress in consumer law is of significant importance for the economy as a whole.  For 
example, there is a big difference in the “economic losses” between those EU Member States 
which have a collective redress mechanism and those which have none. According to the 
Consultation Paper, the total annual consumer benefit in the Member States which have a 
collective redress system is about €523 million.483  The estimated detriment which consumers face 
in the Member States which do not have collective redress mechanisms is approximately €100 
million and close to €384 for an individual consumer. 
The numbers presented above have forced the EU to find a way for the consumers to be 
compensated in case of being harmed in mass consumer disputes.  
 
b. 1980s, 1990s and 2000s  
In the last thirty years many instruments have been enacted for consumer protection on 
European level.484 All those instruments have focused on the creation of rights for consumers, but 
none of them have created a comprehensive procedural mechanism for the protection of those 
rights. Few Directives have created an obligation for the Member States to ensure there is an 
adequate and effective means for protection of consumers’ rights in their national legislations.485 
However, these Directives were limited to cessation or prohibition of the infringements of 
consumers’ rights.486 Due to the lack of mechanisms for collective redress, in the next period the 
EU focused on developing a concept for collective redress. Each harmed consumer has a legitimate 
interest to be compensated, otherwise illegal income gained as a result of consumer’ rights 
                                                          
483 Consultation Paper for Discussion on the Follow-up to the Green Paper on consumer collective redress, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress_cons/docs/consultation_paper2009.pdf on 28.11.2015, p.6.  
484 For example: DIRECTIVE to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises 
(85/577/EEC); DIRECTIVE 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts; DIRECTIVE 97/7/EC on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts; DIRECTIVE 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the 
prices of products offered to consumers; DIRECTIVE 2001/95/EC on general product safety, etc.  
485 For example: Article 7 of the DIRECTIVE 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts; Article 11 of the DIRECTIVE 
97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts; Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection 
of consumers' interests.   
486 Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests (OJ 166, 11.6.1998, p.52) 
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infringements would remain in the “hands” of wrongdoers. Even though the possibility of 
consumer collective protection in the EU context was mentioned for the first time in 1984487, the 
first real instruments for consumer collective redress at EU level appeared within the EU 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013.   
 
c. EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013488 
The lack of consumer collective redress has been pointed out as a weakness in the EU 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013.489 In this Strategy the Commission laid down three main 
objectives which should be achieved in five priority areas for the EU in the period of 2007-2013. 
These five priority areas included: “(1) better monitoring of consumer markets and national 
consumer policies; (2) better consumer protection regulation; (3) better enforcement and redress; 
(4) better informed and educated consumers; and (5) putting consumers at the heart of other EU 
policies and regulation.” The Commission at the time also aimed to create a single common set of 
rules for collective redress for both infringements of consumer protection rules and for breaches 
of EU anti-trust rules.490  
 
- Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress (2008)  
The Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress491 is a crucial instrument of the EU 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013. The Green Paper was released by the Commission and it 
intended to stimulate debate about consumer collective redress. The focus of the Green Paper was 
“the resolution of mass claim cases and aims at providing effective means of collective redress for 
citizens across the EU.”492 According to the Green Paper, when a large group of consumers 
affected by a single trader’s malpractice wants to commence a case, they face barriers in terms of 
                                                          
487 See more in Hodges, C., 2008. The reform of class and representative actions in European legal systems. Hart 
Publishing: Oregon, p.102.  
488 For more about the EU policy in the field of consumer protection see Hodges, C., 2007. Collectivism: Evaluating 
the effectiveness of public and private models for regulating consumer protection. In: Willem van Boom and Marco 
Loos, ed. 2007. Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law: Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group 
Action and Public Authority Intervention. Groningen: Europe Law Publishing. 
489 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and 
Social Committee, EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013 Empowering consumers, enhancing their welfare, 
effectively protecting them, COM (2007) 99 final (13.3.2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/overview/cons_policy/doc/EN_99.pdf  
490 Id. at 11. 
491  Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress COM (2008) 794 final, (27.11.2008), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0794:FIN:EN:PDF. 
492 Id. at 3. 
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access, effectiveness and affordability.493 In other words, consumers are faced with high litigation 
costs, complex and long procedures and insecurity about the outcome of the cases (the risk of 
litigation). To solve the problem, the EU provided four options: (a) option one, no EU action; (b) 
option two, a network of entities (public bodies and consumer organisations) that have the power 
to bring a collective redress action; (c) option three, a mix of policy instruments (including ADR 
mechanisms) and (d) option four, each Member State must have judicial collective redress 
procedures.494  
One major criticism regarding this Green Paper on consumer collective redress is the lack 
of differentiation between the two big groups of consumer damages. The first group refers to the 
so-called “scattered damages”, while the second group refers to the so-called “mass damages.” 
These two types of consumer damages are different from each other because the first type of 
damages occurs in multiple cases of low value, while the second type of damages are of relatively 
high value. Hence, both groups (scattered damages and mass damages) deserve separate attention 
and they should not be treated in the same way as the Green paper on consumer collective redress 
does.495 
 
- Consultation Paper (2009) 
This Paper specifies the objectives set by the Green Paper (2008) into three categories i.e. 
general, specific and operational objectives.496 This Paper mainly focused on the dilemma of 
whether the ADR mechanism or the judicial mechanism should have the leading role in the 
collective redress processes at EU level.  
 
- Joint Information Note (2010) 
Through this Joint Information Note, the three EU Commissioners for Justice, Competition 
and Consumer Policy mutually expressed the need for a coherent European approach to collective 
redress. 
In the Note, the Commissioners concluded that some Member States still do not have 
collective redress mechanisms, but, on the other hand, those who have differ from each other 
                                                          
493 Id. at 4. 
494 Id. at 12.  
495 See more in Wrbka, S., Van Uytsel, Stevan. and Siems, Mathias., 2010. Collective actions. Cambridge University 
Press: New York. pp. 42-56.   
496 Consultation Paper for Discussion on the Follow-up to the Green Paper on consumer collective redress, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress_cons/docs/consultation_paper2009.pdf on 28.11.2015, p.12.  
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significantly. There is a diversity regarding the scope of the redress procedures (sectoral or in 
general), the legal standing (private persons or public bodies), the effect of the judgement (who is 
bound by the judgement), etc. This diversity among the national systems regarding the accepted 
concepts of collective redress may undermine the enjoyment of the rights which are protected by 
the EU law. In order to avoid such diversity among national systems regarding the concepts of 
collective redress, the Commissioners recommended accepting a common set of rules which would 
be followed by the EU Member States in the process of creating their national models for collective 
redress.   
 
- European Parliament Resolution - Towards a Coherent European Approach to  
Collective Redress (2012)497 
From a conceptual point of view, this Resolution of the EU Parliament placed private 
enforcement of EU consumer law secondary. The EU Parliament stressed out the primary role 
which European and national authorities have in the sphere of EU law enforcement, therefore, 
private enforcement should only supplement, but not replace public enforcement.498  
Due to the different procedural and damage law systems in the Member States, the EU 
scheme of collective redress should take the form of a horizontal framework including a common 
non-binding set of principles that should be accepted by the Members States in their own national 
systems. 499  Under this horizontal approach the Members States are not required to accept an 
identical collective redress system, but they may create their own collective redress systems which 
respect the safeguards laid down by the Resolution.500  
 
                                                          
497 European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’ P7_TA (2012)002, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-0012&language=EN, 
[Accessed on 29.11.2015].  
498 Id. at 4. 
499 Id. at 6, point.15. 
500 Id. at 5, point.20.; Those safeguards are the following, (1) “there must be a clearly identified group before the 
representative action takes place in court; (2) the collective redress mechanism must be founded on the opt-in 
principle; (3) the representative actions shall be brought by qualified entities like those referred to in Art. 3 of the 
Injunctive Directive; (4) only actual damages shall be covered, punitive damages must be prohibited; (5) the principle 
of access to evidence shall be designed according to the European procedural tradition; (6) the loser pays principle 
shall stay as a safeguard against the proliferation of unmeritorious claims; (7) contingency fee principle and third-
party funding principle must be prohibited; (8) the court jurisdiction and the applicable law shall be determined 
according to the Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II Regulations.”   
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- Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - “Towards a 
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress” (2013)501 
In 2013 the Commission released the Communication “Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress” by which it declared acceptance of both the horizontal 
approach and the safeguards proposed by the EU Parliament as a concept which shall provide 
avoidance of any uncoordinated sectorial EU initiatives and also ensure smooth interface with 
national procedural rules.502  
According to the Commission collective redress mechanisms may appear in the form of 
injunctive relief and compensatory relief. The ultimate goal of the EU collective redress systems 
would be compensation only.503 In other words, the collective redress mechanisms shall have only 
one function – compensation. The punishment and deterrence functions are to be left to public 
enforcement. By doing this, the Commission officially split the functions of public and private 
enforcement of consumer law in the EU. The Communication lays down that the advantages of 
having a collective redress system are improved access to justice and stronger enforcement of the 
Union rights, while the major disadvantage is the risk of abusive litigation.  
 
- Recommendations on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violation of rights granted under the 
Union Law (2013)504 
With the Recommendation on collective redress, the Commission rounded off the process 
of creating a coherent horizontal legal framework for collective redress in the EU under the 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013. Having in mind the different legal traditions in the Member 
States, the EU decided to be a silent regulator by setting non-mandatory common rules into this 
Recommendation for each Member State.   
                                                          
501 Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions - “Towards a European Horisontal Framework for Collective Redress”, 
COM (2013) 401 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/com_2013_401_en.pdf, [Accessed on 
06.12.2015]. 
502 See more in Id. at 16, p.4.  
503 Id. at 10, point 3.1  
504 Commission Recommendation of 11.06.2013 on Recommendations on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violation of rights granted under 
Union Law, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396&from=EN, 
[Accessed on 06.12.2015]. 
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 Each Member State is free to create its own model of collective redress in accordance with 
the national legal tradition of the respective Member State considering the safeguards set by this 
Recommendation. In that way, the Member States might have different models for collective 
redress, but all those models shall be based on a common set of rules, which is the goal of this 
Recommendation. Member States can apply their collective redress mechanisms to any relevant 
area, particularly to the areas of consumer protection, competition, environmental protection, 
protection of personal data, financial services, investor protection, etc. 
 The common principles recommended by the Recommendation on collective redress will 
be analysed in details in the text below.  
  
2. EU collective redress policy in competition law  
 
 Four possible options have been assessed in the process of determining the design for 
damages actions assessed.505 The Commission preferred the option which required a binding 
instrument for the regulation of damage actions, but it contained no competition-specific measures 
for collective redress.506 The practical consequence of this option was the lack of mandatory 
collective redress mechanisms designed specifically for competition cases, i.e. there would be no 
specially designed representative and opt-in collective actions for competition cases. This option 
officially became a Proposal and on 26 November 2014 the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted the “Directive 2014/104 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union.”507 In its “preamble” the Directive on antitrust damages actions undoubtedly declared that 
Member States shall not be required to introduce collective redress mechanisms for enforcement 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.508 This does not mean that the collective redress mechanisms are 
excluded, or prohibited in competition cases, but it means that their usage shall depend on the 
specific Member State.    
                                                          
505 COM (2013) 404 final; Commission Staff Working Document - Impact Assessment Report on Damages Actions for 
breach of the EU Antitrust Rules., Strasbourg, 11.06.2013., available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_assessment_en.pdf., p.31-37.  
506 Id., p.8  
507 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union., OJ L 349/1, 05.12.2014. 
508 Id., p.3, point 13.  
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  It is true that the Directive on antitrust damages actions did not foresee collective action 
specially designed for competition cases, but it left an “open door” for collective action in 
competition law. Namely, the Directive on antitrust damages actions allows claiming damage by 
“someone who acts on behalf of one or more injured consumers”. Acting on someone else’s behalf 
is a classic element of representative litigations. This conclusion can be drawn from the definition 
provided for damages actions in Article 2(4), as follows: 
“action for damages means an action under national law by which a claim for damages is brought before a 
national court by an alleged injured party, or by someone acting on behalf of one or more alleged injured 
parties where Union or national law provides for that possibility, or by a natural or legal person that 
succeeded in the right of the alleged injured party, including the person that acquired the claim.” 
 
The article above points to two conclusions. First, this Directive allows collecting damages 
on a collective basis through a representative litigation (collective redress mechanisms) and, 
second, the use of a representative litigation depends on the Union and the national law. The Union 
law allows the employment of collective redress mechanism for the protection of Union rights, 
including the right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of the competition 
law. Namely, in 2013 the Commission adopted the Recommendation on collective redress509, 
which covers all sectors (including competition law) where injured parties are faced with the need 
to obtain compensation in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union 
law (Article 1 of the Recommendation). The competition cases for harm caused by an infringement 
of Article 81 and 82 EC are undoubtedly within the scope of the Recommendation on collective 
redress. This means that the injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms foreseen 
by the Recommendation on collective redress can be used in the cases where there are injured 
parties in mass harm situations caused by violations of the Article 81 and 82 EC. 
 
3. The EU collective redress model under the Recommendation on collective redress 
 
a. Introduction  
The Recommendation has a simple structure. It consists of a preamble (preface) and six 
chapters. The first chapter covers the purpose and subject matter of the Recommendation. The 
second chapter is dedicated to the definitions and the scope of the Recommendation. The third 
                                                          
509 Commission Recommendation of 11.06.2013 on Recommendations on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violation of rights granted under 
Union Law, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396&from=EN, 
[Accessed on 06.12.2015].   
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chapter covers the common principles for both injunctive and compensatory collective redress. 
The forth chapter is dedicated only to the principles relating to injunctive collective redress, while 
the fifth chapter only to the principles relating to compensatory collective redress. The sixth 
chapter contains general information. 
The models of collective redress actions analysed in this chapter are only those foreseen 
by the Recommendation. The explanation below follows the structure of the Recommendation.  
 
b. Subject matter jurisdiction  
Article 1 (1) of the Recommendation on collective redress announces that the purpose of 
this EU instrument “is to facilitate access to justice, stop illegal practices and enable injured parties 
to obtain compensation in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union 
law.” The final goal of this Recommendation is for all Member States to have collective redress 
mechanisms at national level for both injunctive and compensatory relief.  
The Commission recommends that collective redress mechanisms be applied in all sectors 
where a “mass harm situation caused by violations of rights granted under Union law” might 
appear.510 This means that the Recommendation covers all sectors (consumer cases, anti-trust 
cases, protection of personal data cases, financial abuses cases, environmental protection cases, 
etc).511   
 
c. Group action v. representative action 
For the purposes of this analysis, the definition of the term “collective redress” provided by the 
Recommendation512 will be “disassembled” into its components.  
 
collective redress means: 
a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility to 
claim cessation of illegal behaviour 
collectively by two or more natural or legal 
persons,  
a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility to claim 
compensation collectively by two or more natural or 
legal persons claiming to have been harmed in a mass 
harm situation,  
or, by an entity entitled to bring a 
representative action, 
or, by an entity entitled to bring a representative action, 
 
injunctive collective redress 
 
compensatory collective redress 
                                                          
510 Recommendation (preamble point 2).  
511 Blennerhassett, J.2016. A Comparative Examination of Multi-Party Actions. The case of environmental Mass 
Harm. Hart Publishing. Oxford. Portland Oregon. p. 246.  
512 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-a).  
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 From the table above, regarding the relief which may be sought, it may be concluded that 
the Recommendation advocates for the Members States to create collective redress mechanisms 
which will enable the consumers to seek both injunctive and compensatory relief. Enabling 
consumers to seek compensatory reliefs would achieve the ultimate goal set by the Commission 
that within the Europe each harmed consumer has to be indemnified.513  
 The text of the Recommendation does not limit the application of collective redress 
mechanisms only before national courts. On the contrary, collective redress mechanisms might be 
either in the form of a court action or in the form of an action (request) dedicated for an ADR 
procedure.514 Currently, ADR mechanisms for consumer protection, such as the Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR) platform enacted with the Regulation on consumer ODR, are in force at EU 
level.515 Therefore, the Recommendation leaves a possibility for the consumers to be compensated 
on a collective basis either through a court proceeding or through an ADR mechanism.  
 It seems that the Recommendation distinguishes between two types of collective redress 
mechanisms depending on who has initiated the collective redress procedure, “two or more natural 
or legal persons” or “an entitled entity”. Before we make a conclusion on this point, let us analyse 
some of the definitions devoted to the collective redress mechanisms provided by certain authors 
and institutions. For example, in the EU Commission Report 516 devoted to the antitrust damages 
actions, the collective action517 is defined as a “legal proceeding initiated by a victim on his/her 
own behalf and on behalf of a number of other victims (the group) that she represents”. Stadler518 
                                                          
513 Communication (point 3.1). 
514 Eckel, P., 2015. A Common Approach to Collective Redress in Antitrust and Unfair Competition – A Comparison 
of the EU, Germany and the United Kingdom. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law. 
vol. 46(8) p.922.  
515 OJ L 165/1 18.06.2013. 
516 Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust 
damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios [pdf] Brussels, Rome and 
Rotterdam, p.270.   
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf 
[Accessed on 24 January 2016], p.270.  
517 The term “collective action” is actually synonymous with the term “group action” because both terms are usually 
used when the right to initiate an action is given to the victim itself. In this context, too, the term “collective action” 
refers to the situations where the right to initiate an action is given to the victim itself. 
518 Stadler, A., 2007. Collective action as an efficient means for the enforcement of European competition law. 
Published in the International Competition Law Series: Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law. Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, p.209.  
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explains that “the group action is based on the strict principle of representation, where one affected 
individual or undertaking is entitled to bring an action on behalf of all persons or undertakings 
who suffered damage through the defendant’s violation.” Keske519 defined the collective action as 
an “action brought by one member (“lead plaintiff”) of the group that is to be represented in the 
action. The so-called lead plaintiff belongs to the group and it represents his\her interest as well as 
that of all group members.”  
The same authors define the representative action as follows. In the EU Commission 
Report 520 the representative action is defined as “an action initiated by an ex ante authorised 
representative body on behalf of a specific group of victims. These actions may be initiated by 
consumer association, association of traders, or by a public body.” instead of using the term 
“representative actions” for the actions brought by consumer associations, Stedler521 simply uses 
the term “actions brought by association”. In the same manner Keske522 defines the representative 
action as “an action brought by an association or specific body on behalf of a group of victims.” 
The above authors make a distinction between a group and a representative action based 
on who has the right to initiate a collective redress mechanism, in terms of whether that right 
belongs to the victims damaged in the same mass harm situation or to a qualified entity. If the right 
to initiate an action belongs to the victims damaged in the same mass harm situation, that type of 
collective redress mechanism is designated as a group action in the European jargon523. On the 
other hand, if that right is given to a qualified entity, the type of collective redress mechanism is 
designated as a representative action.  
The above logic of dividing collective redress mechanisms into group and representative 
actions is accepted by the Recommendation. The definition of “a representative action” provided 
by this EU instrument confirms this conclusion:524  
“representative action means an action which is brought by a representative entity, an ad hoc certified entity 
or a public authority on behalf and in the name of two or more natural or legal persons who claim to be 
                                                          
519 Keske, S., 2009. Group Litigation in European Competition Law a Law and Economics Perspective. Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam. Available at: 
https://www.google.com/search?q=Group+Litigation+in+European+Competition+Law+A+Law+and+Economics+pe
rspective+Sonja+E.&oq=Group+Litigation+in+European+Competition+Law+A+Law+and+Economics+perspective+S
onja+E.&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i59.985j0j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=122&ie=UTF-8 [Accessed 30 January 2016], 
p.51.  
520 Id, at p.271.  
521 Id, at p.204. 
522 Id, at p.51.  
523 The term “European jargon” is used based on the definitions previously given by European scholars and also 
based on the Report prepared by Civic Consulting (Lead) and Oxford Economics in 2008 for the purposes of the 
European Commission – DG SANCO.  
524 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-d); 
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exposed to the risk of suffering harm or to have been harmed in a mass harm situation whereas those persons 
are not parties to the proceedings.”     
 
 From the above definition it is clear that the Recommendation makes a clear distinction 
between group actions (situations where the victims themselves initiate a collective redress action) 
and representative actions (situations where a representative entity initiates a collective redress 
action).  
Based on the Recommendation’s text, both group and representative actions are 
representative devices in their essence because both actions are initiated on behalf of a group of 
consumers (victims who are damaged in the same mass harm situation), who are not formal parties 
to the proceedings.525 The consumers who act on behalf of the group are the leading plaintiff in 
the group action, while the representative entity which also acts on behalf of the group is the 
leading plaintiff in the representative action. In both cases (group or representative actions) formal 
parties in the collective redress proceedings are only the plaintiff and the defendant.526 
Taking into consideration the common feature of both actions (both work as representative 
devices), it can be concluded that: 
“nearly each and every group action could be regarded as a representative action, be it a public agency or a 
consumer organisation action on behalf of consumers, or even a lead plaintiff who is bringing a group action 
to court.” 527 
 
According to Cafaggi and Micklitz528 it is not of great importance who brought the action 
before the court as long as both types of actions work on a representative basis. There is another 
element which is relevant for both types of actions: the way compensation is distributed. If 
consumers receive their compensation directly, it is a case of a traditional representative action, 
whereas if they receive their compensation through the representative who distributes it among 
them, it is a case of a collective representative action.529  
 
 
                                                          
525 Idem.  
526 Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust 
damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios [pdf] Brussels, Rome and 
Rotterdam, p.270.   
527 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p. 26.  
528 idem.  
529 Civic Consulting (Lead) and Oxford Economics, 2008. Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union. [pdf] Berlin: European Commission – DG SANCO. p.6-9.    
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d. Standing to bring a group action vs. a representative action  
 
- Standing to bring a group action 
As it was presented above, the Recommendation makes a clear distinction between group 
actions (situations where the victims themselves initiate a collective redress action) and 
representative actions (situations where a representative entity initiates a collective redress action). 
Depending on the type of action which is in question, different categories of subjects appear as 
entitled initiators of a collective redress proceeding, whether in the form of a group or a 
representative action.  
With regard to the initiation of a group action, according to the Recommendation two or 
more natural or legal persons530 are sufficient to bring a collective redress action on behalf of all 
victims who were damaged in the same mass harm situation. According to Yeazell, this form of 
initiating a collective redress mechanism by a victim on behalf of a number of other victims who 
were actually damaged in the same mass harm situation is a form of representation designated as 
“a self-interest representation.”531 All victims share a common interest, which is compensation 
due to suffered damage in the same harm situation. This common interest defines the group 
because a member of the group will be anyone whose personal interest would coincide with the 
common one. As long as his personal interest coincides with the common interest (the interests of 
the entire group), he will be considered a member of the group. If we take into consideration the 
fact that one person becomes a member of the group because his personal interest coincides with 
the common one, the same person derives his legitimacy to act on behalf of the group from his 
personal interest (self-interest representation). Since the realisation of his personal interest 
depends directly on the realisation of the common interest, being the representative of the group, 
that person will seek the best way to realise the common interest. 532 Given that this concept of 
representation is based on the belief that everyone protects their interests in the best possible way, 
the representative is expected to be "free" in choosing the means (ways) for the protection of their 
own interest and the common one. Having in mind that legitimacy in  interest-based representation 
is built on the assumption that the common interest is adequately protected since it coincides with 
the personal interest of the representative and everyone protects their own interest in the best way 
                                                          
530 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-a). 
531 Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., p.280-291. 
532 Idem.  
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possible, then each member of the group has the right to represent the entire group (a collective 
standing to sue).  
Having said that it seems the victims’ right to initiate a collective redress action on behalf of 
other victims who were damaged in the same (similar) way derives merely from the fact that all 
have shared a common interest. In other words, nobody grants this right to the victims, they merely 
have it because they all share a common interest, from which it is assumed that the representative 
of the group will seek the best way to realise the common interest, as long as his personal interest 
coincides with the common one. 
 
- Standing to bring a representative action  
With regard to the initiation of a representative action, according to Recommendation, each 
Member State should designate representative entities which shall be entitled to bring 
representative actions on behalf “of two or more natural or legal persons who claim to be exposed/ 
[…] or to have been harmed in a mass harm situation […].”533 This form of representation by 
Yeazell is designated as representation by attribution. 534  The concept of representation by 
attribution rests on the belief that the representative knows what is good for the represented party, 
while the self-interest concept rests on the belief that everyone knows what is best for him or 
herself. So, there is a difference between a situation where one person represents someone else’s 
interest and a situation where the same person represents their own interest. In the first situation 
(by attribution) the representative acts as a trustee, while in the second situation (by self-interest) 
as an agent of one’s own interests.  
Therefore, the representative entity must be “chosen” very carefully because the legal 
destiny of the group’s interests directly depends on the capacity of the representative entity to 
provide an adequate representation (protection) of the group’s interests. On this point, the 
Recommendation requires each designation of a representative entity to be made “on a basis of 
clearly defined conditions of eligibility.”535 The process of verification of the eligibility criteria 
should include at least the following preconditions: 
- the entity should have a non-profit making character;  
- there should be a direct relationship between the main objectives of the entity and the rights granted under   
  Union law that are claimed to have been violated in respect of which the action is brought; and  
- the entity should have sufficient capacity in terms of financial resources, human resources, and legal  
  expertise, to represent multiple claimants acting in their best interest.  
                                                          
533 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-d). 
534 Yeazell, S.C., 1987. From Medieval Group litigation to the Modern class action. Yale University Press., p.280-291. 
535 Recommendation (Ch.3, point 4). 
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The preconditions presented above must be met constantly; on the contrary the entity would 
lose its status as a representative, even in the middle of a court procedure.536 By setting such 
preconditions, the Recommendation tries to prevent any possible abuse of consumer interests in 
the process of their representation.  
According to the first precondition, the representative entity should have a not-for-profit 
character. In our opinion, putting this precondition, the Recommendation aims to prevent the 
emergence of the phenomenon of “entrepreneurial lawyering” immanent in the US class action 
regime.537 In the US class action regime, the lawyers have their own interests (greater fees) because 
they finance the entire class action procedure. Under such circumstances, the lawyers would easily 
settle meritorious claims for far less than their worth, if they benefited greater fees in the case. 
These situations are known as “sweetheart settlements”, where the clients’ interests are 
compromised by their legal representatives. 538  In these cases, the lawyers actually trade-off 
meritorious claims of their clients for greater attorney’s fees offered by the defendant.  
With the second precondition, the Recommendation requires that consumers’ interests be 
represented adequately, that is, the representative entity’s objectives must correspond with the 
“rights granted under Union law that are claimed to have been violated […]”. For example, an 
environmental organisation should not be given the right to initiate a representative action in the 
field of competition law. The objectives of the entity in question must be in line with the nature of 
the right that has allegedly been breached.  
With the third precondition, the Recommendation sets further safeguards in order to ensure 
adequate representation of consumers’ interests. Namely, it requires the representative entity to 
have financial and human capacity, and legal expertise in this type of proceedings.  The manner of 
financing collective redress actions will be discussed below in the thesis. The other two elements 
(skilled team which may handle complex cases and experienced lawyers) increase the professional 
capacity of the entity, which is a guarantee that the consumers’ interests would be protected better.  
 
 
 
                                                          
536 Recommendation (Ch.3, point 5). 
537 Gibbons, Susan MC., 2010. Group Litigation, Class Actions, and Collective Redress: An anniversary Reappraisal of 
Lord Woolf’s Three Objectives. Published in The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On edited by Deirdre Dwyer. Oxford 
University Press, p. 114. 
538 Idem.  
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- Forms of representative entities  
According to the Green Paper on collective redress (2008), giving legal standing to 
qualified entities (such as, consumer organisations, ombudsmen, etc.) to bring representative 
actions will strengthen the consumersќ position.539 Besides, thе option of giving legal standing to 
qualified entities in Europe is a matter of legal tradition. In that context Gidi explains that “the 
traditional civil law political ideology generally looks to the government as a protector of the 
public interests.” 540  The Recommendation determines two forms in which the representative 
entities may appear, ad-hoc representative entities and entities designated by public authorities.541    
Ad-hoc entities are always created for a particular case. For example, the not-for-profit 
organisation “Group Action against Skandia” was registered in October 2003, several months 
before the proceeding was initiated (Skandia case). The Recommendation also allows 
“certification only for one particular representative action.”542 Based on the Recommendation’s 
text, ad-hoc entities do not obtain a right of collective standing to sue automatically at the moment 
they are established, instead they are granted such a right by the national courts (or other 
authorities) in the process of certification on an ad-hoc basis.543 The role of the national courts (or 
other national authorities) in the process of certification is to verify the concrete entity’s fulfilment 
of the eligibility preconditions set in the national law. In that way, only entities which are 
competent (capable of) to provide adequate representation of consumers’ interests may pass 
certification and eventually obtain the right to initiate a collective redress action on behalf of a 
certain groups of consumers. Having in mind the Recommendation’s preference for an opt-in 
based model of collective redress, these ad-hoc entities are entitled to represent only the interests 
of their members (which are identified).544 
Entities designated by public authorities are qualified entities formed by the state in 
advance for an indefinite number of cases. Considering their permanent nature, these entities may 
represent identifiable victims too (not necessarily their members).545 A good example of an entity 
                                                          
539 Green Paper on collective redress p.13, point 53. 
540 Gidi, A., 2003. Class Action in Brazil – A model for civil law countries. American Journal of comparative law, 
p.372.  
541 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-d and Ch.3, point 6) 
542 Recommendation (Ch.3, point 6) 
543 Idem.  
544 SEC (2008) 404 final; Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the WHITE PAPER on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, available at: 
[http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/working_paper.pdf], [Accessed on 
06.02.2016], p.20.  
545 Idem.  
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which has permanent nomination to initiate collective redress actions is the Swedish Consumer 
Ombudsman.546 According to the Swedish Group Proceeding Act (2002) Sec. 6, a public group 
action may be initiated “by a nominated and suitable public authority”. In Sweden, this public 
authority is nominated by the government.547 Unlike ad-hoc entities, public authority entities have 
permanently recognised collective standing to sue.     
 
e. Definition of the term “collective follow-on action” 
Under the Directive 2014/104 on antitrust damages actions548 both follow-on and stand-
alone actions remained individual in their nature. There were some initiatives for creating separate 
types of collective antitrust damage actions, but the Commission chose the scenario which 
preferred a vertical binding instrument for the regulation of damage actions which contains no 
competition-specific measures for collective redress. Even though the Directive 2014/104 does not 
foresee a collective redress action specially designed for competition cases, it does not mean that 
the collective redress actions are forbidden in competition law.549 Namely, Article 2(4) of the 
Directive 2014/104 allows claiming damage by “someone who acts on behalf of one or more 
injured consumers”, which is a representative litigation per defintionem. It turns out that the 
Directive 2014/104 allows a collective antitrust damage action, but its regulation as separate type 
of antitrust damage action is to be left to another EU or national instrument.  
At EU level, such instrument is the Recommendation which contains explicit definition of 
a “collective follow-on action.” The collective follow-on action is defined as: 
“a collective redress action that is brought after a public authority has adopted a final decision finding that 
there has been a violation of Union law.”550 
 
The Recommendation does not contain any rules devoted to stand-alone damage  
                                                          
546 Persson, A. H., Collective enforcement: European prospects in light of Swedish experience, In Collective Actions. 
Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interest (Red: Wrbka, S & Van Uytsel, S. & Siems, M,) 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 347. 
547 Idem.  
548 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union., OJ L 349/1, 05.12.2014. 
549 Blennerhassett, J.2016. A Comparative Examination of Multi-Party Actions. The case of environmental Mass 
Harm. Hart Publishing. Oxford. Portland Oregon. p.274.  
550 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-e). 
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actions, which, in our opinion, should not be interpreted that these actions may not be employed 
on a representative basis, but rather as an act of compliance with the current EU competition policy 
which prefers strong public enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty.551 
The Recommendation sets two additional rules regarding collective follow-on actions. 
With the first rule, the Recommendation has asked the Member States to adopt rules to avoid 
conflicts which might appear regarding the rulings of the courts and the public authorities. To that 
end, the Recommendation proposes that the courts start collective redress actions after the 
proceedings run by a public authority have been concluded. In cases when a collective redress 
action was previously commenced by the court, the court should stop the proceeding until the 
proceedings of the public authority have been concluded. With the second rule, the 
Recommendation protects the consumers from losing their right to compensation due to the expiry 
of the limitation periods before the public authority makes the final decision. Based on this rule, 
as long as the proceedings governed by the public authorities run, the right to compensation is be 
put on hold. When the proceedings run by the public authority have been finally concluded, the 
limitation period for filing a claim for compensation resumes.  
In the end, in our opinion, the collective follow-on action may be employed either as a 
group collective follow-on action or as a representative collective follow-on action. This 
conclusion is based on the fact that the principal precondition for engaging this action is that there 
is a previously taken decision by a public authority, by which it is found that there has been a 
violation of Union law. 
 
f. Certification criteria (admissibility)    
The Recommendation does not explicitly stipulate formal certification (admissibility) 
criteria. Obviously, the set of certifications’ prerequisites is left to be modelled by each of the 
Member States in the process of tailoring a national collective redress system. Still some of the 
safeguards incorporated in the Recommendation’s text actually may be treated as certification 
criteria.  
The requirement of a direct relationship between the main objectives of the entity and the 
type of violated right, resembles the typicality requirement. Namely, the US class action regime 
requires “the claims or defenses of the representative parties to be typical to the claims and 
                                                          
551 See more in Blanco, Luis Ortiz. Second ed., 2006. European Community Competition Procedure. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.p.47. 
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defenses of the class members.”552 Here, the representative entity has no claim or defense of its 
own, but if its objectives coincide with the type of right which has allegedly been violated, in our 
opinion, it makes them (the entity and the victims) typical to one another.  
The Recommendation sets highly demanding preconditions for certification of any 
representative entities. Namely, each entity must have a considerable amount of financial 
resources, human resources, and skills in the form of legal expertise.553 These preconditions are 
closely connected to the requirement of adequacy of representation. For example, in the US class 
action regime the adequacy of representation as a requirement for certification is enhanced with 
an appointment of well-experienced, well-skilled and well-equipped class counsel.554  
Nevertheless, in the Recommendation’s text one may clearly distinguish between two 
certification prerequisites: a numerosity and a commonality requirement. Namely, the requirement 
for at least two persons to appear as plaintiffs as a precondition for the employment of the group 
action, truly works as a numerosity requirement.555 The commonality requirement is implicitly 
foreseen as a precondition for certification by the Recommendation in Chapter 2, Section 3-a, and 
Section 3-b. These provisions of the Recommendation require that the persons who claim to have 
been harmed all be damaged in the same mass harm situation.556 This means that all victims who 
have suffered damage in a mass harm situation share at least one common fact, that is, the same 
factual event, which is allegedly the reason for violation of their rights. The category of mass harm 
situation shall be discussed in the thesis below.    
The Recommendation requires the Member States to provide in their national systems a 
verification of the certification criteria at the earliest possible stage of litigation, so as to dismiss 
all manifestly unfounded cases. Dismissing unfounded cases at the earliest possible stage would 
mean that the plaintiffs would not have a chance to blackmail the defendant because the action 
would be dismissed at the very beginning of the procedure and only “strong cases” would be 
proceeded further, while the “groundless cases” would be stopped at the beginning. 557  The 
collective actions are time and money consuming procedural devices, therefore solving the 
admissibility issues at the earliest possible stage saves the financial resources of all parties 
                                                          
552 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) (3). 
553 Recommendation (Ch.3, point 4-c).   
554 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (g) (1).  
555 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-a). 
556 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-a & 3-b).  
557 Gibbons, Susan MC., 2010. Group Litigation, Class Actions, and Collective Redress: An anniversary Reappraisal of 
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involved in the case. It is meaningless to proceed with a case which is obviously unfounded 
because that would generate costs only and may easily jeopardise the purpose of the collective 
redress mechanisms.  
The courts examine the admissibility of collective actions at their own motion (ex officio), 
i.e. without the need of a formal objection submitted by any of the parties in the proceeding.  
 
g. Defining the term “mass harm situation” and “same illegal activity”  
As it was previously stated, in our opinion, the existence of a mass harm situation is a 
precondition for raising a collective redress action. This conclusion is drawn directly from the text 
of the Recommendation, which defines the term “mass harm situation” as:  
“a situation where two or more natural or legal persons claim to have suffered harm causing damage resulting 
from the same illegal activity of one or more natural or legal persons;”558 
 
However, the mere existence of a mass harm situation is not enough, the Recommendation 
requires the concrete mass harm situation to be caused by the same illegal activity. Hence, only 
those persons who claim to have been harmed in the same mass harm situation shall have either 
standing to sue or the right to opt in the group as members. In this way, the boundaries of the group 
are established because only those victims who have been harmed by the same illegal activity 
constitute the group.  
The Recommendation does not provide a definition of the term “illegal activity”, but it 
provides useful guidance thereof. In its preamble, the Recommendation explains that our modern 
societies sometimes generates situations in which a large number of persons can be harmed by the 
same illegal activities performed by one or more wrongdoers.559 Also, having in mind that the 
Recommendation was enacted “to […] stop illegal practices and enable injured parties to obtain 
compensation in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union law,” in 
our opinion, each act of violation of a right granted under Union law which affects a large number 
of persons shall be considered an illegal activity that creates a mass harm situation. The term “act 
of violation” is a broad legal category, which may refer either to contractual obligations or to non-
contractual obligations. For example, if a mass provider of services breaches its contractual 
obligations towards its customers, he actually causes damages stemming from its unfulfilled 
contractual obligations (damage resulting from breach of contract). In another case, if a mass 
                                                          
558 Idem, art. 3(b).  
559 Recommendation (Preamble, point 2)  
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provider of goods abuses its dominant position by posing price fixing, he causes damage stemming 
from violated provisions of law (damage resulting from breach of statutory duty). The above 
examples show that the act of violation might be to a right arising out of a contract or a right arising 
directly out of a provision of law. In our opinion, the Recommendation covers both types of 
violations.  
Having said that, it is still not precisely clear what type of cases are covered by the 
Recommendation. Besides all different classifications of the category of “mass violations” which 
exist in contemporary tort law literature, it is broadly accepted to talk about mass harm situations 
and mass torts situations.560 The term mass harm situations refer to ”mass injuries caused by 
defective products or environmental exposures to toxic chemicals, mass financial losses resulting 
from violation of competition law, securities law, consumer protection law, human rights abuses 
etc,”561 while the term mass tort situations to “ medical and other losses associated with personal 
injuries.”562 Having no further guidelines in the Recommendation regarding the interpretation of 
the terms, such as, mass harm situations, illegal activity, types of violation etc., it is really hard to 
precisely determine the ambit of the Recommendation. If the Recommendation had had a precise 
definition of the terms above, it would have been possible to determine if the Recommendation 
covers the most problematic types of cases – mass tort cases. It is true that the Recommendation 
puts no limits on the typology of the violations, but the Member States should seriously take into 
consideration all criticism made by the American scholars regarding the incompatibility of the 
class action mechanism with the nature of mass tort cases, where the personal injury element 
dominates over the common origin of the harm.   
 
h. Opt-in model vs. opt-out model 
 Collective redress mechanisms may appear in two forms depending on the manner in which 
the groups are constituted: an opt-in based model and an opt-out based model. A key difference 
between the two forms is whether the consumers must opt in the collective action through an 
affirmative act or are presumed to be included in the action unless they affirmatively declare a lack 
of desire to participate in the proceedings. 563  Under an opt-out system, all members of the 
                                                          
560 Blennerhassett, J.2016. A Comparative Examination of Multi-Party Actions. The case of environmental Mass 
Harm. Hart Publishing. Oxford. Portland Oregon. p.12-16.  
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562 Idem, p.14.  
563 Leuven Report, p.287. 
154 
 
represented group are bound by the outcome of the action unless they have declared their wish not 
to be members of the group after being notified of the proceeding. Under an opt-in procedure, after 
being notified, the consumer represented would have to explicitly express their desire to be part of 
the group in order to benefit from the outcome of the action.564   
Opt-in models of collective redress mechanisms are front-loaded proceedings because the 
class (group) is constituted at the beginning of the procedure. Namely, each consumer who intends 
to enter the group has to issue an individual claim form (under the GLO system) or an application 
(under the Swedish GPA). All submitted individual claim forms (or applications) are recorded into 
a group register.565 These registers are basic procedural tools for the courts and they must be 
accurate regarding the group members’ personal data. The accuracy of the register enables the 
court to pay direct compensation to each of the group members at the remedy stage.  
Opt-in models of collective redress mechanisms keep the due process guaranties safe 
because the final judgment binds only those consumers who have explicitly expressed their consent 
by issuing an individual claim form to enter the group. That is the reason why opt-in systems are 
a much more preferred option in Europe than the opt-out systems.  
Opt-in models of collective redress mechanisms form small groups of harmed 
consumers.566 There are many reasons for this. For example, the opt-in systems require much more 
active and motivated group members compared to the opt-out systems. Namely, each victim must 
issue an individual claim form (or an application) in order to take part in the proceeding. Under 
the GLO system, the potential members are even required to pay the claim form issue fee567 before 
they enter the group register. Another reason is the personal attitude of the victim who considers 
that the litigation costs would be higher than the amount of compensation sought, etc. Unlike the 
opt-in systems, the opt-out systems tend to capture a larger number of represented parties and lead 
to more consistent decisions in general.568 The opt-out based models are better compared to the 
opt-in based models because the former do not require the victims to be as active as the latter do. 
That is the reason why the opt-out rates in the US ranged from 0.1%-0.2%.569  
                                                          
564 Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust 
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The cost-benefit analysis favours none of the two models. In the opt-in models, the 
certification stage consumes a lot of resources in order to examine the claims of the claimants who 
intend to enter the group register (verification stage). For example, in the case of Hobson v. Ashton 
Morton Slack Solicitors the total recovery was £25,000, while the litigation costs were £110,000. 
570 In the opt-out models, the verification stage is postponed because they are always followed by 
the problem of establishing group membership, which inevitably requires employment of indirect 
models of distribution, which also consumes a lot of resources to examine the claims which seek 
compensation.571  
The above-mentioned factors make the opt-in model more suitable for actions which 
involve small classes and very serious personal injuries because only seriously harmed victims 
would be highly motivated to solve their cases on a class-wide basis, and in that way sharing the 
common costs for adjudication of the common questions.572 On the other hand, the opt-out systems 
are much more suitable to handle damages that are small in amount and dispersed. 573 
 
- The Recommendation favours opt-in models of collective redress mechanisms 
The Recommendation favours an opt-in rather than an opt-out model of collective redress 
mechanisms.574 The basic argument against the implementation of the opt-out principle in Europe 
is the incompatibility of this principle with the due process rights of the European citizens.575 
Namely, each European citizen, wherever he comes from, has many procedural rights, among 
which the most important are the right of party autonomy and the right of party disposition.576 
These two rights are not just procedural, but also constitutional rights. Hence, implementing an 
opt-out principle in Europe shall mean adjudication of citizen’s rights in their absence, which 
challenges the constitutional right of access to justice guaranteed by the European Convention on 
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576 Hess, B., 2012. A Coherent approach to European collective redress. In: D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, ed.2012. 
Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.6.13 
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Human Rights (ECHR).577 If courts rule over the citizens’ rights in their absence, it is contrary to 
Article 6 of the ECHR, which guarantees that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing”.  
Reading Article 6 of the ECHR and the due process guaranties provided for in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth amendments of the US Constitution, it can be concluded that both rules mirror each 
other. Notwithstanding the above, the US society, however, solved this issue by the category of 
adequate representation and notice in some type of classes. It is for the EU to find a way in which 
the representative litigation will be accepted without depriving the EU citizens from the essence 
of their right to access to justice. For the reasons above the debate over opt-in or opt-out is more 
complex than it appears at first sight. 578 The considerations of consumer justice and market control 
can favour opt-out systems, while the considerations of fundamental rights and avoiding 
procedural abuse favour opt-in systems.   
For the reasons stated above, the Recommendation prefers for the claimant party to be 
formed based on the opt-in principle, which requires an express consent by the natural or legal 
persons before they enter the group.579 The Recommendation requires a possibility for each group 
member to enter or to leave the claimant party at any time before the final judgement is given or 
before the case is otherwise validly settled.580 Also, those members who will leave the group shall 
not be deprived of the possibility to pursue their own individual claims.581  
 
i. Funding and costs  
The Recommendation requires the Member States to implement the loser pays principle 
(known as the “English rule”). According to this principle, “the party that loses a collective redress 
action shall reimburse any necessary legal costs borne by the winning party.”582 It would be 
expected from the EU to accept the loser pay principle because most of the EU Member States are 
part of the “civil law tradition”, where this principle is fundamental. The EU’s Small Claims 
                                                          
577 About the access to justice see more at Zuckerman, A., Zuckerman on civil procedure, 2006. Sweet & Maxwell, 
London. pp.59-72.  
578  Hodges, C., 2008. The reform of class and representative actions in European legal systems. Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, p.130.  
579 Recommendation (Ch.5, Sec.21). 
580 Recommendation (Ch.5, Sec.22). 
581 Idem.  
582 Recommendation (Ch.3, Sec.13). 
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Procedure works under this principle as well.583  But this principle is not fundamental only in the 
EU territory, moreover it works as a general rule in almost every jurisdiction worldwide.584 
Besides the fact that the loser pays principle is globally recognised, the fundament question 
is whether this principle is adequate for collective redress actions as it is for individual civil 
proceedings? More than half a century ago, Kalven and Rosenfield explained that the customers 
are in a poor position when seeking legal redress either because they are not well informed or 
because such redress is disproportionally expensive. 585 So, having in mind this “poor position” of 
the consumers as well as the risk of bearing the litigation cost in case of losing the suit, it seems 
unlikely that consumers would be able to initiate a collective redress procedure under such 
circumstances. 
But, what would happen if consumers were not to take the risk of bearing any cost (“the 
American rule”)?586 A good example is the Myodil litigation, where 93% of the claims were legally 
aided by the Legal Aid Board, which means that the claimants were waived the opposite (wining) 
party’s costs. Around five thousand claim forms were issued. The Board ordered its legal team to 
audit all of the claims. The results were dramatic: lots of unmeritorious claims have been found, 
and only around four hundred claims were found to be meritorious. The Board withdrew the legal 
aid and the case collapsed, but £40 million were spent.587  
The above example shows that neither the English rule, nor the American rule provides 
satisfactory results. Which of those two principles will be implemented depends entirely on the 
legal tradition to which the concrete country belongs. Given the civil law legal tradition of the 
Member States,588 the Commission recommended that the loser pay principle be implemented in 
their national collective redress systems. The principal reason is the fact that the loser pay principle 
is a serious “gatekeeper” from unmeritorious collective redress actions. 
                                                          
583 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ L 199/1.   
584 Hodges, C., Vogenauer, S. and Tulibacka, M., 2009 Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 
Paper No 55/2009. University of Oxford., p.19.  
585 Kalven, H, and Rosenfield, M., 1941. The Contemporary function of the class suit. Chi. L. Rev. 688, 686. 
586 See more in Nagy, I. C., 2013. Comparative collective redress from law and economic prospective: without risk 
there is no reward. 19 Columbia Journal of Europian Law 469, p.483. 
587 Zuckerman, A., 2006. Zuckerman on civil procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, London para.12.54. 
588 Recommendation (Ch.1, Sec.2).  
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Each of the jurisdictions589which are subject of analysis in this thesis allows for collective 
redress actions to be financially supported by “third parties”. This principle is confirmed by the 
Recommendation as well.590  
The Recommendation sets strict rules about the manner of financing collective redress 
actions. Namely, it requires the claimant to declare the origin of the funds provided for support of 
the representative action at the beginning of the proceeding. The origin of the funds should show 
that there is no conflict of interests between the third party and the claimant. With this rule the 
Commission tries to protect consumers from “dishonest” sponsorship. For example, the company-
wrongdoer may indirectly fund the collective redress action in order to have an influence over the 
outcome of the suit. Therefore, the courts should have the mandate to stop the proceeding in case 
of a conflict of interests between the third party and the claimant party and its members.591  
Besides the obligation to declare the origin of the funds before the court, the claimant has 
also an obligation to show sufficient amount of resources to run the procedure and to meet the 
adverse costs in case of losing the case. With this obligation (sufficient amount of resources) the 
Recommendation clearly indicates that raising a collective redress action is always connected with 
the risk of high adverse costs. Therefore, before they decide to file a collective redress action, any 
potential claimant party should seriously consider the merit of the case. The obligation for the 
losing party to pay the adverse cost represents a very serious barrier against unmeritorious group 
actions.  
The same obligation (sufficient amount of resources) is foreseen as a precondition for 
certification of the entity which intends to initiate a representative action.592 
Based on the text of the Recommendation, it may be concluded that the actions for 
collective redress may be financed by the state, NGOs, various governmental and non-
governmental funds, third parties etc., under the condition that they adhere to the rules set by the 
Recommendation. Namely, each third party which appears as a financial supporter of a concrete 
collective redress action, may not: 
- “seek influence over the procedural decisions of the claimant party, including on settlements;  
- provide financing for a collective action against a defendant who is a competitor of the fund provider or 
against a defendant on whom the fund provider is dependent;  
- charge excessive interest on the funds provided.”593 
                                                          
589 It refers to the United States of America, England & Wells and Sweden.   
590 Recommendation (Ch.3, Sec.14).  
591 Idem.  
592 Recommendation (Ch.3, Sec.6). 
593 Idem.  
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Unlike the US class action regime, which is fundamentally based on contingency fee 
agreements, the European collective redress system strictly prohibits such agreements.594 On this 
point, the Recommendation requires the Members State to avoid any method of calculating the 
attorney’s fee which would create incentives for “lawyer’s entrepreneurship” immanent in the US 
class action regime.595 According to the Commission, the contingency fee is one of the ingredients 
that makes the famous “American toxic cocktail” - a combination of punitive damages, 
contingency fees, opt-out principle and pre-trail discovery.596 Instead of favouring incentives for 
“lawyer’s entrepreneurship” on the EU territory, the Commission sought to encourage a 
competitiveness culture, where businesses which play by the rules can have competitive 
advantages.597 Therefore, in the Green Paper (2008)598 the Commission recommends avoiding any 
option for collective redress in the EU that accepts elements which encourage a litigation culture.  
One of the possible methods of funding the collective redress action is legal aid.599 The 
legal aid funding model supports individuals only and it covers the ongoing litigation costs and 
meets the adverse costs of the winning party. This type of financing is mostly used in England and 
Wales, where the legal aid rate per capita is the highest in Europe (€53.80 for England and Wales, 
€13.96 for Ireland, €5.59 for Germany, €4.64 France and €0.78 Italy)600 For example, the Legal 
Services Commission spent a gross amount of £110,900,000 in ten cases only.601 We saw that this 
approach may create incentives for unmeritorious claims because due to the legal aid provided, the 
claimants would not pay anything even if the case fails, which motivates them to file unmeritorious 
claims.602  
Another possible method of funding the collective redress action are the so-called legal 
expenses insurance policies (LEI), which may appear in two forms i.e. before the event and after 
                                                          
594 Hodges, C., 2010. Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model. London: Civil Justice Quarterly No.3., p.373.  
595 Recommendation (Ch.5, Sec.30). 
596 European Commission DG SANCO, MEMO/08/741, p. 4. 
597 Idem.  
598 Green paper on collective redress p.14, point 53. 
599 Hodges, C., Vogenauer, S. and Tulibacka, M., 2009 Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 
Paper No 55/2009. University of Oxford, p.24.  
600 Hodges, C., 2010. Country Report: England and Wales. The Global Class Actions Exchange [online] available at: 
< http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/country-report-england-and-wales> [accessed 26 August 2017], 
p.26.  
601 Mulheron, R., 2008. Reform of collective redress in England and Wales. A Research Paper for submission to the  
Civil Justice Council of England and Wales. London. Civil justice council, p. 73. 
602 Zuckerman, A., 2006. Zuckerman on civil procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, London para.12.54. 
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the event.603 LEI is a type of an insurance policy which covers policy holders against the potential 
costs of a legal action brought by or against the policy holder. LEI is used for different types of 
cases, such as traffic accidents, labour disputes, etc., and covers the costs of the procedure.  
Another possible method of funding collective redress actions is through Third Party 
Funders (TPFs).604 TPFs is an alternative method of litigation funding where a commercial funder 
with no connection to the merits of the case pays the costs of the client’s case in return for a share 
(percentage) of the recovery awarded to the client if the client wins the case. This percentage varies 
from 25%-40% in Austria, Germany, Netherlands. 605  In our opinion, there is no significant 
difference between the TPFs and the US law firms because funding is under the same condition - 
a percentage of the client’s net recovery if the case ends successfully. This type of funding is not 
in line with the objectives set by the Recommendation that the Members State should avoid any 
method of calculating the attorney’s fee which creates incentives for entrepreneurial lawyering.  
  
j. Injunctive collective redress 
The Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests606 and its 
codified version, the Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests607, have provided a European–wide consumer protection regime by enabling “qualified 
entities” to bring actions for injunctions against wrongdoers who infringe the collective interests 
of consumers before the competent courts or other public bodies in all Member States.  
Based on the wording of Article 2(1) (a) of the Directive 2009/22/EC, the action for an 
injunction may be shortly defined as an order requiring cessation or prohibition of any 
infringement. Injunctions may be in the form of inhibitory relief, prohibitory relief and affirmative 
injunctions.608 An inhibitory injunction forbids a certain legal activity at the time the injunction 
order is granted and the wrongful act is going to be brought to an end (a cessation order). A 
                                                          
603 See more about the alternative ways of funding group litigations in Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios [pdf] Brussels, Rome and Rotterdam.  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf 
[Accessed 24 January 2016], p.285-286. 
604 Hodges, C., Vogenauer, S. and Tulibacka, M., 2009 Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 
Paper No 55/2009. University of Oxford, p.30. 
605 Idem, p.30-31.  
606 Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests (OJ 166, 11.6.1998, p.52) 
607  Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests - codified version (OJ 110, 
23.04.2009) 
608 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in the 
US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p.16-17.  
161 
 
prohibitory injunction prohibits repetition of the wrongful activity in the future (a prohibitory 
order). In fields such as unfair contract terms and deceptive advertisements, the injunction may 
require additional activities such as: disclosure of evidence, products recall, monitoring of the 
process of compliance, etc. (an affirmative order).  
Ogorzalek has distinguished four functions of injunctions, such as behavioural, restitution, 
deterrent and regulatory function.609 The injunctions have a behavioural function because they 
demand the wrongdoer to change his illegal behaviour so that his activities would be in compliance 
with the law in the future. In other words, by issuing an injunction, the court seeks modification in 
the wrongdoer’s behaviour. Ogorzalek 610  talks about the restitution function of injunctions, 
explaining that the consumer cannot expect compensation, but he may rather count on 
“reparation”, that is, improvement or modification in unlawful behaviour. The term “reparation” 
used in this context correlates much more with the behavioural and deterrent function rather than 
with the restitution function of injunctions. Restitution is defined as taking a harmed person back 
to the position he held prior to the damage. In case of breaching the consumer law, both the courts 
and the administrative authorities have the mandate to impose very effective sanctions against the 
wrongdoers, which might make the concrete offence worthless to commit. In that case those 
sanctions would have a deterrence effect on anyone who is planning to behave unlawfully. The 
Commission is the “Silent regulator” of the EU market and its aim in the consumer sphere is to 
maximise consumer participation and trust in the market. In order to achieve this aim, the 
Commission firmly relies on injunctions as inevitable tools for consumer protection. The 
Commission would not be able to run its agenda devoted to consumers’ affairs without having 
tools by which it can modify the suppliers’ behaviour on the market. By adopting the Injunctive 
directive, the Commission has enabled the courts and the administrative authorities to deliver 
orders by which they should control the companies’ behaviour. Having the possibility of 
controlling the companies’ behaviour to a certain extent is nothing else but regulation of the 
market.  
 Under Art.3 of the Directive 2009/22/EC, only qualified entitles have the right to bring 
collective injunctive actions. The Recommendation has extended the list of persons who may 
initiate an injunctive collective redress by giving that right to the consumers themselves (“at least 
                                                          
609 See more in Ogorzalek, M., 2014. The Action for Injunction in EU consumer law. European University Institute. 
Available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34560/2014_Ogorzalek_Author.pdf?sequence=1 
[Accessed 28.02.2016], p.40-54.  
610 Idem, p.46.  
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two or more natural or legal persons […] claiming to have been harmed in a mass harm 
situation”).611 There is no difference between the collective injunctive actions under the Directive 
2009/22/EC and the injunctive collective redress under the Recommendation, because the 
Directive 2009/22/EC has already recognised the existence of the so-called collective interests of 
the consumers612 which are also subject of the Recommendation.  
 Having in mind the indivisible nature of injunctions, which mostly appear as inhibitory or 
prohibitory reliefs, the Recommendation should have explicitly declared that opting out is allowed 
under the injunctive collective redress mechanisms. The rules for “opting-in” are set in Chapter 
Five, which refers to compensatory collective redress only, but it would be clearer if the 
Recommendation explicitly prohibited any opting out solution under injunctive collective redress 
mechanisms.  
 
k. Compensatory collective redress and distribution  
The ultimate goal of the EU collective redress systems is to compensate harmed 
consumers.613 The Recommendation on collective redress (2013) was enacted in order to enable 
injured consumers to obtain compensation in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights 
granted under Union law. The Recommendation has foreseen two types of remedies which may 
be granted in a collective redress proceeding, such as injunctive and compensatory reliefs. The 
situation with injunctive reliefs is satisfactory because currently at EU level there are at least 
minimum standards for issuing injunctive reliefs on individual or collective basis. The situation 
with compensatory reliefs is far from satisfactory, it is even blurred. 614  Namely, the 
Recommendation has left many serious legal questions unanswered, such as trial techniques for 
the determination of the defendant’s liability, methods for assessing the amount of damage, 
damage’s calculation on an aggregate basis, distribution of the damage award, etc. These questions 
are fundamental for each compensatory collective redress system and, therefore, the absence of 
guidelines is, in our opinion, the greatest omission of this Recommendation. 
                                                          
611 Recommendation (Ch.2, point 3-a).  
612  The collective interests are defined in the Directive 2009/22/EC as interests which do not include the 
accumulation of interests of individuals who have been harmed by an infringement. This is without prejudice to 
individual actions brought by individuals who have been harmed by an infringement. 
613 Id. at 10, point 3.1  
614 Rotterdam, p.270.   
614 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p. 38.  
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Probably, there is an explanation of why the Recommendation left the above questions 
unanswered. According to the EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013, approved by both the EU 
Parliament and the EU Commission, Member States should create collective redress mechanisms 
based as opt-in models and restriction for the courts to calculate damage on an aggregate basis.615 
A combination of an opt-in model and the possibility for the court to calculate actual damages 
practically means that the courts may calculate damages only on an individual basis and any model 
of indirect distribution is excluded. The GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action fit into the 
EU concept for collective redress mechanism because both are opt-in models and the courts are 
allowed to award individual damages only. But, both models share the same “defect” - the inability 
to capture small claims cases (scattered losses cases), whose nature requires an opt-out approach 
and an ability for the courts to calculate damages on an aggregate basis. Broadly speaking, cases 
which involve personal losses (where people’s health is affected) are traditionally treated on an 
individual basis.616  On the other hand, if the court is faced with cases which involve trivial 
economic losses (scattered losses cases) or losses which may not be determined on an individual 
basis, the aggregate method is superior than individual damage assessment.617 In these cases, the 
victims are usually not willing to initiate any court proceedings because the court’ fees outweigh 
the value of compensation. It should be mentioned that if the value of the claims is extremely low, 
any method of individual damage assessment may not provide acceptable results and none of the 
victims would raise individual proceedings seeking compensation. Therefore, it is recommended 
that aggregate methods for damage assessment should be used, at least for one reason, to deter the 
wrongdoer from subsequent unlawful activities.618  
The Recommendation does not contain any provisions for distributing awards because such 
rules are not necessary. Based on the cases presented for the Swedish group action system and the 
GLO system, we saw that in both systems rules for distribution are not needed. Namely, under 
both systems the courts may award only damages which are calculated on an individual basis.619 
As long as the judgements are delivered on behalf of individually specified persons, both systems 
                                                          
615 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’ P7_TA(2012) 002, note 20/2  & note 20/7.  
616 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p.33-34 
617 Idem.  
618 Kocher, E.,2011. Collective rights and collective goods: enforcement as collective interest. In: J. Steele, and Van 
Boom, H. Willem, ed. 2011. Mass Justice: Challenges of Representation and Distribution. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Ch.6, p.126-127.  
619 Falla, E., 2012. Powers of the judge in collective redress proceedings. [e-book] Brussels, Université libre de 
Bruxelles – ULB., p.212. 
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have no need of rules for distribution because the beneficiaries of the judgment may demand 
enforcement on an individual basis before a bailiff.  
 
l. Punitive damages 
The Recommendation strictly prohibits any use of punitive damages in the European 
collective redress system.620 Punitive damages are an inevitable part of the US class action regime 
because from a conceptual point of view, by imposing punitive damages, two functions should be 
accomplished in the US, such as deterrence and punishment. 621 From an economic perspective, 
punitive damages should be in an amount between what it is found appropriate for the purpose of 
deterrence and what is found appropriate for the purpose of punishment.622  
In all continental European countries, there is a strict division between the public and the 
private law sphere. The deterrence and the punishment functions are traditionally in the public law 
sphere, while compensation is in the private law sphere. Respecting this legal tradition, in its 
official papers the Commission has clearly announced that collective redress in the EU shall have 
one function only - that of pure compensation.623 The punishment and deterrence functions should 
be left to public enforcement. Therefore, punitive damages should not be part of a European 
collective redress system.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Consumer collective protection was an immanent category in the acquis communautaire 
since the 1980s. But consumer collective protection was limited only to the cessation or prohibition 
of the infringements of consumers’ rights, while the restitution (compensation) of the consumers 
was left aside. The lack of consumer collective redress was noticed as a weakness, and the 
Commission (EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013) took steps toward the creation of a “union 
collective redress mechanism.” 
                                                          
620 Id., point 31. 
621 Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S., 1998. Punitive Damages: An economic analysis. Harvard Law Review, 111(4), 960. 
622 Id., pp.962.  
623 Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social 
committee and the committee of the regions - “Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”, 
COM (2013) 401 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/com_2013_401_en.pdf (06.12.2015)., p.10, 
point 3.1  
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The initial plan was to create one single remedy for both consumer and competition law 
infringements. In that context, in 2012 by its Resolution, the EU Parliament proposed a horizontal 
framework including a common set of principles providing uniform access to justice via collective 
redress within the EU for both consumer and competition law infringements. Also, from the very 
beginning there was a common attitude that collective redress may not be regulated at Union level 
by a vertical instrument. The reason was that some Member States still did not have a collective 
redress mechanism, while, on the other hand, there was a large diversity among those Member 
States that had some sort of collective redress mechanism. Therefore, the only possible Union 
approach here would be a horizontal one.   
Soon after the Union policy changed and the initially planned “union collective redress 
mechanism” was not created. Instead, the consumer policy and the competition policy were 
separated. In 2013 the Union adopted a non-binding horizontal instrument (a recommendation) for 
collective redress, while in 2014 the Union adopted a binding vertical instrument (a directive) for 
damage actions in the competition law. The Directive on damages actions does not contain 
competition-specific collective redress remedies, which does not mean that the collective redress 
mechanisms are excluded or prohibited in competition cases, but it means that their usage depends 
on the specific Member State.    
The Recommendation proposes for each Member State to implement injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms. Both injunctive and compensatory collective redress 
mechanisms may be in the form of a group action and a representative action. In essence, both the 
group action and the representative action are representative devices because the persons 
represented are not formal parties to the proceedings. The leading plaintiff (a class representative, 
representative plaintiff) in the group action are the consumers who act on behalf of the group (self-
representation), while in the representative action the leading plaintiff is the representative entity 
who also acts on behalf of the group (representation by attribution).  
 Furthermore, the connecting factor (the commonality requirement) among the potential 
group members would be the occurrence of a mass harm situation i.e. violation of the rights granted 
under Union law. In other words, the common interest which derives from the violation of the 
rights granted under the Union law. The determination of the preconditions required by the courts 
for granting certification orders are left to be regulated on a national level. The existence of a 
formal certification stage within the collective redress procedure is strongly recommended. 
Each collective redress system balances between the collective and the individual approach 
in awarding damages to harmed consumers. The Recommendation protects the individual 
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approach unambiguously, and here is the biggest negative criticism to this EU instrument. The 
Recommendation strongly suggests acceptance of the opt-in principle, which is a safe solution 
because it is based on the consent of the consumer, which is the same as in the traditional civil 
procedure. But, the opt-in model is suitable only if object of adjudication are cases which involve 
significant economic losses or personal injuries. This model is not suitable for cases where the 
victims suffer trivial harm only (“scattered losses”). Scattered losses cases have a very high share 
in the total number of mass harm cases. In the scattered losses cases, none of the harmed consumers 
would be willing to do anything in order to get compensation which is trivial in value. Therefore, 
the opt-in based collective redress actions “easily sweep in a lot less claimants.”624 So the opt-in 
model is not a solution for the scattered losses cases. The Recommendation should have foreseen 
an opt-out model for the scattered losses cases, while an opt-in model for cases which involve 
economic losses with a significant value or personal injuries. The current approach of the 
Recommendation of a “one size fits all” remedy is not a workable solution. 625  
Besides the above criticism, the Recommendation deserves another serious criticism 
regarding the complete absence of any rules devoted to procedural questions, such as trial 
techniques for determination of the defendant’s liability, methods for assessing the amount of 
damage, damages calculation on an aggregate basis, distribution of the damage award, etc. These 
questions are fundamental for each compensatory collective redress system, and, therefore, they 
should have been foreseen in the Recommendation because the ultimate goal of the EU collective 
redress systems is to ensure compensation.626 
Regarding the litigation costs, the Recommendation requires the Member States to 
implement the loser pays principle, as a serious “gatekeeper” from unmeritorious collective redress 
actions. The Recommendation requires the plaintiff to have a sufficient amount of resources to run 
the procedure and for that reason, it allows the plaintiff to be financially supported by “third 
parties”. The Recommendation sets strict rules about the manner of financing the collective redress 
actions, trying to prevent any conflict of interests between the third party and the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
                                                          
624 Mulheron, R., 2009. The case for an opt-out class action for European member states: a legal and empirical 
analysis. 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 409. pp. 431. 
625 Wagner, G., 2011. Collective redress - categories of loss and legislative options. Law Quarterly Review 2011 
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CHAPTER SIX – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE JURISDICTIONS OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ENGLAND AND WALES, SWEDEN AND  
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Introduction  
This comparative analysis covers the four jurisdictions previously analysed, as 
jurisdictions which have already implemented a certain type of collective redress mechanisms (the 
US; England and Wales; and Sweden) and jurisdictions which are still developing (the EU). The 
subject of analysis are not entire jurisdictions, but concrete collective redress models from the 
above four jurisdictions. These four jurisdictions are the United States of America, England and 
Wales, Sweden and European Union, hereinafter referred to as “focused jurisdictions.” Five 
concrete models of collective redress mechanisms are taken from these four jurisdictions as 
follows: the US class action under FRCP Rule 23; the Group Litigation Order under CPR 19.10; 
the English class action under CAT Rules 2015; the Swedish group action under GPA rules and 
the collective redress actions (both group and representative actions) under the Recommendation 
on collective redress 2013.  
This comparative analysis consists of four sections, which are subsequently divided into 
concrete procedural questions, relevant to the subject of the thesis. These four sections are the 
following: (1) commencing a collective redress procedure; (2) conduct of a collective redress 
procedure; (3) remedies, distribution and the res judicata principle in the collective redress 
procedures, and (4) cost, funding and fees in the collective redress procedures. 
Rather than at the end of the chapter, the conclusion is given in the section on each of the 
procedural questions which are subject of analysis.  
 
1. COMMENCING A COLLECTIVE REDRESS PROCEDURE 
 
a. Basic features of the specific collective redress mechanism (a definition): This part 
of the comparative analysis presents the basic features of the collective redress mechanisms. The 
US class action under FRCP Rule 23 is “a representative device that empowers a named class 
representative to act on behalf of other similarly situated whether they could have sued 
independently or even wanted to do so.”627 Under this model the “similarly situated” (the class 
                                                          
627 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters, p.742. 
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members) are not formal parties in the procedure and their interests are represented by a class 
representative before the court. If their rights (interests) have been adequately represented before 
the court, they are all bound by the final court judgement delivered in such a proceeding. The 
Group Litigation Order under CPR 19.10628 is a case management order which enables the courts 
to manage a defined group of claims which have common or related issues of fact or law (GLO 
issues) instead of investigating every individual claim in detail.629 The actions brought together 
under the group litigation order remain separate proceedings and each of them must be resolved 
on an individual basis.630 Under this model there is no representation as it is the case with the US 
class action, but the GLO is still a mechanism which enables a class-wide resolution of multiple 
cases because the common (or related) issues of fact or law are to be solved at once and identically 
for all claims that are on the group register at the time when the judgment is given.631 After the 
determination of the GLO issues, all individual claims are to be solved in subsequent individual 
lawsuits.632 The English class action under CAT Rules 2015633 is a representative device where a 
representative brings an action on behalf of a defined class of persons (class members), who are 
not formal parties to the proceedings.634 If the class members’ interests have been adequately 
represented before the Tribunal, they are all bound by the final judgement delivered in such a 
proceeding.635 The Swedish group action under GPA rules is a representative device636 because 
being a representative of several persons (group members), the plaintiff may bring an action with 
legal effects for them.637  Under this model the group members are not formal parties in the group 
procedure and the final court judgement has a preclusive effect on all of them.638 Both the group 
and the representative actions under the Recommendation on collective redress 2013 are 
representative devices because both actions are initiated on behalf of a group of consumers who 
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are not formal parties to the proceedings.639 The leading plaintiff in the group action are the 
consumers who act on behalf of the group, while in the representative action the leading plaintiff 
is the representative entity which also acts on behalf of the group. In both cases (group or 
representative actions) formal parties to the collective redress proceedings are only the plaintiff 
and the defendant.640  
Conclusion: The US class action, the English class action, the Swedish group action and 
the group and representative actions under the Recommendation are representative devices. 
Common features of these devices are the following: (a) one or more persons may sue or be sued 
as a representative party (the claimant or defendant) on behalf of other similarly situated persons 
(the class/group); (b) the class is not a formal party to the proceedings; (c) there is a common 
interest among the members which create the class (similarly situated persons) and (d) the final 
judgement given in such litigation binds all class members.641 The essence of the representative 
litigation is the possibility for someone (the representative party) to act on behalf of similarly 
situated persons with a legal effect for them. Unlike this, under the GLO mechanism the lead 
plaintiff does not represent anyone from the group in а class action sense, but instead he allows for 
many individual actions to be grouped into one procedure so as the common issues shared by all 
actions are determined at once and identically for all individual actions. The aim of the GLO 
mechanism is to save the judicial resources and to make the court system more efficient when it is 
dealing with multiple cases which share common issues. Therefore, the GLO mechanism is not a 
representative device, but it is a case management tool which reduces the burden of the courts to 
solve each action on an individual basis when they are dealing with mass litigation cases.642 
The positive and negative effects of the implementation of these collective redress models 
are discussed below.  
 
b. What types of mass disputes are covered by the specific collective redress models 
(subject matter jurisdiction)? This procedural question addresses the subject matter jurisdiction 
of each of the collective redress systems. The US class action under FRCP Rule 23 has no 
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limitations regarding its subject matter jurisdiction, i.e. it covers all types of cases.643 The most 
frequent cases are consumers’ cases, securities related cases, civil rights cases, employment cases, 
personal injuries cases, etc.644  The Group Litigation Order under CPR 19.10 has no limitations 
regarding its subject matter jurisdiction, i.e. it covers all types of cases.645 The most frequent cases 
are personal injuries cases (liability claims, pharmaceutical related cases), consumers’ cases, 
financial services related cases, etc.646 The English class action is a sector specific instrument, 
which covers only competition cases. No other types of cases are allowed under this regime. 647 
The Swedish group action under GPA rules covers all civil cases, which fall under the competence 
of the general courts, as well as the environmental cases, which fall under the competence of the 
environmental courts.648 The most frequent cases are in the area of consumer law, insurance 
services, civil rights cases. 649  Both the group and the representative actions under the 
Recommendation on collective redress 2013 may be applied in all sectors where “mass harm 
situation caused by violations of rights granted under Union law” might appear. 650  This 
formulation is very broad and needs to be explained. The Recommendation was adopted by the 
Commission in order to enhance collective redress for both infringements of consumer protection 
rules and for breaches of the EU anti-trust rules.651 This means that the principal areas where the 
Recommendation should be applied are consumer and anti-competition cases. The main concern 
regarding the subject matter of the Recommendation are the so-called mass torts cases, which refer 
to medical and other losses associated with personal injuries.”652 In our opinion, from the EU 
policy perspective the Members States should not extend the application of their national collective 
redress systems to mass torts cases, but having in mind that the Recommendation is a horizontal 
instrument, the final decision is to be made by the specific Member State.  
                                                          
643 Leuven Report, p.280. 
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Conclusion: The US class action, the GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action have 
no limitations regarding their subject matter jurisdictions. The US class action and the GLO 
mechanisms have been applied to personal injuries cases, while there is no record about the 
Swedish group action. The English class action is a sector specific instrument due to which it may 
be applied to competition cases only. Both the group and the representative actions under the 
Recommendation on collective redress 2013 have no expresses verbis subject matter limitations, 
but from the EU policy perspective these are sector specific instruments which cover mainly 
consumers and competition cases. 
 
c. Do the respective jurisdictions provide “special court jurisdiction” for initiating 
collective redress actions and mandatory content for the application for class (group) 
certification? This procedural question should clarify if the specific jurisdiction provides special 
(“increased”) court jurisdiction for initiating collective redress actions and requires mandatory 
content for the application for class (group) certification. Having in mind the complexity of mass 
cases, it is expected that specially designated courts should handle such cases.  The internal US 
court jurisdiction structure among district and federal courts is not subject of this thesis. What is 
important for this thesis is that all federal class actions in the US are entirely controlled by the 
FRCP Rule 23.653 The FRCP Rule 23 neither increases, nor decreases the “level” of jurisdiction 
needed to deal with a class action. The US class action under the FRCP Rule 23 does not require 
special (increased) court jurisdiction. The US class action under the FRCP Rule 23 is initiated in 
the same way as the other lawsuits and the class action complaint may be submitted upfront or 
during the procedure.654 The FRCP Rule 23 is silent regarding the content of the class action 
complaint. The Group Litigation Order under CPR 19.10 requires special court jurisdiction. 
Namely, for cases in the London’s territory the application for GLO should be made to the Senior 
Master in the Queen’s Bench Division or the Chief Chancery Master in the Chancery Division, 
while for cases outside London the application should be made to a Presiding Judge or a Chancery 
Supervising Judge of the Circuit in which the District Registry which has issued the application 
notice is situated.655 The application for GLO is made in the same way as the other applications 
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for court orders.656 An application for GLO may be submitted before or after any relevant claims, 
and it must contain information on the nature of the litigation, how many parties are expected to 
be involved, which are the common issues, and if there are smaller groups of claims within the 
wider group. 657 The English class action falls under the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal, hence no court jurisdiction is relevant here.658 The application for the English class 
action must be submitted upfront by sending a collective proceeding claim to the Tribunal.659 The 
application is very formal and requires the applicant to provide a “detailed plan” about how the 
course of the proposed collective proceeding would look like.660  The Swedish group action 
requires special court jurisdiction. Competent courts which may deal with group actions are only 
those general (district) and environmental courts which are designated by the Government as 
capable of handling these cases.661 The application for a group proceeding is treated as an ordinary 
claim according to the rules of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure662 and may be submitted 
at the beginning of the procedure (upfront)663 and in an ongoing proceeding by submitting a request 
for the case to be converted into group proceedings.664 The Recommendation on collective redress 
2013665 is silent on these questions, which means that each of the Members States is to regulate 
this on national level.  
Conclusion: The GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action regime explicitly require 
special court jurisdiction, while the US class action under the FRCP 23 does not. But the US federal 
courts as courts with nationwide jurisdiction have enhanced capacity in terms of human, legal and 
technical resources. Hence, in our opinion small district courts, regardless of the country in 
question, have no capacity to deal with such cases, therefore the court jurisdiction over mass cases 
should be concentrated in specialised courts.  
Except the English class action, the rest of the focused jurisdictions have a flexible 
approach towards the content of the application for class (group) certification. In our opinion, the 
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plaintiff should be required to submit a detailed application for class (group) application because 
in that way lots of formal questions would be solved at the beginning of the collective proceeding.   
 
d. Who is entitled to appear in the capacity of plaintiff before the court holding the 
right to represent the interests of the class (group) on behalf of which he/she appears before 
the court (standing to sue)? This procedural question addresses one of the biggest dilemmas in 
the theory of collective redress mechanisms, that is, who should be given the right to represent a 
similarly situated person with legal effects for them? The US class action under the FRCP Rule 23 
may be initiated by both persons whose rights have been allegedly subject of an infringement 
(victims)666 and organisations.667 The organisations are not allowed to demand monetary reliefs on 
behalf of the class members, instead they may demand only injunctive reliefs.668 Public authorities 
(the State) are not allowed to initiate class action procedures.669 The Group Litigation Order under 
the CPR 19.10 may be initiated by persons whose rights have been allegedly subject of an 
infringement (victim) and at the court’s own initiative.670 The organisations are not allowed to 
apply for GLO671, expect if their own rights are subject of controversy. The organisations may 
become a party of a specific GLO mechanism as a party who represents its own right (victim) 
rather than as an authorised applicant on someone else’s behalf. This is fully in line with the 
principle that anyone who may appear before a court as a party may also apply for a GLO.672 The 
English class action may be initiated by both a class representative who is a class member (victim) 
and by a class representative who is not a class member (organisation).673 The CAT Rules are 
silent on whether this class action might be initiated by public authorities. The Swedish group 
action may be initiated by persons whose rights have been allegedly subject of an infringement 
(victim), by organisations and by public authorities.674 In Sweden the right to initiate a group action 
proceeding depends on the type of group action. According to GPA Sec.1 (2) a group action may 
be instituted as a private group action, an organisation action or a public group action. 
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Consequently, the right to initiate a private group action belongs to a private person (a natural 
person or legal entities), the right to initiate an organisation action belongs to organisations 
(associations) and the right to initiate a public group action belongs to the public authority 
nominated by the Government.675 In both organisation and public group actions, plaintiffs are not 
group members because they do not represent their own personal claims.676 The collective redress 
actions under the Recommendation on collective redress 2013 may be initiated by both persons 
whose rights have been allegedly subject of an infringement (victim) 677  and by designated 
representative entities.678 This means that the right to initiate a group action belongs to private 
persons, while the right to initiate a representative action belongs to representative entities. The 
Recommendation also suggests that the Members States should empower public authorities to 
initiate representative actions, as an alternative to the representative entities.679 
Different national approaches due to different social conditions: Each of the focused 
jurisdictions recognises the right of a victim to initiate a collective redress mechanism when his/her 
right has been allegedly subject of an infringement. Organisations (associations) whose objectives 
are in line with the consumers’ harmed rights also enjoy the same right (except under the GLO 
mechanism). Some of the jurisdictions allow for collective redress mechanisms to be initiated also 
by public authorities, either by the court itself (the GLO mechanisms) or by a nominated entity 
(the Swedish group action and the Recommendation).  
It may be concluded that all jurisdictions resemble each other to some extent, but in reality, 
each of the jurisdictions has taken a different approach towards the principle of standing to sue. 
For example, dominant initiators of class actions in the US are individuals (victims) with their 
attorneys. In England and Wells dominant initiators are also individuals, but with strong financial 
support through legal aid schemes. The EU approach favours consumer organisations (association) 
as initiators of collective redress mechanisms. Sweden has a remarkable consumer protection 
tradition run by the Consumer Ombudsman, but most of the group actions initiated since 2002 
have been private group actions. 680  The reasons for having different concepts regarding the 
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initiation of collective redress mechanisms lie in the fact that each of the jurisdictions has a 
different social and legal tradition. In the US, the class action has transformed from an “escaping 
tool” of the mandatory joinder principle into a crucial supplement for the governmental regulation 
of the diffuse markets.681 The US society is characterised by ex post market regulation, which 
means that the market’s failures (such as, defective products, mass securities frauds, mass 
pollutions, etc.) are usually solved through a civil procedure. In that way, the civil procedure has 
become a tool for public purposes, for example, market control. On the other hand, in the EU 
territory the market is controlled by ex-ante measures taken by administrative authorities with 
strong discretions. For example, before it releases a product on the market, each economic operator 
needs to get a permission from a relevant administrative authority. Under such circumstances the 
civil procedure is used only as a tool for “repairing” the possible damages on the market.682 Under 
the US class action regime the courts in civil procedures may award punitive damages, which have 
a purely punitive effect, while the courts on the EU territory may award only actual damages 
(compensation). On the EU territory, the punishment function is strictly reserved for the public 
authorities which have a monopoly over the public enforcement of consumer law.683 Additionally, 
these public authorities still have control over the private enforcement of consumer law because 
the “standing” of the representative entities (which have the right to initiate collective redress 
actions) needs to be approved by a public authority in the specific Member State.684 In this way, 
the public authorities have kept the public enforcement in their hands and continued to have control 
over the private enforcement of consumer law. Under such circumstances, the individuals with 
their lawyers are expected to be the key actors in the US, while in the EU territory these are the 
organisations (associations) which are approved by the State. In short, the US society has had a 
“bottom-up competitive evolution of the legal rules”, while the EU has accepted a “top-down 
administrative decision-making culture.”685  
A class (group) representative who is a member of the class (group): From a theoretical 
perspective, there are many different concepts which have defined the right to bring a collective 
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redress action, which makes the overall picture about this legal institute blurred. In our opinion, 
the theoretical explanations about this legal principle should start with the fact of who is damaged 
(the victim). The traditional civil doctrine is based on the principle that each individual must be 
“vested” with a right to court protection in case his right is under the threat of being infringed or 
it has already been infringed.686 Under the principles of the individual civil procedure, the right to 
court protection (right to bring an action before the courts) belongs to each individual (physical or 
legal persons) who claims that his right has been allegedly subject of an infringement and seeks 
court protection against an individual defendant.687 The same concept was used in the process of 
developing the US class action regime back in the 19th and 20th century. Namely, the US class 
action regime recognises the right of a victim to act as a representative on behalf of similarly 
situated persons because his personal interest coincides with the interests of the entire class. It is 
an assumption that the representative of the class will seek the best way to realise the common 
interest as long as his personal interest coincides with the common one. Both the victim and the 
class share a common interest, which may be in the form of a requirement for someone else’s 
behaviour modification, compensation, etc. In other words, the victim as a class representative and 
the class members are actually in the “same shoes”. Hence, the victim draws his legitimacy to act 
on behalf of the class from his personal interest which coincides with the interests of the entire 
class. This form of representation is designated as self-interest representation because regardless 
of the fact that the victim represents a class, he still acts as an agent of its own interests. This form 
rests on the assumption that everyone knows what is best for himself.688 Having in mind the above, 
in our opinion, each jurisdiction must provide the victims with the right to initiate collective redress 
actions because it comes as a natural consequence of the fact that each harmed individual has to 
be given the right to seek court protection, whether on an individual basis or on a collective one. 
The most serious criticism for “vesting” the individuals with standing to bring collective redress 
actions is the so-called agency problem (“entrepreneurial lawyering”) immanent in the US class 
action regime.689 But, on the other hand, the English follow-on representative actions regime690, 
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which may be initiated only by a specified body (not by the victims) has presented disastrous 
results. In the only case raised under this regime, Consumer Association v. JJB Sports (2007), the 
group of people affected was estimated to hundreds of thousands of shirts’ buyers, but only 130 
buyers (consumers) have been identified, which is less than 0.1%.691   
 A class (group) representative who is not a member of the class (group): Some of the 
focused jurisdictions recognise the organisations’ (associations) and the State’s (public authorities) 
right to appear in the capacity of plaintiff with a mandate to represent the interests of the group 
before the court. In cases where either an organisation or a public authority appears as a plaintiff, 
they are not members of the group because their “personal” right is not subject of adjudication.692 
Their legal mandate to initiate collective redress mechanisms stems out directly from the law. They 
are simply entitled to initiate collective redress actions. Even though they are not victims, they 
have a recognised right to initiate private litigation for protection of rights which belong to private 
individuals (victims). This form of representation is designated as representation by attribution 
and rests on the belief that the representative knows what is good for the represented party.693 
Under this form of representation, the representative acts as a trustee, not as a victim. This means 
that when representing groups in collective redress mechanisms, both the organisations and the 
State (public authorities), actually act as trustees of those groups.    
 The State as a class (group) representative: The right of the State (public authorities) to 
initiate collective redress actions is explained with two arguments: first, the legal tradition and, 
second, the reluctance of the State to share the standing with private individuals.694 The traditional 
civil law doctrine has always looked on the government as a protector of public interests,”695 but 
the State may involve itself into private relations (private law sphere) in different forms. The most 
recognised form is when the public prosecutor acts as a plaintiff in civil procedure cases.696 In the 
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sphere of consumer protection, the public prosecutor in Portugal may bring a popular action (lat. 
actio popularis).697 Another form of State’s involvement in the sphere of consumer protection are 
consumer agencies. These agencies may be part of the government (Office of Fair Trading in 
England and Wales)698 or may be designated (nominated) by the government. The latter refers to 
Sweden, where the Consumer Ombudsman has the capacity to initiate a legal action on behalf of 
the consumers699 and since 2002 he has had the right to bring a public group action before ordinary 
courts.700 This “governmental approach” is accepted by the Recommendation701, even though the 
consumer organisations are the first option for the EU Commission. This “governmental approach” 
is good for societies where the role of consumer organisations is weak and they need to be 
substituted by someone else who will provide protection to consumers (public authorities).702 But, 
on the other hand, this approach is seen as being ineffective due to the lack of resources, lack of 
technical expertise, trained people who are capable of running such complex litigations, etc., as 
well as non-resistance to political influence.703 
Organisations as class (group) representatives: The right of some organisations 
(associations) to initiate collective redress actions is hard to explain with legal arguments. For the 
traditional civil doctrine, it is “strange” when such organisations represent collective interests704, 
but in reality, their role as enforcers of collective rights cannot be denied either on US705 or on 
European soil.706 As it was already mentioned, their legal mandate to initiate collective redress 
mechanisms simply stems out from the law.  
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In general, organisations might be in two forms, permanent (ex-ante) and ad-hoc 
organisations (ex-post). Permanent organisations have a stable structure and last indefinitely, while 
ad-hoc organisations are always created for a particular case.707 In its White Paper the Commission 
suggests that the organisations should be granted with standing to represent their own members or 
wider groups.708 For example, in the Skandia case, the plaintiff (a not-for-profit organisation) 
claimed damages only on behalf of its members.709 In this type of cases the interests of the group’s 
members are gathered upfront, which facilitates the course of the court procedure. In our opinion, 
these models of organisations should be taken into serious consideration. When the legal order 
gives a standing to consumer organisations to represent harmed consumers, it makes it for public 
purposes, which means erga omnes. In one product liability case, the organisations represent their 
own members only, seeking repair of the products, while the other victims are left outside of that 
specific proceedings. In this way, trust in consumer organisations is called into question710 because 
the specific organisation would be seen more as a “private organisation” which only takes care of 
its members rather than as an organisation which takes care of public good. At this point, mention 
should be made of the potential conflict of interest which may arise between the members of the 
organisation who seek injunction and the consumers (not members) who seek monetary relief.711 
One of the goals of each collective redress system is legal certainty, which may not be 
accomplished if consumer organisations divide the group of harmed consumers. Therefore, each 
authorised organisation must represent all similarly situated consumers regardless of the fact 
whether they are members of that particular organisation or not. The process of “pooling the group 
members’ interests” should not be governed by the internal rules of the organisations, but by the 
concrete collective redress model (opt-in or opt-out) instead.  
The EU Commission prefers the consumers’ organisations to be the key actors in the 
collective redress proceedings.712 The arguments are: the permanent structure of the organisations, 
better financial resources, the immanent experience of the organisations in the sphere of injunctive 
reliefs, etc. On the other hand, no one can guarantee that people who work in organisations have 
                                                          
707 For example, the not-for-profit organisation “Group Action against Skandia” has been registered in October 2003, 
several months before the proceeding was initiated (Skandia case).  
708 White Paper, p.4.   
709 Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust 
damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios [pdf] Brussels, Rome and 
Rotterdam, p.271. 
710 Issacharof, S., 2008. Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe? Vanderbilt Law Review Vol.62, p.195. 
711 Idem.  
712 Recommendation (Ch.3, point 4). 
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skills to manage collective redress procedures. Also, no one can guarantee the loyalty of the 
management, which may misappropriate the financial resources of the organisation. 713  When 
defending the role of consumer organisations, one of the crucial arguments of the EU Commission 
is the risk of anticipating the phenomenon “entrepreneurial lawyering” immanent in the US class 
action regime.714 But the organisations need a lawyer too, so the agency problem may easily arise 
in situations where the management of the organisation and the legal counsel have an agreed 
material interest in the particular litigation.  
Conclusion: From the comparison above, it may be concluded that a single solution, which 
means preferring only one type of class (group) representative, is not an option. Namely, the 
preferred class (group) representative may monopolise his role in the respective civil justice 
system, which is an open space for many potential abuses of the collective redress system. On the 
other hand, each of the types of class (group) representatives (victims, organisations or the State) 
has advantages and disadvantages in the process of representing class (group) interests. Therefore, 
in our opinion, a mixed solution is preferable under which all the above actors (victims, 
organisations and the State) are entitled to represent the interests of other similarly situated 
persons. The Swedish group action model may be a good example of that (a mixed scenario).  
 
e. What preconditions should be met for the respective dispute to be permitted to be 
resolved on a class-wide basis (admissibility)? Each court is required to examine certain 
preconditions and based on the results decide whether the dispute is suitable for class-wide 
treatment or it should be adjudicated on an individual basis. In order to make a better comparison 
of the certification criteria set by each of the focused jurisdictions, we have prepared a table below, 
which will be used in the analysis. We have divided the table into three parts: prerequisites which 
refer to the class (group); prerequisites which refer to the class (group) representative and 
prerequisites which refer to the lawyers as class (group) counsels.  
 
CERTIFICATION PREREQUISTES715   
 US class 
action  
Group 
Litigation 
Order  
English class 
action  
Swedish 
group action 
Recommendat
ion 2013  
                                                          
713 Issacharof, S., 2008. Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe? Vanderbilt Law Review Vol.62, p.192-197. 
714 Gibbons, Susan MC., 2010. Group Litigation, Class Actions, and Collective Redress: An anniversary Reappraisal of 
Lord Woolf’s Three Objectives. Published in The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On edited by Deirdre Dwyer. Oxford 
University Press, p. 114. 
715 The content of the table is filled in based on the texts from the US FRCP, the English CPR, the English CAT Rules, 
the Swedish group proceeding act and the Recommendation for collective redress 2013.  
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Prerequisites which refer to the class (group) 
Defined class  “…an order that 
certifies a class 
action must define 
the class…”  
FRCP 23 (c) (1) 
(B) 
 “…claims […] 
are brought on 
behalf of an 
identifiable class 
of persons.” 
CAT 79 (1) (a) 
“… the group 
[…] is 
appropriately 
defined.” 
GPA 8 (4) 
 
Numerosity 
requirement  
“the class is so 
numerous that 
joinder of all 
members is 
impracticable”.   
FRCP 23 (a) (1)  
“…number of claims 
giving rise to the 
GLO issues.” 
CPR 19.11 
(implicitly)  
“…claims […] 
are brought on 
behalf of an 
identifiable class 
of persons.” 
CAT 79 (1) (a) 
(implicitly) 
“… that are 
common or of a 
similar nature for 
the claims of the 
group members”  
GPA 8 (1) 
(implicitly)   
“…collectively by 
two or more 
natural or legal 
persons […]” 
Rec (3) (a) 
Commonality 
requirement 
“there are 
questions of law or 
fact common to the 
class”  
FRCP 23 (a) (2) 
“…case management 
of claims which give 
rise to common or 
related issues of fact 
or law.” 
CPR 19.10 
“…claims sought 
to be included in 
the collective 
proceedings raise 
common issues.” 
CAT Rules 79 
(1) (b) 
“…action is 
founded on 
circumstances 
that are common 
or of a similar 
nature […] and 
do not differ 
substantially 
from other 
claims...”  
GPA 8 (1&2 
“… suffered harm 
causing damage 
resulting from the 
same illegal 
activity...”  
Rec (3) (b) 
Predominance 
of common 
over 
individual 
questions   
“…questions of 
law or fact 
common to class 
members 
predominate over 
any questions 
affecting only 
individual 
members 
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
    
Superiority of 
the collective 
treatment 
over the 
individual one 
“a class action is 
superior to other 
available methods 
for fairly and 
efficiently 
adjudicating the 
controversy” 
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
“…whether any 
other order would be 
more appropriate 
than GLO…”  
PR 2.3 
“…claims sought 
to be included in 
the collective 
proceedings are 
suitable to be 
brought in 
collective 
proceedings.” 
CAT 79 (1) (C) 
“… the larger 
part of the claims 
to which the 
action relates 
cannot equally 
well be pursued 
by personal 
actions by the 
members of the 
group.”  
GPA 8 (3) 
 
a. type of 
cases  
usually the courts 
examine the value 
of the claims  
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
(A) 
 “… the size 
and the nature 
of the class;” 
CAT 79 (2) (d) 
  
b. current 
status of 
other cases   
how many pending 
cases there are for 
the same matter 
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
(B&C) 
 
 “…whether 
any separate 
proceedings 
making claims 
of the same or 
a similar nature 
have already 
been 
commenced by 
members of the 
class.” 
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CAT 79 (2) (c) 
c. superior
ity over 
ind. civil 
procedure 
techniques 
possibility of 
employment of 
joinder, 
intervention, 
consolidation, or 
administrative 
proceeding  
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
possibility of 
employment of 
consolidation or 
representative party 
action  
P.R 2.3  
“…whether 
collective 
proceedings are 
an appropriate 
means for the 
fair and 
efficient 
resolution of 
the common 
issues.” 
CAT 79 (2) (b) 
  
d. class-
wide 
techniques 
atn 
disposal 
possibility of 
employment of 
class-wide 
procedure 
techniques for 
solving all cases at 
once   
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
(D)  
 “…whether the 
claims are 
suitable for an 
aggregate 
award of 
damages;” 
CAT 79 (2) (f) 
  
e. cost 
analysis  
same as for  
FRCP 23 (b) (3) 
(D) 
 “…the costs 
and the benefits 
of continuing 
the collective 
proceedings.”  
CAT 79 (2) (b)  
  
f. court / 
ADR  
  yes,  
CAT 79 (2) (b) 
  
 
Prerequisites which refer to the class (group) representative 
Typicality  
requirement 
“… the claims or 
defenses of the 
representative 
parties are typical 
of the claims or 
defenses of the 
class.” 
FRCP 23 (a) (3) 
    
Adequacy of 
representati
on  
 “…the repress. 
parties will fairly 
and adequately 
protect the 
interests of the 
class.” 
FRCP 23 (a) (4) 
 “…the Tribunal 
shall consider 
whether that 
person would 
fairly and 
adequately act in 
the interests of 
the class 
members.” 
CAT 78 (2) (a) 
 
“…the court must 
take into 
consideration the 
plaintiff’s interest 
in the substantive 
matter.” 
GPA 8 (5) 
according to the 
Recommendation, 
the representative 
entities should 
have a non-profit 
making character 
and there should be 
a direct 
relationship 
between the main 
objectives of the 
entity and the 
rights granted 
under Union law 
Rec (3) (4) (A&B) 
- capability 
 
the plaintiff has to 
be well informed 
about the case, and 
he must understand 
  “…the court must 
take into 
consideration the 
circumstances 
generally, 
whether the 
plaintiff is 
appropriate to 
“…the entity 
should have 
sufficient capacity 
in terms of human 
resources.” 
Rec (3) (4) (C) 
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the nature of 
dispute716 
represent the 
members of the 
group in the 
case.” 
GPA 8 (5) 
- previous 
experience  
same as above     same as above 
- there must 
be no 
conflict of 
interest  
there must be no 
fundamental 
conflict of interest, 
at least for one 
element which 
predominates the 
case717 
 “… the applicant 
does not have, in 
relation to the 
common issues 
for the class 
members, a 
material interest 
that is in conflict 
with the interests 
of class 
members.” 
CAT 78 (2) (b) 
 “…the claimant 
party should be 
required to declare 
to the court at the 
outset of the 
proceedings the 
origin of the 
funds…” 
Rec (3) (14)  
 
 
- more than 
one 
interested 
representati
ve  
“the court must 
appoint the 
applicant best able 
to represent the 
interests of the 
class.” 
FRCP 23 (g) (2) 
 
 “…if there is 
more than one 
applicant seeking 
approval to act as 
the class 
representative in 
respect of the 
same claims, 
would be the 
most suitable.” 
CAT 78 (2) (c) 
  
- secured 
costs for the 
adverse 
party   
no costs shifting 
rule is applied in 
the US  
 “…will be able 
to pay the 
defendant’s 
recoverable 
costs.”  
CAT 78 (2) (d) 
the plaintiff is 
required to 
present financial 
capacity to cover 
the ongoing cost 
of the procedure 
only.718 
“…the claimant 
party has 
insufficient 
resources to meet 
any adverse 
costs…” 
Rec (3) (14) (c) 
 
- funding 
the action  
it is explicitly 
required from the 
class counsel   
FRCP 23 (g) (1) 
(b) 
 
 
 
  “…the court must 
take into 
consideration the 
plaintiff’s 
financial capacity 
to bring a group 
action.” 
GPA 8 (5) 
“…the entity 
should have 
sufficient capacity 
in terms of 
financial 
resources.” 
Rec (3) (4) (C) 
 
Prerequisites which refer to the lawyer 
                                                          
716 In this case the proposed class representative knew what the actual basis for the claims was and he was involved 
in the prosecution of the case. The court found the background of the proposed representative as a bank compliance 
officer as the most significant element, which means that he understands what it means to be a fiduciary. See more 
in In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89, 96 (D. Conn. Apr. 4, 2006). 
717 In this case the defendant contended that there was a fundamental conflict between the distributors and the 
harmed (end users) by the scheme, but the court did not find a fundamental conflict between the distributors and 
the hospitals, at least with respect to the liability issues. See more in Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco 
Int'l, Ltd., 247 F.R.D. 253 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2008).  
718 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35. pp. 17. 
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Obligation to 
have a 
lawyer  
“…an order that 
certifies a class 
action must […] 
appoint class 
counsel.” 
FRCP 23 (c) (1) 
(B) 
 
 “… claimants’ 
solicitors to form a 
Solicitors’ Group 
and to choose one of 
their number to take 
the lead […].” 
P.D 2.2  
 “… a private 
group action and 
an organisation 
action shall be 
brought through 
an attorney who 
is an advocate.” 
GPA 11 
 “…the entity 
should have 
sufficient capacity 
in terms of legal 
expertise.” 
Rec (3) (4) (C) 
 
 
 
Eligibility 
criteria 
needed for 
appointing 
the lawyer  
the court must 
consider:  
- “the work 
counsel has done 
in investigating 
potential claims, 
- counsel's 
experience,  
-  counsel's 
knowledge of the 
applicable law, 
- the resources that 
counsel will 
commit to 
representing the 
class;” 
23 (g) (1) (a) 
   The 
Recommendation 
bans contingency 
fee agreements.  
Rec (5) (30) 
 
Formal certification hearing and decision 
Formal 
certification 
“[…] the court 
must determine by 
order whether to 
certify the action 
as a class action. 
FRCP 23 (c) (1) 
(A) 
Implicitly yes, 
P.D 3.4  
“…the tribunal 
may make a 
collective 
proceedings 
order, after 
hearing the 
parties…” 
CAT 77 (1)  
Implicitly yes,  
GPA 9 
 
Permission 
by a 
superior 
court  
 an obligation for the 
managing judge to 
inform the superior 
court when GLO is 
issued.  
P.D 3.4  
   
 
 
All focused jurisdictions require certain prerequisites for the employment of their collective 
redress mechanisms. From the table above, it may be seen that in some elements they resemble 
each other, but in certain elements they differ. All focused jurisdictions (except the GLO) make a 
distinction between the prerequisites which refer to the class and the prerequisites which refer to 
the class (group) reprehensive. The GLO mechanism does not set prerequisites for a class (group) 
representative because this system has no representative in the same form as the other jurisdictions 
have.   
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Requirement for a defined class (group): The US class action, the English class action and 
the Sweden group action require the plaintiff to define the class prior to certification.719 The class 
(group) must be defined by using objective criteria,720 which means the court should not enter into 
the merits of the case just to constitute the class.721 At the certification stage the class must be 
ascertainable (identifiable) only because the personal identification of the class (group) members 
under opt-out regimes (the US class action and the English class action in their opt-out version) 
comes at the enforcement stage, while under the opt-in regimes (the Swedish group action) during 
the period of constituting the group register. If the class (group) is not defined properly, 
certification may be denied.722 
Numerosity requirement: Only the US class action regime sets an explicit requirement of 
numerosity. No reference is given in the FRCP Rule 23 as to how many members are enough for 
class certification, which practically means that only one member may initiate a class action. In 
the case of Dupler v. Costco (2010)723, Mrs. Dupler was a plaintiff on behalf of herself and all 
others similarly situated against Costco Wholesale Corporation. The rest of the focused 
jurisdictions implicitly require the presence of multiple claims, which is coherent with the nature 
of each collective redress system, which is employed when mass cases appear.  
Commonality requirement: Each of the focused jurisdictions explicitly require that there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class (group). The commonality requirement is an 
essential element of each collective redress system because the lack of a common index of 
representation hinders the possibility for multiple cases to be solved on a class-wide basis. None 
of the focused jurisdictions require total commonality724, as does the English representative action 
under the CPR 19.6. In the case of Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd (1910),725 the court 
dismissed the representative action due to the lack of a same contract between all class members 
and the defendant; same defences pleaded by the defendant against the claimants; and a same 
measure of damages claimed by all class members. Instead, there should be at least one common 
element (shared by all members) which would move the entire proceeding forward. 726  For 
                                                          
719 Please see the table above.  
720 Anderson, B. and Trask, A., 2012. The Class Action Playbook. New York: Oxford University Press. p.25. 
721 Fosamax Products Liability Litigation, 248 F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) cited in Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, 
K. M., 2010. Federal Practice and Procedure. vol. 7A. St. Paul: Thomsom West. §1760, n.9 
722 In the case Devitor v Telia Sonera AB (2006) The court called the plaintiff to define the group according to the 
GPA Sec.8 (4), but the plaintiff did not respond to the court and due to this the case was dismissed. 
723 Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 705 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010). 
724 Falla, E., 2012, p.100. 
725 (Markt&Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd, 1910 cited in Mulheron, 2002, p.27) 
726 Heaton, N., 2016, p.5.  
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example, the defendant‘s liability is sufficient for the proceeding to move forward as a class action 
because the variations in the amount of damage can be solved through establishing subclasses, 
assessment of aggregate damages, etc. “Members of the class may possess different avenues of 
redress, but their claims must stem from the same source”.727  
Predominance requirement: Under the US class action regime, before the court certifies 
damage class actions, it must examine whether common questions of law or fact predominate over 
any individual questions. In our opinion, this requirement mirrors the commonality requirement 
because if at least one common element (the defendant’s liability, for example) is sufficient to 
employ a class action, why should the court search for more common questions at the certification 
stage? In the case of Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., (2006), the court found that the predominance 
requirement was met because the defendant’s billing practice was against the law. The court simply 
found that the defendant was liable for breaching the law, which is, in our opinion, the same “test” 
which was previously used for testing the commonality requirement.   
In our opinion, the above argumentation is probably the reason why the rest of the focused 
jurisdictions do not distinguish the predominance requirement as а separate precondition for class 
(group) certification.  
Superiority requirement: Each of the focused jurisdictions (except the Recommendation)728 
requires the court to examine whether the proposed collective redress mechanism is superior to the 
other available methods for adjudicating on the controversy.729 The US class action and the English 
class action provide extensive lists of preconditions which must be considered by the court when 
it tests superiority,730 while the GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action set this requirement 
in general terms.731  
Through the superiority requirement each of the focused jurisdictions addresses the very 
important question of whether a collective redress mechanism is superior to other available 
methods for adjudicating on the dispute fairly and efficiently.732 To a large extent, the answer 
depends on the type of right which is subject of adjudication. If subject of adjudication are trivial 
                                                          
727 Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., D.C.Cal.2005, 231 F.R.D.602, cited in Wright, A. C., Miller, R. A. and Kane, K. 
M., 2010. Federal Practice and Procedure. vol.7A. St. Paul: Thomsom West. §1763, n.1. 
728 The Recommendation does not regulate this requirement.  
729 Please see the table above.  
730 FRCP Rules 23 (b) (3) (a-d); CAT Rules 79 (2).  
731 Practice Direction 2.3; GPA Sec.8 (3). 
732 FRCP Rule 23 (b) (3); PR 2.3; CAT Rules 79 (1) (c); GPA 8 (3).  
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economic losses 733 , the class-wide treatment is superior over any individual civil procedure 
technique. The small claims share common costs (economy of scale), for example, the witness 
gives his testimony once only, the liability is determined once only (efficiency), etc.734 In addition, 
the consumers are not willing to ask for court protection for low value claims. If subject of 
adjudication are either personal injuries or substantial economic losses735, the class-wide treatment 
is not always a superior method for solving such cases. Personal injuries cases always involve 
individual questions which are complex to manage through collective redress mechanisms, or 
potential class (group) members simply prefer to exercise their rights through individual 
proceedings due to the considerable amount of their economic loss (fairness). 
Bearing this in mind, when testing the superiority of the specific collective redress, the 
courts model must consider all the aspects of the dispute in question. Under the US class action 
and English class action regimes, the court is explicitly required to examine the type of the cases 
(low value cases, personal injury cases, etc.), the current status of other cases (the possibility of 
gathering all cases before one forum or the problem with “belated” certification)736, the possible 
costs, or, under the CAT rules, the possibility for the controversy to be solved through ADR. When 
the court examines the superiority requirement it also needs to foresee which of the class-wide 
procedural techniques are to be used in the specific case, such as sub-classes (subgroups), a notice, 
an opt-in/out model, a bifurcated trial, an aggregate award of damages, etc. For example, under 
the English class action regime, if the Tribunal finds that the claims are strong enough, it may 
decide to apply opt-out proceedings, or opt-in proceedings in order to “compensate” for the lack 
of cohesiveness by providing a possibility to the potential class members to stay passive and to 
keep their right to initiate a separate proceeding.737 In the end, it should be mentioned that no one 
collective redress mechanism is superior if the cause of action requires individual treatment.738    
Typicality requirement: Only the US class action regime requires the court to examine 
whether the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
                                                          
733 Wagner, G., 2011. Collective redress - categories of loss and legislative options. Law Quarterly Review 2011 
(127), p. 61. 
734 Nagy, I. C., 2013. Comparative collective redress from law and economic prospective: without risk there is no 
reward. 19 Columbia Journal of Europian Law 469, p.475. 
735 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p.32-34. 
736 Federal Practice and Procedure. vol.12B. St. Paul: Thomson West, p.448-449. 
737 CAT Rules no.79 (3). 
738 Cafaggi, F., 2009. The Great Transformation. Administrative and judicial enforcement in consumer protection: A 
remedial Prospective. Chicago: Loyola Consumer Law Review, 21 (4), p. 520.  
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the class.739 The rest of the focused jurisdictions do not set this requirement in their collective 
redress systems. The plaintiff’s claim is typical, “if it arises from the same event or practice or 
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, or if his or her claims are 
based on the same legal theory”740. In the case of In Re Teflon Products Liability Litigation741, all 
class members suffered damages from the same event - decomposing of teflon pens on high 
temperature, but regarding the remedy sought they were atypical of each other. Namely, some the 
class members sought economic damages (price return), while others claimed personal injuries 
(caused by the chemical released in the process of teflon’s decomposition). Here, by proving his 
“price return” claim, the class representative does not prove the claims of those members who 
claim personal injuries, which makes him an atypical representative. This problem may, however, 
be solved by dividing the class into two subclasses and appointing two representatives, one for 
each of the subclasses.  
It is true that none of the focused jurisdictions sets a typicality requirement, but each of 
them has foreseen the subclasses (subgroups) as a method for solving such issues.  
Adequacy of representation: Each of the focused jurisdictions, except the GLO mechanism, 
explicitly requires the class (group) representative to protect the interests of the class (group) 
members in a fair and adequate manner.742 An adequate representation of class (group) members’ 
interests in a collective redress proceeding is of crucial importance for them because in their 
absence, as formal parties, the court would deliver a judgment which would bind them.  
The GLO mechanism do not require adequacy for the group representative because this 
model does not have a “classic” representative as the other models in the focused jurisdictions do, 
instead the solicitors’ group (lead solicitor) plays the role of the representative.”743 In this way, the 
court communicates with the lead solicitor only rather than with each claimant separately.  
In general, when testing the adequacy of the class (group) representative (who is a member 
of the group), each of the focused jurisdictions examines his capability (capacity) to manage such 
complex cases by considering his personal skills, his profession, the ability to understand what it 
means to be a guardian (fiduciary), etc.744  Furthermore, the court may examine the previous 
                                                          
739 FRCP Rule 23 (a) (3) 
740 Mulheron, R. 2004 The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Prospective. Hart Publishing. 
Oxford. Portland Oregon.p.310. 
741 In Re Teflon Products Liability Litigation 254 F.R.D. 354 (S.D.Iowa 2008) cited in Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. 
and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer, p. 695. 
742 Please see the table above. 
743 Hodges, C., 2001. Multi-party actions. New York: Oxford University Press, p.73. 
744 See more in In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89, 96 (D. Conn. Apr. 4, 2006); CAT Guide p.72;  
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involvement of the proposed class (group) representative in the particular controversy, his previous 
experience in similar contexts, his capability to handle the communication with the lawyers, etc.  
When a representative entity (a consumer organisation) is a representative of the class 
(group), the objectives of the entity must coincide with the interests of the class (group) 
members. 745  The adequacy of the representative entity is tested through its objective. The 
capability (capacity) of such a representative entity is examined through its qualities such as human 
resources, legal expertise, and a sufficient amount of financial resources. 
In order to enhance the protection of the class (group) interests, some of the focused 
jurisdictions (the English class action is silent on this question) have imposed an obligation for the 
class (group) representatives to engage a lawyer (legal expertise).746 Under the US class action 
regime, the adequacy requirement tests both the class (group) representative’s characteristics and 
the lawyer’s characteristics, while the other jurisdictions limit their “investigation power” to the 
class (group) representative’s characteristics only.747  
The most serious problem regarding the adequacy requirement is the presence of a possible 
conflict of interest between the class representative and the class (group). In the case of In Re 
Teflon Products Liability Litigation we saw that even though the representative was part of the 
class (one of them), he was an atypical representative for some of the class members due to the 
different remedy sought. In this case, the court divided the class into two subclasses and appointed 
two different representatives to each of the subclasses. In that way, each of the subclasses was 
represented by a representative whose relief sought was the same as the reliefs sought by the 
respective subclass. The most cited conflict of interest is when the representative has a material 
interest that is in conflict with the class (group) members’ interests (the “entrepreneurial 
lawyering” phenomenon).748. Here the lawyers seek their own interests (greater fees) because they 
finance the entire class action procedure. They may easily affect the class representatives, too, by 
promising a portion of their share. Under such circumstances, both the representatives and the 
lawyers become atypical representatives. In a specific class action, they expect greater fees, while 
the class members expect compensation. It is reasonable to expect that both the representatives 
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and the lawyers would settle meritorious claims easily for far less than what these are worth, if 
they earn greater fees in the case. In these cases, the representatives actually trade-off the 
meritorious claims of the class members for greater fees offered by the defendant (a sweetheart 
settlement). Probably one of the main reasons why the attorneys’ fees in the US range from 5%-
50% of the total settlement value, are the abovementioned sweetheart settlements.749 In this way, 
the class action is abused and it misses its primary goal of compensating the consumers as justly 
as possible.  
A potential conflict of interest may also arise in cases where a consumer organisation acts 
as the class representative. As it was already mentioned, no one can guarantee the loyalty of the 
management, which may misappropriate the financial resources of the organisation or make a deal 
with the attorneys who represent the organisation.750  
None of the focused jurisdictions provides a perfect solution to this problem, instead they 
provide different safeguards for controlling “the material incentives” of both the representatives 
and the lawyers. For example, if the case is still in the certification phase, the court may deny the 
proposed certification due to inadequate representation of the class (group) members. In each of 
the focused jurisdictions, if the case has already been certified, the judge monitors the behaviour 
of the representatives, and if he considers that the plaintiff no longer represents the class (group) 
members’ interests appropriately, he may suspend the plaintiff (Sweden),751 he may revoke the 
previously granted certification752 or hold the proceeding.753 Furthermore, in the US the attorney’s 
fees are determined by the judge,754 in the other jurisdictions contingency fee agreements are 
banned, while the Recommendation requires each plaintiff to disclose the origin of his funds and 
in case a consumer organisation intends to initiate a collective redress action, it needs to be a not-
for-profit organisation.755       
Formal certification: The US class action and the English class action explicitly require the 
court (the tribunal) to hold a certification hearing and to make a formal decision whether to grant 
or deny the proposed certification. The GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action do not set 
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such an obligation for the court, but in practice the courts make formal decisions in both 
jurisdictions.756  
Conclusion: Regardless of the fact that some of the focused jurisdictions set more, while 
others set less prerequisites, they all share the same admissibility concept. Namely, each of the 
jurisdictions has two sets of prerequisites: a set which refers to the class (group) and a set which 
refers to the class (group) representative. The first set of prerequisites tests the cohesiveness of the 
class and the superiority of the collective redress mechanism over individual procedural 
techniques. The minimum standard for both the commonality and the superiority requirements is 
that no collective redress mechanism may be employed if the cause of action requires individual 
treatment.757 The second set of prerequisites tests the suitability (adequacy) of the class (group) 
representative to act as a representative of the interests of the class (group) members. The greatest 
problem regarding this requirement is how to control “the material incentives” of the 
representatives (and the lawyers) in order to prevent abuse of the collective redress systems. 
Safeguards will be discussed below.  
 
2. CONDUCT OF A COLLECTIVE REDRESS PROCEDURE  
 
g. Does the court have at its disposal special procedural techniques for solving cases 
on a class-wide basis (case management tools)? Collective redress mechanisms involve special 
procedural techniques which enable the courts to deal with mass cases on a class-wide basis. Using 
procedural techniques typical of the traditional (individual) civil procedure, the courts may not 
solve mass cases. For the purposes of this comparison, we analyzed the following collective 
procedural techniques: powers of the judge, bifurcation of the trial, test claims, subclasses 
(subgroups), models for establishing class (group) membership and notifying the class (group) 
members. 
 Managing powers of the court (judge): One of the main objectives of each collective 
redress system is judicial economy.758 In order to achieve this objective, the court must conduct 
the procedure efficiently and economically. To do that the court needs to have wide discretional 
powers. Each of the focused jurisdictions recognises the central role of the judge in the proceeding, 
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delegating him considerable case management powers by which he controls the proceeding, the 
parties, the lawyers and the class (group) members. The most remarkable managing powers of the 
judge shall be discussed below.   
Bifurcation of the trial: In order to separate the common issues of the class (group) from 
the individual issues which affect some of the class (group) members, in each of the focused 
jurisdictions (the Recommendation is silent on this question) the courts may bifurcate the 
proceeding into a trial of the common issues (a liability stage) and a trial for determination of the 
remedy (a remedy stage). The FRCP is silent on this question, but the US courts use this procedural 
tool in their practice. For example, in the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart (2004)759, the court divided 
the action into a liability phase (stage 1) and a remedy phase (stage 2). Under the GLO mechanism 
the managing judge may also divide the trial in a trial of common issues and a trial of individual 
issues. The common issues are solved through test claims before the management court, while the 
individual issues may be solved by other courts.760 The English class action also foresees the 
possibility of trial bifurcation.761 The GPA does not foresee trial bifurcation explicitly, instead it 
allows for the “postponement of consideration of a particular issue,”762 which is interpreted as a 
possibility for the court to divide the trial.763  
 The power of the judge to divide the trial is in line with the requirement that there should 
be at least one common element (shared by all members) which will move the entire proceeding 
forward.764 The defendant’s liability is usually that common element and it is determined on the 
trial of common issues, while the individual issues, such as the variations in the amount of damage, 
can be solved through establishing subclasses, assessment of aggregate damages, etc.  
Test claims: The essence of the test case approach is to avoid trials of each individual claim 
on the common issues. Under the US class action regime, the test claims technique is possible, and 
it is used in mass tort cases.765 The judge may ask the parties to choose which cases will be tried 
as test claims, or ask them to choose the cases on a random basis. Under the GLO mechanism the 
court may order for one or more of the claims to proceed as test claims.766 The test case should 
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decide an issue which is common to the claims of all group members (a “GLO issue”), while the 
rest of the claims will be put on hold.767 For example, in the case of MMR Vaccine case768 the 
judge selected eight lead cases which addressed the question of whether the vaccine was defective 
or not (a “GLO issue”). The GPA does not a contain rule as to whether the court in Sweden may 
select test claims.769 
The final outcome of the test claim binds the claims that have been put on hold. If the test 
claim is successful (the defendant’s liability has been determined), the claims which have been put 
on hold will proceed further in individual proceedings seeking compensation.  
Subclasses (subgroups): This technique is used when some facts or law are not common to 
all class (group) members, but to some of them, for example, variations in the causation of the 
damage, different degrees of injury, different types of remedy sought within the same class, etc. 
The US class action regime explicitly authorises the court to create subclasses for a particular 
issue.770 Each subclass must independently satisfy all the prerequisites of Rule 23 (a) and (b).771 
Under the GLO mechanism the judge may divide the group into subgroups.772 The English class 
action has also foreseen a possibility of creating subclasses. 773  The Swedish group action 
explicitly allows the court to divide the group into subgroups,774 for example, in the case of Pär 
Wihlborg v The Swedish State through the Chancellor of Justice (2007) the court created three 
subgroups due to the variations in the causation of the damage. 
By using this procedural technique, the court is in a position to solve the conflicts of 
interests among the class members and to preserve the adequate representation in the case by 
appointing separate class (group) representatives to each of the subclasses created.  
 Establishing class (group) membership: In mass harm situations, it is hard for all victims 
to be identified. For example, in one case where a company has abused its dominant position, it 
may harm millions of individuals. Apart from the difficulty identifying the harmed individuals, 
the next problem is how to “pool” them in one court procedure. The court must “close” the class 
(group) due to the res judicata principle. The collective redress systems recognise two models for 
establishing class (group) membership: the opt-in and the opt-out model.  
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Under the opt-in model, during the certification stage the court examines the properness of 
the class (group) definition. If the court finds that the class (group) definition is objective, it must 
set admissibility criteria for entry in the class (group) register, a cut-off date until which it calls all 
potential members to enter in the class (group) register (if they wish to do so) and to establish a 
group register. Under the GLO mechanism, if the court decides to grant GLO, the order must 
include instructions about the establishment of a group register, it must specify the GLO issues 
(verification criteria), specify the management court775 and the managing judge must specify a cut-
off date.776 The English class action may be instituted as an opt-in class action, which operates in 
the same way as the GLO mechanism, the difference being the Register is kept by the class 
representative only.777  The Swedish group action regime functions on the same principle, but the 
GPA does not contain provisions for a group register, which gives discretion to both the judge and 
the plaintiff regarding the manner of maintaining group members’ records. 778  The 
Recommendation requires the Members States to implement opt-in based collective redress 
systems for both group and representative actions.779 An important management tool for each opt-
in based model is the group register because it ensures the accuracy of the group. Namely, each of 
the above-mentioned opt-in systems requires each person who intends to opted-in the proceeding 
to register his/her personal data. Due to this, the opt-in models are also-called upfront loaded 
models because the group is constituted at the beginning of the procedure. Another positive aspect 
is the fact that each member has opted-into the proceeding by explicit consent, which is in line 
with the principle of party autonomy.780 But, besides the positive, there are also several negative 
aspects which are cited against the opt-in based models. First, the GLO mechanism is highly 
criticises for the requirement for each potential member to have submitted a claim before it enters 
the group register, which means an obligation for the claimant to pay the initial court fee.781 Unlike 
this, the English class action and the Swedish group action regimes require only an application 
from the potential group member (no costs).However, there is another problem – the process of 
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verification of the admissibility criteria (“gatekeeper problem”). 782  Meeting the admissibility 
criteria here means establishing if the specific claim (proved by certain evidence) falls under the 
group’ definition.783 In the case of many claims this verification stage in the Nordic countries lasts 
for up to two years.784 In case of improperly defined admissibility criteria, as is the case of Myodil 
litigation, plenty of weak and unmeritorious cases (around 4,000 claims) came before the court 
out of which only 426 were found to meet the criteria.785 This is the so-called “bandwagon effect” 
and it pushes the defendant to settle the case irrespective of the merits because he is afraid of losing 
the case and paying additional costs if the case continues. Somehow the defendant is blackmailed 
to settle the case.786 The above facts show that the opt-in based models are money and time-
consuming mechanisms. For example, in the case of Honbson v. Ashton Morton Slack Solicitors 
the total recovery was £25,000, while the litigation costs were £110,000787. Another negative 
aspect of these systems is the so-called “passivity problem” in the cases which involve trivial 
economic losses. Namely, people are not interested in spending their time and resources for trivial 
compensation, as was the case of Consumer Association v. JJB Sports (2007), where the 
compensation was less than £50 and out of hundreds of thousands of shirts’ buyers only 130 buyers 
(consumers) have opted-in, which is less than 0.1%.788  
Under the opt-out model, if the court decides to grant certification, an individual (or best 
practicable) notice must be given to the potential class members.789 Each person who falls within 
the class definition is considered a class member unless he has explicitly opted-out from the 
proceeding. No one can calculate how many persons actually stay inactive and fall within the class 
definition by which they actually become class members. This is a problem for the court because 
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it needs to develop a managerial strategy on the case, but it does not know the number of cases.790 
Under this model, in most cases the precise number of class members would probably never be 
known because some of them may have missed the notice, while the others may have stayed 
inactive. Obviously, the accuracy of the membership in these models is the greatest problem. A 
specific characteristic of these models is the fact that all (absent) class members are represented 
by a class representative, without their explicit consent, but with legal effect on them.791 This opt-
out approach has been subject of serious criticism within the EU institutions because it allows the 
courts to rule over the citizens’ rights in their absence, which is contrary to Article 6 of the 
ECHR.792 
The opt-out based models are better in comparison with the opt-in based models because 
the former do not require the victims to be active as the latter do. Therefore, the opt-out rates in 
the US range from 0.1%-0.2%.793 In the opt-out based models, the verification stage is postponed 
for later (a remedy or distribution stage)794, which makes it а cheaper model thаn the opt-in based 
one, particularly in cases where the class action fails. But, even if only the defendant’s liability is 
solved on a class-wide basis, each class member (if he wishes to continue) is required to react in 
the same way as the group members under the opt-in models, by raising individual claims, 
application forms, etc. Under such circumstances, there is no big difference between the two 
models.795   
All the above equally refers to both the US damage class action under the FRCP 23 (b) 
(3)796 and the English class action under the CAT rules no.82 (2) as opt-out based models.797  
Notice: The notice to absent class (group) members is of significant importance for the 
concept of collective redress mechanisms because it protects the due process rights. If the party 
prefers to adjudicate his or her right before the court on an individual basis, he may stay inactive 
by not opting-in, or be active by opting out from the proceeding. In both cases (whether an opt-in 
or an opt-out model), each of the focused jurisdictions entitles the class (group) members to be 
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informed about the ongoing procedure, where their rights are subject of adjudication. For example, 
under the US class action regime, the court must notify the class members when the class under 
Rule 23 (b) (3) has been certified,798 in case of a settlement or voluntary dismissal799 and in case 
some of the orders held by the court are combined or altered further in the process.800 The class 
members whose addresses are known are sent a personal mail,801 but for those who cannot be 
identified through a reasonable effort, the notice usually takes the form of an internet or newspaper 
advertisement.802 The content of the notice is strictly regulated by law.803 Notification costs in the 
US are borne by the class representative.804 Under the GLO mechanism the court may publicise 
the GLO order.805 Neither the CPR nor the Practice Direction contain rules about what kind of 
notice would be considered appropriate, but evidence shows that the notice in the UK and Wales 
takes the form of an advertisement.806 The English class action strictly sets an obligation for the 
class representative to keep the class members informed about every important decision taken in 
the proceeding. Under the CAT Rules the class representative performs the delivery, while the 
content and the manner in which the class members are informed is decided by the Tribunal.807 
There are no records as to who bears the costs of notification, but having in mind the obligation 
for the class representative to perform the delivery is probably the one who bears the costs. The 
class representative has to notify the class members of: the certification hearing, the cut-off dates, 
if the class representative settles his claim, if the class representative intends to withdraw from that 
position, when the Tribunal delivers the decision, if the Tribunal assesses the damage on an 
aggregate basis and when a collective settlement is reached.808 Under the Swedish group action 
regime the members whose names and addresses are known, are notified by a personal notice 
(according to the Code for Judicial Procedure),809 while the others who cannot be identified are 
informed in another suitable way (radio, advertisement in a newspaper, etc.).810 The content of the 
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notice is strictly regulated by law.811 Apart from this first notice addressed to the group members, 
the GPA regulates an obligation for the court to notify the group’s members of other important 
procedural orders and in case of a proposed settlement.812 In Sweden the court bears the costs for 
notifying the group members.  
Conclusion: Each of the collective redress systems which are subject of this comparative 
analysis is a complex litigation, and is, more or less, based on the principle of party autonomy.813 
Due to that each of the above systems puts the court in a central position in the proceedings and 
“vests” it with considerable case management powers. The aim is to enable the courts to run such 
complex litigations and to protect the rights of the absentees. The mandate given to the courts to 
adjudicate the rights of absentees stresses their public functions and transforms the traditional civil 
procedure into a public interest litigation.814  
Each of the collective redress systems which are subject of this comparative analysis 
handles the individual issues by using techniques which separate the common issues from the 
individual issues, enabling class-wide treatment at least for the common issues. The systems 
discussed above resemble each other on this point. Regarding the techniques for capturing the class 
(group) membership, the above systems use either an opt-in or an opt-out model, but neither of 
them is an appropriate solution applicable to all mass cases. The opt-in model seems appropriate 
for adjudication of personal injury cases or cases which involve small classes (groups)815, while 
the opt-out model for “scattered loss cases”, where the victims suffered losses with a trivial 
value.816 On this point, if the classification of types of losses is applied which distinguishes 
personal injuries, substantial economic losses and economic losses with a trivial value,817 in our 
opinion, it may be concluded that the opt-in based models are suitable for cases which involve 
personal injuries or substantial economic losses, while the opt-out based models for cases which 
involve economic losses with a trivial value. Having in mind all the positive and negative 
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consequences in the process of implementation of both models (opt-in and opt-out), the concept 
of the English class action seems to have advantages in comparison with the other collective 
redress systems. Namely, taking account of the nature of the class and the value of the damage that 
individual class members may recover,818 under this regime the Tribunal decides whether to apply 
an opt-in or an opt-out approach in each particular case. In this way, the Tribunal “adjusts” the 
proceeding, case by case, based on the features of the specific case.  
 
3. REMEDIES, DISTRIBUTION and THE RES JUDICATA PRINCIPLE IN 
COLLECTIVE REDREES PROCEDURES  
 
h. What types of remedies may be adopted by the court within a collective redress 
procedure? Each of the focused jurisdictions permits both injunctive and monetary reliefs. Each 
of the focused jurisdictions permits delivering interim judgements as well. We have records that 
some of the focused jurisdictions allow a combination of reliefs under the same judgement.  
Injunctions: The US class action regime819 allows issuing an injunction under the Rule 23 
(b) (2). 820 The relief issued under this rule is an indivisible legal remedy and it equally binds all 
class members. The class members are not allowed to opt out of the class. The reliefs usually 
require the defendant to cease his unlawful behaviour (a negative action), but they may also require 
the defendant to change his labour policy in a certain way (a positive action).821 Under the GLO 
mechanism822, an injunction is probably allowed, but we have no records to be able to analyse this 
question more deeply. Under the CAT Rules the Tribunal may grant injunction reliefs.823 Under 
the Group Proceeding Act the plaintiff may seek injunction reliefs.824 The Recommendation on 
collective redress allows issuing collective injunctive orders for the cessation or prohibition of a 
violation of rights granted under Union law. 825 Following the list of orders which may be granted 
under the Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests826, the 
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injunctions might be in the form of inhibitory relief, prohibitory relief and affirmative 
injunctions.827  
Monetary (damage) reliefs:828 The US class action regime allows for issuing monetary 
(damage) reliefs under the FRCP 23 (b) (3). Delivering damage reliefs under this regime is 
conditioned by two additional prerequisites, the predominance of common issues over any 
questions affecting individual members only and the superiority of the class action mechanism in 
respect of other available methods for adjudicating the controversy. 829  The GLO mechanism 
allows for issuing monetary (damage) reliefs,830 but it has to be mentioned that the GLO is primary 
a mechanism for adjudication of common issues only, while the individual issues are usually 
subject of subsequent trials. 831  Under the CAT Rules the Tribunal may grant compensatory 
(damage) reliefs.832 Under the Group Proceeding Act the plaintiff may seek monetary (damage) 
reliefs.833 The Recommendation on collective redress allows redress on a collective basis, i.e. 
redress was the main reason why it was enacted.834 
Interim judgements: The courts deliver interim judgments when they adjudicate only 
common issues (such as liability) and those judgments serve as grounds for subsequent individual 
proceedings (determination of redress). The interim judgements are not final judgments because 
they leave the calculation of the monetary (damages) relief for the second phase of the same 
proceedings or to other courts or administrative bodies. The US class action regime recognises 
interim judgements by which the courts determine the defendant’s liability (in most cases), while 
the subsequent proceeding might be in the form of a mini-trial on individual damage claims or 
administrative proceedings on individual claims. 835  The GLO mechanism recognises interim 
                                                          
827 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in the 
US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p.16-17.  
828 Monetary and damage reliefs are used as synonyms because both are monetary (pecuniary) decrees. The legal 
ground on which they are adopted (contractual or non-contractual liability) has no relevance in this context.  
829 For more about both the predominance and the superiority requirement, please see the part devoted to the US 
damage class actions.   
830 Practice Direction point 15.1.  
831 See more in Andrews, N., 2003. English civil procedure. Oxford University Press. Oxford p.982.  
832 Heaton, N., 2016, p.3. 
833 Persson, A. H., Collective enforcement: European prospects in light of Swedish experience, In Collective Actions. 
Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interest (Red: Wrbka, S & Van Uytsel, S. & Siems, M,) 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 347. 
834 Recommendation (preamble, point.11); More about the protection of collective interests through injunction 
please see in Kocher, E.,2011. Collective rights and collective goods: enforcement as collective interest. In: J. Steele, 
and Van Boom, H. Willem, ed. 2011. Mass Justice: Challenges of Representation and Distribution. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Ch.6, p.122.  
835 Friedenthal, J.H., Miller, A.R., Sexton, J.E. and Hershkoff, H., 2009. Civil Procedure. 10th ed. St. Paul: Thomson 
Reuters. p. 774; Please also see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 340 (U.S. June 20, 2011).  
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judgements836. For example, in the case of Gerona Air Crash Group Litigation837, the judge 
determined the defendant’s liability for suffered psychiatric injuries by the passengers (the 
claimants). The calculation of the damages was left for subsequent proceedings. Under the CAT 
Rules an interim judgement may be delivered by the Tribunal as well.838 Under the Swedish group 
action regime, the courts may grant interim judgements839, by which they first solve the liability 
of the defendant as a common issue to all group members, and these subsequently become a basis 
for the determination of the damage in the next phase. The Recommendation on collective redress 
is silent on this question.  
Combined judgements: We use the term “combined judgements” for cases where two 
different types of reliefs are given in the same formal decision. The FRCP Rules 23 do not 
Shtipulate this question explicitly, but according to the US courts’ practice one class may be 
maintained simultaneously under two types of class actions (the so-called “hybrid class 
actions”).840 For example, in the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores (2004)841, the court certified a 
hybrid class action which involved injunctive, monetary and damage reliefs. The plaintiffs here 
required individual back pay awards and punitive damages. The court found that as long as the 
monetary (damage) reliefs were incidental to the required injunction relief, there was no 
impediment for the certification of such a class under the FRCP Rule 23 (b) (2). Incidental damages 
are “those to which class members would be automatically entitled once liability to the class as a 
whole is established [...] do not entail complex individualised determinations”842. In this way the 
court tried to avoid the initiation of two class action proceedings, in the first seeking injunctions 
and in the second redress. The US Supreme Court disagreed with such a ruling, considering that 
“individualised monetary claims belong under Rule 23 (b) (3) and they must be subject of  
additional proceedings where the scope of the individual reliefs would be determined.”843 It seems 
that in the US, neither the law, nor the practice have a clear answer to the dilemma of whether 
injunctive and monetary reliefs are allowed to be combined.  
                                                          
836 Practice Direction point 15.1. 
837 Akehurst & Others –v- Thomson Holidays Ltd and Britannia Airways Ltd, Unreported, Cardiff County Court, 6th 
May 2003 and 25th November 2003, CF103949 & CF106685, cited in Falla, E., 2012. Powers of the judge in 
collective redress proceedings. [e-book] Brussels, Université libre de Bruxelles – ULB. p.204. 
838 CAT Rules no.88 (1). 
839 GPA Sec.27. 
840 Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer, p.698.  
841 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
842 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 171 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2004) 
843 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 340 (U.S. June 20, 2011) 
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On the EU territory, none of the focused jurisdictions explicitly regulates this question and, 
unfortunately, we have no court records for any court case which combines injunctive and 
monetary reliefs under a single judgment. Some authors consider that a combination of both 
injunctive and monetary reliefs under the “same roof” would be a difficult task for Europe.844 
Combining different remedies in the individual civil procedure model is a known method, but in 
the collective redress mechanism it is problematic. For example, in one product liability case, the 
class (group) members may have a conflict of interest due to their different personal attitudes 
(wishes) regarding the defective product. Some members may seek prohibitory injunction (to be 
allowed to return the defective product to the producer) and claim damages (money refund), while 
other members seek an affirmative injunction (to get the defective product repaired), which 
excludes the possibility of claiming damages.845  This “double conflict situation” may not be 
resolved through subclassing, as it was the case in In Re Teflon Products Liability Litigation.846 
Namely, in the latter case both subclasses required damages, some of them economic damages 
(price return), while the other part, damages due to personal injuries. In the first case, the conflict 
of interest has two levels: first, the incompatibility of combining a prohibitory with an affirmative 
injunction, and, second, the incompatibility of combining an affirmative injunction with a damage 
claim. Under such circumstances, respecting the principle of proportionality, priority should be 
given to an affirmative injunction, which means there would be no possibility of claiming 
damages.847 
Conclusion: Each of the focused jurisdictions allows for both injunction and monetary 
reliefs. Also, in order to handle individual issues, each of the above jurisdictions allows for issuing 
interim judgments. A problematic point is the combination of injunction and monetary relief under 
a single court order due to possible conflicts of interests which may arise among the members 
regarding the remedies required. Having in mind that the above combination of remedies may save 
serious resources, by avoiding duplicate proceedings on the same infringement, it deserves greater 
attention.  
                                                          
844 Cafaggi, F., 2009. The Great Transformation. Administrative and judicial enforcement in consumer protection: A 
remedial Prospective. Chicago: Loyola Consumer Law Review, 21 (4), p.519.  
845 Idem, p.535.  
846 In Re Teflon Products Liability Litigation 254 F.R.D. 354 (S.D.Iowa 2008) cited in Glannon, W. J., Perlman, M. A. 
and Raven-Hansen, R., 2011. Civil Procedure. New York: Wolters Kluwer, p. 695. 
847 Cafaggi, F., 2009. The Great Transformation. Administrative and judicial enforcement in consumer protection: A 
remedial Prospective. Chicago: Loyola Consumer Law Review, 21 (4), p.536. 
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i. How are monetary reliefs distributed among class (group) members? А 
precondition for the employment of any distribution model is that damage is calculated on an 
aggregate basis.848 If the damage is calculated on an individual basis, and the collective redress 
mechanism is based on direct compensation, such a collective redress system has no need of a 
distribution model. For example, under the GLO mechanism the judge is obliged to determine the 
real (actual) damage suffered by the claimant, consequently the judge is authorised to award only 
individual compensation.849 Each claimant is entitled to initiate enforcement on an individual basis 
before a bailiff. Under the Swedish group action regime, the courts are explicitly required to 
specify each group member in their judgement,850 which means each of them is individually 
entitled to initiate enforcement of the judgment before a bailiff. 851 Hence, the damage needs to be 
calculated on an individual basis. For example, in the case of Olivia Ozum v Sweden (2008)852 the 
court awarded each of the claimants a fixed amount of €3,700. 853  The Recommendation on 
collective redress is silent on this question, but the attitude of the EU institutions is against any 
possibility for the courts to calculate damage on an aggregate basis.854 Victims are free to seek 
redress, but courts may grant only actual damages calculated on an individual basis.855 According 
to the English class action regime, the Tribunal may calculate damages both on an individual and 
aggregate (collective) basis. The Consumer Right 1998 explicitly authorises the Tribunal to 
calculate damages on an aggregate basis, when it finds that it is appropriate.856 The Act also 
requires the Tribunal to provide instructions for distribution among the class members in case it 
has awarded aggregate damage. The FRCP Rule 23 does not explicitly authorise the courts to 
                                                          
848 Howells, G., 2011. Cy-près for consumers: Ensuring class action reforms deal with “scattered damages”. In: J. 
Steele, and Van Boom, H. Willem, ed. 2011. Mass Justice: Challenges of Representation and Distribution. 
Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Ch.3, p.60.  
849 Falla, E., 2012. Powers of the judge in collective redress proceedings. [e-book] Brussels, Université libre de 
Bruxelles – ULB, p. 216 
850 GPA Sec.28.  
851 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35. pp. 14. 
852 Case No. T 3897/2008. The details about the cases from Sweden are taken from the National Report: Group 
Litigation in Sweden prepared by Lindblom, P. H cited in the text; from the webpage of the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law [https://www.biicl.org/]; and from the article written by the Swedish attorneys 
Sparrman, G. and Goransson, L. 
853 The interest due to belated payment is estimated by the bailiff.   
854 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’ P7_TA(2012)002, note 20, line available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-0012&language=EN, 
[Accessed on 29.11.2015]. 
855 Harbour, L and Evans, J., 2012. World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe. edited by P. G. Karlsgodt. Oxford University Press. Canada, point 4.4.2. 
856 CRA 47 (C) Rule no.2 
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award aggregate damages and also has no rules for distribution.857 In their practice the US courts 
have developed different types of damage calculation on an aggregate basis and models for damage 
distribution. 858  
Aggregate damages: It is not disputable that the calculation of actual damages on an 
individual basis is the preferred model of damage assessment (individual damages assessment) 
because it is accurate and it takes into consideration all relevant characteristics of the specific case. 
But in certain cases, the individual damage assessment approach cannot be applied for objective 
reasons. For example, the number of class members is vast and assessing the damage to each of 
the members would cost more than the compensation itself. Another example is when, under the 
opt-out model, the court has no accurate number of class members, which prevents the court from 
assessing the damages on an individual basis. In order to avoid such impediments, some collective 
redress systems allow for the total damage to be assessed on behalf of a class (aggregate damage), 
not on behalf of a particular class member.859  
Techniques for assessing aggregate damages: In assessing damage on a class-wide basis, 
in general courts may use three different techniques in collective redress actions.860 If the court is 
faced with a class which involves individual questions, it may divide it into subclasses and assess 
the amount of damage for each of the subclasses, instead of being required to evaluate each and 
every individual class member’s loss.“861 This model of calculation is suitable for cases which 
involve many individual questions, such as personal injury cases. 
If the court knows the number of class members, and if the characteristics of the case allow 
for the average sum to be calculated for each member, the court multiplies that average sum with 
the total number of class members (a global lump sum).862 In this way, each of the group’ members 
receives equal compensation. This model of calculation is suitable for opt-in systems, where the 
number of class members is accurate. 
                                                          
857 Mulheron, R. 2004 The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Prospective. Hart Publishing. 
Oxford. Portland Oregon, p.408. 
858 Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. Ariz. May 18, 1990), cited in Nagareda, A. 
R., 2009. The Law of Class Actions and Other Aggregate Litigation. 2nd ed: Foundation Press, p.499. 
859 Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust 
damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios [pdf] Brussels, Rome and 
Rotterdam, p.289. 
860 The author in this Report provides a comprehensive analysis of possible methods fo rthe calculation of damages 
on an aggregate basis. The author has classified all known methods in three groups. For better systematisation, we 
accepted this classification. Falla, E., 2012. Powers of the judge in collective redress proceedings. [e-book] Brussels, 
Université libre de Bruxelles – ULB, p. 187-188. 
861 Falla, E., 2012, p.187.  
862 Idem, p.188.  
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If the court has no accurate information about the number of class members, it calculates 
the damage simply on the evidence of injury to the group, without precise evidence that each 
putative victim has suffered loss or how much he has suffered.”863 Damages awarded under this 
method are in the form of a global sum, lump sum or the judge may apply the formula approach. 
This model of calculation is used in opt-out systems, where the number of group’s members may 
not be determined accurately.864  
Types of cases vs. aggregate damages: Certain types of cases are more suitable for class-
wide damage assessment in respect to other types of cases. Broadly speaking, cases which involve 
personal losses (people’s health is affected) are traditionally treated on an individual basis.865 The 
usage of subclassing techniques is not a guarantee that personal losses would be adjudicated justly 
on a class-wide basis. The situation is the same with the substantial economic losses, where some 
holder of right would receive less compensation than it should (if the damage was assessed on an 
individual basis) due to the class-wide assessment of the damage. People’s rights may be easily 
“compromised” in this way because damage is assessed on a class-wide basis. This is one of the 
crucial arguments of the EU institutions against damage assessment on a class-wide basis.866 On 
the other hand, if the court is faced with cases which involve trivial economic losses (scattered 
losses cases) or losses which may not be determined on an individual basis, the aggregate method 
is superior to the individual damage assessment867. In these cases, the victims are usually not 
willing to initiate any court proceedings because the court’ fees outweighs the value of 
compensation. In the case of Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co (2008)868 the court estimated that for 
approximately $4,000 none of the individual class members would have a strong interest to seek 
compensation in a separate proceeding. It should be mentioned that if the value of the claims is 
extremely low, any method for individual damage assessment may not provide acceptable results.  
An extreme example is when a producer filled the tea bags with 19 grams instead of 20 grams 
                                                          
863 Falla, E., 2012, p.188.  
864 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, (Cal. 1967), cited in Howells, G., 2011. Cy-près for consumers: Ensuring 
class action reforms deal with “scattered damages”. In: J. Steele, and Van Boom, H. Willem, ed. 2011. Mass Justice: 
Challenges of Representation and Distribution. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Ch.3, p.61. 
865 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p.33-34 
866 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’ P7_TA(2012)002, note 19.  
867 Caffagi, F. and Micklitz, Hans-W., 2007. Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law in 
the US and the European Community. Florence: European University Institute, p.33-34.  
868 Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 628 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2008). 
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(“sham packages”). 869 None of the victims would raise individual proceeding seeking 
compensation in this case, which automatically results in illegal gain for the producer. For these 
types of situations, many authors strongly recommend using aggregate methods of damage 
assessment, at least for one reason, to deter the wrongdoer from subsequent unlawful activates.870 
Under such circumstances collective redress systems have merely a deterrence function.  
Direct vs. indirect distribution: In the case of Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus 
Growers (1990)871 the court used both direct and indirect distribution. Namely, the court identified 
some class members and verified their claim forms, but for those class members who could not be 
identified, the court ruled that the remaining fund asset should be distributed for charity purposes. 
In cases where the court may identify the class members, compensation is direct because each of 
the class members would be paid. That is the case with both the GLO mechanism and the Swedish 
group action, where the beneficiaries are already written in the judgement and they may demand 
enforcement on an individual basis. Another form of direct compensation is when the defendant 
himself, at the court’s request, distributes the damage awards to the class members based on his 
internal evidence (as a formal employer of the class members) and in these situations there is no 
need of creating a distribution fund.872 In some cases, the court creates a distribution fund and 
entrusts the fund’s liquidation to a third independent party873 or the court may entrust the fund to 
the class representative.874 In general, the liquidator administers the fund, but its crucial task is to 
assert the class members claims according to the formula (or pro rata)875 provided by the court. 
For example, in the case of Graham v. Security Pacific Housing Services, Inc (1996)876, a common 
fund of $6.7 million was established and each class member was to receive a portion calculated by 
using a formula approved by the court. Based on the defendant’s records, around 60,000 members 
were identified and each of them was called, by personal mail, to submit his/her claim form not 
                                                          
869 Wagner, G., 2011. Collective redress - categories of loss and legislative options. Law Quarterly Review 2011 
(127), p. 61, p.72.  
870 Kocher, E.,2011. Collective rights and collective goods: enforcement as collective interest. In: J. Steele, and Van 
Boom, H. Willem, ed. 2011. Mass Justice: Challenges of Representation and Distribution. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Ch.6, p.126-127.  
871 Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. Ariz. May 18, 1990), cited in Nagareda, A. 
R., 2009. The Law of Class Actions and Other Aggregate Litigation. 2nd ed: Foundation Press, p.499. 
872 Mulheron, R. 2004 The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Prospective. Hart Publishing. 
Oxford. Portland Oregon, p.423-424.  
873 Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica, p.197-205. 
874 CAT Rules 93 (1).  
875 In this way, each of the group’ members receives equal compensation (pro rata or per capita). 
876 Graham, et al., v. Security Pacific Housing Services, Inc., et al., 2:96-CV-132(P)(S), filed in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Cited in Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica, 
p.198. 
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later than March 2, 1997 (a cut-off date). A notice was published in the national edition of USA 
Today for the other members (who were not identified). Until May 1, 1998 exactly 60,195 
claimants received compensations, which means that the liquidator had to deal with more than 
60,000 claims forms, which is a huge administrative operation.877 The above case is an opt-out 
settlement, but obviously it faces similar problems as the opt-in models. Namely, both models 
must inevitably include “mechanisms” for collecting and filtering claim forms (a verification 
stage). Under both models the process of claims’ verification requires serious financial and human 
resources, which makes both systems expensive.  
Non-direct distribution is used when the court simply cannot use any form of direct 
compensation. There are several reasons why the court cannot use direct compensation and is 
forced to order other forms of compensation which are “as near as possible” to the class 
member.878 The most recognised form of indirect distribution is the cy-prés distribution model. 
This model is applied when there is a factual unfeasibility for the court to identify the class 
membership (or the membership varies) or economic unfeasibility because the distribution costs 
outweigh the damage award itself.879 The above problems occur in the opt-out based models 
because they always capture a vast number of members, whose membership is hard to identify 
accurately.880 Under such circumstances (a small number of class members are identified) instead 
of leaving the unlawful gain in the defendant’s hands, the US courts have invented models of 
compensation in which class members are reasonably expected to have some benefits.881 Broadly 
speaking, the cy-prés model may appear in two forms: price reduction or allocation of the damage 
fund to a third party entity for the indirect benefit of the injured class as a whole (the next best 
                                                          
877 Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica, p.205. 
878 Nagareda, A. R., 2009. The Law of Class Actions and Other Aggregate Litigation. 2nd ed: Foundation Press, p.498.  
879 Kalajdzic, J., 2010. Access to a Just Result: Revisiting Settlement Standards and Cy Près Distributions. Canadian 
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880 Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Luiss Guido Carli, 2007. Making antitrust 
damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios [pdf] Brussels, Rome and 
Rotterdam. pp.286. 
881  Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715 (Cal. 1967) [online] available at:< 
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use).882 In the well-known case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 883, the court did not prove 
individual damage because it could not identify the victims, plus the individual losses were too 
small, which made any separate action unfeasible to adjudicate. In this case, instead of leaving the 
overcharges to the defendant, the court ruled that the defendant should decrease his prices to all 
customers for a fixed period of time.884  In this way, besides the class members who were subject 
of overcharges, all other customers who used this taxi company in the designated period of time 
benefited. Hence, benefits under cy-prés may have non-class members, but this is a more 
acceptable solution than to leave the unlawful gain to the defendant.  
Similar to the price reduction model are the so-called coupon settlements, under which the 
class members get coupons for buying the defendant’s products or services with a discount for a 
certain period of time. 885  Both models (price reduction and coupons) are subject to serious 
criticism because they force the consumers to “deal business” again with the company (the 
defendant) which has already breached their consumer rights, or they may result into a reduction 
in the quality of the defendant’s products or services. 886  
An example of the allocation of damage to a third party entity is the case of Six (6) Mexican 
Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers (1990), where the court ruled that the remaining fund asset should 
be distributed on behalf of the “Inter-American Fund for Indirect Distribution in Mexico” because 
this Fund provided human assistance projects in areas where many of the plaintiffs were believed 
to reside.  
Unclaimed damages: Considering the difficulties related to the identification of the class 
members under opt-out models, it usually happens that a certain the amount of the damages 
awarded remains unclaimed. This situation is rarely possible under opt-in models, but it may 
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Oxford. Portland Oregon, p.427. 
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happen. 887  In case of unclaimed damages, in general the court may apply cy-prés and put 
unclaimed damages to their next best use or return the remaining amount to the defendant (a 
reverter fund).888 The latter is not a preferred option because in that way the collective redress 
mechanism loses its deterrence function. Which option is to be used by the court is a matter of 
policy. Of all focused jurisdictions, only the class action regime under CAT rules explicitly 
authorises the Tribunal to use cy-prés in case of unclaimed damages.889 
Conclusion: According to the current concept on which the GLO mechanism and the 
Swedish group action are based, both systems have no need of distribution rules. Under both 
systems, the courts are authorised to assess individual damages only and the beneficiaries are 
specified in the judgments, which enables them to initiate enforcement before a bailiff on an 
individual basis (separately). These two systems may adjudicate cases on a class-wide basis, but 
they may not conduct collective enforcement because both systems have preserved the old 
(current) individual model of enforcement. The lack of both aggregate damage assessment and 
distribution rules makes the above two systems unsuitable for cases which involve small value 
claims (scattered losses) for two reasons: the consumers are out of the class (they are not willing 
to opt-in)890 and litigation costs for assessing the damage on an individual basis are greater than 
the value of the damage itself.891 Simply, scattered losses cases are “out of range” of the above 
two systems.  
Both the US class action and the class action under the CAT rules892, as opt-out models, 
are suitable for solving scattered losses cases due to the possibility given to the court to assess the 
damage on a class-wide basis, and to use the opt-out model for establishing the class membership. 
In this way, all victims subject to an infringement are captured under a single proceeding and the 
total damage is to be assessed on behalf of the class.893 Under this approach consumers’ rights may 
easily be “compromised”, but having in mind the low value and the unwillingness of right holders 
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to demand separate court protection, the collective redress systems at least increase their deterrence 
function applying this “aggregate approach”.894 
Each collective redress system which allows damages assessment on a class-wide basis, 
inevitably requires distribution rules.895 Each concept of distribution must include both rules for 
direct and indirect distribution because opt-out regimes always have problems with the 
identification of class members, which leads to awarded damages remaining unclaimed.   
 
j. Does the award adopted within a collective redress procedure bind the members 
of the group as well? A court procedure which is completed may not be re-litigated. In the absence 
of the res judicata principle, the class action cannot achieve its primary goals of legal certainty 
and judicial economy. For the class action regime, it is of crucial importance that each class 
member is precluded from the possibility of initiating a subsequent class or individual proceeding 
on the merits already solved on a class-wide basis.  
Under the US class action all class members are bound by the judgment delivered in class 
action proceedings. 896  This question has been regulated by the courts through their practice 
because the FRCP is silent on this question. It should be mentioned that the class members of a 
mandatory class action under Rule 23 (b) (2) are not precluded from initiating a subsequent damage 
class action under Rule 23 (b) (3).897 Under the GLO mechanisms, each judgment delivered under 
the GLO scheme is binding on the parties to all other claims that are on the group register at the 
time the judgment is given.” 898 The management court may order the judgement which would be 
binding on a claim which has subsequently entered the group register (so-called latecomers),899 
but this may not be interpreted as an exception to the strict principle that each claim which is on 
the group register at the time when the judgment is given is precluded from the right of subsequent 
individual proceeding on GLO issues already solved on a group wide basis. The class action under 
CAT rules stipulates that a judgment given by the Tribunal in a collective proceeding is binding 
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on all represented persons. 900  In case of subclasses, or individually represented persons, the 
Tribunal specifies (enlists) to whom the judgment would not have a preclusive effect.901 Under the 
Swedish group action regime a judgement delivered in a group proceeding has legal force to all 
members of the group.902  
Based on the above it may be concluded that judgements are binding both for and against 
each and every member of the represented class (group) and no exceptions are allowed. This type 
of res judicata principle is known as the two ways res judicata principle because the class (group) 
members are bound regardless of the outcome of the collective redress procedure (positive or 
negative). Some jurisdictions, for example Brazil, recognise a one-way res judicata principle, 
under which the class members are bound only if the judgment is positive for them. In case of 
negative judgement, the class members are not bound by it and they may initiate subsequent 
individual proceedings.903  
Conclusion: Each of the focused jurisdictions has implemented a simple, but strong res 
judicata principle, under which judgements bind each class (group) member regardless of the 
outcome of the proceedings. In this way, both judicial economy and legal certainty are achieved 
because a vast number of cases are adjudicated “once and forever.” By using the one-way res 
judicata principle, one mass dispute may be re-litigated several times, which will create legal 
uncertainly in society. Instead of protecting the individual rights through the preclusive effect of 
the judgment, it seems more suitable to protect the individual rights during the class (group) trial 
by enhancing the quality of class (group) representation.  
 
4. COST, FUNDING AND FEES IN THE COLLECTIVE REDRESS  
PROCEDURES 
 
k. What is the rule applied by the respective jurisdiction regarding the costs of the 
procedure? The US class action regime applies the so-called “American rule”, under which the 
client pays for his attorney (win or lose) and the attorney’s fee cannot be switched on the opposite 
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(losing) party.904 While the rest of the focused jurisdictions apply the so-called “English rule” 
under which the party bears the risk of paying the opposing party’s attorney’s fee, if losing the 
case (costs shifting rule).905 Both principles are taken as fundamental in each of the respective 
legal traditions and may not be applied interchangeably. 906  The English rule may not be 
implemented in the US because the role of the attorneys in the US society has a different social-
history perspective, which was already discussed above in the section devoted to the principle of 
standing to sue.907 On the other hand, the EU Commission considers that the American rule may 
create incentives for unmeritorious collective redress actions.908 For example, in the case of the 
Myodil litigation909, the consumers were freed from any obligation to reimburse the opposite 
(wining) party’s cost because their claims were legally aided by the Legal Aid Board. The results 
were disastrous: only 426 claims out of 4,000 claims were evaluated as meritorious. The Board 
withdrew the legal aid and the case collapsed, but £40 million were spent. Unmeritorious claims 
have another negative aspect, namely they put pressure on the defendant to settle the case 
irrespective of the merits because faced with a vast number of claims, the defendant is afraid of 
losing the case and paying more costs if the case continues. Actually, the defendant is blackmailed 
to settle the case.910 Due to the reasons above, the Commission considers that the cost shifting rule 
is a serious gatekeeper from unmeritorious claims and strictly recommends that it be applied in the 
Members States. 
Class members vs. costs: The US class action, the class action under CAT rules and the 
Swedish group action do not require the class (group) members to bear litigation costs, respecting 
the fact that only class (group) representatives are formal parties in the collective redress 
mechanisms. 911 Under the US class action regime there is one exception: if the attorney (class 
counsel) wins the case and absent class members benefit from his work, the attorney is 
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compensated from the common distribution fund.912 The class action under the CAT rules foresees 
an exception regarding the costs for determination of individual issues for particular class 
members.913 Under the Swedish group action regime the court may award costs against group 
members in two situations: first, if the plaintiff has been supported by public funds, but he cannot 
reimburse the cost from the losing defendant, and, second, if the plaintiff wins the case, but he 
cannot enforce the risk agreement against the losing defendant. 914  In both cases, the group 
members may not bear litigation costs in an amount higher than the one they have benefited from 
the case. 
Under the GLO mechanism the costs are divided into common and individual costs.915 
Common costs are those which are invoked regarding the establishment and maintenance of the 
GLO mechanisms and each group litigant pays an equal share of the common costs.916 Individual 
costs are those which are invoked for the determination of a specific claim and are borne by the 
claimant.917 The Recommendation on collective redress is silent on this question.  
Conclusion: Each of the focused jurisdiction has its own “gatekeeper” from unmeritorious 
claims. Attorneys are gatekeepers in the US because no one would finance an unmeritorious case, 
hence the US attorneys make natural the privately driven selection. While, on European soil, the 
cost shifting rule is the gatekeeper because no one would initiate a court procedure for an 
unmeritorious case, knowing that he would have to bear the adverse costs if the case ends 
unsuccessfully. Hence, each collective redress system must have a “gatekeeper” which will 
demotivate any potential claimant from bringing unmeritorious claims. In that context, the cost 
shifting rule would work as a serious gatekeeper against potential unmeritorious claims.  
 
l. Who funds the collective redress actions? The collective redress proceedings are 
financed in the same way as the individual proceedings. In both proceedings, the plaintiff finances 
the litigation.918 In the same manner, the funding issue in collective redress systems addresses both 
questions (preconditions) of whether the class (group) representative has enough financial 
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resources to cover the ongoing court (litigation) fee and whether the class (group) representative 
is able to reimburse the defendant’s adverse costs.  
A sufficient amount of financial resources as a precondition for certification: In each of the 
focused jurisdictions, the lack of financial resources hinders class (group) certification. Under the 
US class action, the counsel must present sufficient financial resources for representing the class 
before the court, or the proposed class would not be certified.919 The GLO mechanism does not 
explicitly regulate this question, even though in reality this mechanism is not possible without 
external financial support. The class action under the CAT rules requires the class representative 
to present sufficient financial resources to meet the adverse cost.920 Even though this model does 
not foresee explicit obligation for the class representative to cover the court fee, in reality all court 
fees related to the notice, the maintenance of the register, etc. are covered by the class 
representative only. The Swedish group action regime explicitly requires the plaintiff to present 
sufficient financial capacity to cover the ongoing cost of the group action procedure only, while 
the plaintiff is not required to guarantee for the possible defendant’s cost.921 The Recommendation 
on collective redress explicitly requires the plaintiff to present sufficient financial resources to 
cover both the court fee and meet the adverse cost of the proceeding.922 
The class (group) members as funders: If the class (group) members are the only ones to 
initiate the collective redress mechanisms, there would not be any proceeding. Half a century ago, 
some authors explained that the customers are in an unfavourable position when seeking legal 
redress either because they are not well informed or because such redress is disproportionally 
expensive.923 We have no records of the class (group) members themselves playing a significant 
role as initiators of collective redress actions in the respective national collective redress systems 
in any of the focused jurisdictions.  
The organisations (associations) as funders: The EU Commission prefers that consumer 
organisations be the key actors in initiating a collective redress action because they “would not 
pursue a personal interest, but the interests of the class.”924 The ultimate goal of these consumer 
organisations is to protect consumers. But, having in mind that all European jurisdictions apply 
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the cost-shifting rule, any lost case where the plaintiff is a consumer organisation may be fatal for 
it because the organisation would be called to pay the adverse cost of the winning party. Hence, 
organisations, like the class (group) members, are faced with the issue of financial resources. 
Organisations may finance their activities in various ways, such as membership, governmental 
funds, grants from third parties, etc.925 For example, in the Skandia case (2004)926 each member 
was required to pay a €15 membership. The organisation increased its capital to €200,000 in that 
way and met the “financial” precondition sought for certification.927 But this type of financing may 
be used more as an alternative rather than as a general rule because consumers are passive for 
certain types of cases (for example, a low value case) and they would not be willing to enter in any 
organisation to be part of any “public law enforcement agenda.”  
Governmental funds are another alternative, but they are inevitably connected with the problem of 
possible political influence on the work of the organisations.928 A similar alternative are the grants 
from third-party investors, where there is also a risk of “dishonest sponsorship” because the 
sponsor might be a competitor of the defendant wanting to influence the outcome of the procedure 
by his indirect involvement in the case.  
In the above types of financing, there is a risk of potential conflict of interest between the 
class representative (the organisation) and the sponsor. This type of conflicts of interest must be 
avoided because they necessarily lead to abuse of the collective redress proceedings’ goals. For 
example, any competitor of the defendant is interested in destroying the market position of its 
competitor rather than in taking care of the consumers’ interests. In order for these conflicts of 
interests to be avoided, the Recommendation on collective redress foresees a list of safeguards 
which should be applied. First, the organisation must be a not-for-profit organisation. This 
requirement is logical because any lucratively based organisation would care more about its 
lucrative interests than the interests of the consumers. Second, each plaintiff is required to declare 
the origin of the funds at the beginning of the proceeding, so that the court is able to inspect any 
possible conflict of interest between the plaintiff and the third party (sponsor). In case of a conflict 
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of interest, the courts should have a mandate to stop the proceeding, as a preventive measure 
towards better protection of the consumers’ interests.929   
The State (public authorities) as funders: In case a collective redress action is initiated by 
the government through any of its public authorities, the funding of such a proceeding would come 
from the State budget to a large extent.930 For example, the costs invoked by the Ombudsman in 
Sweden are covered by the State.931 A principal criticism for this type of funding is the political 
influence which may come from certain political groups and the reluctance of the governments to 
provide financial resources for such purposes.932 At this point it should be mentioned that the 
municipalities may act as sponsors. For example, in the case of Carl de Geer et al v The Swedish 
Airports and Air Navigation Service (2007)933 the plaintiffs were, in part, financially supported by 
the local municipality.  
The attorneys as funders: The unfavourable position of the victims in the US has been 
enhanced by the attorneys who have an entrepreneurial spirit and offer their legal services under 
contingency fee agreements. Under а contingency fee agreement, the attorney takes the obligation 
to finance the class suit entirely and if he wins the case he takes а fixed percentage of the client’s 
net recovery. By financing the class actions, the attorneys become key players in the sphere of 
private enforcement in the US. 934  Contingency fees usually range from 20%-30% of the 
recovery935, which is the main reason why the US attorneys are more motivated to succeed in the 
case than the attorneys who are paid on an hourly rate.936 On the other hand, under this model the 
victims (plaintiffs) are highly motivated to sue because they don't have to pay anything, even if 
the case collapses.937 But at this point, this type of financing becomes problematic because the 
attorneys have their own personal interest in the proceedings (greater fees), which is different from 
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the interest of the class members (a compensation). This “principal – agency problem” is known 
as the “entrepreneurial lawyering phenomenon”938, where the attorney has a material interest that 
is in conflict with the class (group) members’ interests. The attorneys may easily affect the class 
representatives, too, by promising a portion of their share. Under such circumstances, the attorneys 
would easily settle even meritorious claims for far less than what they are worth, if they benefit 
from greater fees in the case. In this way, the attorneys actually trade-off the meritorious claims of 
the class members for greater fees offered by the defendant (a sweetheart settlement). These 
abovementioned sweetheart settlements are probably one of the main reasons why the attorneys’ 
fees in the US sometimes go up to half of the total settlement value.939 In this way, rewarding the 
class representatives or the attorneys, the collective redress procedure is abused and it misses its 
primary goal of compensating the consumers. 
Each of the focused jurisdictions has some sort of safeguards against possible abuse of 
collective redress proceedings. For example, in each of the focused jurisdictions the court plays an 
active role in the process of determining the attorneys’ fees i.e. the decision for costs is made by 
the court.940 Some of the focused jurisdictions (the US class action system and the Swedish group 
action system) allow even for the participation (monitoring) of the class (group) members when 
the court determines the attorneys’ fees.941 Some authors suggest that the class member with “the 
most significant stake in the controversy” is chosen as the lead plaintiff because he is a champion 
of the class and he may counterbalance the power of the attorneys.942 In this way, in the security 
class litigation in the US, institutional investors who have a significant stake in the controversy 
have been appointed as class representatives and they have demonstrated better control over the 
attorneys during the class suits.943 For the same reasons, the EU Commission considers that the 
organisations are more capable of performing monitoring of the attorneys’ work during the 
trials.944 
Public funding: The State may support collective redress proceedings financially through 
specially designated governmental funds or through legal aid. The Fonds d' aide aux recours 
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collectifs in Quebec, Canada, is an example of a specially designated governmental fund which 
exclusively supports class actions.945 The resources of this fund are open to both individuals and 
organisations. Under this model of financing, the plaintiff is obliged to reimburse the sponsorship 
back to the fund, usually if he wins the case.946 For example, under the Swedish group action 
regime the court may award costs against the group members if the plaintiff is supported by public 
funds, but he cannot reimburse the cost from the losing defendant.947  
The legal aid funding model supports individuals only, covering the ongoing litigation 
costs and meeting the adverse costs of the winning party. This type of financing is mostly used in 
England and Wales, where the legal aid rate per capita is the highest in Europe (€53.80 for England 
and Wales, €13.96 for Ireland, €5.59 for Germany, €4.64 for France and €0.78 for Italy).948 For 
example, the Legal Services Commission spent a gross amount of £110,900,000 in ten cases.949 
We saw that this approach may create incentives for unmeritorious claims because due to the legal 
aid being provided, the claimants would not pay anything even if the case collapses, which 
motivates them to file unmeritorious claims.950 
Funding by third parties: Under this model of financing, a commercial funder (third party 
funders - TPFs951 or special purpose vehicles - SPV)952 with no connection to the merits of the 
case pays the costs of the client’s case in return for a share (percentage) of the recovery, under the 
condition that the client wins the case. This percentage varies from 25%-40% in European 
countries, such as Germany, Austria, Netherland.953 In our opinion, there is no difference between 
the TPFs (or SPV) and the US law firms because funding is under the same condition, a percentage 
of the client’s net recovery, if the case ends successfully. The Recommendation on collective 
redress recognises this model of financing the collective redress actions, after the courts have 
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previously exercised control over the motivation of the private funder to be involved in the 
particular case.954  
Legal expenses insurance policies (LEI): One of the alternatives for funding collective 
redress actions is through individual insurance policies, which policy holders cover against the 
adverse costs, if the case collapses. These policies may appear in two forms: before the event 
policies and after the event policies.955 Germany has a developed market for this type of insurance 
policies, while in England the effects of the implementation of such insurance policies are average. 
On the other hand, Sweden has an unpleasant experience in that field. Namely, the Swedish 
insurance companies were against the introduction of a group action in Sweden. Even the largest 
insurance company in Sweden (Trygg-Hansa) excluded coverage for plaintiffs (but not defendants) 
in the group actions after the GPA entered into force. 956  
Conclusion: Due to their different social context, each of the focused jurisdictions has 
different models for funding the collective redress mechanisms. The US class action system is 
mostly financed by entrepreneurial attorneys, the GLO cases are supported through legal aid 
schemes to a large extent, we have no records about the class action under the CAT rules, the 
Swedish group action system has no dominant funder because various entities act as funders, and 
the Recommendation on collective redress prefers financing though consumer organisations or by 
private third parties. None of the above models provides satisfactorily results on their own because 
each of them has its own disadvantages. Therefore, the Swedish approach, which is a mixed 
scenario, has advantages over any system which prefers one option only. In that context, the 
collective redress systems as expensive mechanisms for delivering justice should be financed on a 
broad basis (mixed scenario).957  
 Having in mind the negative experiences which each of the focused jurisdictions has, 
particularly in situations where the interests of the sponsor diverge from the interests of the 
consumers, it is necessary to introduce serious safeguards against any potential conflict of interest. 
In case of a conflict of interest between the sponsor and the class (group) the entire collective 
redress system departs from its genuine goals and instead of being a solution becomes a serious 
problem. Therefore, each jurisdiction must create a set of safeguards against possible abuses of its 
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collective redress mechanisms. The Recommendation on collective redress may serve as a good 
example.  
 
m. How is the attorney’s fee determined? As it was already mentioned under the US 
class action regime, the relations between the plaintiff and the attorneys are regulated by 
contingency fee agreements. The attorney’s (contingency) fee may be calculated differently, but 
the two most recognised forms are the lodestar formula and the percentage formula.958 If a fund is 
not available (for example, injunctive relief is sought), the lodestar formula is usually applied, 
whose calculation takes into account the time and the efforts which were reasonably put by the 
attorney on the specific action.959 If a fund is available, the percentage formula is usually applied 
and the attorneys take a fixed percentage of the client’s net recovery.960 Contingency fees usually 
range from 20%-30% of the recovery.961  
In Europe, the attorneys and the clients conclude similar (intermediate) forms of 
contingency fee agreements which rely on the principle of no win, no (less) fee, but the attorneys’ 
fees may not be calculated on the value of the subject of dispute only and they may not be in the 
form of a percentage of the client’s net recovery.962 In Europe contingency fee agreements are 
prohibited because they lead to small compensations for the clients, while greater rewards for the 
attorneys. 963  Namely, under the EU collective redress policy the victims are entitled to full 
compensation,964 which will be jeopardised if the attorney takes some of it. In general, each form 
of pactum de quota litis, which is based on a proportion of the sum recovered, is prohibited in 
Europe because it is considered that it violates public order and is incompatible with attorneys’ 
ethics.965 Due to the reasons above, the Recommendation requires the Members State to avoid any 
method of calculation of the attorney’s fee which will create incentives for “lawyer’s 
                                                          
958 Voet, S., 2015. The Crux of the Matter: Funding and Financing Collective Redress Mechanisms. Published in EU 
Civil Justice. Hart Publishing. P. 210.  
959 Coffee, C. J., 1987. The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large 
Class Action. U. Chi. L. Rev. 54 (877). 
960 Federal Practice and Procedure. vol.12B. St. Paul: Thomson West, p.472-473. 
961 Coffee, C. J., 1987. The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large 
Class Action. U. Chi. L. Rev. 54 (877). Some authors reference cases where the attorneys’ fees went up to 50% of the 
total settlement value, please see in Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica., pp.471-473. 
962 Falla, E., 2012, p.340. 
963 Hodges, C., Vogenauer, S. and Tulibacka, M., 2009, p.29. 
964 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’ P7_TA (2012)002, note 20 (7).  
965 Voet, S., 2015, p. 211. 
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entrepreneurship” immanent in the US class action regime.966 Instead of favouring incentives for 
“lawyer’s entrepreneurship” within the EU territory, the Commission has encouraged a 
competitiveness culture, where businesses which play by the rules can make use of their 
competitive advantages. 967  Having said that the so-called “conditional fee agreements” are 
recognised in collective redress cases in England and Wales under which if the case ends 
successfully, the regular fee scale may be doubled.968  The so-called “risk agreements”969  are 
recognised in Sweden, too, where if the case ends successfully, the regular fee scale may be 
doubled or tripled. Under both jurisdictions, if the case collapses, the attorneys receive reduced 
fees.970 For example, in the case of Åberg v Elefterios Kefalas (“Air Olympic”)971, a risk agreement 
was concluded and the hourly rate was agreed in such a way that the attorney would be paid twice 
of his hourly rate, if he wins the case, or only half of his hourly rate if he loses the case. In both 
jurisdictions, the attorneys’ fees may not be calculated as a percentage of the client’s net recovery. 
The class action under the CAT rules is an exception because according to the Guide for 
CAT rules, it is allowed for an attorney and a client to conclude an agreement where the attorney’s 
fee would be calculated as a percentage of the damages awarded to the client (“damages-based 
agreement”)972. With such a concept of attorneys’ fee calculation, in our opinion, there is no 
difference between the damages-based agreements and the contingency fee agreements. The CAT 
rules provide one peculiarity about the damages-based agreements - that such agreements are 
unenforceable if they relate to opt out proceedings. Bearing in mind the lack of further guidance 
provided by the CAT Rules, this restriction may be understood as a preventive measure against a 
possible risk of entrepreneurial lawyering. Namely, under the opt-in model the classes are smaller 
and the class members are informed through the group register about the proceeding (as well as 
about the agreement concluded between the class representative and the attorney), hence if any of 
the members want to exclude themselves from being subject of attorneys’ agreement enforcement 
later on, they may opt-out of the class. In our opinion, CAT rules allow the conclusion of damages-
                                                          
966 Recommendation (Ch.5, Sec.30). 
967 European Commission DG SANCO, MEMO/08/741, p. 4. 
968 Hodges, C., 2001. Multi-party actions. New York, US – Oxford University Press, p.145. 
969 GPA Sec.38.  
970 Leuven report, p.317. 
971 Case No. T 3515/2003. The details about the cases from Sweden are taken mainly from the National Report: 
Group Litigation in Sweden prepared by Lindblom, P. H. Details have also been taken from the webpage of the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law and from the article written by the Swedish attorneys Sparrman, G. 
and Goransson, L. 
972 CAT Guide p.82. 
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based agreements if the class members are informed and have actually agreed with it implicitly by 
staying in the class.  
 Conclusion: The methods of attorneys’ fees calculation are closely connected with the type 
of financing the litigation. The attorneys in the US run a serious risk in each of the class actions 
which they finance, which gives them a legitimate right to demand greater fees. On European soil, 
the attorneys are more comfortable because they do not finance the litigations, and in case of losing 
the case, they still get something (half of the fee scale). In order to prevent any possible material 
conflict of interest between the attorneys and the class (group), court control is crucial and the 
current active role of the judge in estimating the attorneys’ fee should be kept. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. SUMMARY  
 
From the first chapter, it can be concluded that the traditional civil procedure is not an 
adequate method for solving cases which involve diffuse, collective or homogeneous individual 
rights or interests (mass cases). The analysis showed that the procedural institutes, such as material 
plurality of parties, formal plurality of parties or joinder of proceedings, are either theoretically or 
practically inapplicable to mass cases. The principal reason lies in the fact that the traditional civil 
procedure was designed for adjudication of individual rights rather than for adjudication of diffuse, 
collective or homogeneous individual rights or interests. Under such conditions consumers have 
no effective access to justice, which is the reason why many harmed consumers are left 
uncompensated in such cases.  
On the one hand, it is of great importance to make a distinction between diffuse, collective 
and homogeneous individual rights or interests from a traditional civil procedure perspective 
because the traditional civil procedure is not an adequate method for solving such types of rights 
or interests. But, on the other hand, distinguishing between diffuse, collective and homogeneous 
individual rights or interests is not essentially important from a collective redress perspective 
because in collective redress proceedings the court cares only about the nature of the relief sought 
(indivisible or divisible relief), while the type of right is not an issue.   
Given the fact that the traditional civil procedure is not an adequate method for solving 
mass cases, being a country, which does not have a model of collective redress, R. Macedonia 
needs to implement one. The basic principles on which that collective redress model should be 
posed are given as recommendations below. These recommendations arose from the analysis made 
of the jurisdictions of the US class action system, the English GLO system, the English class action 
system, the Sweden group action system and the proposed EU collective redress model.  
… 
From the second chapter, it can be concluded that back in the 19th century the US courts 
also faced cases which involved numerous parties (“giant suits”) and, if all were made parties to 
the proceeding, that would impede or unreasonably delay the process of granting a court decision. 
In order to escape from the rule of mandatory joinder under which each person who is subject to 
service of process must be joined as a party to the proceeding, the US Supreme Court promulgated 
a procedural model under which one or several named class representatives may act on behalf of 
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other similarly situated persons and the final court judgement would equally bind both the class 
representatives as formal parties to the proceeding and the similarly situated persons as class 
members. In this way, instead of dealing with hundreds of claimants, the court dealt only with few 
of them and solved the whole legal controversy at once. In the US, this procedural model was 
called a class suit at the beginning and a class action later, but in its essence, this model is a 
representative litigation because the procedural activities performed by named class 
representatives bind the entire class.  
At the beginning of the 20th century the US society was faced with new types of cases, 
which were provoked by the failures of the uncontrolled market. Those cases included unlawful 
activities such as price-fixing practices, financial frauds practices, deceptive sales practices, etc, 
and affected a vast number of consumers (mass cases). Given the fact that the cases involved a 
vast number of harmed consumers, relying on their previous experience from the 19th century, the 
US courts solved these mass cases on a representative basis. The comparative analysis showed that 
the current US damage class action model [Rule 23 (b) (3)] still provides good results in such types 
of cases because these cases are not suitable for individual treatment under the rules of the 
traditional civil procedure. The above cases are known as “scattered loses cases” and they are 
characterised by the fact that individual victims suffer trivial harm only. Compensation in these 
types of cases is simple, but it would cause disproportionate litigation costs if the rules of the 
traditional civil procedure are applied. Under the US damage class action model, the court 
determines the class membership on an opt-out basis and it calculates the damage on an aggregate 
basis, which decreases the litigation costs and allows for these types of cases to have access to 
courts.973 In fact, the traditional paradigm for the damage class action was for it to be a mechanism 
for enforcing regulation and compensating small losses.974 Having said that, it can be concluded 
that the US damage class action is an effective collective redress model for collecting small losses.  
The damage class action becomes problematic when applied on mass tort cases i.e. property 
damages cases (damages with significant economic losses) and personal injuries cases.975 These 
cases involve individual questions which are sometimes not suitable for class-wide treatment, 
especially not on an opt-out basis. This does not mean that the US damage class action is absolutely 
unsuitable for solving mass tort cases, but its superiority needs to be tested in each mass tort case 
                                                          
973 Wagner, G., 2011. Collective redress - categories of loss and legislative options. Law Quarterly Review 2011 (127), 
p. 61.  
974 Hensler, D., 2000. Class Action Dilemmas. RAND: Santa Monica., p.68-72.  
975 Idem;  
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very carefully. It should be stressed again that the US damage class action as an opt-out model was 
created for collecting small losses, not for adjudication of mass tort cases. It is true that both the 
scattered losses cases and the mass tort cases are characterised by their “massiveness” (a vast 
number of similar claims), but they substantially differ from each other regarding the volume of 
the damage, type of injuries, etc. Therefore, different types of damages require different types of 
remedies. In other words, the US damage class action as an opt-out model is undoubtedly a superior 
collective redress model for collecting small losses, while for mass tort cases it needs to be applied 
carefully because some evidence has shown that the opt-in models seem to be more appropriate 
models for adjudication of personal injury cases or cases which involve small classes.976  
… 
From the third chapter, it can be concluded that England and Wales changed many concepts 
of collective representation in the past two decades and it seems that the right model has been 
found in the class action under CAT rules from 2015.  
In the 1970s and 1980s the English society faced mass tort cases, especially product 
liability cases from the pharmaceutical sphere. These types of cases usually involve damages in 
the form of death or personal injuries and are particularly difficult for class-wide treatment because 
they contain individual questions, such as variations in the causation of the damage, different 
degrees of injuries, etc. These types of cases are suitable for individual treatment, but when the 
number of claims is enormous the courts are simply inundated with claims and their resolution 
would take years. Also, if these types of cases are treated on an individual basis, there is a great 
risk of various adjudications on the same/similar issues by the courts. The litigation costs which 
will be spent for resolution of each claim in a separate proceeding will be disproportionately 
greater than the compensation itself. None of the judicial systems have unlimited material 
resources.  
The solution was found in the Group Litigation Order, as a special case management tool, 
under which by using test claims, the court solves only the common issues that are shared by all 
claims that entered the group register (opt-in model). When the common issues are solved, all 
claims that were previously put on hold, will proceed as individual (regular) civil proceedings. In 
this way, the common issues are equally solved for all claimants, while each damage is to be 
calculated on an individual basis through separate individual proceedings. The comparative 
                                                          
976 Mulheron, R., 2009. The case for an opt-out class action for European member states: a legal and empirical 
analysis. 15 Colum. J. Eur.L. 409, p.427.  
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analysis showed that the GLO mechanism is an expensive procedural mechanism and in certain 
cases it has been subject of serious abuses. But being an opt-in based model which calculates the 
damage on an individual basis, with certain improvements the GLO mechanism might be an 
effective collective redress model for solving either personal injuries cases or cases which involve 
significant economic losses.  
On the other hand, the GLO mechanism is absolutely unsuitable for collecting small losses 
due to the high litigation costs typical for GLO cases and its opt-in nature. For that reason, in 2015 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal was empowered to conduct a class action on an opt-out basis 
(the English class action). Actually, the English class action is an “adjustable” collective redress 
model because it may appear in both forms, as an opt-in and as an opt-out model. Evaluating the 
strength of the claims and the amount of damages that the class members may recover, the Tribunal 
decides which model (opt-in or opt-out) would better fit the concrete case in each case. In this way, 
the Tribunal adjusts the class action proceeding to every specific case. Besides, the Tribunal is also 
empowered to calculate damages on both individual and aggregated basis. With such procedural 
techniques at its disposal, the Tribunal is able to solve any type of mass case as long as the class 
action is a superior method for adjudicating the controversy. For example, when the Tribunal is 
faced with a case which involves small loses, it may order an opt-out approach in combination 
with aggregate assessment of the damage, while in cases which involve significant losses or 
personal injury cases, the Tribunal may order an opt-in approach in combination with the sub-
classing technique to better adjudicate the individual questions. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the English class action has the capacity to be an effective collective redress mechanism for any 
type of mass case. The practice in the next period will show how effective this collective redress 
system is in reality.  
… 
From the forth chapter, it can be concluded that in 2002 Sweden introduced a collective 
redress system (a group action) due to the lack of an efficient procedural system for adjudication 
of certain types of smaller claims. The initial intention to enact an opt-out based model, but under 
hard lobbying organised mainly by the business sector, the Swedish group action was promulgated 
as an opt-in model. 977 The comparative analysis showed that most of the mass cases in Sweden in 
the past years were in the area of consumer law, insurance services, civil rights discrimination, etc. 
The 2007 Report prepared by the Ministry of Justice concluded that the Swedish group action 
                                                          
977 Lindblom, Per Henrik., 2009. Group Litigation in Scandinavia. ERA Forum (2009) 10:7-35, p.12.  
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model achieved improvement in the behaviour of companies and in the access to justice for 
consumers. In general, the Swedish group action model worked satisfactorily. But the Report 
presented unsatisfactory results in the sphere of small losses cases. Evidence showed that in some 
cases in Sweden only 8% of group members opted-out, while 60% stayed passive and did not opt-
in.978 The reason was located in the fact that the opt-in models were not suitable for collecting 
small losses. In these cases, the litigation costs are higher than the compensation sought, which 
demotivates the consumers to file an action, while the companies (defendants) are aware thereof 
and use this consumer passivity to their own benefit. Unlike the opt-in models, the opt-out models 
encompass all small claims, plus those ones which would never be brought before a court. It can 
be concluded that the Swedish group action works efficiently as an opt-in based model, except in 
the small claims cases, which were the principal reason for the implementation of the collective 
redress system in Sweden.  
… 
From the fifth chapter, it can be concluded that the EU has not provided a feasible concept 
for a collective redress system. The guidelines set in the Recommendation on collective redress 
from 2013 are not in line with the objective to be achieved with the implementation of collective 
redress systems in the Member States. The main objective of the Recommendation on collective 
redress “is to facilitate access to justice, stop illegal practices and enable injured parties to obtain 
compensation in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union law.”979 
In 2013 prevention from illegal practices (in the form of injunction reliefs) worked satisfactorily 
under the Injunctive Directive’s rules, 980  but consumers had no effective mechanism for 
compensation in mass harm situations (in the form of compensatory reliefs), which was the main 
reason for the promulgation of the Recommendation on collective redress as an EU instrument. 
The Recommendation requires the Members States to implement opt-in based models of collective 
redress which should be principally initiated by consumer organisations and the calculation of 
damages should be performed on an individual basis. Collective redress models which have the 
above characteristics are the GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action, which are actually 
more flexible thаn the recommended model by the EU Commission because they have no 
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limitations regarding the standing to sue. The comparative analysis showed that both models (the 
GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action) are absolutely inapplicable in cases which involve 
small losses. Having in mind that the Recommendation was principally promulgated to enhance 
the access to justice in both consumer and competition cases, which basically involve small losses, 
it is not clear how the EU Commission plans to improve the access to justice for such type of cases 
with an opt-in based model. It is impossible to enhance the access to justice in both consumer and 
competition cases by using opt-in models, which “miss” small losses cases because they are 
naturally inappropriate to handle such cases. For these reasons, the Recommendation actually 
missed its main objective of enabling injured parties to obtain compensation in mass harm 
situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union law. 
However, the safeguards against possible abuses of collective redress systems stipulated in 
the Recommendation are well set and they may serve as a model for each collective redress system, 
particularly the obligation for the plaintiff to declare the origin of his funds to the court.  
… 
From the sixth chapter, it can be concluded that all types of mass cases cannot be resolved 
through a single “one size fits all” remedy.981 The comparative analysis showed that both the US 
class action and the class action under the CAT rules982, as opt-out models, are suitable for solving 
scattered losses cases due to the possibility given to the court to use the opt-out model for 
establishing class membership and to assess the damage on a class-wide basis. In this way, all 
victims subject to an infringement are captured under a single proceeding and the total damage is 
to be assessed on behalf of the class. It can be concluded that each collective redress model which 
aims to be efficient in collecting small losses must include rules under which the class membership 
will be established on an opt-out basis, the damage will be assessed on a class-wide basis and it 
will have various types of distribution of damage reliefs. For example, both the GLO mechanism 
and the Swedish group action have no such rules, which makes them unsuitable for scattered losses 
cases because the consumers are not willing to opt in for such trivial harms and the litigation costs 
for assessing the damage on an individual basis would be greater than the value of the damage 
itself. 
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982 Regarding the class action under CAT rules we have records for few cases solved under this model, therefore 
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On the other hand, the comparative analysis showed that collective redress systems, as opt-
in models, can be suitable for solving mass tort cases (personal injuries cases or cases which 
involve substantial economic losses) due to the possibility given to the court to determine the 
common issues on a class-wide basis and to assess the damages on an individual basis. In this way, 
the litigation costs which would be spent for resolution of each claim in a separate proceeding 
would be saved, and the risk of various adjudications on the same/similar issues would be avoided. 
Damage assessment can be performed through separate individual proceedings, which is always 
accurate and takes into consideration all relevant characteristics of the specific case. In certain 
cases, if the sub-classing technique is applicable, instead of being required to evaluate each and 
every individual class member’s loss, the court may assess the amount of damage for each of the 
subclasses.  
Having in mind that different types of mass cases require different (suitable) types of 
remedies, each collective redress mechanism which favours a single type of remedy will restrict 
that particular collective redress mechanism only to certain types of cases. For that reason, 
collective redress mechanisms should be “adjustable” procedural models which can be adjusted 
case by case, based on the features of the concrete case. In this context, the English class action 
model can be taken as an example.  
 
2. FEASIBILITY OF THE THESIS    
 
The general hypothesis of this research was that the traditional (individual) civil procedure 
is not an adequate method for solving mass disputes. The general hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that the presence of rights or interests in the mass cases that cannot be classified as 
individual rights (diffuse, collective and homogeneous rights or interests), challenges the 
traditional civil procedure as a procedural method for their adjudication. The EVN case is a mass 
case which involved homogeneous individual rights and it was subject of adjudication through a 
traditional civil procedure. The results were unsatisfactory because many consumers were not 
compensated (those who did not raise actions), the ratio of recovery and litigation costs was 1:760 
(in order to recover €0.10, the plaintiff had to pay at least €76), entrepreneurial lawyering emerged 
(the attorneys funded the claims and, in addition, gave a portion of their net fee to the client), and 
there was a great danger of inundating the courts by filing thousands of cases with trivial values (a 
real danger for the entire civil justice system to collapse). Both the plurality of parties and the 
joinder of proceedings, as procedural techniques which deal with situations where there is more 
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than one party, proved to be either theoretically or practically inapplicable to mass cases. Under 
both procedural techniques each of the EVN claims had to be initiated individually in a separate 
proceeding (compliant to the formalities required by the Civil Procedure Act, paying court taxes, 
hiring an attorney, submitting evidence, etc.) and they had to be subject of personal service. That 
is a consequence of the fact that the traditional civil procedure has an individual nature and it has 
to treat each claim separately by respecting all procedural formalities and guaranties. The 
traditional civil procedure treats each claim individually because it was created for providing 
protection of individual rights (droit subjective), but not for collective rights. “The existing 
European litigation procedures, the principles of which were laid down more than half a century 
ago in most countries, are not structured to accommodate mass cases” 983. Bearing this in mind, 
the general hypothesis that the traditional (individual) civil procedure is not an adequate method 
for solving mass disputes is confirmed.  
The jurisdictions which were subject of research have installed collective redress 
mechanisms for providing protection in mass cases which are different from the traditional civil 
procedure. So that this research activity is better systematized, these collective redress mechanisms 
were analyzed depending on the stages of the civil procedure. These stages are: (a) commencing 
the procedure; (b) course of the procedure; and (c) the effect of the judgement.  
Having said that the first working sub-hypothesis was that there are specificities regarding 
the commencement of a civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be 
classified as individual. The traditional civil procedure commences by submitting a claim before 
the court by which the claimant automatically becomes a formal party to the proceeding. Collective 
redress mechanisms also commence by submitting claims (application), but they include a 
certification stage during which the court examines the suitability of the claims for a class-wide 
treatment. If the required certification criteria are met, the traditional civil procedure obtains the 
status of a representative litigation. Unlike the representative litigations which have an 
admissibility stage, the traditional civil procedure has no such stage and it may not be run as a 
representative litigation. Bearing this in mind, the first sub-hypothesis that there are specificities 
regarding the commencement of a civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that 
cannot be classified as individual is confirmed.  
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The second working sub-hypothesis was that there are specificities regarding the course 
of the civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified as individual. 
Under the traditional civil procedure, the judge is responsible for the course of the proceedings 
and his main task is to examine if all procedural conditions for holding the trial (a central hearing) 
have been met. When it is faced with a large number of parties, the court may use either the 
plurality of parties or the joinder of proceedings, but both procedural techniques have a very 
limited power to “capture” a vast number of claims. In collective redress mechanisms, the judge 
has at his disposal special procedural techniques by which he can deal with mass cases. For 
example, in order to separate the common issues of the class (group) from the individual issues 
which affect some of the class (group) members, the courts may bifurcate the proceeding into a 
trial of the common issues (a liability stage) and a trial for determination of the remedy (a remedy 
stage). In order to avoid trials of each individual claim on the common issues, the court may use a 
test case approach. If some facts or law are not common to all class (group) members, but to some 
of them (different degrees of injury), the court may use the subclass technique. In order to capture 
a vast number of claims, the court approves a class (group) definition and each person who falls 
within the class definition is bound by the final judgement. In order to keep the class members 
(unknown) informed, the court may use a notice in the form of a newspaper advertisement, an 
internet advertisement, radio, etc. The above techniques enable the judge to deal with mass cases. 
Bearing this in mind, the second sub-hypothesis that there are specificities regarding the course of 
the civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified as individual is 
confirmed.  
The third working sub-hypothesis was that there are specificities regarding the effect of 
the judgment in a civil procedure for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified 
as individual. Under the traditional civil procedure, the principle of res judicata does not allow for 
the same cause of action to be adjudicated twice between the same parties. The same principle is 
applied in collective redress mechanisms, but the boundaries of a judgment delivered in a 
representative litigation extend to the class (group) members who were not formal parties in the 
proceedings. This is the breaking point where the concept of representative litigation and the 
concept of traditional civil procedure are in collision. The traditional civil procedure lies on two 
corresponding principles, party autonomy and party disposition984 whose direct consequence is 
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that every party must have had her day at court before the binding judgment enters into force. 
Unlike the traditional civil procedure, the representative litigation works on the principle of 
adequate representation of the class members’ interests according to which the absentees 
(unnamed class members) are bound by the judgment, only if their interests were represented fairly 
and adequately.985 The principle of adequate representation lies on the assumption that as long as 
the personal interest of the class representative coincides with the interest of the class member 
(represented) he may represent him. They both share the same (similar) interest, so as long as the 
class representative protects his interest, he automatically protects the interest of the class member 
too. In this way, it is not necessary for the class member to initiate a separate procedure because 
he was adequately represented, on the assumption that the outcome of the subsequent procedure is 
the same as the previous one. This concept of representation allows for few members (formal 
parties) to represent the entire class and for the court to dealt only with few claimants instead of 
dealing with hundreds of them, and solve the whole legal controversy at once. The traditional civil 
procedure does not recognize the principle of adequate representation (the same/similar interest), 
but instead it rests on the principle of party autonomy (consent). Bearing this in mind, the third 
sub-hypothesis that there are specificities regarding the effect of the judgment in a civil procedure 
for the protection of rights or interests that cannot be classified as individual is confirmed.  
 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the results gathered through the comparative analysis, in this part of the thesis we 
will provide recommendations for the basic principles of collective redress mechanisms which 
each country should take into consideration if it intends to implement such a mechanism in its 
national jurisdiction. In the process of tailoring these recommendations, we took account of the 
social context of the former Yugoslav republics, as countries with a similar social-economic 
structure as that of the R. Macedonia.  
 
a. Social context: The current social context in the R. Macedonia resembles those of the 
US, England and Sweden before each of these countries implemented their collective redress 
systems. Namely, each of these jurisdictions faced “massive” infringements of human rights that 
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could really interrupt the functioning of the economic system as a whole. Both the Telecom case 
and the EVN case are classical examples of massive infringements of consumer rights. The current 
traditional civil procedure was not an adequate mechanism for solving these two cases, which was 
the reason why a large number of harmed consumers were not compensated. For that reason, we 
recommend the implementation of a collective redress mechanism. 
 
b. Types of cases: The class-wide treatment is a superior method for solving cases which 
involve trivial economic losses, but is not always a superior method for solving personal injuries 
cases, which always involve individual questions which are complex to manage through collective 
redress mechanisms, or for solving cases which involve substantial economic losses, where the 
holders prefer to exercise their rights through individual proceedings due to the considerable 
amount of their economic loss. Therefore, we recommend that there are no limitations regarding 
the subject matter jurisdiction. However, when testing the superiority requirement, the court must 
carefully consider all aspects of the dispute in question because the class-wide treatment is not a 
superior method for adjudication of mass tort cases. 
 
c. Special court jurisdiction: We recommend special court jurisdiction for cases which 
are subject of class-wide treatment. Each type of collective redress mechanism is a complex 
proceeding and it requires specialised judges, well equipped courts and sufficient material 
resources. To improve the level of proficiency and to secure the continuity of the proceeding, in 
our opinion such complex cases should be run by a panel of three (or more) professional judges.  
 
d. Standing to sue: The comparative analysis showed that a single solution, which means 
preferring only one type of class (group) representative, is not an option. For example, dominant 
initiators of class actions in the US are individuals (victims) with their attorneys, who work 
together as joint ventures for initiating class actions. On the one hand, the attorneys in the US have 
a positive role (they are crucial holders of the process of private enforcement of consumer or anti-
competition law), but, on the other hand, they can abuse class action procedures by putting their 
material interests before the interests of the clients (entrepreneurial lawyering). In England and 
Wales, most of the cases have been financially supported by legal aid schemes. On the one hand, 
without this help barely anyone would ever initiate a GLO proceeding, but on the other hand, there 
have been cases where this help was vulgarly abused by submitting unmeritorious claims. Only in 
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Sweden did the investigator find out that the group action system has not been abused.986 The 
Swedish group action may be initiated by persons whose rights have been allegedly subject of an 
infringement (victim), by organisations and by public authorities. Therefore, in our opinion, a 
mixed solution is preferable under which all the above actors (victims, organisations and the State) 
should be entitled to represent the interests of other similarly situated persons. 
  
e. Admissibility: The comparative analysis showed that each of the jurisdictions has two 
sets of prerequisites, first, a set which refers to the class (group) and, second, a set which refers to 
the class (group) representative. The first set of prerequisites tests the cohesiveness of the class 
(the commonality requirement) and the superiority of the collective redress mechanism over the 
individual procedural techniques (the superiority requirement). The second set of prerequisites 
tests the suitability (adequacy) of the class (group) representative to act as a representative of the 
interests of the class (group) members (adequacy of representation).  
Commonality requirement: A requirement of total commonality of law and fact, as is 
required by the English representative action under CPR 19.6, has to be avoided. In our opinion, 
it must be possible to identify at least one common element shared by all members which will 
move the entire proceeding forward. The presence of individual questions does not prevent the 
admissibility of class-wide treatment because the judge has at his disposal various procedural 
techniques for dividing certain class members into subgroups, etc.  
Superiority requirement: A collective redress mechanism should only be employed if it is 
superior to other available methods for adjudicating the dispute fairly and efficiently. When the 
judge tests superiority, he should take into consideration the type of the case, the current status of 
the other cases which are subject of class-wide treatment, the other available methods for solving 
the controversy, the available procedural techniques for class-wide treatment, the expected cost of 
running the case on a class-wide basis and the possibility of damage assessment on an aggregate 
basis.   
Adequacy of representation: The class (group) representative must protect the interests of 
the class (group) members in a fair and adequate manner. When the judge tests the adequacy of 
one particular class representative, he should take into consideration his capability to understand 
his role as a trustee of the class behind him, his ability to communicate and to control the work of 
                                                          
986 See more in Persson, A. H., Collective enforcement: European prospects in light of Swedish experience, In 
Collective Actions. Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interest (Red: Wrbka, S & Van Uytsel, S. & 
Siems, M,) Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 356. 
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the attorneys, his experience in such cases, if he has any conflict of interests with the class in 
respect to the common questions, etc. The class representative must be typical of the class members 
in respect of the common questions, while the differences regarding the relief sought or variations 
in the amount of damage may be solved by dividing the class into subclasses.  
In order to prevent possible conflicts of interests between the class representative and the 
class, the judge must be “vested” with powers such as: denying certification in case of an 
inadequate class representative proposed; monitoring the behaviour of the class representative 
during the proceedings and if the judge finds that the class representative is no longer representing 
the class (group) members’ interests appropriately, he should be allowed to suspend that particular 
class representative and appoint another class representative.   
Having in mind the complexity of these types of cases and in order to increase the level of 
legal certainty, in our opinion a certification hearing and a formal decision for certification should 
be mandatory.  
f. Trial techniques for class-wide treatment: As it was said, the presence of individual 
questions should not prevent the initiation of a collective redress mechanism. On the contrary, the 
judge has to be empowered to select procedural techniques by which he can handle both common 
and individual questions. The judge has to identify at least one common question of law or fact 
shared by all members first. In order to solve that particular common question equally for all class 
members (for example, the defendant’s liability), the judge must have the power to bifurcate the 
trial into a trial for determination of common issues and a trials for determination of the remedy. 
The outcome of the trial on which common issues are subject of adjudication is equally binding 
for all class members. 
 If a fact or law is not common to all class (group) members, but only to some of them 
(for example, variations in the causation of the damage, different degrees of injury, different types 
of remedy sought within the same class etc.), the judge must have the power to divide that part of 
the class by forming subclasses. The subclass technique allows for certain types of conflicts of 
interests among class members to be solved.  
Opt-in/opt-out: The comparative analysis showed that a single solution, which means 
preferring either an opt-in or an opt-out model, is not an option. In our opinion, whether a class 
should be certified on an opt-in or an opt-out basis should be decided by the judge in each particular 
case taking account of the nature of the rights which are subject of adjudication. The comparative 
analysis showed that the opt-in models are more appropriate for adjudication of cases which 
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involve personal injuries or substantial economic losses, while the opt-out models for cases which 
involve economic losses with a trivial value. Therefore, the judge should be given the power to 
decide ad hoc which model, an opt-in or an opt-out, is to be applied in a particular case.   
Notice: Class members must be entitled to be informed about important procedural orders. 
The members whose names and addresses are known should be sent a personal notice, while those 
who cannot be identified should be informed in another suitable way (radio, newspaper 
advertisement, the internet, etc.). In our opinion, the court must inform the class members about: 
(a) the certification hearing; (b) the cut-off dates; (c) if the class representative intends to withdraw; 
and (d); in case of a decision (or settlement).  
 
g. Types of remedies: Both injunction and monetary reliefs should be allowed under a 
collective redress mechanism.  
When the judge decides to bifurcate the trial, he needs to have an opportunity to grant an 
interim judgement on the common issues.  
A combination of injunction and monetary relief under a single court order (combined 
judgment) should be allowed if there is no conflict of interests among members regarding the 
reliefs sought. The comparative analysis showed that certain types of injunctions cannot be 
combined with monetary reliefs, for example, an affirmative injunction with a damage claim.  
Class wide settlements should be allowed upon a previous court approval.   
 
h. Calculation of damages: The judge should be empowered to select which method of 
damage calculation is suitable for the case in question. The comparative analysis showed that 
certain methods of damage assessment are suitable for certain types of cases. Preferring only one 
method of damage assessment may restrict the collective redress system only to particular types 
of cases. For example, the GLO mechanism and the Swedish group action system do not allow 
damage assessment on an aggregate basis, which prevents both systems from dealing with low 
value cases. The possibility of damage assessment on an aggregate basis should be one of the 
elements which will be examined by the judge when he tests the superiority requirement.    
Cases which involve personal losses are traditionally treated on an individual basis in 
collective redress mechanisms in the form of subsequent separate proceedings. But if there is a 
possibility for the class to be subdivided into subclasses (for example, by categories of injuries), 
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the judge should be empowered to assesses the amount of damage for each of the subclasses, 
instead of being required to evaluate each and every individual class member’s loss.987 
In cases where the number of class members is accurate and if the characteristics of the 
case allow for an average sum to be calculated for each member (per capita), the judge should be 
empowered to assess a “global lump sum” by multiplying the average sum with the total number 
of class members. This model of calculation is suitable for opt-in systems, where the number of 
class members is accurate.988 
In cases where the number of class members is not accurate or damage assessment for each 
of the members would cost more that the compensation itself, the court should be empowered to 
calculate the damage simply based on the evidence of injury to the group, without precise evidence 
that each putative victim has suffered loss or how much loss he has suffered. Damages awards 
under this method are in the form of a global (lump) sum or the judge may apply the formula 
approach.989 This model of calculation is used in opt-out systems, where the number of group 
members may not be determined accurately. 
 
i. Distribution of monetary reliefs: If the court can identify the class members 
(beneficiaries), the distribution should be direct.  
Where the beneficiaries are already written in the judgement and the judgment is 
enforceable on an individual basis, each beneficiary may demand enforcement directly against the 
defendant (an option without a distribution fund).  
If the defendant has accurate internal evidence about class members (usually as a former 
employer), the court may order the defendant to distribute the damage awards to the class members 
(an option without a distribution fund). 
If a distribution fund is created, the judge should be allowed to select to whom the fund’s 
liquidation is to be entrusted. In our opinion, possible options are either the class representative or 
a specialised firm. The court as a liquidator is not an option because the distribution stage requires 
efficient management, which is not the case with the courts in general. A class representative as a 
fund’s liquidator can be an option when the collective redress action is raised by a consumer 
                                                          
987 Falla, E., 2012. Powers of the judge in collective redress proceedings. [e-book] Brussels, Université libre de 
Bruxelles – ULB, p. 187-188. 
988 Idem.  
989 Idem.  
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organisation which can prove its management ability to distribute the fund in an efficient way. In 
all other cases, specialised firms should be appointed as funds’ liquidators.  
The liquidator must distribute the fund efficiently and under the monitoring of the judge. 
The liquidator distributes the fund according to the method provided by the court. Identified class 
members should be sent personal mails, while the class members who cannot be identified are 
notified on the internet, in a newspaper or other public advertisement. Both identified and 
unidentified class members should be called to submit their claim forms until a certain date (a cut-
off date).   
If awarded monetary relief remains unclaimed, the court should be allowed to apply cy-
prés and put the unclaimed damages to their next best use.  
Non-direct distribution: When the judge cannot use any form of direct compensation, he 
should be empowered to distribute the remainder to its next best use (a cy-prés distribution model). 
What would be the next best use of the remainder of the fund should be decided by the judge on 
an ad hoc basis.  
 
j. Res judicata: In our opinion, the res judicata principle should work in “two ways”, i.e. 
both the formal parties (plaintiff and defendant) and the class (group) members should be bound 
by the judgement regardless of the outcome of the collective redress procedure (positive or 
negative). In this way, both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of judicial economy 
would be achieved.  
 
k. Cost: The comparative analysis showed that claimants whose litigation costs were 
waived are highly motivated to file unmeritorious claims. In our opinion, the cost shifting rule 
would work as a serious gatekeeper against potential unmeritorious claims.  
 
l. Funding: The comparative analysis showed that none of the current models of funding 
in the focused jurisdictions provides satisfactorily results. In our opinion, collective redress 
systems as expensive mechanisms for delivering justice should be financed on a broad basis. Each 
type of funding should be allowed as long as it is not in conflict with the aims of the collective 
redress procedure. In our opinion, the claimant should be obliged to declare the origin of the funds 
provided for support of the representative action at the beginning of the proceeding. The courts 
should have a mandate to stop the proceeding in case of a conflict of interests between the funder 
and the claimant party and its members.  
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m. Fees: Contingency fee agreements should be allowed. If the attorney finances the 
collective redress mechanism in full, he should be given the right to charge a percentage of the 
client’s net recovery. The percentage should be determined by the judge. 
When the attorney is hired as a professional only (no funding basis), if he wins the case, he 
should be given the right to charge doubled fees, but if he loses the case, he should be given the 
right to charge half fees.  
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POVZETEK  
Predmet te teze so t.i. masovni sodni zadevi (spori) in postopkovni mehanizmi za njihovo 
reševanje. Analiza bi morala pokazati, ali je tradicionalni civilni postopek (ne)ustrezna metoda za 
zaščito pravic ali interesov, ki jih ni mogoče opredeliti kot posameznikove, medtem ko bi 
primerjalna analiza pravnih sistemov, ki so že vzpostavila sistem kolektivnih odškodnin, morala 
pokazati kateri model zagotavlja zadovoljive rezultate. Primerjalna analiza vključuje pravne 
sisteme Združenih držav Amerike, Anglije in Walesa, Švedske in EU. 
Namen te teze je predstaviti dejstvo, da Makedonski državljani nimajo učinkovite pravice 
dostopa do sodišča v masovnih zadevah, ker je tradicionalni (individualni) pravdni postopek 
neustrezen mehanizem za reševanje tovrstnih primerov. Republika Makedonija je vzeta za primer 
pravnega sistema, ki še vedno nima vzpostavljenega sistema kolektivnih odškodnin. Republika 
Makedonija lahko služi kot model za vse republike nekdanje Jugoslavije, ker imajo vsi enako 
tradicijo pravnega civilnega postopka, pri čemer se lahko na tej točki ugotovi, da imajo podobne 
socialno-ekonomske razmere. Prav zaradi tega je naloga te teze opozoriti na potrebo o reformi 
мakedonskega civilnega pravosodnega sistema (tudi civilno-pravosodnih sistemov v nekdanjih 
jugoslovanskih republikah) glede reševanja masovnih zadev in zlasti potrebe o reformi civilnega 
postopka. Na podlagi izkušenj drugih držav je treba dati predloge o smernicah, v katerih je treba 
prilagoditi makedonski pravdni model. 
Nekateri primeri, ki so se nedavno pojavili v Republiki Makedoniji, so sprožili naš interes, 
da bi raziskali, kako se te  obravnavajo s civilnega procesnega vidika, ker je v teh primerih velik 
del prebivalstva oškodovan, ne da bi prejel nadomestilo škode. Ti primeri so se pojavili zlasti v 
kontekstu kršitev konkurenčnega prava, zlorabe prevladujočega položaja, pravic potrošnikov, 
onesnaževanja zraka (okoljsko pravo) itd. Najpomembnejša značilnost teh primerov je njihova 
množičnost, oziroma dejstvo, da obnašanje ene same entitete (kot centra moči) prizadene tisoče, 
včasih celo milijone drugih oseb, ki so na določen način povezane. 
Samo v prvem primeru (»Zadeva Telekom«) je bilo skoraj 70% vseh uporabnikov fiksnih 
telefonskih linij prizadetih, medtem ko noben ni prejel nadomestilo škode.  V omenjenem primeru 
je Komisija za varstvo konkurence R. Makedonije sprejela Sklep št. 07-296/3 z dne 21.04.2011 s 
katerim je naložila Makedonskemu Telekomu AD Skopje plačilo globe v znesku EUR 
1.000.000,00 za storjenega prekrška v skladu s členom 47 / 1-2 Zakona o konkurenci (zloraba 
prevladujočega položaja). Zloraba se je nanašala na protipravno obremitev strankam z stroški 
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glede pripravo mesečnih računov. Kot posledica teh nezakonitih dejanj je Makedonski Telekom 
pridobil sredstva v višini cca. 1.200.000,00 EUR. Pravne učinke sklepa Komisije za varstvo 
konkurence R. Makedonije z dne 21.04.2011 s katerim je bila sankcionirana zloraba položaja s 
strani Makedonskega telekoma je mogoče analizirati na makro in mikro ravni. Na makro ravni bo 
država s to sankcijo v svojem proračunu zbrala okrog 1.000.000,00 EUR, medtem ko na mikro 
ravni pa 291.427,00 potrošnikov bodo v celoti ostali brez nadomestila škode. Torej, ali je v tem 
primeru Makedonski telekom ustvaril dobiček? Odgovor je pozitiven, ker je razlika med 
nezakonito pridobljenim zneskom, oz. 1.200.000,00 EUR in plačano globo, oz. 1.000.000,00 EUR, 
celih 200.000,00 EUR. 
Primer Telekom nikoli ni bil obravnavan pred sodiščem zaradi nesprejemljivo zakasnjene 
odločbe Državne komisije za varstvo konkurence, ki predstavlja neposredni vzrok za neupravičeno 
odškodovanje prizadetih potrošnikov. Vse potencialne odškodninske zahtevke so namreč zastarale 
v času, ko je Komisija izdala svojo odločbo o naložitvi globe zaradi zlorabe prevladujočega 
položaja družbe Telekom. Tako je ta primer vključeval samo učinka kaznovanja, medtem ko 
učinek odvračanja in vrnitve sploh ni bil prisoten. 
V drugem primeru ("Zadeva EVN") so prizadete vse družine v državi kot gospodinjstva. 
V tem primeru je Komisija za varstvo konkurence R. Makedonije dne 16.3.2011 sprejela Odločbo 
PP št. 09-15 / 8, na podlagi katere je bila EVN Makedoniji AD Skopje izrečena globa v višini 
500.000,00 EUR za prekrška v skladu s členom 47 / 1 (2) Zakona o varstvu konkurence. V tem 
primeru je bila globa izrečena, ker je EVN Makedonija AD Skopje zlorabila svoj prevladujoči 
položaj na trgu, in sicer s protipravnim zaračunavanjem maloprodajnim tarifnim odjemalcev 
manipulacijsko pristojbino v višini okoli 0,10 EUR. Z zlorabo prevladujočega položaja je EVN na 
makro ravni povzročila izkrivljanje (motnjo) upoštevnega trga za distribucijo električne energije; 
EVN je prekinila zdravo konkurenco na trgu in nezakonito pridobila 1.046.557,00 EUR. Na mikro 
ravni je bilo okoli 560.000 gospodinjstev (odjemalcev) nezakonito zaračunana manipulacijska 
pristojbina za obravnavo v fiksnem znesku 0,10 EUR, in tudi odjemalci so ostali brez nadomestila 
škode. 
Zadeva EVN je bila preizkušena pred sodiščem, rezultati pa so bili nepravični. Primer EVN 
je pokazal, da oškodovani potrošniki niso bili pripravljeni sprožiti sodnih odškodniskih postopkov, 
ker so njihove terjatve imele nepomembne vrednosti, pravdni stroški pa so bili večkrat višji od 
pričakovanega nadomestila škode. Brezbrižnost potrošnikov so uporabili odvetniki, ki so prevzeli 
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pobudo in vložili več sto zahtevkov za nadomestilo škode v višini 0,10 EUR. Namen odvetnikov 
ni bil zagotoviti nadomestilo škode za potrošnike, temveč zaračunati sodne stroške nasprotni, 
neuspeli stranki v pravdi. Odvetnik je v povprečju za nadomestilo v višini 0,10 € zaračunaval 
pravdnih stroškov v znesku EUR 150. Rezultat teh sodnih zadev je bil predvidljiv - potrošniki bi 
uspeli v svojih zahtevkih, kar bi jim samodejno dalo pravico, da z nasprotne stranke prejmejo svoje 
pravdne stroške. Prav povračilo stroškov s strani nasprotne in neuspele stranke je bil edini razlog, 
zaradi katerega so se odvetniki strinjali, da plačajo sodne takse iz svojih "žepov". Končni rezultat 
v tej zadevi je v bistvu pokazal, da je tradicionalni civilni postopek pripeljal do neupravičene 
rezultate, kot so podjetniško odvetništvo, odsotnost nadomestila škode potrošnikov, visoki stroški 
sodnih postopkov, velika nevarnost za preplavitev sodišč z vložitvijo na tisoče tožb s trivialnimi 
vrednostmi, itd. Zadeva EVN je vključevala tisoče potrošnikov, zato smo poskušali obvladati 
veliko število potrošnikov naenkrat z uporabo nekaterih inštitutov tradicionalnega civilnega 
postopka, ki se ukvarjajo s situacijami, v katerih obstaja pluralnost strank. Analiza je pokazala, da 
so postopkovni inštituti, kot so materialna pluralnost strank, formalna pluralnost strank ali 
združitev postopkov, teoretično ali praktično neuporabni za množične primere. 
V tretjem primeru (Zadeva Zelena koalicija) so bili prizadeti vse ljudi, ki živijo v Velesu 
in njegovi regiji (okoli 100 000 prebivalcev). Namreč, 30. Maja 2008 je bila zoper Republiko 
Makedonijo vložena tožba zaradi dolgotrajnega onesnaženja okolja na območju Velesa in njene 
regije s strani metalurško-kemičnega kombinata "Zletovo" – Veles, ki je v državni lasti. Ta primer 
se je obravnaval kot prvi "veliki okoljski spor", ki je bil vložen pred sodiščem v Republiki 
Makedoniji. Tožniki v tem sporu so od tožene stranke (države) zahtevali preselitev odlagališča 
žlindrinih odpadkov svinca in cinka ter opravljanje dekontaminacijo javnih zelenih površin v 
Velesu. Zahtevek je bil zavrnjen kot neutemeljen, ker tožeče stranke niso mogle dokazati 
odgovornosti na strani tožene stranke. Pravzaprav tožeči stranki nista imeli dovolj materialnih 
sredstev za plačilo ustrezne okoljske študije, ki bi bila predložena sodišču kot izvedensko mnenje. 
Tožniki so namesto takšnega izvedenskega mnenja predložili poročila, ki analizirajo problem 
onesnaževanja v Velesu, vendar iz različnih perspektiv. Ta poročila niso bila osredotočena na 
vprašanje odgovornosti (vzročnosti). Zato, pomanjkljivo financiranje je pripeljalo do neuspeha v 
tem sporu. 
Zgornji trije primeri se zaradi svoje kolektivne narave bistveno razlikujejo od rednih sodnih 
zadev. Ti primeri vključujejo tako imenovane kolektivne pravice, medtem ko "redni sodni 
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postopki" vključujejo tako imenovane individualne pravice ("droit subjectif"). Kolektivne pravice 
so nedeljive z materijalne in procesne perspektive, ker vedno pripadajo skupnosti in jih ni mogoče 
razdeliti v kvote, ki bi jih pripisale vsakemu članu skupnosti. Zato morajo te vrste pravic na 
kolektivni osnovi reševati sodišča. Poleg teh pravic so nekatere vrste posameznih pravic prav tako 
zahtevale kolektivno obravnavo sodišč zaradi postopkovnih gospodarskih razlogov (znanih kot 
homogene posamezne pravice). Te pravice pripadajo posameznikom in jih je mogoče uveljavljati 
na sodišče v obliki individualnih tožb, vendar bodo zaradi majhne vrednosti sodni stroški za 
njihovo odločanje odtehtali vrednost samega nadomestila. Na primer, v zadevi EVN za 
nadomestilo škode v višini 0,10 EUR odvetniška pristojbina je dosegla EUR 150. Obstoj splošnega 
pravnega in dejanskega vprašanja omogoča, da se v takih primerih kolektivno pomoč odobri na 
ravni razreda oz. skupine. 
Kot je bilo že omenjeno, ta teza vključuje primerjalno analizo pravnih sistemov Združenih 
držav Amerike, Anglije in Walesa, Švedske in EU, kot pravnih sistemov, ki so že izvedli modele 
kolektivnih odškodnin (reprezentativni spori) za reševanje masovnih zadev (primeri, ki vključujejo 
kolektivne pravice). Z uporabo primerjalne analize smo na eni strani ugotovili, kakšni so pozitivni 
vidiki vsakega modela kolektivnih odškodnin in na drugi strani kakšni so negativni vidiki. 
Primerjalna analiza je pokazala, da je trenutni model razredne (skupinske) odškodninske 
tožbe v ZDA [pravilo 23 (b) (3)] učinkovit sistem kolektivnih odškodnin za nadomestilo majhnih 
škod. Odškodnina v teh vrstah primerov je preprosta, vendar bi pri uporabi pravil tradicionalnega 
civilnega postopka povzročila nesorazmerne stroške postopka. V skladu z ameriškim modelom 
razredne odškodninske tožbe, sodišče določi članstvo v razredu na "opt-out" podlagi in izračunava 
škodo na agregatni podlagi, kar zmanjšuje stroške sodnih postopkov in omogoča dostop do sodišč 
v primeru tovrstnih postopkov. Pravzaprav tradicionalna paradigma ameriške razredne 
odškodninske tožbe naj bi zagotovila mehanizem za uveljavljanje predpisov in kompenzacijo 
majhnih škod Iz zgornjega je mogoče sklepati, da uveljaljen sistem v Združenih državah 
predststavlja učinkovit mehanizem kolektivnih odškodnin za zbiranje majhnih izgub, oz. škod. Ta 
sistem postane problematičen, če se uporablja za množične deliktne zadeve, npr. primeri 
premoženjske škode (škode z velikimi gospodarskimi izgubami) in primeri osebnih poškodb. Te 
zadeve vključujejo posamezna vprašanja, ki včasih niso primerna za razredno (skupinsko) 
obravnavo, zlasti ne na "opt-out" podlagi. 
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Primerjalna analiza je pokazala, da je "pravni red angleške skupine" (CPR 19.10) drag 
procesni mehanizem, v nekaterih primerih pa celo predmet hudih zlorab. Toda kot model, ki 
temelji na "opt-outu", ki izračuna škodo na posamezni osnovi in z določenimi izboljšavami, je 
morda učinkovit sistem kolektivnih odškodnin za reševanje primerov osebnih poškodb ali 
primerov, ki pomenijo znatne gospodarske izgube. 
V skladu s primerjalno analizo je "Švedska skupinska tožba" (GPA 2002) zagotovila 
izboljšanje vedenja podjetij in izboljšanje dostopa do pravnega varstva za potrošnike, vendar so 
dokazi pokazali, da v nekaterih primerih na Švedskem le 8% člani skupine so se odločili ("opt-
out"), medtem ko jih je 60% ostali pasivni in se ni odločili. To pomeni, da Švedska skupinska 
tožba kot model, ki temelji na odločbi ("opt-out"), deluje učinkovito, razen v primerih majhnih 
zahtevkov, čeprav so bili primeri majhnih zahtevkov glavni razlog za izvajanje sistema kolektivnih 
odškodnin na Švedskem.  
Primerjalna analiza je pokazala, da EU ni zagotovila izvedljivega koncepta sistema 
kolektivnih odškodnin. Smernice, določene v Priporočilu za kolektivne odškodnine od leta 2013, 
niso v skladu s ciljem, ki bi ga bilo treba doseči z izvajanjem sistemov kolektivnih odškodnin v 
državah članicah. Glavni cilj Priporočila za kolektivne tožbe je "olajšati dostop do sodnega varstva, 
ustaviti nezakonite postopke in oškodovancem omogočiti, da pridobijo odškodnino v razmerah 
množičnih škod, ki so posledica kršitev pravic, podeljenih v skladu s pravom Unije". V letu 2013 
je preprečevanje nezakonitih ravnanj (v obliki opustitvenih odredb) zadovoljivo delovalo v skladu 
s pravili direktive, vendar potrošniki niso imeli učinkovitega mehanizma za nadomestilo v 
primerih množičnih škod (v obliki nadomestilo škod), kar je bil glavni razlog za razglasitev 
priporočila za kolektivne tožbe kot instrument EU. Priporočilo zahteva, da države članice izvajajo 
model, ki temelji na "opt-outu", ki ga morajo načeloma začeti potrošniške organizacije, 
izračunavanje škode pa mora biti izvedeno na individualni osnovi. Modeli kolektivnih odškodnin, 
ki imajo zgoraj navedene značilnosti, sta mehanizem GLO in Švedska skupinska tožba. 
Primerjalna analiza je pokazala, da sta oba modela (mehanizem GLO in Švedska skupinska tožba) 
absolutno neuporabna za primere, ki vključujejo majhne izgube, oz. škode. Ob upoštevanju 
dejstva, da je bilo priporočilo pretežno razglašeno za povečanje dostopa do pravnega varstva v 
potrošniških zadevah in primerih konkurence, ki v glavnem vključujejo majhne škode, ni jasno, 
kako namerava Komisija EU izboljšati dostop do pravnega varstva glede tovrstne zadeve z model, 
ki temelji na "opt-in"? Nemogoče je izboljšati dostop do pravnega varstva tako v potrošniških kot 
tudi v konkurenčnih primerih z uporabo modelov "opt-in", ki "izpuščajo" zadeve z majhnimi 
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škodami zaradi naravne neustreznosti za obravnavanje takih primerov. Zaradi teh razlogov je 
Priporočilo dejansko zgrešilo svoj glavni cilj, da se oškodovanim strankam omogoči, da pridobijo 
odškodnino v zadevah množičnih škod, ki so posledica kršitev pravic, podeljenih po pravu Unije. 
Na podlagi primerjalne analize je mogoče sklepati, da različne vrste množičnih primerov 
zahtevajo različne (ustrezne) vrste pravnih sredstev za njihovo reševanje. Z drugimi besedami, vse 
vrste množične primere ni mogoče rešiti z enim samim "enim velikostim za vse" sredstvom. 
Primerjalna analiza je pokazala, da sta tako ameriška razredna tožba kot tudi razredna tožba v 
skladu s pravili CAT, kot "opt-out" modeli primerni za reševanje primerov razpršenih izgub zaradi 
možnosti sodišča, da uporabi "opt-out" modela pri vzpostavitvijo članstva v posameznem razredu 
in tudi da bi ocenilo škodo na ravni razreda. Na ta način so vse žrtve protipravnega dejanja ujete v 
okviru enotnega postopka in celotna škoda se oceni v imenu razreda. Lahko se tukaj sklene, da 
mora vsak model kolektivnih odškodnin, katerega namen je učinkovito nadomestilo majhnih škod, 
vključevati pravila, po katerih se bo članstvo v razredu ugotovilo na podlagi "opt-out", oz. 
zavrnitve, škoda pa bo ocenjena na podlagi razreda in nadomestilo škode bo imelo različne vrste 
distribucije. Na primer, tako mehanizem GLO kot Švedska skupinska tožba ne vsebovata takšna 
pravila in zaradi tega nista primerna za primere razpršenih škod, saj se potrošniki ne želijo odločiti 
("opt-in") za takšne neznatne škode, kjer bodo stroški postopka za utvrditvijo nastale škode na 
posamezni osnovi večji od vrednosti samega nadomestila škode. 
Po drugi strani pa je primerjalna analiza pokazala, da so sistemi kolektivnih odškodnin, kot 
modeli "opt-in" lahko primerni za reševanje primerov množičnih odškodnin (primeri osebnih 
poškodb ali primeri, ki povzročajo znatne gospodarske škode) zaradi možnosti sodišča, da določi 
skupna vprašanja na ravni celotne skupine in utvrditi škodo na posamezni podlagi. Na ta način se 
bodo shranile stroški postopka, ki bi nastale v primeru reševanje vsakega zahtevka v ločenem 
postopku, pa tudi se bo izognilo prisotno tveganje različnih odločitev o istih / podobnih vprašanjih. 
Utvrditvijo škode je mogoče izvesti z ločenimi posameznimi postopki, pri čemer je pristop vedno 
natančen in upošteva vse pomembne značilnosti posameznega primera. Medtem ko v nekaterih 
primerih, če se uporablja tehnika podklasa, sodišče, namesto da bi ocenjevalo izgubo vsakega 
posameznega člana razreda, bo ugotavljalo znesek škode glede vsakega podrazreda. 
Glede na to, da različne vrste množičnih primerov zahtevajo različne (primerne) vrste 
pravnih sredstev za njihovo reševanje, vsak mehanizem kolektivnih odškodnin, ki daje prednost 
enemu samemu pravnemu sredstvu, bo ta mehanizem kolektivnih odškodninskih pravnih sredstev 
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omejil le na določene vrste primerov. Zato bi morali mehanizmi kolektivnih odškodnin biti 
"prilagodljivi" proceduralni modeli, ki jih je mogoče prilagoditi za vsak primer posebej, in sicer 
na podlagi značilnosti konkretnega primera. V tem kontekstu lahko kot vzorec uporabimo "model 
razredne Angleške tožbe". Razredna Angleška tožba je "prilagodljiv" model kolektivne 
odškodnine, ker se lahko pojavlja v obeh oblikah, "opt-in" ali "opt-out" model. Medtem ko ocenjuje 
moč trditvah in višino odškodnine, ki bi jo lahko prejeli člani razreda, sodišče odloča, kateri model 
("opt-in" ali "opt-out") bi bolje ustrezal konkretnemu primeru. Na ta način sodišče prilagodi 
postopek v vsakem konkretnem primeru. Poleg že omenjene postopkovne možnosti je sodišče prav 
tako pooblaščeno za izračun odškodnine na individualni in agregirani podlagi. S tem da sodišče 
ima na razpolagi te postopkovne tehnike, lahko reši vse vrste množičnih primerov, seveda, če je 
razredna tožba boljša metoda za presojo polemike. Na primer, kadar se sodišče spoprijema z 
zadevo, ki vključuje majhno škodo, lahko odredi pristop "opt-out" v kombinaciji s skupno oceno 
škode, medtem ko lahko v primerih, ki vključujejo znaten znesek škod ali primerov osebnih 
poškodb, lahko odredi "opt-in" pristop v kombinaciji s tehnikami podklasa za boljše presojanje 
posameznih vprašanj. Iz zgornjega je mogoče sklepati, da je Angleški razredna tožba sposobna 
biti učinkovit mehanizem kolektivnih pravnih sredstev za vse vrste množičnih primerov. 
Kljub vsem pozitivnim in negativnim vidikom mehanizmov kolektivnih odškodnin, 
tradicionalni (individualni) civilni postopek ni primeren način za reševanje kolektivnih sporov. 
Primerjalna analiza je pokazala nezadovoljive rezultate, ko je bil v primeru EVN uporabljen 
tradicionalni civilni postopek, ker mnogim oškodovanim potrošnikom ni bila nadomeščena škoda 
(tistih, ki niso tožili), razmerje med stroški izterjave odškodnine in stoški sodnega postopka je bilo 
1: 760 (da bi izterjal 0,10 EUR, je moral tožnik plačati vsaj 76 EUR), pojavilo se je podjetniško 
odvetništvo (odvetniki so financirali postopka in poleg tega so oškodavanim porabnikom dali del 
neto zaračunanega zneska) in nastala je velika nevarnost za preplavitev sodišč z vložitvijo na tisoče 
tožb s trivialnimi vrednostmi (resnična nevarnost za propad celega civilnega pravosodnega 
sistema). Tako množica strank kot združitveni postopek kot procesne tehnike, ki obravnavajo 
situacije, v katerih je več kot ena stranka, so se izkazale za teoretično ali praktično neuporabne v 
primeru kolektivnih zadev. Na podlagi obeh proceduralnih tehnikah je bilo treba vsaka od zahtev 
zoper EVN začeti posamično v ločenem postopku (v skladu s formalnostmi, zahtevanimi na 
podlagi Zakona o pravdnem postopku, plačevanju sodnih taks, najemu odvetnika, predložitvijo 
dokazov itd.) in morali so biti predmet osebne storitve. To je posledica dejstva, da ima tradicionalni 
civilni postopek individualno naravo, kjer se mora vsak zahtevek obravnavati ločeno s 
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spoštovanjem vseh postopkovnih formalnosti in jamstev. Tradicionalni civilni postopek obravnava 
vsak zahtevek posamično, ker je bil ustvarjen za zagotavljanje zaščite posameznih pravic 
(subjektivna droit), ne pa tudi za kolektivne pravice. 
Tradicionalni civilni postopek in reprezentativni spor (mehanizem kolektivnih pravnih 
sredstev) se med seboj bistveno razlikujejo. Tradicionalni pravdni postopek se namreč začne z 
vložitvijo tožbe pred sodiščem, s katerim tožeča stranka samodejno postane stranka v postopku. 
Kolektivni odškodninski mehanizmi se prav tako začnejo z vložitvijo zahtevkov (prijave), vendar 
vključujejo fazo certifikacije, v katero sodišče preučuje primernost zahtevka za razrednega 
obravnavanja. Če so izpolnjena potrebna merila za certificiranje, tradicionalni civilni postopek 
pridobi status reprezentativnega spora. Za razliko od reprezentativnih sporov, ki imajo stopnjo 
dopustnosti, tradicionalni civilni postopek takšne stopnje nima in se ne sme voditi kot 
reprezentativni spor. Poleg tega je v skladu s tradicionalnim civilnim postopkom sodnik odgovoren 
za potek postopka, njegova glavna naloga pa je preveriti, ali so bili izpolnjeni vsi procesni pogoji 
za izvedbo sojenja (glavna obravnava). Sodišče lahko pri soočanju z velikim številom strank 
uporabi množico strank ali združitev postopkov, vendar imajo obe postopkovni tehniki zelo 
omejeno pooblastilo za "zajemanje" številnih zahtevkov. V okviru kolektivnih odškodninskih 
pravnih sredstvev ima sodnik na razpolago posebne postopkovne tehnike, s katerimi lahko 
obravnava množične zadeve. Na primer, z namenom ločevanje skupnih vprašanj razreda (skupine) 
iz posameznih vprašanj, ki vplivajo na nekatere člane razreda (skupine), lahko sodišča razširijo 
postopek na preizkus skupnih vprašanj (stopnja odgovornosti) in preskus za določitev pravnih 
sredstev (faza pravnega sredstva). Da bi se izognili preizkusom vsakega posameznega zahtevka 
glede skupnih vprašanj, lahko sodišče uporabi pristop testnega primera. Če nekatera dejstva ali 
zakoni niso skupna vsem članom razreda (skupine), ampak samo nekaterim (različnim stopnjam 
poškodbe), lahko sodišče uporabi tehniko podrazreda. Da bi zajeli veliko število zahtevkov, 
sodišče da definicijo razreda (skupini) in vsaka oseba, ki spada v tako določenega razreda, je 
vezana na sodbo. Za obveščanje članov razreda (neznanih) lahko sodišče uporabi obvestilo v obliki 
časopisnega oglasa, internetnega oglasa, radia itd. Zgornje tehnike omogočajo sodniku, da 
obravnava kolektivne primere. Bistvena razlika med tradicionalnim civilnim postopkom in 
reprezentativnim sporom je učinek sodbe. V skladu s tradicionalnim civilnim postopkom načelo 
res judicata ne dovoljuje, da se o istem tožbenem zahtevku med istimi strankami dvakrat odloča. 
Isto načelo se uporablja v kolektivnih odškodninskih pravnih sredstev, vendar učinke sodbe, 
sprejete v reprezentativnem pravdnem postopku, zajamejo vse člane razreda (skupine), ki niso bili 
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formalni udeleženci v postopku. To je prelomna točka, v kateri trčijo koncept reprezentativnih 
sporov in koncept tradicionalnega civilnega postopka. Tradicionalni civilni postopek temelji na 
dveh ustreznih načelih, strankarski avtonomiji in strankarski dispoziciji, katerih neposredna 
posledica je, da mora vsaka stranka imeti svoj dan na sodišču preden sprejeta sodba dobi pravno 
vezujočo moč. V nasprotju s tradicionalnim civilnim postopkom reprezentativni spori delujejo na 
načelu primerne zastopanosti interesov razreda, na poglagi katerega so odsotne osebe 
(neimenovani člani razredi) zavezane s sodbo, le če so bili njihovi interesi zastopani pošteno in 
ustrezno. Načelo primerne zastopanosti temelji na predpostavki, da dokler osebni interes 
predstavnika razreda sovpada z interesom razrednega člana (zastopanega), lahko ta zastopa njega. 
Oba imata enak (podoben) interes, tako da, dokler predstavnik razreda ščiti svoj interes, samodejno 
ščiti tudi interes člana razreda. Na ta način članu razreda ni potrebno začeti ločeni postopek, ker je 
bil ustrezno zastopan, pod predpostavko, da je rezultat poznejšega postopka enak prejšnjemu. Ta 
koncept zastopanja omogoča, da nekaj članov (formalnih strank) zastopa celoten razred in da 
sodišče obravnava samo nekaj tožnikov, namesto da bi se ukvarjalo z njimi na stotine, in takoj 
rešiti celoten pravni polemik. Tradicionalni civilni postopek ne priznava načela ustrezne 
zastopanosti (enakega / podobnega interesa), temveč temelji na načelu avtonomije stranke 
(privolitve). Ob upoštevanju tega je potrjena tretja podhipoteza, oz. da obstajajo posebnosti glede 
učinka sodbe v civilnem postopku za zaščito pravic ali interesov, ki jih ni mogoče opredeliti kot 
posameznikova. 
V bistvu reprezentativni pravni spori omogočajo, da eden ali več članov ene skupine 
(predstavnik /-ci) ukrepajo v imenu celotne skupine (pri čemer je treba tožiti), da bi si pri tem vzeli 
legitimnost za skupni interes. Skupni interes se šteje kot povezovalni (privlačni) dejavnik, ki 
opredeljuje sodobne razrede (skupine). Vse dokler se osebni interes nekoga ujema s skupnim 
interesom (interesi celotne skupine), se bo ta štel za član skupine (razreda). Zato se oseba 
legitimira, da deluje v imenu skupine prav iz svojega osebnega interesa (zastopanje za lastne 
interese), ker njen osebni interes sovpada s skupnim interesom. Zastopanje za lastne interese 
temelji na prepričanju, da vsak-a ve, kaj je najbolje za njega ali njo. Koncept skupnih interesov se 
od 18. stoletja ni spremenil, in sicer je v vseh nacionalnih zakonodajah obstoj skupnega dejstva ali 
prava predpogoj za zaposlitev njihovih reprezentativnih naprav. 
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